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Abstract (English) 
This dissertation develops a semantic framework for analyzing tense, aspect and mood (TAM) 
markers on the basis of a language-independent semantic space and applies this framework to the 
ranges of polysemy associated with -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and zero-marking (-Ø) in Turkish. 
The semantic framework introduces anchoring relations as semantic building blocks of TAM 
reference, which serve to ‘anchor’ (or situate) an abstract predicational content in the temporal, the 
epistemic, and the volitional frames defined in the immediate discursive context. It formulates 
anchoring relations in terms of higher-order entities (temporal locations, thoughts, and projections) 
qualified relative to cognitive states that serve as reference points in the three domains. It defines 
basic anchoring categories in each of the three domains of anchoring and illustrates them with 
grammatical strategies across languages. It then develops a quasi-formal metalanguage which 
enables one to decompose the convention-bound meaning of an utterance into a volitional 
category, an epistemic category, a temporal category and an abstract predicational content (SoA), 
taking scope over each other in this respective order. Although the framework is primarily about 
sentence meaning, it centrally deals with phenomena traditionally relegated to pragmatics, 
including deixis, anaphoric reference and conventional implication. It also accounts for how the 
speaker’s linguistic intentions relate to the illocutionary act she performs. 
The analytic part of the dissertation identifies the main conventional uses of the Turkish TAM 
markers -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø in finite sentences, using a ‘family resemblance’ approach to 
polysemy. It analyzes each of the identified uses into their semantic building blocks and renders 
them into the metalanguage of anchoring categories. It seeks the motivations for the present-day 
ranges of polysemy of these markers in the diachronic stages of their semantic evolution.  
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Abstract (Nederlands) 
In deze dissertatie wordt een semantisch raamwerk ontwikkeld voor de analyse van markeerders 
van tijd, aspect en modus (TAM) op basis van een taalonafhankelijke semantische ruimte. Dit 
raamwerk wordt toegepast op het polysemie van de Turkse -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor markeerders als ook 
van de nulmarkeerder (-Ø). 
Het semantische raamwerk voert ankerrelaties (anchoring relations) in als semantische 
bouwstenen voor TAM-referentie, die een abstracte predicationele inhoud ‘verankeren’ (of 
situeren) in de temporele, epistemische en volitionele kaders, die door de onmiddellijke discursieve 
context bepaald worden. De relaties worden beschreven in termen van entiteiten van een hogere 
orde (temporele locaties, gedachten en projecties), die gekarakteriseerd worden in relatie tot 
cognitieve toestanden die als referentiepunten functioneren in de drie domeinen. In elk domein 
worden basisankercategorieën (basic anchoring categories) gedefinieerd, die geïllustreerd worden 
met grammaticale strategieën van diverse talen. Vervolgens wordt een quasi-formele metataal 
ontwikkeld die het mogelijk maakt de conventionele betekenis van een uiting uit te splitsen in een 
volitionele categorie, een epistemische categorie, een temporele categorie en een abstracte 
predicationele inhoud (stand van zaken), die elkaar in de respectieve volgorde binnen hun bereik 
hebben. Hoewel het raamwerk hoofdzakelijk betrekking heeft op zinsbetekenis, behandelt het 
fundamenteel fenomenen die traditioneel worden overgelaten aan pragmatiek, zoals deixis, 
anaforische referentie en conventionele implicatie. Het verklaart ook de wijze waarop de 
linguïstische intenties van de spreker in verband staan met de taalhandeling die hij of zij uitvoert.  
In het analytische deel van de dissertatie worden de belangrijkste conventionele gebruiken 
van de Turkse TAM-markeerders -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor en –Ø in finiete zinnen onderscheiden, door 
middel van een op het concept van ‘familiegelijkenis’ gebaseerde benadering van polysemie. Elk 
geïdentificeerd gebruik wordt ontleed in zijn semantische bouwstenen en wordt omgezet in de 
metataal van anchoring categories. De verklaring van de hedendaagse polysemie van de 
markeerders wordt gezocht in de diachrone stadia van hun semantische ontwikkeling.  
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The Turkish examples are given in the national orthography of the Republic of Turkey. The 
following list shows the phonetic realizations of the orthographic symbols in the IPA (International 
Phonetic Alphabet) standard: 
a : /a/ ı : /ǿ/ r : /Ȏ/ 
b : /b/ i  /i/ s : /s/ 
c : /ȴ/  j : /Ȣ/ ş : /ȓ/ 
ç : /tȓ/  k : /k/ t : /t/ 
d : /d/ l : /l/ or /ǻ/ u : /u/ 
e : /e/ m : /m/ ü : /y/ 
f : /f/ n : /n/ v : /v/ 
g : /g/ o : /o/ y : /j/ 
ğ : /ǳ/  ö : /œ/ z : /z/ 
h : 
 
/h/ p : /p/   
Turkish markers are referred to in the text using abstract representations underspecified as to 
phonetic alternations conditioned by morpho-phonological rules such as vowel harmony and 
consonant assimilation. The letters used for abstract phonemes and their phonetic realizations (in 
the Turkish orthography) are listed below: 
A : a, e  
I : ı, i, u, ü 
U : u, ü  
X : a, e, ı, i, u, or ü 
D : d, t 




In the abstract morpheme representations, parentheses are used to indicate buffer phonemes. 
A hyphen (-) is used to mark a bound morpheme. Where a marker is in the focus of a discussion, it 




The glosses listed below have been chosen to reflect the semantic functions of Turkish morphemes 
that are commonly identified in the literature. As such, they do not necessarily reflect the general 
meanings nor the focal uses of the morphemes they stand for. Therefore, they may not match the 
actual uses of the morphemes which appear in the examples throughout the dissertation.  
In the Turkish examples, agreement with the 3rd person singular (which is actually formally 
unmarked) is not shown in the glosses. Glosses of Turkish examples taken from other sources are 
realigned according to the list below. Glosses of examples from other languages appear in the same 
way as in the original documents, unless specified otherwise. 
A1PL first person plural agreement  INF infinitive 
A1SG first person singular agreement JDGe judgment enclitic 
A2PL second person plural agreement LOC locative 
A2SG second person singular agreement NEC necessity 
A3PL third person plural agreement NEG negative 
ABIL abilitative NEGP negative particle 
ABL ablative NOM nominative 
ACC accusative  OPT optative 
AN  action nominalizer P1PL first person plural pronoun 
ASC associative P1SG first person singular pronoun 
CAUS causative P2PL second person plural pronoun 
COM comitative/instrumental  P2SG second person singular pronoun 
COND conditional P3PL third person plural pronoun 
CONDe conditional enclitic P3SG third person singular pronoun 
CONJ conjunction PASS passive 
CONT continuous  PAST past 
DAT dative PASTe past enclitic 
DTA durative temporal adverbial  PLU plural 
EPAST evidential past POS possibility 
EPASTe evidential past enclitic POSS possessive 
EXCP existential copula PRIV privative 
FN factive nominalizer PROG progressive  
FUT future QP question particle 
GEN genitive RDUP reduplication 
HABG habitual-generic REL relative pronoun 
IMP imperative SREL subject relativizer 
 vi 
List of symbols and abbreviations 
In the text and in examples: 
* : indicates ungrammaticality (morphosyntactic ill-formedness) 
# : indicates non-acceptability of a marker (or a combination of markers) in the 
intended use 
? : indicates low degree of acceptability of a marker (or a combination of markers) 
in the intended use 
> : indicates ranking in a hiararchy 
- : 
 
indicates a boundary of morphemic combination 
In the metalanguage of anchoring categories: 
¬ : indicates negation 
[ ] : enclose the argument(s) of a predicate 
( ) : indicate containment (scope taking) 
/ / : enclose specifications for basic anchoring categories 
< > : enclose a displaced frame 
{ } : indicate the value returned by a value-retrieving function  
ANA : indicates an anaphoric reference 
ANA.OCC : indicates an anaphoric reference to an occurrence 
DISP-T : indicates an expression which triggers a temporal displacement 
DISP-E : indicates an expression which triggers an epistemic displacement  




In the text: 
SMALL CAPS : Labels for basic anchoring categories. 
italics : Terms defined or introduced for the first time, linguistic markers and 
expressions, variables for semantic contents, emphasis. 
Initial caps Descriptive labels for grammatical paradigms. 
 ‘single quotes’ : Terms by quoted authors, terms used in other frameworks, English 
translations within the text. 
 
In the examples: 
SMALL CAPS : Gloss items for Turkish examples 
bold : Markers currently discussed (and their glosses). 
italics : Translations of non-English examples. 
 
In non-Turkish examples quoted from other sources, bold and italic typesetting shown above 
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1.1 The aim and the scope of the study 
This dissertation aims to identify and analyze the ranges of polysemy of the Turkish TAM (tense, 
aspect, and mood) markers -Xr, -Iyor, -DIr and zero-marking (-Ø) in terms of purely semantic 
categories defined in a language-independent way. 
The work is organized in two parts. Part I develops a semantic framework which incorporates 
a structured semantic space of TAM-related dimensions. Part II applies this semantic framework to 
the analysis of the current ranges of polysemy and the diachronic developments of the Turkish 
TAM markers -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø. 
The present Chapter, the Introduction, expands on the need for a purely semantic 
metalanguage for cross-linguistically comparable analyses in the field of TAM. It then outlines the 
main sources of inspiration for the semantic framework to be developed, delimits the levels of 
analysis, and defines the preliminary concepts. In Part I, Chapter 2 introduces the idea of anchoring 
relations, which stand for the components of sentence meaning which ‘anchor’ or ‘situate’ an 
abstract predicational content within temporal, epistemic and volitional frames defined in the 
discursive context. Chapter 3 introduces higher-order entities in the temporal, epistemic and 
volitional domains and motivates isomorphic perspectival configurations in each domain. Chapter 
4 defines the basic anchoring categories and expands on the formal and communicative correlates 
of their expression. Chapter 5 provides usage-based characterizations of the basic anchoring 
categories and illustrates their grammatical expression with cross-linguistic data. Chapter 6 
develops a metalanguage of anchoring categories which can render the conventional meaning of a 
sentence in the form of a hierarchical semantic structure. In Part II, Chapter 7 reviews the general 
properties of Turkish with an emphasis on the formal structure of its TAM system. Chapter 8, 
which constitutes the core of Part II, identifies the main conventional uses of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø 
and analyzes each use into its semantic building blocks using the semantic metalanguage defined 
in Part I. It then spots the anchoring categories which are characteristically signaled by each 
marker and represents them in the form of semantic maps. Lastly, it compares the given analysis 
with previous treatments in the semantics of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø. Chapter 9 proposes hypotheses 
as to how -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø may have attained their present-day ranges of polysemy. The last 
chapter, the Conclusion, summarizes the merits of the semantic framework developed in Part I, 
mentions how the Turkish analysis in Part II differs from previous treatments which rely on 
traditional tense, aspect and mood categories, and suggests some future prospects. 
 2 
1.2 The need for a purely semantic metalanguage 
The semantic analysis of Turkish TAM markers presented in this study does not use the traditional 
categories ‘tense’, ‘aspect’, ‘mood’, ‘modality’ and their subcategories.1 One reason for avoiding 
them is that they cannot effectively handle polysemy and cumulative expression, both of which are 
pervasive in the expression of TAM-related dimensions.2 The second reason is that ‘tense’, ‘aspect’ 
and ‘mood’ are not purely semantic categories; they denote grammatical paradigms by definition.3 
Therefore, semantic analyses based on these categories are influenced by the grammatical 
particularities of the investigated language. They also fail to efficiently handle temporal or modal 
distinctions which are not coded grammatically (e.g., those expressed by adverbial elements, 
mental state verbs, or zero-marking). As a result, they often yield analyses which are not cross-
linguistically comparable. 
A comprehensive and cross-linguistically comparable analysis of a TAM marker necessitates a 
purely semantic metalanguage, which integrates various dimensions of time, knowledge, volition 
and illocutionary force in a coherent and principled way. In spite of recent advancements in TAM, 
especially in linguistic typology, the field still lacks a complete semantic theory which provides a 
universal semantic metalanguage. The semantic framework developed in the present dissertation 
is intended as a prolegomena to such a semantic theory of TAM. It motivates a language-
independent semantic space with reference to universally applicable cognitive and communicative 
notions, explicitly defines semantic categories on this semantic space, and develops a purely 
semantic metalanguage. This metalanguage is then used in the analysis of the polysemies of the 
Turkish markers -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor, and -Ø. As such, the analysis implements a radical meaning-to-form 
(or, function-to-form) orientation.4 Since the semantic categories are explicitly defined beforehand, 
the analysis also avoids the notorious terminological confusion in the field of TAM.5 
                                                           
1 Throughout the dissertation, the abbreviation ‘TAM’ is used in a pre-theoretical sense, to denote any type 
of formal strategy which refers to some aspect of time, knowledge, volition, or illocution. 
2 Analyses based on the traditional categories ‘aspect’, ‘tense’, or ‘mood’ tend to coerce a given marker into 
one of these three paradigms. But strategies identified as ‘aspect’ or ‘tense’ often also have a number of 
‘modal’ and ‘discursive’ uses (e.g., ‘past’ markers expressing ‘counterfactuality’, ‘perfective’ markers 
‘sequentiality’, ‘future’ markers ‘epistemic modality’, ‘resultative’ markers ‘evidentiality, etc.). A certain use of 
a single marker may also incorporate both ‘temporal’ and ‘modal’ dimensions (e.g., the ‘predictive’ uses of 
some future markers). 
3 ‘Tense’ and ‘aspect’ refer to grammatical paradigms which indicate, respectively, the temporal distance of 
an event from a reference time, and the internal perspective from which an event is viewed (e.g., Comrie 1976: 
1-3, Bhat 1999: 43-44). Similarly, a ‘mood’ involves a grammatical (and generally, morphological) marker 
which expresses the speaker’s subjective attitude towards a propositional content (e.g., Palmer 1986: 21, 
Hengeveld 2004: 1190). 
4 Croft (2003: 13-14) echoes Greenberg’s (1966: 74) contention that “one is basically employing semantic 
criteria” in identifying comparable grammatical phenomena across languages, and recommends the meaning-
to-form orientation as a standard research strategy for ensuring cross-linguistic comparability in typological 
research. Examples of the meaning-to-form orientation in linguistic analysis include Keenan & Comrie’s 
(1977) study of relative clauses, Li & Thompson’s (1976) cross-linguistic survey on ‘subject’ and ‘topic’, 
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1.3 The main sources of inspiration 
The semantic framework developed in the first part of this work benefits from insights, ideas and 
results from various theoretical frameworks and empirical studies in the field of TAM. It is mainly 
established on the groundwork of linguistic typology: It benefits from various cross-linguistic 
studies in TAM (e.g., Comrie 1976, 1985; Bybee 1985; Bybee & Dahl 1989; Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 
1994, Dahl 1985, Bhat 1999; Chafe & Nichols 1986; Palmer 1986, 2001; Johanson 2000a; Johanson & 
Utas 2000; Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003) as well as descriptive grammars of various individual 
languages. The semantic analysis of Turkish markers in Part II imports insights from semantic 
maps, which have been fruitfully used in typological studies on grammatical TAM markers (e.g., 
Anderson 1982 for ‘perfect’, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998 for ‘modality’). Although the bulk of 
the analysis deals with synchronic phenomena, a diachronic perspective is adopted in explaining 
the ranges of polysemy associated with -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø. These sections critically refer to the 
process of grammaticalization (e.g., Traugott & König 1991, Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991, 
Hopper & Traugott 1993, Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994 and Lehmann 1995, among others). 
This study follows the cognitive linguistics tradition, which investigates linguistic meaning in 
connection with speakers’ subjective perspectives. Accordingly, it adopts a speaker-oriented 
approach to semantics rather than a simple correspondence theory of meaning that only rests on 
objectively defined referents and truth conditions. The theoretical apparatus in Part I imports 
insights and mechanisms from various frameworks within cognitive linguistics: The idea of 
anchoring, which accounts for the relational nature of TAM markers, essentially builds on the 
account of ‘grounding’ in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 1997, 2002a,b; Brisard 
2002a,b). The three semantic domains motivated in the semantic space of TAM (namely, the 
temporal, epistemic and volitional domains) are originally inspired by Sweetser’s (1990) three-way 
distinction among ‘content’, ‘epistemic’, and ‘speech-act’ domains. The mental space theory (e.g., 
Fauconnier 1985, Fauconnier & Sweetser 1996, Fauconnier & Turner 1994, 1998) provides another 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Xrakovsky’s (2001) edited collection on imperative constructions, and Nuyts’ (2001a) treatment of alternative 
strategies for expressing epistemic modality in Dutch, German and English. 
5 Although the terms ‘tense’, ‘aspect’, ‘mood’ and ‘modality’ have long been used in linguistic analyses, 
scholars often disagree on the exact meaning of these terms and also on their subcategories. For instance, there 
are still controversies in distinguishing types or paradigms of ‘aspect’ (see, e.g., Bache 1995, Dahl 1999, Comrie 
2002, Sasse 2002 and Tatevosov 2002, for summaries of different classifications of aspectual distinctions). 
There are many definitional discrepencies, such as what ‘habitual’ aspect actually covers, whether ‘perfect’ is 
as a subcategory of tense or aspect, whether ‘future’ is a tense or mood, or what differentiates the ‘indicative’ 
mood form the ‘declarative’. Different frameworks distinguish and label different types and subcategories of 
‘modality’ (e.g., Rescher 1968, Lyons 1977, Perkins 1983, Coates 1983, 1995, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998, 
Bybee & Fleischman 1995, Palmer 1986, 2001). Nuyts (2005), who points to the terminological confusion 
around the notion 'modality', even questions the use of the term for denoting any coherent semantic 
paradigm. Scholars diverge not only in how they define the mood categories ‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ (e.g., Givón 
1982, 1994, Chafe 1995, Mithun 1995, Bowern 1998, Palmer 2001, Verstraete 2005) but also in whether these 
labels are useful or not (e.g., Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca: 1994: 326-240, Bybee 1998, van der Auwera & Schalley 
2004). 
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main pillar of the proposed semantic framework: The account of center displacements and the 
related phenomenon of anaphoric TAM reference centrally recruit the mechanism of mental space 
construction. 
The present framework motivates a hierarchical structure for sentence meaning, which is 
similar in sprit to the semantically motivated layered structures proposed in Functional Grammar 
(e.g., Dik 1989/1997, Hengeveld 1987, 1990). It shows most affinity with to Anstey’s (2002) 
proposal, which differs from standard accounts of Functional Grammar in taking layering as a 
purely semantic phenomenon. 
The semantic framework developed in Part I takes into account not only the cognitive, but 
also the communicative aspects of TAM reference. In delimiting its levels of semantic analysis and 
in accounting for how linguistic representations relate to linguistic actions, it rests on the basic 
tenets of the speech act theory (e.g., Austin 1962; Searle 1965, 1969, 1975a,b, 1979). It follows Grice 
(1957, 1968, 1975) in distinguishing between ‘what is said’ (what the speaker conventionally 
conveys) and ‘what is meant’ (what the speaker actually intends). It also critically refers to Grice’s 
Principle of Cooperation and Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) Principle of Relevance in accounting for 
the implication (on the side of the speaker) and inference (on the side of the addressee(s)) of 
speaker’s intentions in making an utterance. 
1.4 Levels of analysis and preliminary definitions 
1.4.1 Illocutionary acts, utterances and sentences  
This study delimits its levels of semantic analysis starting form the level of illocutionary act, which 
is characterized by Searle (1965/1991: 254, 1969: 16-17) as the ‘minimal unit of linguistic 
communication’. The term utterance is used to denote a (spoken, written, or in some other way 
coded) signal produced in performing an illocutionary act. In other words, an utterance is the 
minimal linguistic expression associated with a certain illocutionary force.  
The study basically uses the terms of the five-way classification of illocutionary acts proposed 
in Searle (1975a) in referring to different types of utterances:6 
• Assertive utterances are those which are produced in ‘assertive illocutionary acts’, of which 
the point “is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being the case, to 
the truth of the expressed proposition” (Searle 1975a: 12). They include utterances by 
means of which the speaker performs acts of telling, informing, reporting, admitting, 
claiming, suggesting, concluding, answering, etc.  
                                                           
6 The present study does not maintain that this classificatory scheme is exact or exhaustive. Indeed, it has 
been criticized for lacking a principled and sound basis (e.g., Levinson 1983: 240-241). It is used here only for 
descriptive purposes. 
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• Directive utterances are products of ‘directive illocutionary acts’, which are “attempts […] 
by the speaker to get the hearer to do something” (Searle 1975a: 13). Directive utterances 
appeal the addressee(s) to take action in the direction of speaker’s desire, preference, or 
consent, and they may or may not include an element of moral assessment. They include 
orders, requests, instructions, obligations, permissions, pleas, advises, etc.  
• Promises are utterances produced in ‘commissive illocutionary acts’, “whose point is to 
commit the speaker […] to some future course of action” (Searle 1975a: 14).  
• Expressive utterances are produced in ‘expressive illocutionary acts’, which “express the 
psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in 
the propositional content” (Searle 1975a: 15). They are involved in the illocutionary acts of 
thanking, congratulating, welcoming, giving apologies, etc.  
• Declaratory utterances are involved in ‘declarations’, of which the “successful performance 
brings about a correspondence between the propositional content and reality” (Searle 
1975a: 16-17). The success of declarations often depends on the authority of the speaker 
granted by an extra-linguistic institution. They include utterances produced in order to, 
e.g., declare war, excommunicate someone, appoint someone chairman, etc.  
Apart from these classes, I distinguish expressions of wish, which express a desire, wish, or 
hope of the speaker without specifically appealing the addressee(s) to take action. I use the term 
statement to refer to utterances which appear in non-personal communication (e.g., in official or 
institutional announcements, laws, and regulations). The term sentence is used throughout the 
dissertation to refer to a formal representation of an utterance. 
1.4.2 Utterance meaning and semantic value 
The current semantic framework attributes ‘meaning’ primarily to utterances. The overall meaning 
of an utterance in an actual communicative context is referred to as the utterance meaning. It covers 
ultimately context-sensitive implications which go beyond what is coded in conformity with 
linguistic conventions; it hence includes conversational (and other non-conventional) implicatures, 
perlocutionary intentions, and indirect illocutionary forces.7 It closely matches Grice’s (1957, 1968, 
1975) notion of ‘what is meant’ (or, ‘utterer’s meaning’) as opposed to ‘what is said’. 
                                                           
7 An indirect illocutionary force is one which does not directly follow from the conventional meaning 
(semantic value) of an utterance; it is implied on the basis of contextual assumptions. ‘Indirection’ is taken 
here in a more restricted sense than in Searle (1975b), who allows some degree of conventionalization in what 
he calls ‘indirect speech acts’. For instance, the utterance in (i), intended to make an addressee open a window, 
will be taken here as yielding an indirect illocutionary force. But the interpretation of Searle’s example in (ii) 
as a request is highly conventional. Hence, this utterance will not be taken here as having an indirect 
illocutionary force. (Still, one should acknowledge that the distinction between an implied meaning and a 
conventional use is not always clear-cut, since purely pragmatic implications can gradually evolve into 
conventional uses.) 
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That part of the utterance meaning which is conveyed by virtue of representational 
conventions is referred to as the semantic value of an utterance. The semantic value corresponds to 
what is generally referred to as ‘sentence meaning’ (or, ‘what is said’) but can additionally include 
conventional implications.8 It is analyzable into the generalized meanings of the words and 
constructions that formally constitute the sentence.  
The semantic value of an utterance is primarily understood relative to its speaker.9 In other 
words, it involves ‘subjectivity’ (in the sense of Benveniste 1958, 1966 and Lyons 1982, and as 
manifested in the idea of ‘construal’ in the cognitive linguistics tradition). Still, ‘meaning’ is 
primarily taken as a property of utterances (and sentences) in the present study, rather than one of 
the minds of speakers (nor of hearers).10 This early remark does not intend to deny the close 
connections between the semantic value of an utterance and the speakers’ mental or cognitive 
structures. (On the contrary, such connections will be emphasized in defining anchoring relations 
in Chapter 2.) The point is that when one analyzes the meanings of utterances, one is not 
automatically analyzing the contents of speakers’ minds or cognitive structures. 
The semantic value guides the inferences that lead to the recovery of speaker’s communicative 
intentions, provides input for cognitive processes of constructing and manipulating discourse 
structures (e.g., mental spaces), and includes information for regulating discourse connectedness 
and coherence. Although the semantic framework developed in Part I is primarily concerned with 
the components of the semantic value (and with how TAM markers are mapped onto these 
components), it also aims to account for how it relates to utterance meaning (what the speaker 
actually means within the immediate context of the utterance). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(i) Isn’t it too hot here?  
(ii) Can you pass the salt? (Searle 1975b/1991: 268) 
8 What is referred to as ‘conventional implication’ here is related to, but not identical with, Grice’s (1975) 
notion of ‘conventional implicature’. (Grice argues, for instance, that the conjunction ‘but’ does not explicitly 
convey, but only conventionally implies that there is a contrast between two propositions.) It more closely 
matches the notion of ‘explicature’ introduced by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) in their attempt to elaborate 
the Gricean notion of ‘what is said’. Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 182) take an explicature as a proposition 
arrived at by the “development of a logical form encoded by the utterance”. Carston (2003: 9) provides a more 
elaborate definition: “An ‘explicature’ is a propositional form communicated by an utterance which is 
pragmatically constructed on the basis of the propositional schema or template (logical form) that the 
utterance encodes; its content is an amalgam of linguistically decoded material and pragmatically inferred 
material”.  
Grammatical markers of ‘perfect’ are good examples of what is called a ‘conventional implication’ here: 
They constantly invite the addressee(s) to infer the consequences of a past event at the reference time. This 
implication is part of the conventional meaning of a perfect marker. 
9 The term speaker is used throughout the dissertation in an extended sense. It denotes the intentional 
producer of a linguistic expression, be it spoken, written, or coded in some other way. For convenience, the 
pronoun she will be used to refer to the speaker in general. 
10 This is why semantic categories defined in Part I are not labeled ‘cognitive’ or ‘mental’. 
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The semantic value is taken in this study as the raw data for semantic analyses. Before one can 
start to make any semantic decomposition, generalization, or other kind of semantic analysis on a 
given utterance, one first needs to have understood its convention-bound meaning as accurately as 
necessary for one’s immediate analytic goals. Any error in understanding and representing the 
semantic value of an utterance should count as a descriptive flaw, not an analytic one. 
1.4.3 The communicative background 
The semantic value of an utterance can be successfully communicated only if the speaker and the 
addressee(s) share certain contextual assumptions. These assumptions, construed from the 
perspective of the speaker, constitute the communicative background of an utterance.  
The communicative background consists of the totality of the speaker’s assumptions which 
are related to her immediate illocutionary act and which she also assumes to be shared (or can 
readily be taken for granted, or immediately inferable) by her addressee(s).11 Such assumptions 
constitute the presuppositions of an utterance. They may include various kinds of information, 
including items of general knowledge (or, ‘world knowledge’), culturally-shared knowledge, 
assumptions about the institutional or social position of the interlocutors, elements of the 
immediate communicative context, and the current state of the discourse. 
1.4.4 The context-sensitivity of the semantic value  
The semantic value of an utterance is closely tied to the communicative background. It typically 
incorporates deixis (i.e., it specifies links to the reference points in the communicative situation) 
and indexation (i.e., it refers to entities and relations available in the communicative context), and 
includes instructions for discourse organization. Conventional uses of certain TAM markers cannot 
even be defined without recourse to contextual elements. For instance, ‘inferential’ markers 
conventionally imply that a piece of evidence for the expressed proposition exists in the immediate 
context. Or, certain imperative or interrogative strategies index the social status of the 
interlocutors. Such contextual references12 in the semantic value makes it necessary that many 
phenomena traditionally relegated to pragmatics (e.g., deixis, presupposition, speech acts, mental 
space building and manipulation, anaphoric reference, discourse organization, conventional 
                                                           
11 The communicative background is comparable to ‘common ground’ in Stalnaker (1972) and to ‘mutually 
manifest assumptions’ in Sperber & Wilson (1986). The idea of ‘ground’ in Cognitive Grammar is similar but 
not identical to that of communicative background as defined here. While the ‘ground’ covers all aspects of 
the actual communicative situation, the communicative background only includes speaker’s assumptions 
relevant to her immediate message. This does not mean that the communicative background does not contain 
assumptions about the ground. It critically includes assumptions about the participants, mutually (or 
collectively) tracked reference points in discourse, and frames (mental spaces) conceived around these 
reference points. 
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implication, etc.) be covered in a semantic analysis of sentences and sub-sentential units. Just as 
individual TAM markers are best ascribed meaning in terms of their contribution to the semantic 
value, the semantic value itself is best understood in its relations to the actual communicative 
context.13  
1.4.5 Markers and uses 
A marker is a unit of formal composition which has a distinctive meaning at the level of 
illocutionary act. It can be a bound morpheme or a particle, a lexical item or a grammatical 
element, a verbal root or an inflectional marker, a special syntactic configuration, a supra-
segmental unit, a distinctive intonational contour, etc.  
Particular markers in particular languages are associated with one or more distinctive 
semantic functions. Following Anderson (1982), these will be called here the uses of a marker. 
Anderson (1982) describes uses as “what speakers intend and hearers infer in particular contexts”. 
For instance, one can distinguish at least two uses of the English auxiliary verb will: ‘future’ as in 
(1.1) and ‘epistemic necessity’ as in (1.2): 
(1.1) The bus will take off at six.  
(1.2) This will be the milkman. (e.g., upon someone ringing the doorbell) 
Working with uses has some empirical benefits. Unlike abstract semantic features or primes, 
they can be identified at the level of illocutionary act and characterized in a maximally theory-
neutral way. As pointed out by Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994), uses of a marker are accessible to 
non-linguists too: 
[…] apparently both linguists and native speakers find the different uses of a 
morpheme to be fairly accessible. Opening almost any reference grammar, one 
finds the author enumerating the “uses” of particular morphemes (Bybee, 
Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 44). 
The semantic framework developed in this dissertation is primarily concerned with the uses 
of TAM markers which are conventionally associated with them. A conventional use of a marker is 
one which can be expressed by that marker without the involvement of ultimately context-
                                                                                                                                                                                
12 The term reference is used in this study in its most general sense. It is not restricted to designation by 
naming, but also includes (implicit or explicit) deixis, indexation of contextual elements, and anaphoric 
reference. 
13 Such a holistic approach was already advocated in Frege’s (1884/1997: 90) ‘context principle’: which 
suggests that “[…] the meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in isolation”. 
Davidson (1984: 22) suggests extending Frege’s context principle in favor of a ‘holistic’ treatment of sentence 
meaning: “Frege said that only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning; in the same vein he 
might have added that only in the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore a word) have 
meaning”. 
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dependent implications (indirect illocutions). A conventional use can be characterized in terms of 
the semantic categories it is composed of and (when necessary) its presuppositions (i.e., contextual 
and discursive assumptions required in its communicative background).  
Conventional uses of a marker can be identified at different levels of granularity. For instance, 
one can take ‘request’ and ‘order’ as two different uses of an imperative marker, or subsume them 
under one general use (say, ‘directive’). Or one can identify ‘sequential occurrence in the past’ and 
‘preterit’ as two conventional uses of past morpheme, or include them in a more general label (say, 
‘past perfective’). In identifying the main uses of Turkish TAM markers in Part II, the level of 
granularity will be adjusted as closely as possible to match that of cross-linguistic gram types.14  
1.4.6 Polyfunctionality  
Markers and uses do not always match in a one-to-one manner. Markers (especially grammatical 
markers) are often associated with more than one (generally, in some way related) conventional 
use. This one-to-many mapping between markers and their uses is referred to here as 
polyfunctionality.15  
Polyfunctionality can be described in terms of homonymy, monosemy, polysemy, and 
pragmatic implications. Homonymy entails that different meanings (or uses) of a form are 
unrelated; each form-meaning mapping is then identified as a separate linguistic item. Accidental 
homonymy is hardly relevant in the field of TAM, since recent developments in TAM (especially 
semantic maps and research on grammaticalization and cross-linguistic category types) have 
shown that cross-linguistically, multiple uses of TAM markers are often diachronically related. 
Still, homonymy can be identified where two (or more) meanings/uses of an apparently same form 
are judged to be unrelated by native speakers.  
Monosemy attributes a ‘general’ or ‘abstract’ meaning to a marker and accounts for its 
different uses in terms of context-induced interpretations. In the field of TAM, monosemy has 
mostly been used in the study of modality (e.g., Kratzer 1981, 1991, Papafragou 2000). Monosemist 
accounts can potentially produce psycholinguistically significant hypotheses as to the semantic 
denominator involved in the various uses of a marker. However, there are a number of reasons 
                                                           
14 Cross-linguistic category types (or, gram-types) stand for tense, aspect, and mood categories commonly 
grammaticalized across languages. They represent a level of analysis which mediates between language 
specific TAM markers (grams) and universal conceptual dimensions. Due to their cross-linguistic 
commonality, they receive special theoretical import in the quest for language universals. Bybee, Perkins & 
Pagliuca (1994: 301) list the following most commonly attested gram types: completive, resultative, anterior, 
perfective, past, progressive, habitual, imperfective, agent-oriented modalities, epistemic modalities, speaker-
oriented modalities, future, and “those that occur regularly in certain types of subordinate clauses”. 
15 The term polyfunctionality is used here the way it is used in van der Auwera (1999): It is neutral as to 
specific types of relatedness among different uses of a marker (e.g., homonymy, polysemy, vagueness, 
pragmatic extension, basic vs. secondary meaning, etc.). Haspelmath (2003: 212) uses the term 
‘multifunctionality’ in a similar sense. 
 10
why a monosemist approach is generally not well-suited in the description and explanation of the 
semantic functioning of TAM markers. First, although monosemy seeks to associate a TAM marker 
with a context-independent meaning, most TAM markers are context-sensitive by their very 
nature: As will be further expounded in Chapter 2, they specify values relative to reference states 
defined in the communicative background. Second, monosemist accounts attempt to explain 
polyfunctionality on the basis of synchronic semantic ranges of TAM markers (and often omitting 
peripheral, but still conventional uses). However, as demonstrated by semantic maps (e.g., 
Anderson 1982 on ‘perfect’, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998 on ‘modality’), any synchronic 
semantic range of a marker is the outcome of the stages in its historical development. As a result, 
even very similar markers in two different languages often occupy different regions on the 
semantic space. Hence, a monosemous characterization assigned to a TAM marker in one language 
often does not apply to a comparable marker in the next language.  
Polysemy refers to the conventional association of more than one related meanings (uses) with 
one form (marker) (e.g., Taylor 1995, 2003, van der Auwera 1999). In the cognitive linguistics 
tradition, polysemy has generally been coupled with Rosch’s (1973, 1977) idea of ‘prototypes’: A 
linguistic category is associated with a ‘prototypical’ or ‘core’ meaning and a number of 
‘peripheral’ ones related to the core in some way. Examples include Lakoff’s (1987) ‘radial 
categories’ and Langacker’s (1991, 2000) ‘hierarchical network models’. In the field of TAM, the 
prototype model is mostly formulated in terms of a ‘basic’ (or ‘primary’) meaning and a number of 
‘extended’ (or ‘secondary’) ones (e.g., Comrie 1985: 18-23). Yet another type of polysemy draws on 
similarities in the conceptual structure (e.g., ‘force dynamics’ in Talmy (1988), ‘metaphorical 
mappings’ in Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Fleischman 1989, and Sweetser 1990).  
The approach of the present framework to the issue of multiple uses of TAM markers is a 
variant of polysemy: It seeks ‘family resemblance’ among various uses of a marker. Each 
conventional use is related to at least one other use, without necessarily being tied to some basic or 
prototypical meaning. The family resemblance approach to polyfunctionality has been successfully 
used in linguistic typology, most notably and in the research on cross-linguistic category types (or, 
gram-types) (e.g., Dahl 1985, Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994) in semantic maps16 (e.g., Anderson 
1982, 1986, Kemmer 1993, Haspelmath 1997, 2003, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998, van der 
Auwera, Dobrushina & Goussev 2004), and in certain studies on grammaticalization (Heine 1992, 
Haspelmath 1998: 31-32).  
Accounts based on polysemy often recruit the idea of pragmatic implications (such as 
conversational implicatures or discourse-conditioned nuances) in addition to conventional 
                                                           
16 Semantic maps are pictographic tools which map markers from one or more languages onto semantic 
categories represented on a semantic space (see, e.g., Haspelmath 2003, Croft 2003: 122-156, van der Auwera & 
Temürcü 2006). 
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meanings (e.g., Comrie’s (1985: 26-29) treatment of the Russian perfective aspect for conveying 
sequentiality as a discourse-conditioned implicature). In the family resemblance approach adopted 
here, a use of a marker will be admitted as part of its range of polysemy as long as any 
conventional association holds, even when the use requires very specific contexts. A use will be 
taken as arising from a pragmatic implication only when a conventional form-meaning association 
is absent. 
The family resemblance approach does not exclude the possibility, nor deny the potential 
usefulness, of identifying prototypical vs. peripheral uses, revealing semantic-structural 
similarities between different uses, detecting homonymies, or formulating monosemous 
characterizations. It only abstains from taking a priori decisions about the nature of the relatedness 
among multiple uses of a marker. Once the full semantic range of a marker is discovered at a 
certain level of specificity, certain uses can be identified as basic, primary, or prototypical, e.g., on 
the basis of criteria like historical precedence or frequency of use. More than one ‘focal’ or 
‘prototypical’ use can be detected in addition to peripheral ones (e.g., as proposed in Dahl 1985). 
Certain uses can be discovered to share a conceptual structuring across different semantic 
domains. A monosemist characterization can be arrived at, provided that it is based on a 
sufficiently large number of conventional uses. Homonymy can be brought into play when two 
uses in the semantic range of a TAM marker are remotely linked so that their synchronic 
relatedness is not (no longer) transparent to native speakers.  
Most of the previous studies in the polyfunctionality of TAM markers, whether 
predominantly monosemist or polysemist, have attempted to explain the relatedness among 
multiple uses of a TAM marker from a synchronic-psychological point of view. But in the family 
resemblance approach adopted here, explanations for polysemy are sought in the semantic 
developments of the markers throughout their history, in conformity with the research on cross-
linguistic category types and grammaticalization. 
1.4.7 A semantic space onto which TAM-related uses can be mapped 
The idea of a ‘multi-dimensional conceptual space’ envisaged in Dahl (1985) has been a primary 
source of inspiration for the present study. Dahl (1985: 33-35) depicts this conceptual space as 
consisting of the ‘building blocks’ of a universal theory of TAM:  
The foci and extensions of [cross-linguistic tense, mood, and aspect] categories 
may be seen as points and regions respectively in a multi-dimensional 
‘conceptual space’. In a way, the dimensions that make up the space will take the 
place of ultimate building-blocks – ‘quarks’- in the theory (Dahl 1985: 33). 
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Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 47-48) share Dahl’s vision of this conceptual space which 
underlies the level of cross-linguistic category types and conceive it as being “created by the 
interaction of cognition and communicative needs”. They further maintain that “[t]he universal 
semantic content is independent of the type of expression that these universal concepts have in 
particular languages”.17 The semantic framework of TAM categories developed in this work can be 
seen as an attempt to provide content and structure to this conceptual space. 
1.5 Summary 
This introductory chapter stated the aims of the dissertation, expanded on the need for defining 
purely semantic categories in the field of TAM reference, cited the main sources of inspiration of 
the semantic framework developed here, and clarified the approach of this study to the issue of 
polyfunctionality.  
Chapter 2 below, which marks the start of the theoretical part of the work, introduces 
anchoring relations as basic components of TAM reference in three semantic domains. It also 
preliminarily exemplifies them and expands on the relations of scope between anchoring relations 
defined in three (temporal, epistemic, and volitional) semantic domains. 
                                                           
17 Palmer’s (2001:19) level of ‘notional features’ basically corresponds to the level of ‘conceptual space’ 
assumed in Dahl (1985) and in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994), and his level of ‘typological categories’ is 
comparable to that of ‘cross-linguistic category types’: 
In a typological study there are three distinct but related sets of concept (three levels of 
discourse) – the typological categories that are seen as common to various different 
languages, the grammatical markers associated with them in individual languages, and the 














Anchoring relations in three semantic domains 
Anchoring relations are components of the semantic value of an utterance which specify values 
relative to reference states defined in the temporal, epistemic or volitional domains. They situate 
(or, ‘anchor’) an abstract predicational content (a state-of-affairs, or SoA) in the communicative 
background. The three types of anchoring relations are preliminarily characterized as follows: 
• A temporal relation specifies a value relative to the current temporal state (i.e., speaker’s 
perception of ‘now’ or other reference time). An utterance may present its content as 
having occurred before, occurring at, or to occur after this temporal state. 
• An epistemic relation specifies a value relative to the current knowledge state (that of the 
speaker in the communicative situation or of another source of judgment). In relation to 
this knowledge state, an utterance may associate a propositional content with certainty, 
impossibility, various degrees of probability, sources or kinds of evidence, etc. 
• A volitional relation specifies a value relative to the current volitional state (that of the speaker 
in the communicative situation or of another willful agent). In relation to this volitional 
state, an utterance may present its content as wished for, feared for, permitted, accepted, 
etc. 
Temporal, epistemic, and volitional anchoring relations are conceived in purely semantic 
(cognitive, communicative, or general conceptual) terms, independent of any formal criteria. 
Hence, they can be conveyed by any type of strategy, including grammatical elements, lexical 
items, supra-segmental units, intonational contours, a combination of those, or with zero-marking. 
They are not strictly associated with terms like ‘tense’, ‘aspect’, ‘mood’, since the latter are 
commonly used to denote formal-grammatical paradigms. But the grammatical expression of 
temporal anchoring relations is typically accomplished by what is generally identified as tense and 
aspect markers, epistemic relations by markers of epistemic modality or evidentiality, and 
volitional relations by speaker-oriented moods, sentence-type distinctions or special intonational 
patterns. The next three sections delimit the semantic enclosure of the three types of anchoring 
relations using terms which frequently appear in the TAM literature and give simple examples. 
The labels used here for anchoring relations are preliminary; the ‘categories of anchoring’ to be 
used in actual semantic analyses will be defined in Chapter 4 and illustrated in Chapter 5. 
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2.1 Temporal relations 
Temporal relations are typically expressed by markers of tense (e.g., ‘past’, ‘present’, ‘future’), 
viewpoint aspect (e.g., ‘perfective’ vs. ‘imperfective’, e.g. Comrie 1976), perspectival aspect (as 
conceived in Dik 1997: 225) and/or temporal adverbs. Formal units primarily identified as ‘moods’ 
(e.g., ‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ markers), indicators of temporal type (‘Aktionsart’ markers), and specific 
verb classes can also convey temporal relations, either on their own or in combination with other 
strategies. The following English sentences exemplify different temporal relations. Using 
preliminary labels, (2.1) and (2.2) can be identified as expressing ‘future’, (2.3) ‘perfect’, (2.4), 
‘habitual-gnomic’, and (2.5) and (2.6) ‘present continuous’: 
(2.1) The match will start at eight. 
(2.2) The match starts at eight. 
(2.3) Mary has lost her keys. 
(2.4) The earth revolves around the sun. 
(2.5) John is writing a letter. 
(2.6) The key is on the table. 
2.2 Epistemic relations 
The term ‘epistemic’ is used in this study in a broad sense, to cover both estimations of likelihood 
(epistemic modality) and specifications of evidential dependency (evidentiality). Epistemic 
relations can be conveyed by a variety of strategies, e.g., verbal suffixes, auxiliary verbs, particles, 
adverbs, or mental state predicates. A language may also use more than one strategy in conveying 
basically the same epistemic relation.18 Grammatical elements primarily identified as tense or 
mood markers are often conventionally associated with epistemic relations or entail epistemic 
values besides temporal ones. The lack of epistemic modality and evidentiality (i.e., ‘certainty’ or 
‘factuality’, which tends to be formally unmarked cross-linguistically) also counts as an epistemic 
relation. To give some simple examples from English, (2.7) and (2.8) express different degrees of 
‘epistemic possibility’, (2.9) ‘evidentiality’, and (2.10), ‘certainty’: 
(2.7) Mary might have come yesterday. 
(2.8) John will probably fail. 
(2.9) Apparently, she has been fired. 
(2.10) John gave this book to me. 
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2.3 Volitional relations 
Volitional relations include various attitudes which stem from an agent’s faculty of will. They are 
typically expressed by (inflectional) moods, modal suffixes or particles or sentence type 
distinctions. They include attitudes such as ‘wish’ (including, ‘hope’ and ‘desire’), ‘pleasure’, and 
‘acceptance’. For example, (2.11) and (2.12) below express ‘wish’ (with different epistemic 
presuppositions) and (2.13) expresses ‘pleasure’: 
(2.11) If only John came with us. 
(2.12) I hope he understood what I said. 
(2.13) I’m glad that you are here. 
In the examples above, the indexation of a volitional attitude is highly transparent. All 
directive utterances also express ‘wish’, because they basically signal what the speaker wants, 
prefers, favors, or consents to be realized. The same holds for questions, because they are complex 
directives which request or urge the addressee(s) to provide an answer.19 (2.14) illustrates ‘wish’ in 
an order, (2.15) in a request, (2.16) in a permission, (2.17) in an advice, and (2.18) in a question:20 
(2.14) Give me the keys! 
(2.15) Could you give me a pen? 
(2.16) He may leave now. 
(2.17) You should see this movie. 
(2.18) What are you looking for?  
Critically, in the current framework assertive utterances are taken as expressing a specific 
volitional relation. Assertions relate a semantic content to the speaker’s will in a different way than 
expressions of wish or directive utterances. In making a sincere assertion, the speaker accepts a 
certain representation of the world as reflecting reality (although she does not explicitly state this). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
18 See Nuyts (2001a) for alternative strategies of expressing epistemic modality in Dutch, German, and 
English.  
19 For treatments of questions as epistemic requests, see, e.g., Katz & Postal (1964) and Searle (1969: 69, 
1975a: 14). 
20 These utterances can be interpreted differently depending on the speaker’s intentions in different 
communicative contexts. For instance, (2.15) can be meant as a question, and (2.16) can express epistemic 
possibility. Each of them can also be used for performing a variety of ‘indirect’ illocutionary acts in specific 
contexts. What is relevant here is that they are conventionally associated with the directive uses mentioned 
here. 
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2.4 Distinguishing epistemic and volitional relations 
In the literature on TAM, temporal dimensions (e.g., as expressed by tenses and aspects) have been 
clearly distinguished from epistemic and volitional ones (leaving aside discussions such as 
whether the ‘future’ is basically temporal or epistemic). But epistemic and volitional dimensions 
have often been conflated together. Linguists and philosophers of logic have commonly assumed a 
basic divide between a level of ‘propositional content’ and a level of ‘subjective attitudes’ (or, 
‘mood’) in the meaning of a sentence. Epistemic and volitional categories are often packed into a 
single semantic paradigm even in some fine-grained grammatical models. For instance, in 
Functional Grammar, ‘hope’ and ‘wish’ are located at the same hierarchical level (Level 3) as 
‘subjective epistemic modality’ and ‘evidentiality’ (Dik 1989/1997: 66).  
Similarly, the judgment-related notion of ‘certainty’ (or, ‘factuality’) is frequently confused 
with the will-related notion of ‘assertion’, although the assertion/non-assertion distinction is 
actually independent of the specific epistemic assessment involved in an utterance.21 The labels 
‘assertive’, ‘indicative’, ‘declarative’ and ‘affirmative’ are often used ambiguously between 
epistemic and volitional-illocutionary senses.22  
2.5 One anchoring relation from each domain 
Every utterance is associated with one relation from each of the three domains of anchoring in its 
main clause. The examples below show how simple sentences can be roughly analyzed for their 
semantic components in the three domains (Here too, labels used for anchoring relations are 
preliminary): 
(2.19) John will take the train. (‘future’, ‘certainty’, ‘assertion’) 
(2.20) John might take the train. (‘future’, ‘epistemic possibility’, ‘assertion’) 
(2.21) Take the train! (‘future’, ‘ epistemic possibility’, ‘wish’) 
                                                           
21 As Lyons (1985: 179) states, “[…] one can not only assert or deny, but also query, presuppose, or even 
consider (in soliloquy or thought), the factuality of a proposition”. Conversely, one can assert or deny not only 
a certainty, but also a possibility, a conjecture, or an inference. On this issue, see also Hooper (1975), who takes 
‘factivity vs. non-factivity’ as a different parameter from ‘assertion vs. non-assertion’ in classifying verbs 
which take sentential complements. Foley & Van Valin (1984) and Bybee (1985: 169-170) also clearly 
distinguish ‘assertion’ from the expression of speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition. Bybee, 
Perkins & Pagliuca’s (1994) remark is instructive: 
Considerable evidence suggests that it is not the domain of truth or fact that is the relevant 
domain for mood, but rather the domain of assertion and non-assertion that is relevant […] 
That is, mood does not index the truth value of a proposition in any abstract sense, but 
rather tells us the extent to which the speaker is willing to ASSERT the truth of a proposition 
(Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 239). 
22 The assertive mood is often implicitly assumed to be there whenever a clause is not ‘directive’ or 
‘subjunctive’, but it not explicitly identified as such. This is apparently because both ‘certainty’ and ‘assertion’ 
are formally unmarked in the overwhelming proportion of languages. 
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(2.22) John may be taking the train. (‘present’, ‘epistemic possibility’, ‘assertion’) 
(2.23) John may have taken the train. (‘past’, ‘epistemic possibility’, ‘assertion’) 
(2.24) I hope John took the train. (‘past’, ‘epistemic possibility’, ‘wish’) 
(2.25) If only John had taken the train! (‘past’, ‘counterfactual certainty, ‘wish’) 
(2.26) John took the train. (‘past’, ‘certainty’, ‘assertion’) 
Generally, only one or two of the three anchoring relations are prominent in a main clause. 
For instance, while the temporal relation ‘future’ is prominent in (2.19), it is less so in (2.20), and 
least so in (2.21). Similarly, both the command in (2.21) and the expression of hope in (2.24) entail 
epistemic possibility (rather than certainty) about the realization of the expressed action,23 but this 
epistemic dimension is not as prominent as in (2.20), (2.22) or (2.23). Most of the descriptive 
statements express ‘certainty’ and ‘assertion’ as non-prominent anchoring relations. For instance, 
(2.26) entails both ‘certainty’ and ‘assertion’ in addition to the prominent category ‘past’; it 
semantically contrasts with (2.23) (which entails ‘epistemic possibility’ and ‘assertion’) and with 
(2.25) (which entails ‘counterfactual certainty’ and ‘wish’). 
To say that every utterance expresses one temporal, one epistemic and one volitional relation 
at once is not to say that these relations are totally independent from each other. Due to general 
cognitive and communicative reasons, certain relations in one domain are more compatible with 
some relations in the other domains. For instance, ‘wish’ generally (but not always) combines with 
‘epistemic possibility’ and ‘future’ rather than with ‘certainty’ and ‘past’. Similarly, ‘certainty’ 
appears more often in utterances with ‘past’ or ‘present’ than those with ‘future’, due to the 
inherent indeterminacy of the latter. 
2.6 The hierarchy of scope for anchoring relations 
The three types of anchoring relations are asymmetrically related through scope: 
• A temporal relation takes scope over a SoA: 
Temporal locations necessarily contain SoAs, but not vice versa. In other words, events 
necessarily occur (and states obtain) in time. 
• An epistemic relation takes scope over a temporal relation: 
                                                           
23 A speaker would not urge nor hope for an action if she was certain that it would be accomplished. 
Indeed, Givón (1995: 121-122) also shows that expressions of ‘deontic modality’ (which, in his terminology, 
subsumes both directive utterances and expressions of wish) entail uncertainty. Givón’s treatment differs 
from what is suggested here in that he attributes the sense of uncertainty in such expressions directly to their 
being future-oriented. 
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Judgments necessarily contain temporally qualified events or states, but not vice versa. In 
other words, an epistemic evaluation is always about an event or state which is already 
temporally qualified. 
• A volitional relation takes scope over an epistemic relation: 
Every volitional attitude necessarily contains a judgment, but not vice versa. In other 
words, every volitional attitude towards an event presupposes an assessment about the 
truth, possibility, or likelihood of that event. But one can have any kind of epistemic 
evaluation as to the truth of an proposition regardless of whether one wants it to be real (or 
feels fine about it) or not. 
These considerations suggest the following scope hierarchy, which will be more accurately 
defined in the context of a finite sentence in section 3.1.2: 
(2.27) Volitional relations > epistemic relations > temporal relations > SoA 
This hierarchy suggest that epistemic evaluations mediate between what one perceives in the 
course of time and how one wants (or intends) to change this course. This makes sense in the 
context of actions in general: An intentional agent acts on the basis of her judgments as to truth or 
likelihood of what has happened, is happening, and is to happen .24  
2.7 Spatial relations, non-relational aspects and temporal types 
Not all semantic dimensions that are relevant for TAM reference count as anchoring relations. For 
instance, specifications of ‘place’ or ‘space’ are not taken as clausal anchoring relations, although 
they typically show up as relative categories. Spatial relations can be expressed in three ways: First, 
any SoA participant (i.e., ‘entity’) is associated with spatial qualifications25, which can remain 
implicit or be explicitly given as in (2.28). Second, a place can be conceived as a participant of a SoA 
(i.e., expressed as an argument of a predicate) as in (2.29). Lastly, a spatial expression may specify 
the location for an occurrence as a whole, as in (2.30): 
(2.28) The man on the corner is looking at me. 
(2.29) I live in London. 
(2.30) There was a film festival in Antwerp last week. 
                                                           
24 Nuyts’ (2001) remark emphasizes the role of epistemic evaluations in the success of human actions: 
Estimations of the degree to which states of affairs are true of the world are no doubt an 
essential ingredient of any kind of human perception and action, as the veridicality of a 
human’s understanding of the world is critical for his/her adequate functioning in it (and 
ultimately, for his/her survival) (Nuyts 2001: 23). 
25 The term ‘space’ is used here in its most general sense, which includes the three-dimensional physical 
space as well as other conceivable modalities of existence. 
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Spatial relations such as those involved in (2.30) above can be taken as constituting a separate 
semantic layer which takes scope over the predication as a whole26. Even then, they are lower in 
scope than temporal anchoring relations, because spatial entities and relations are necessarily 
conceived in time. What is referred to as a SoA in the present framework can then be seen as a 
predicational content already situated in space. 
As stated the beginning of this chapter, anchoring relations are by definition relative, i.e., their 
interpretation requires the identification of reference states (which can be implicit in the 
communicative background or explicitly specified in the utterance). Semantic components 
associated with ‘quantificational aspects’ (e.g., Dik 1997: 221), ‘phasal aspects’ (e.g., Dik 1997: 223), 
and ‘bounders’ (Bybee & Dahl 1989: 86, Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 87-88) will not be taken 
here as temporal anchoring relations, because their interpretation does not require an identification 
of a(n) (explicit or implicit) reference time. They will be taken as non-relative dimensions inherent 
in the temporal structures of SoAs.  
Similarly the temporal type of a SoA (variously referred to in the literature as ‘inherent aspect’, 
‘situation-type’, ‘SoA-type’, ‘Aktionsart’, ‘eventuality’, or ‘actionality’) does not qualify as an 
anchoring relation, because it stands for temporal information which is inherent to a designated 
SoA. For instance, it is impossible to construe an event of ‘freezing up’ without an inherent 
duration. Although the current analytic framework is not primarily about inherent temporality, 
reference to temporal types will be necessary because they often interact with anchoring relations 
within the total semantic value of an utterance. Figure 1 shows the terminology used throughout 
the work in classifying SoAs as to their temporal types. It is based on the ‘Aktionsart’ distinctions 
proposed in Vendler (1957), which are later adopted and elaborated in Dowty (1979) and Van Valin 
& Lapolla (1997). The class of ‘semelfactives’ is Smith’s (1991, 1997) addition to Vendler’s original 
four main classes. The five main temporal types are distinguished on the basis of four binary 
parameters: (1) whether a SoA is (virtually) instantaneous or durative (+/-punctual), (2) if 
+punctual, whether it brings about a change of state or not (+/-change), (3) if -punctual, whether it 
necessarily involves an end-point in time or not (+/-telic), and (4) if -telic, whether or not it 
requires an energy input (+/-energy).27  
                                                           
26 This is so, for instance, in the layered clause structures of Functional Grammar (e.g., Dik 1989/1997: 52). 
27 For more information about the binary parameters used in classifying SoAs according to their inherent 
temporal values, see, e.g., Comrie (1976: 41-51), Smith (1997: 17-37) and Van Valin & Lapolla (1997: 91-113). 
Sasse (2002) gives a survey of the literature on aspect (inherent temporality as well as viewpoint aspect) and 
reviews some recent publications on the topic. See also Bickel (1997), Tatevosov (2002) and Rothstein (2004) 









Figure 1. A classification of SoAs as to their temporal type. 
SoAs can further be classified as to whether they involve ‘iteration’ (e.g., Comrie 1976: 43), the 
agent’s ‘control’ (e.g., Dik 1997: 112-115), or ‘causativity’ (e.g., Van Valin & Lapolla 1997: 100-101), 
but such distinctions will not be necessary for the analytic goals of this dissertation. 
Achievements, semelfactives, accomplishments, activities and states are exemplified below 
with simple past sentences in English:  
(2.31) The ball popped. (achievement) 
(2.32) John broke the vase. (achievement) 
(2.33) John glanced at the visitors. (semelfactive) 
(2.34) Jill knocked on the door. (semelfactive) 
(2.35) The water froze up. (accomplishment) 
(2.36) John ate two apples. (accomplishment) 
(2.37) John wrote a letter. (accomplishment) 
(2.38) Jill walked (for hours). (activity) 
(2.39) John worked (for days). (activity) 
(2.40) John had a headache. (state) 
(2.41) The man stood on the corner. (state) 
It is important to note that within the current framework, the classification given in Figure 1 is 
primarily applied to SoAs, which are taken here as components of the sentence meaning and not of 
the sentence form. As such, they do not necessarily stand for the properties of formal-structural 
SoAs 
+punctual -punctual (durative)  
+change  -change  +telic  -telic (atelic)  
achievement  semelfactive accomplishment  
+energy -energy  
state  activity  
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elements such as verbs or predicates, as they usually do in the literature.28 The temporal type of a 
SoA should be detected by looking at the semantic value of an utterance as a whole (as advocated, 
e.g., in Verkuyl 1972, 1993 and Dik 1997: 106): Not only the verb but also the arguments, adjuncts, 
aspect or tense markers, and even the mood of an utterance can play a role in the correct 
identification of the temporal type. To repeat some well-known examples, while (2.42) and (2.44) 
express (atelic) activities, (2.43) and (2.45) express (telic) accomplishments. Similarly, while the 
assertive sentence in (2.46) involves a state (of being seated), the directive sentence in (2.47) 
involves an achievement (a punctual change which indicates the entry to the state of being seated): 
(2.42) He wrote poems.  
(2.43) He wrote a poem. 
(2.44) He ran for hours. 
(2.45) He ran to the park. 
(2.46) He is sitting there. 
(2.47) Sit! 
Throughout the work, the term event will be used to denote dynamic SoAs in general, which 
include all temporal types but states. The term occurrence will be used for a happening of an event 
as well as for a temporary obtainment of a state.  
Within the class of states, four schematic subtypes will be distinguished, namely, state of result, 
state of possibility, state of necessity and state of willingness. A state of result is a state which is 
understood as a consequence of a past event or process. It corresponds to Bybee, Perkins & 
Pagliuca’s (1994: 54) semantic label ‘resultative’, which signals “that a state exists as a result of a 
past action”. It includes what Anderson (1982: 228, 259) calls ‘intransitive uses of result-state’ (as in 
2.48) and ‘state-passives’ (as in 2.49):  
(2.48) The sun is set.        (Anderson 1982: 232) 
(2.49) The house is all painted now.   (Anderson 1982: 259) 
State of result is similar to ‘perfect’. But while perfect expresses a past event and imply results 
in the present, state of result exclusively focuses on a present situation. The past process is 
ultimately backgrounded; it is only conceptually entailed in the meaning of the stative predication.  
                                                           
28 Van Valin & Lapolla (1997: 92) adopt distinct terminologies for ‘types of SoAs’ and ‘properties of verbs 
and other predicates’ (Aktionsarten), and use the labels in Figure 1 here only for the latter. But Dik 
(1989/1997: 106) applies a similar classification to SoAs themselves, which he takes to correspond to the 
“conception of something which can be the case in some world” rather than to formal units of a sentence. 
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A state of possibility is one which involves a potential for the realization of a certain event. This 
potential can be due to an intrinsic power (e.g., an ability or capacity) of the primary participant of 
the SoA (i.e., what van der Auwera & Plungian 1998) call ‘participant-internal possibility’). For 
example, (2.50), (2.51) and (2.52) express ability (or capacity). A state of possibility can also be 
attributed to conditions external to the primary participant of a SoA (i.e., the type of modality 
called ‘participant-external possibility’ in van der Auwera & Plungian 1998). This subtype may 
(but not necessarily does) include a socially or institutionally granted permission, and may or may 
not refer to moral or ethical norms or values. Sentences in (2.50) to (2.54) refer to conditions which 
enable or allow the subject to take the mentioned action. (2.55) and (2.56) additionally entail an 
element of permission (A state of possibility can also be explicitly designated by predicates like be 
able to or be capable to, be allowed to, etc. Here they are exemplified as they are conveyed by 
grammatical strategies, namely, the auxiliary verbs can and may):  
(2.50) Some spiders can jump. 
(2.51) Boris can get by with sleeping five hours a night. (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 80) 
(2.52) This camera can record for six hours. 
(2.53) To get to the station, you can take bus 66.    (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 80)  
(2.54) The lion cannot get out of its cage. 
(2.55) We may smoke here. (e.g., permission granted by institutional regulations) 
(2.56) John may not come to the party. (e.g., permission denied by John’s parents) 
‘Dispositional statements’ identified in Smith (1997: 34) as denoting “ability of preference” 
rather than referring to actual occurrences, can also be subsumed under the general label state of 
possibility:  
(2.57) Dwight plays bridge. (i.e., can/likes to play bridge).  [Smith 1997: 34] 
A permission which is partly or wholly granted by the speaker will be taken as involving a 
directive use rather than describing a state of possibility. 
The term state of necessity covers stative SoAs which include a need for an action. It can 
originate from conditions internal to the primary participant of the SoA (in which case it 
corresponds to ‘participant-internal necessity’ -or ‘need’- in van der Auwera & Plungian’s (1998) 
classification). A state of necessity can also be due to factors external to the primary participant (in 
which case a ‘participant-external necessity’ is at stake). The latter type may involve a socially or 
institutionally imposed obligation, which may further be coupled with a moral or ethical norm. 
(2.58) and (2.59) are examples for state of necessity due to the internal conditions of a participant. 
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(2.60) to (2.62) exemplify states of necessity as imposed by circumstantial conditions. (2.61) and 
(2.62) additionally contain an element of obligation: 
(2.58) Boris needs to sleep ten hours every night for him to function properly. 
 (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 80) 
(2.59) Animals have to eat in order to survive.  
(2.60) To get to the station, you have to take bus 66. (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 80) 
(2.61) John must return home before midnight. (e.g., an obligation imposed by John’s parents) 
(2.62) One must take off his shoes before he enters a mosque. (e.g., an obligation due to religious 
rules) 
Expressions of participant-external necessity in which an obligation is imposed or endorsed 
by the speaker will be taken as directive utterances rather than expressions of state of necessity. 
A state of willingness is one which involves an agent’s willingness to perform an action. In 
English, will is sometimes used to convey this semantic dimension, as illustrated in (2.63) and in 
Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca’s (1994) example for ‘willingness’ (2.64):  
(2.63) She will not obey. (e.g., she doesn’t want to) 
(2.64) I’ll help you. (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 178) 
Dimensions of stativity often connote a certain direction in time. For instance, a state of result 
is understood in relation with past events; a state of necessity or willingness in relation with the 
future; and a state of possibility with habitual (regular or temporally unrestricted) occurrences. But 
these temporal connotations are not part of relative temporal specifications expressed in an 
utterance. They rather make part of the conceptualization of a designated SoA. This predicational 
content can be related to the reference time in various ways, e.g., as past, present, habitual, or 
future. 
2.8 Anchoring vs. grounding 
The idea of anchoring is closely related to that of ‘grounding’ proposed in Cognitive Grammar 
(e.g., Langacker 1987, 1991, 1997, 2002a,b; Brisard 2002a,b) in accounting for the deictic nature of 
tense and mood markers in finite clauses, and of demonstratives, articles, and certain quantifiers in 
fully specified nominal expressions. Grounding elements are “grammatical predications that 
indicate the relationship of a designated entity to the ground or situation of speech, including the 
speech event itself, its participants, and their respective spheres of knowledge” (Brisard 2002a: xi). 
The account of ‘anchoring’ presented here differs from that of ‘grounding’ in a number of ways. 
First, while grounding elements are grammatical markers, anchoring relations can also be 
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expressed by non-grammatical strategies, for they are defined in purely semantic terms.29 Second, 
(as a consequence of their grammatical status) semantic dimensions expressed by grounding 
elements are always offstage (non-focal, backgrounded) and schematic (vaguely delimited). But 
anchoring relations (while most typically offstage) can also appear onstage (e.g., when expressed 
by mental state predicates) and they can be very specific (e.g., when specified by adverbial 
elements). Third, grounding defines one single relation between a single vantage point (the 
ground) and a profiled relational content. Consequently, it assumes one single layer which takes 
scope over more objectively construed elements (Langacker 1997: 72; Brisard 2002a: xiv). But the 
framework of anchoring here recognizes three vantage points (centers) in three distinct domains, 
and accordingly motivates three layers of anchoring in a main clause, which are interrelated via 
scope relations.30 
Just like grounding, anchoring can be applied to both clausal and nominal paradigms. This 
study is primarily concerned with anchoring of SoAs at the level of the clause, which corresponds 
to ‘clausal grounding’ or ‘profiling of relationships’ in Cognitive Grammar. Analogous phenomena 
in the nominal paradigm, which correspond to ‘nominal grounding’ or ‘profiling of entities’, will 
not be addressed. 
2.9 Anchoring vs. Sweetser’s conceptual domains 
The three domains of anchoring introduced above are originally inspired by the three conceptual 
domains proposed in Sweetser (1990). These are the content (or, sociophysical) domain, which is 
related to the courses of events in the real world, the epistemic domain, which involves aspects of 
knowledge of the speaker, and the speech-act domain, which involves the illocutionary force 
exerted by the speaker. While there is a certain amount of overlap among the three domains 
assumed here and those in Sweetser (1990), their semantic enclosures do not exactly match. The 
present study also expands on Sweetser’s (1990: 75) insight that “[a]n utterance is content, 
epistemic object, and speech act all at once”, by emphasizing that every utterance expresses one 
anchoring relation from each of the three domains of anchoring. 
                                                           
29 The account of anchoring presented here basically applies the idea of grounding in Cognitive Grammar 
to the purely semantic domain. Indeed, Nuyts (2002), on the basis of evidence concerning alternative 
strategies of expression for epistemic modality in Dutch, German and English (identified in Nuyts 2001a in 
more detail) and with reference to general cognitive and communicative considerations, maintains that 
‘grounding’ should be reinterpreted as a ‘conceptual’ (i.e., semantic) rather a ‘linguistic’ (i.e., formal-
structural) operation. 
30 In Cognitive Grammar, the grounding relation is taken to be essentially epistemic, in the sense that it 
specifies instructions as to how to locate a designated entity or relationship within a shared knowledge frame 
(see Langacker 1987: 126-127, 2002b: 29; Brisard 2002b: xiii-xv). The term ‘epistemic’ is used in the current 
framework in a more restricted sense, to specify semantic components related to judgment and reasoning. 
Epistemic relations constitute only one of the three layers of anchoring in the semantic value of an utterance. 
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2.10 Anchoring vs. the layered structures in Functional Grammar  
The three layers of anchoring are comparable to different layers (or levels) of the clause structure in 
Role and Reference Grammar (e.g., Van Valin 1990, Van Valin & Lapolla 1997) and especially, to 
those of the underlying clause structure (UCS) in Functional Grammar (e.g., Dik 1989/1997, 
Hengeveld 1987, 1990).31 Similar to ‘operators’ in the UCS, anchoring relations are organized in a 
hierarchy of scope relations. But the layered semantic value proposed in the present framework is 
different from the UCS in a number of ways. First and foremost, in the standard versions of 
Functional Grammar, such structures incorporate aspects of formal expression,32 but the layered 
semantic value defined here is purely semantic. Second, while Functional Grammar allows ‘no 
value’ for some layers, the current proposal identifies in every sentence one anchoring category 
from each domain. Third, the three layers of anchoring in the current framework do not exactly 
match the levels of the UCS, although temporal anchoring relations partially correspond to Level 2 
(‘Extended Predication’), epistemic relations to Level 3 (‘Proposition’) and volitional relations to 
Level 4 (‘Clause’) in Dik’s (1989/1997) framework.  
2.11 Parameters along which the three types of anchoring relations differ 
2.11.1 Degree of subjectivity 
Relations defined in hierarchically higher levels of anchoring involve more subjectivity compared to 
those defined in the lower levels. People normally diverge in what they want to be real (or in what 
they admit to be real) more than in what they know (or believe or suspect) to be true. Similarly, 
people’s epistemic assessments towards a certain proposition normally exhibit more divergence 
than how they situate a certain event or state in time. In other words, a speaker’s creative 
involvement is higher in forming judgments than in situating SoAs in time, and highest in the 
orientation of their will.33  
                                                           
31 Semantically motivated layered structures of the similar kind are also assumed in Nuyts (2001a: 347) 
and in some semantically-oriented versions of Generative Grammar (e.g., Cinque 1999). 
32 Nuyts (2001a: 256, 305-306) shows that ‘linguistic’ (i.e., formal-structural) concerns percolate the design 
of the layered structures assumed in Functional Grammar (as well as in Role and Reference Grammar). 
Similar observations are voiced in Anstey (2002), with regard to standard versions of Functional Grammar. 
The hierarchical structure proposed in the present study is particularly similar to that proposed in Anstey 
(2002). It differs from hierarchy of ‘qualifications’ proposed in Nuyts (2001a: 347) primarily in that it 
represents the conventional meanings of utterances, while Nuyts (2001a: 304-366) wants to apply his hierarchy 
to the human conceptual system in general. 
33 The lower degree subjective divergence in the temporal domain is presumably linked to the social need 
of ‘objectivizing’ time. As Benveniste (1966) notes: 
Dans toutes les formes de culture humaine et à toute époque, nous constatons d’une 
manière ou d’une autre un effort pour objectiver le temps chronique. C’est une condition 
nécessaire de la vie des sociétés, et de la vie des individus en société (Benveniste 1966: 6). 
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The high degree of subjectivity (and consequently, of intersubjective divergence) in the 
volitional domain gives rise to different illocutionary acts which reflect interactions of the speaker’s 
will with that of the addressee(s). Various illocutionary acts, e.g., promises, advices, offers, and 
polite requests, involve ‘intersubjectivization’, in Traugott’s (1999, 2003) use of the term: They not 
only index volitional attitudes or interests of the speaker, but also those of the addressee(s). 
2.11.2 Visibility and delimitability 
When the three types of anchoring relations appear as offstage semantic elements in the main 
clause of an utterance, Brisard’s (2002a) metaphor of a ‘frame of a picture’, which he employs in 
describing grounding predications in Cognitive Grammar, will also apply to them: 
[…] the categories and meanings that grounding predications have to offer […] 
cannot accurately be seen as explicit topics of reflection. That would be like 
questioning the frame of a picture, when what people normally do is to focus on 
its (referential) contents (Brisard 2002a: xxv). 
The three types of anchoring relations can be seen as furnishing different ‘layers’ of this frame. 
The temporal relation constitutes the innermost layer; therefore it is the least offstage (hence the 
most ‘visible’) component among the three anchoring relations. The volitional relation resides at 
the outermost layer; therefore it is the most offstage (and the least ‘visible’) component.  
Despite their low degree of visibility, volitional relations provide the layer which stands 
‘closest’ to the level of communication: A temporal or an epistemic relation always appears in the 
context of an illocutionary act, which first and foremost indexes a certain relation to the speaker’s 
immediate will. 
The higher degree of ‘objectivity’ and ‘visibility’ in the lower domains of anchoring allows for 
more accurate and more fine-grained delimitations. For instance, while speakers often specify a 
temporal distance with high degrees of accuracy (e.g., ‘on Thursday at eleven’, ‘twenty six minutes 
ago’), an estimation of likelihood is generally vaguely specified (e.g., ‘probably’, ‘maybe’), and the 
strength of an appeal is more vaguely, if at all (e.g., ‘should’ vs. ‘must’ for an advice vs. an 
obligation).  
The above mentioned asymmetries along the dimensions of subjectivity, visibility, and 
delimitability do not preclude a uniform treatment of the three types of anchoring relations. All the 
three types of anchoring relations are still ‘subjective’ (and eventually, ‘deictic’) in the sense that 
they are relative to reference states defined in the communicative background, which are 
ultimately tied to speaker’s cognitive faculties at the time of utterance.34  
                                                           
34 Lyons (1982) admits that space and time, which have been considered to represent ‘objective’ domains in 
the Western empiricist tradition, may involve also involve subjectivity:  
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2.12 Summary 
This chapter introduced the idea of anchoring in three (the temporal, the epistemic, and the 
volitional) semantic domains. It showed that the main clause of every utterance can be analyzed 
into a volitional, an epistemic, and a temporal relation, which take scope over each other in this 
order. It also delimited certain semantic dimensions relevant for TAM reference as not making part 
of anchoring relations, such as spatial specifications, non-relational aspects, and temporal types 
(Aktionsart distinctions). Lastly, it pointed to certain differences between temporal, epistemic and 
volitional relations in connection with their hierarchical positions in the semantic value of an 
utterance. 
The next chapter defines higher-order entities in the three domains of anchoring. These 
container-type entities will serve in motivating a hierarchical structure for the semantic value and 
in defining anchoring relations in a more explicit way. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
In the last resort, I have perhaps no valid reason for treating the spatiotemporal co-ordinates 
of deixis as being basically objective - nor reason, that is to say, other than adherence to the 
same ontological prejudice as leads me to treat what I call first-order nominals as being 
more basic than second-order or third-order nominals […] This prejudice may be no more 
than the residue of a fairly Anglo-Saxon empiricism! (Lyons 1982: 122). 
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Chapter 3 
Higher-order entities and their perspectival qualifications 
This chapter introduces the higher-order entities defined in the three domains of anchoring. It 
renders anchoring relations in terms of the qualifications of these entities relative to cognitive states 
which are taken as reference points in the respective domains.  
3.1 Entities defined in the three domains of anchoring  
3.1.1 Temporal locations, thoughts, projections 
The higher-order entities defined in the three domains of anchoring are temporal locations, thoughts, 
and projections:  
• A temporal location stands for a general object of temporal perception. It corresponds to a 
time-point conceived in abstraction from its contents and possible qualifications (such as 
past, present, future, etc.).  
• A thought stands for a general object of knowledge,35 conceived in abstraction from its 
contents and possible qualifications (such as certain, likely, unlikely, hypothetical, 
counterfactual, etc.).  
• A projection stands for a general object of will. Any specific projection is a model of the 
world construed around the will of an intentional agent.36 Projections are objects of both 
wishes and assertions. In the former, the speaker wants (or does not want) a certain 
projection to be realized, and in the latter, she accepts (or rejects) one as already real. A 
projection can be qualified with respect to a specific will as wished for, accepted, 
permitted, urged for, etc.  
                                                           
35 The term thought is used here to denote a general object of cognition. It does not entail any (subjective or 
objective, epistemic or evidential) qualification as to the truth, falsity, probability or likelihood of a 
propositional content. The term thought was preferred here to the terms knowledge, belief, opinion, or assumption, 
which all connote specific epistemic attitudes. For instance, the term knowledge is normally used for ‘justified 
beliefs’. While belief is a more general term in epistemology, in ordinary language and in linguistic semantics, 
it is associated with highly subjective, non-justified pieces of information. Likewise, both opinion and 
assumption imply a subjective conviction. The use of the term thought here is similar to Frege’s (1918) 
conception of the notion Gedanke (actually translated into English as ‘thought’ by Geach & Stoothoff in Beaney 
(1997)), in that it entails neutrality as to possible epistemic evaluations: “I call a “thought” something for 
which the question of truth can arise at all” (Frege 1918/1997: 328). 
36 The phrase ‘model of the world’ does not imply a correspondence theory of meaning and truth; it only 
refers to a certain type of cognitive representation. Neither does it entail the idealistic contention that the 
‘world’ be a ‘subjective representation’. It only implies that communication (and possibly, other types of 
intentional behavior) involves mental reconstructions of the world which relate to the will of the 
communicator in a certain way (e.g., as accepted, wished for, feared, hoped for, imposed, permitted, etc.). 
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A state-of-affairs (SoA) is a semantic content which consists of the predication of a property to 
an entity, or of a relation to a constellation of entities. 
Temporal locations, thoughts, and projections are entities with containment properties: 
• A temporal location contains SoAs. A qualified temporal location which contains a specific 
SoA corresponds to a semantic content called a proposition.37 
• A thought contains propositions. A qualified thought which contains a specific proposition 
corresponds to a semantic content called a reflection. 
• A projection contains reflections. A qualified projection which contains a specific reflection 
corresponds to a semantic content called a message.  
Table 1 lists these entities, their qualifications, and the corresponding semantic contents. 
Qualification (predication) is represented with square brackets, and containment (scope) with 
round brackets. 
 
Entity type Qualification Qualified entities with content Semantic content 
general entity: e general predicate:38 P 
(a property or a relation):  
P[e1,…en] : SoA 
temporal location: t temporal qualification: T T[t](SoA1,…SoAn) : proposition 
thought: h epistemic qualification: E E[h](proposition1,… propositionn) : reflection 
projection: p volitional qualification: V V[p](reflection1,… reflection n) : message 
Table 1. Entities, their qualifications and the corresponding semantic contents. 
3.1.2 Scope hierarchy due to containment 
The unidirectional relations of containment presented above trivially yield a hierarchical semantic 
value. In the context of a sentence: 
• A SoA is represented as P[e1,…en], P standing for a predicate and e standing for an entity 
(an argument of the predicate). 
• A proposition is represented as T[t](P[e1,…en]), t standing for a temporal location and T, a 
temporal qualification. 
                                                           
37 A ‘proposition’ conceived as such includes a temporal value, but is independent of epistemic and 
volitional attitudes. This use of the term is different from that in Functional Grammar (e.g., Dik 1989/1997), 
where a proposition is taken as a higher-order entity which includes a certain epistemic attitude of the speaker. 
But the present conception of the term ‘proposition’ complies with the frequently voiced statement that 
sentences with different ‘moods’ or ‘subjective attitudes’ can have the same ‘propositional content’. 
38 A predicate can be a ‘property’ (for a single entity) or a relation (for more than one entity). 
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• A reflection is represented as E[h](T[t](P[e1,…en])), h standing for a thought and E, an 
epistemic qualification. 
• A message is represented as V[p](E[h](T[t](P[e1,…en]))), p standing for a projection and V, a 
volitional qualification.  
This last semantic content, namely, a message in the context of a sentence, corresponds to the 
semantic value of an utterance. In the formula above, V[p], E[h], and T[t] respectively correspond to 
volitional, epistemic, and temporal anchoring relations, and P[e1,…en] corresponds to the abstract 
predicational content (SoA). The semantic value of an utterance is hence simply represented as 
follows: 
(3.1) Volitional relation(Epistemic relation(Temporal relation(SoA))) 
What we achieve is a hierarchical structure of sentence meaning, which is derived from the 
containment properties of the higher-order entities defined in the three domains of anchoring. 
3.1.3 Semantic contents in the context of background cognition 
Entities in the three domains of anchoring have been associated above with richer contents than 
what is expressed in individual clauses. Each clause expresses only one SoA, but a temporal 
location may actually contain many SoAs, each consisting of different entities and predicates. Each 
clause expresses at most one proposition, but a thought may actually contain many propositions, 
which can be associated with various different temporalities. Each clause expresses at most one 
reflection, but a projection may actually contain many reflections, which may include not those 
associated with certainty as well other epistemic attitudes. In other words, SoAs, propositions, 
reflections and messages expressed in individual utterances are always singled out from larger 
cognitive networks. They are meant and understood against these background structures rather 
than as isolated pieces of information. The restriction of at most one SoA, one temporal relation, 
one epistemic relation and one volitional relation per clause is presumably due to the limitations 
set by the human cognitive processing capacities and by unidimensionality of the medium of 
linguistic communication (time). 
This understanding of semantic contents is in line with the basic tenets of the cognitive 
linguistics tradition, which aims to account for linguistic meaning on the basis of larger conceptual 
structures or ‘imagery’, e.g., Johnson’s (1987) ‘image schemas’, Talmy’s (1988, 2000) ‘schematic 
systems’, Langacker’s (1987) operations of ‘scope’, Fauconnier’s (1985, 2000, 2004) notion of 
‘background cognition’. It is particularly compatible with the mental space theory (e.g., Fauconnier 
1985, Fauconnier & Sweetser 1996, Fauconnier & Turner 1998), which takes individual sentences as 
bundles of information which select, manipulate, elaborate, and enrich the contents of cognitively 
represented discourse structures called ‘mental spaces’.  
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This connectivity of expressed contents to background structures enables speakers to make 
anaphoric reference to entities and relations defined in the universe of discourse. It also explains 
how the confirmation of a piece of information can trigger a chain of inferences. As Sweetser & 
Fauconnier’s (1996) following remark make it clear, when we express our wish for something to 
occur (or to have occurred), we actually allude to a more general picture (projection) of the world: 
[…] when we say “I wish John had come to the meeting”, we mean that we view 
as preferable a world that is much like ours except that John came to the meeting. 
Crucially, the speaker does not mean that he or she would prefer a world in 
which John came to the meeting and World War III was announced over the 
radio at the same moment (Sweetser & Fauconnier 1996: 3). 
The present account extends the cognitive mechanisms of ‘selection’ and ‘perspective’ in 
Cognitive Grammar into three special domains.39 While in Cognitive Grammar these mechanisms 
are invoked in the profiling of a relational content (a SoA as termed here) relative to the ground,40 
the current framework recruits three separate viewing arrangements in the selection of temporal 
locations, thoughts, and projections in three domains of anchoring. 
The holistic conception of semantic contents also extends to the level of illocutionary acts. 
Although a simple sentence expresses only one message, speakers do not intend (and addressees 
do not understand) an explicitly conveyed message as an isolated piece of information. Messages 
are always meant and interpreted as connected to more global levels of discourse organization, 
which involve rhetoric relations, conversational goals, as well as non-linguistic intentions. These 
connections also underlie the mechanisms which make it possible for the speakers to ‘mean’ more 
than what they ‘say’ (e.g., by inducing Gricean conversational implicatures and performing 
indirect speech acts). 
                                                           
39 In Cognitive Grammar, as in the present framework, conceptual domains are taken as constituting 
networks of interconnected entities. The cognitive operation of selection determines which part of a network is 
being dealt with. A linguistic expression evokes a certain extent of conceptual content (called the scope of that 
expression) and focuses on a certain region in its scope (the profile of the expression; which is the entity or 
relationship designated by the expression). For example, the verb ‘arrive’ includes in its scope “an entity 
moving along a spatial path to a goal, but within that overall conception (its scope) it profiles only the final 
portion of the trajectory” (Langacker 2001: 5). The notion of perspective emphasizes the involvement of 
subjectivity in conceptualization and interpretation. A perspectival configuration minimally includes a 
‘subject of conception’ or ‘conceptualizer’ (S), an ‘object of conception’ (O) and a ‘viewpoint’. In an ‘optimal 
viewing arrangement’, O is construed in a maximally objective way (i.e., within the referential scene, or 
onstage) and S in a maximally subjective way (i.e., not as part of the referential scene, or offstage). The 
asymmetry between O and S is diminished in deictic expressions. For instance, the personal pronoun ‘I’ 
maximally objectifies S (the speaker), i.e., puts it onstage.  
40 The notions of scope and perspective and the distinction between subjective vs. objective construal 
underlies the account of grounding in Cognitive Grammar. The ground (G) constitutes the vantage point from 
which the profile (designated content) in an expression is construed in a highly (though not maximally) 
subjective way. 
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3.2 A perspective-based delimitation of entity qualifications 
As mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 2, temporal, epistemic and volitional relations involved 
in an utterance are relative to cognitive states which serve as reference points in the respective 
domains or anchoring (namely, the current temporal state, the current knowledge state, and the 
current volitional state). For convenience, current states will henceforth be referred to as centers 
(i.e., temporal center, epistemic center, and volitional center). 
Relative to the temporal center, a temporal location can be: 
(i) anterior (preceding the reference time). 
(ii) simultaneous (coinciding with the reference time) . 
(iii) posterior (potentially following the reference time). 
Relative to the epistemic center state, a thought can be: 
(i) known (already taken for granted).  
(ii) newly apprehended (not yet well-integrated). 
(iii) hypothetical (merely unknown). 
Relative to the volitional center, a projection can be: 
(i) accepted (already taken as reflecting reality).41 
(ii) created on the spot (reflecting speaker’s immediate intentions). 
(iii) envisioned (merely imagined rather than accepted as real).  
These three main qualifications for each type of entity can be generalized as actual, immediate, 
and potential in relation to the relevant current state. As a fourth type of qualification, an entity can 
be generic, i.e., free from any specific relation to the current state. Figure 2 depicts the schematic 
delimitation of the qualification space which can be applied to each domain of anchoring.  
                                                           
41 The term ‘reality’ is not used here as equivalent to epistemic terms such as ‘certainty’ or ‘factuality’. A 
possibility, a probability, a guess, an inference or a conjecture can also be presented as real (i.e., as making 
part in the speaker’s model of actual -rather than an imagined/envisioned- world). It should also be noted 









Figure 2. The schematic configuration of possible qualifications within each domain of anchoring. 
The union of regions which hold a specific relation to the center, i.e., the regions of actuality, 
immediacy, and potentiality, will be called a frame. Temporal, epistemic, and volitional frames 
basically correspond to domain-specific mental spaces.42 
3.2.1 Frames and center displacements 
When the current center in a domain is directly tied to the temporal perception, judgment or will of 
the speaker at the immediate communicative situation, it will be said to be deictic. The deictic 
temporal center is associated with the speaker’s immediate temporal perception, the deictic 
epistemic center with her immediate judgment, and the deictic volitional center with her 
immediate will. A frame conceived around a deictic center will be called a base frame.  
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, a center can be shifted to be associated with the cognitive 
faculties of (real or fictive) beings in (real or fictive) situations, or with those of the speaker as 
conceived in situations other than the communicative one. In such cases, what is at stake is a 
(center) displacement. When the center in a domain of anchoring is displaced, speech participants 
mutually construct a new frame around the new, displaced center. Such a frame will be called a 
displaced frame. The construction of a displaced frame corresponds to the building of a ‘child space’ 
                                                           
42 A mental space (Fauconnier 1985, 2004; Fauconnier & Turner 1994, 1998; Sweetser & Fauconnier 1996) is 
a cognitive construct which defines a domain of referential structure in discourse. The ‘base space’ represents 
the conception of actual reality at the communicative situation. As discourse unfolds, ‘child’ mental spaces are 
created. At any point in discourse, speakers can move from one space to another (shift the ‘viewpoint’ space). 
Mental spaces are related to each other by ‘connectors’, which specify functions among entities across spaces. 
The ‘accessibility’ of a discourse referent at any point of the discourse is determined by the current 
hierarchical configuration of mental spaces, by what the viewpoint space is, and by the connectors that exist 
among mental spaces. A speaker can enrich, structure, and manipulate the contents of any mental space 
accessible from the viewpoint. 
‘Time-spaces’ mentioned in Fauconnier (1985/1994: 29-30) constitute examples of temporal frames as 
conceived here. ‘Hypothetical spaces’ and ‘wish-spaces’ in Fauconnier (1985/1994: 31-33) can be seen as 









in mental space theory (e.g., Fauconnier 1985, Fauconnier & Sweetser 1996).43 A displacement 
which occurs within the bounds of a single utterance will be called a local displacement. In English, 
local displacements can be triggered by ‘when’-clauses, conditional protases, mental state 
predicates, and by sentence-initial temporal, epistemic, volitional, or illocutionary adverbs. 
Discourse-level displacements are those which reach beyond the immediate scope of a single 
utterance, taking effect in (sometimes very long) stretches of discourse.  
A temporal displacement can be to a time point or a temporal range which is located in the past, 
in the future, or to a series of time points around the current temporal center (e.g., to repeater or 
‘habitual’ occasions). In the English examples below, the sentence-initial temporal expressions 
(tomorrow at five, when John arrived, and whenever I see her) trigger local temporal displacements. The 
narrative segment in (3.5) illustrates a discourse-level temporal displacement: The expression 
yesterday at eight builds a temporal frame which is effective through all the three sentences: 
(3.2) Tomorrow at five, I will have left. 
(3.3) When John arrived, Mary had washed the dishes. 
(3.4) Whenever I see her, she has to hurry up for something. 
(3.5) Yesterday at eight, I left home. I was tired. I had not slept enough.  
Local epistemic displacements can be illustrated with conditional sentences. A protasis triggers a 
displacement to a hypothetical, probable, unlikely, or counterfactual thought, so that the epistemic 
assessment expressed in the apodosis is not directly tied to the speaker’s immediate judgment at 
the time of utterance. In (3.6) and (3.7) below, the protases build a ‘hypothetical’ and a 
‘counterfactual’ epistemic frame, respectively, and the predictions in the apodoses are relative to 
these displaced frames. A local epistemic displacement is also involved when the speaker presents 
a belief, a guess, a conclusion, or an assumption from the perspective of other persons (3.8 and 3.9), 
or from her own perspective at a time different than the time of utterance (3.10). Discourse-level 
                                                           
43 In mental space theory, a ‘space builder’ is a linguistic or non-linguistic element which establishes a 
child mental space (or one which refers back to an already existing one). For instance, the conditional protasis 
in (i) builds a ‘counterfactual hypothetical space’. Similarly, the mental state verb believe in (ii) and the 
temporal expression in 1929 in (iii) function as space-builders which establish, respectively, a ‘belief space’ 
and a ‘time space’: 
(i) If I were a millionnaire, my VW would be a Rolls.   (Fauconnier 1985/1994: 31) 
(ii) Len believes that the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.  (Fauconnier 1985/1994: 13-14) 
(iii) In 1929, the president was a baby.        (Fauconnier 1985/1994: 30) 
A child space construed around a displaced center is a complex cognitive structure which can be wholly or 
partly different from the base frame. A great deal of background cognitive operations is apparently involved 
in the construction and structuring of new mental spaces, including ‘blending’ (e.g., Fauconnier & Turner 
1994, 1998, Fauconnier 2004). Langacker’s (1999) mechanism of departure from an ‘actual plane’ to a ‘virtual 
plane’ represents a similar kind of operation, in that it involves the mental detachment of reference points 
from the communicative situation (the ‘ground’). 
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epistemic displacements can be found in logical, mathematical, or argumentative discourse modes 
which involve chains of deductions on the basis assumed premises (3.11) (The anchoring relations 
in the main clauses in (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) are still relative to the speaker’s immediate cognitive 
states): 
(3.6) If it rains, the match will be cancelled. 
(3.7) If it had rained, the match would be cancelled. 
(3.8) According to John, Marry may resign soon.  
(3.9) Larry believes that Marry will resign soon. 
(3.10) I was sure that Eve could not be guilty.  
(3.11) Assume that x is equal to 4 …  
A local volitional displacement is present in utterances which express a volitional relation 
relative to a willful agent other than the speaker as conceived in the communicative situation. Such 
displacements are most transparently visible in volitional attitude reports (here too, the main 
clauses entail deictic volitional relations) (3.12-3.14). A volitional displacement is also at stake when 
an utterance contains a message of a willful agent other than the speaker as conceived in the 
immediate communicative situation. Such displacements are involved in segments of reported 
speech (3.15) or indirect speech (3.16) (again, no volitional displacement is involved in the main 
clauses): 
(3.12) Len wants to see you immediately. 
(3.13) Sally regrets that she couldn’t come. 
(3.14) I was hoping that he was not lying. 
(3.15) He said: “I have good news for you”.  
(3.16) John told me that he would be out of town for two weeks. 
Discourse-level volitional displacements can be found in fictional discourse, including 
anonymous stories, tales and jokes.44 The recognition of such discourse modes (which may be 
contextually inferred or explicitly indicated by a formulaic expression like once upon a time) makes 
it clear that what the speaker tells does not directly stem from her immediate will at the 
communicative situation. This is why a person who narrates a fictive story is not held responsible 
for the veracity of what she tells, and directive utterances which may appear within such narratives 
are not understood as urging the addressee(s) to take certain actions. The volitional center is 
                                                           
44 In Deictic Shift Theory, such discourse stretches are seen as involving a ‘shift’ of the ‘deictic center’ (e.g., 
Segal 1995: 15). 
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displaced in a similar way in acting and imitation. In such discourse modes, some or all of the 
communicative settings (e.g., the speaker, the addressee(s), the place, the time, etc.) are construed 
differently from what they actually are, and the volitional center is aligned in the middle of the 
pretended communicative settings. ‘Conditional’ illocutionary acts involve a special type of 
volitional displacement, exploited by the speaker for specific communicative strategies. (3.17) is 
one of van der Auwera’s (1986) examples of what he calls a ‘conditional speech-act’, and (3.18) is 
one example from Sweetser (1990) of what she calls a ‘speech-act conditional’.45 In both sentences, 
the protasis is presented as a condition for the making of an illocutionary act, rather than as a 
premise for the truth of the apodosis. In other words, the protasis builds a volitional frame in 
which an illocutionary act is formulated. A functionally similar strategy is to make an illocutionary 
act sound ‘distant’ (hence more tentative and polite), which is typically accomplished by the use of 
a past marker. (3.19) is an English example from Fleischman (1989) (who illustrates parallel 
phenomena in various other languages). It expresses an invitation in a volitional frame which is 
purported to be ‘distant’ from the immediate will of the speaker:  
(3.17) If I can speak frankly, he doesn’t have a chance.     (van der Auwera 1986: 199) 
(3.18) If it is not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM? (Sweetser 1990: 118) 
(3.19) I thought/was thinking about asking you to dinner.   (Fleischman 1989: 8) 
Displacements in different domains can be triggered independently of each other. For 
instance, when a speaker recounts a series of actually experienced events, the temporal center is 
displaced to the past, while the epistemic and the volitional centers remain deictic. Or, while the 
epistemic center is always displaced in the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional, the temporal 
relation can be deictic. Displacements in more than one domain can also coexist in the same 
discourse segment. For instance, for the sake of an argument, a lawyer can form a hypothetical or 
counterfactual account of past events, evoking both a temporal and an epistemic displacement. 
Anonymous tales about fantastic worlds in the past typically involve displacements in all three 
domains of anchoring. Lastly, it is possible to trigger a further displacement from an already 
displaced temporal, epistemic, or volitional frame. Examples include ‘flashbacks’ in past narratives 
and chains of assumptions in logical or argumentative discourse.  
3.2.2 Anaphoric anchoring 
Utterances which appear in the scope of a discourse-level displacement will be called dependent 
utterances. Dependent utterances receive part of their anchoring relations anaphorically from a 
                                                           
45 Sweetser (1990: 120) defines speech-act conditionals as including “all cases where the performance of the 
in-process speech act (the apodosis) is presented as being conditional on some factor expressed in the 
protasis”. 
 38
discursively displaced center.46 Consider the following discourse stretch. The utterances in (3.20b) 
and (3.20c) are temporally dependent, because one needs to refer back to the displaced temporal 
center for a full identification of the temporal relations they are associated with. In other words, 
they anaphorically refer to the temporal center initially set in (3.20a).  
(3.20) (a) John left home at six. (b) It was raining. (c) He was going to take the tram. 
Similarly, (3.21b) is an epistemically dependent sentence. The past morphology in would 
serves as an indication of the anaphoric reference to the hypothetical thought introduced by the 
displacement triggered in (3.21a): 
(3.21) (a) Assume that John is the thief. (b) Where would he hide the money? 
The sentences in (3.22b), (3.23b) and (3.23c) are volitionally dependent. They are anaphorically 
associated with the volitional displacements which accompany illocutionary indirections triggered 
by the formulaic expression once upon a time in (3.22a), and by the illocutionary predicate shout in 
(3.23a): 
(3.22) (a) Once upon a time, there lived a little girl in a small village. (b) One day she went to the 
forest.  
(3.23) (a) John shouted: (b) Get out! (c) I don’t want to see you here! 
Dependent clauses are functionally similar to dependent sentences. They involve an anaphoric 
reference to a displaced center introduced in another (typically preceding) phrase or clause in the 
same sentence. For example, the second clause in (3.24) is temporally dependent, because it refers 
back to the temporal center introduced in the ‘when’-clause. Similarly, the apodosis in (3.25) is 
epistemically dependent, because it refers back to the ‘unlikely’ thought introduced in the protasis: 
(3.24) When John came, we were playing cards. 
(3.25) If John came tonight, we would play cards.  
Anchoring relations are by definition relative, in that they specify qualifications with reference 
to centers in the relevant domains. A temporal, epistemic, or volitional relation will be said to be 
deictic only when it is which is relative to a deictic center. In other words, an anchoring relation 
indexed in a dependent sentence or a dependent utterance is not deictic, but just relative. Below are 
some examples. The temporal relation ‘past’ in (3.26) is relative to the time of utterance (speaker’s 
                                                           
46 ‘Dependency’ as used in this context does not include referential (anaphoric) dependency in nominal 
elements (e.g., as involved in pronouns). The idea of anaphoric reference in the domain of time can be found 
in a number of previous studies (e.g., ‘anaphoric tenses’ mentioned in Partee 1973, 1984; Kamp & Rohrer 1983; 
Webber 1988; Vet 1996; Janssen 1996, 2002; de Mulder & Vetters 2002, among others). Anaphoric time 
reference has also been proposed to be present in background segments of narratives (e.g., Nakhimovsky 
1988, Thelin 1990, Smith 2003). The current framework extends the mechanism of anaphoric time reference to 
the epistemic and volitional domains. 
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‘now’), hence is deictic. The same temporal relation appears in (3.27) relative to temporal center 
displaced to future, hence is not deictic. Similarly, the ‘prediction’ involved in (3.28) is deictic, 
because it is relative to the speaker’s immediate knowledge state. But in (3.29), the prediction is 
presented from John’s point of view, hence is not deictic. The prediction in (3.30) too, though 
linked to speaker’s judgment, is not deictic, since the conditional protasis cognitively displaces the 
epistemic center away from the communicative situation. Lastly, the sentences in (3.31) and (3.33) 
illustrate deictic uses of the volitional relations ‘hope’ and ‘assertion’, because they are directly tied 
to the speaker’s immediate will. But in (3.32) and (3.34), the same relations are used in a non-deictic 
way, because they are relative to a displaced volitional state (one which is tied to Len’s will): 
(3.26) She received the mail. 
(3.27) Tomorrow at six, she will have received the mail. 
(3.28) (I think) Jane will not resign. 
(3.29) John thinks that Jane will not resign. 
(3.30) If they force Jane, she will not resign. 
(3.31) I hope the document comes in time. 
(3.32) Len hopes that the document comes in time. 
(3.33) John is happy. 
(3.34) Len says that John is happy. 
3.3 Signaling vs. designation of anchoring relations  
Anchoring relations are often offstage semantic components, e.g., when they are expressed in the 
form of grammatical ‘grounding predications’. But they can also appear onstage, i.e., can make part 
of a designated relational content (SoAs) in a clause. What Brisard (2002a) says for the ‘meanings 
expressed by grounding predications’ straightforwardly applies to anchoring relations: 
Of course, it is possible to thematize, as it were, the meanings expressed by 
grounding predications, but then such a process would need to convert the 
background character of this information into something foregrounded, or 
‘objective’ status […] (Brisard 2002a: xxv). 
An anchoring relation will be said to be designated when it appears onstage, i.e., as part of an 
explicitly designated predicate. It will be said to be signaled when it appears offstage (with or 
without specifications, e.g., by adverbial elements). 
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In English, anchoring relations are typically signaled by grammatical strategies, with optional 
specifications by adverbial elements.47 But a designated anchoring relation typically appears in the 
form of an epistemic, volitional or illocutionary predicate. The primary semantic argument of this 
predicate corresponds to the ‘source’ of the relation (i.e., the cognitive agent(s) with which the 
epistemic or volitional center is associated), and its secondary argument (the complement of the 
predicate) expresses a semantic content (a proposition, a reflection, or a message) in the form of a 
subordinate clause. Simply stated, the designation of an anchoring relation yields a complex 
sentence with a subordinate clause. Below are two examples. The pairs express similar anchoring 
relations, i.e., ‘weak epistemic possibility’ in (3.35) and (3.36), and ‘wish’ in (3.37) and (3.38). While 
(3.35) and (3.37) signal these relations with the auxiliary might and the inverted auxiliary may, (3.36) 
and (3.38) designate them with the mental state predicates suspect and hope:  
(3.35) She might be lying. 
(3.36) I suspect that she is lying. 
(3.37) May they live happily! 
(3.38) I wish they live happily. 
A designated anchoring relation can also be presented relative to an ‘impersonal’ (or, 
‘objective’) point of view. In such cases, English typically uses the pronoun it with an epistemic or 
volitional predicate, which can be a verb (as in 3.39) or an adjective (as in 3.40 and 3.41):  
(3.39) It appears as if she is sleeping. 
(3.40) It is likely/possible that he received the mail.  
(3.41) It is desirable/favorable that she signs the contract. 
Temporal relations are not too often designated in English. Still, examples like (3.42) can be 
found, where a relation of anteriority is designated by the predicate ‘in 1990’. Similarly, (3.43) 
designates simultaneity with ‘now’ and (3.44) designates a non-deictic relation of posteriority with 
‘two days later’: 
(3.42) It was in 1990 that I saw him. 
(3.43) It is only now that she has a car. 
(3.44) It was two days later that he came back. 
                                                           
47 The difference between designation and signaling of anchoring relations is basically a semantic 
difference which concerns the degree of explicitness in reference. Hence, it should not strictly be associated 
with grammatical vs. lexical expression in an a priori way. In deciding whether an anchoring relation is 
designated or signaled in an utterance, one needs to take into account the alternative strategies provided by 
the language under investigation for expressing that relation. 
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An utterance can also designate an illocutionary act. Illocutionary predicates which appear in 
such utterances always entail a volitional relation, because every illocutionary act reflects a 
volitional attitude of the speaker. For instance, the verbs which describe illocutionary acts in (3.45) 
entail the volitional relation ‘want’. An illocutionary predicate can also entail an epistemic relation. 
For instance, the verbs in (3.46) all entail ‘certainty’ in addition to ‘acceptance’: 
(3.45) He ordered/asked/requested/pleaded him to leave. 
(3.46) They affirmed/confirmed/acknowledged that it was a mistake. 
The explicit designation of an illocutionary act in the first person present yields an ‘explicit 
performative’ (Austin 1962: 32-33, Searle 1989). Some examples are given below: 
(3.47) I order you to leave! 
(3.48) I apologize for having disturbed you. 
(3.49) I declare the meeting cancelled. 
(3.50) I argue that the results are not reliable. 
(3.51) I admit that there was a calculation error. 
Whether or not a sentence contains a designated anchoring relation, its main clause always 
signals the three layers of anchoring relations. For instance, (3.52) designates the epistemic 
predicate ‘assume’, and signals ‘past’, ‘certainty’ and ‘assertion’ in its main clause. The main clause 
of (3.53), which designates a volitional predicate (‘wish’), signals ‘present’, ‘certainty’ and 
‘assertion’. In the same vein, (3.54) designates the epistemic predicate ‘suspect’, and signals 
‘present’, ‘epistemic possibility’ and ‘assertion’ in its main clause. Lastly, (3.55), which designates 
the illocutionary predicate ‘ask’ (which entails the volitional relation ‘want’), can be analyzed as 
signaling ‘future’, ‘hypothetical’, and ‘order’ in its main clause: 
(3.52) John assumed that we could meet Mary tomorrow.  
(3.53) Larry wishes to see Mary. 
(3.54) Len may be suspecting that Jane has left. 
(3.55) Ask Jane to leave immediately. 
The designation of an anchoring relation may or may not be accompanied by a center 
displacement. For instance, all the sentences below involve designated anchoring relations. While 
the subordinated clauses in (3.56) and (3.57) involve displaced centers, those in (3.58) and (3.59) 
involve deictic centers: 
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(3.56) John believes that Mary is wrong.  
(3.57) John orders you to go.  
(3.58) I believe that Mary is wrong. 
(3.59) I order you to go! 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter defined temporal locations, thoughts and projections as three types of higher-order 
entities in the three domains of anchoring, and identified their contents as SoAs, propositions, and 
reflections. It derived the hierarchical ranking of temporal, epistemic and volitional relations from 
the properties of containment of these higher-order entities, and showed how linguistically 
expressed semantic contents are linked to background cognitive structures. It then delimited the 
semantic space in each domain of anchoring in terms of the qualifications of higher-order entities 
as actual, immediate or potential relative to (or as bearing no specific relation to) the centers (reference 
cognitive states). Centers which are directly tied to the communicative situation (i.e., to the 
'ground’) were identified as deictic, and those associated with other situations, as displaced centers. 
The chapter also presented an account of anaphoric TAM reference in each of the three domains of 
anchoring, and finally, emphasized the difference between signaling an anchoring relation (e.g., by 
a grammatical TAM strategy) and designating it (e.g., by a mental state predicate). 
The following chapter defines and labels semantic categories in the three domains of 
anchoring, on the basis of isomorphic perspectival configurations introduced in this chapter. It 
than expands on formal strategies for anchoring categories and on how volitional anchoring 
categories relate to speaker’s immediate intentions in making an illocutionary act. 
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Chapter 4 
The basic anchoring categories 
This chapter defines and labels the basic anchoring categories on the semantic space of anchoring, 
in terms of relative qualifications of higher-order entities introduced in the previous chapter.  
4.1 Defining the basic anchoring categories in terms of higher-order entities 
Figure 3 on the next page shows the labels for the basic anchoring categories on the semantic space of 
anchoring. Seven categories are delimited on the basis of isomorphic perspectival configurations in 
each of the three domains of anchoring. In what follows in this section, these categories will be 
defined in terms of higher-order entities (i.e., temporal locations, thoughts, and projections). (Since 
the definitions of these categories in this section are schematic and rather technical, how they make 
sense in the context of actual utterances may not be immediately evident. Their detailed, usage-
based characterizations will follow in Chapter 5, where they will also be illustrated with 
grammatical markers across languages.) All of the basic anchoring categories defined in this 
chapter can also combine with negation, which will be introduced into the metalanguage of 
anchoring categories in Chapter 6. 
4.1.1 The categories of immediacy 
The categories of immediacy are SIMULTANEOUS, NEW INFORMATION, and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION. 
They involve higher-order entities qualified as ‘immediately present’ at the centers in their 
respective domains: 
• SIMULTANEOUS selects the temporal location which coincides with the reference time. 
• NEW INFORMATION selects the thought which is currently in-process.  
• IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION selects the projection which is created on the spot by virtue of 
the immediate act of utterance.  
The semantic contents associated with categories of immediacy are defined as follows:  
• The contents of a temporal location qualified as SIMULTANEOUS (i.e., the SoAs in it) amount 
to immediate conditions. 
• The contents of a thought qualified as NEW INFORMATION (i.e., the propositions in it) 
amount to immediate evidence. 
• The contents of a projection qualified as IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (i.e., the reflections in it) 
amount to immediate intentions. 
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4.1.2 The categories of actuality 
The categories of actuality are ANTERIOR, CERTAIN, and ACCEPTED. They involve higher-order entities 
qualified as already ‘actualized’ from the perspective of the centers in their respective domains: 
• ANTERIOR selects a temporal location or a temporal range qualified as past.  
• CERTAIN selects a thought which is surely known to be true. 
• ACCEPTED selects a projection which is taken as being part of the established reality. 
4.1.3 The categories of potentiality 
The categories of potentiality are POSTERIOR, HYPOTHETICAL, and ENVISIONED. They involve higher-
order entities qualified as ‘non-actual’ (or, ‘irrealis’) from the perspective of the centers in their 
respective domains:  
• POSTERIOR selects a temporal location or range qualified as future.  
• HYPOTHETICAL selects a thought qualified as merely unknown.  
• ENVISIONED selects a merely imagined projection.  
4.1.4 The categories of quantification 
The categories of quantification are RECURRENT, PROBABLE, and ACCEPTABLE. They specify a 
quantificational value over a range of higher-order entities construed around the center in the 
respective domain. Hence, they are inherently scalar:  
• RECURRENT quantifies over a temporal range ‘close to’ the temporal center.  
• PROBABLE quantifies over a range of thoughts ‘close to’ the epistemic center (current 
knowledge state).  
• ACCEPTABLE quantifies over a range of projections ‘close to’ the current volitional state. 
4.1.5 The categories of generality 
The categories of generality are ATEMPORAL, GENERAL FACT, and GENERAL STATEMENT. They involve 
generic higher-order entities. They express the occurrence of a SoA, the truth of a proposition, or 
the recognition of a reflection as not contingent to (i.e., as holding no specific relation to) the 
current cognitive states (centers) in their respective domains:  
• ATEMPORAL selects a generic temporal location.  
• GENERAL FACT selects a generic thought.  
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• GENERAL STATEMENT selects a generic projection.  
4.1.6 The categories of relevance 
The categories of relevance are categories which combine a category of immediacy with either a 
category of actuality or one of potentiality. As such, they establish a causal, a logical, or an 
intentional relevance to the current (deictic or displaced) cognitive states.  
In the temporal domain, 
• PERFECT combines ANTERIOR and SIMULTANEOUS, establishing a causal relation between the 
contents of the two. It expresses both a past SoA (the content of ANTERIOR) and an 
immediate condition (the content of SIMULTANEOUS), conceived as a ‘result’ of the past 
occurrence.  
• PROSPECTIVE combines POSTERIOR and SIMULTANEOUS, establishing a causal relation 
between the contents of the two. It expresses both a future SoA (the content of POSTERIOR) 
and an immediate condition (the content of SIMULTANEOUS), conceived as a ‘cause’ for the 
potential occurrence.  
In the epistemic domain, 
• INFERRED combines CERTAIN and NEW INFORMATION, establishing a logical relation between 
the contents of the two. It expresses a definitive conclusion (the content of CERTAIN) along 
with a piece of immediate evidence (the content of NEW INFORMATION) which is conceived 
as a ‘proof’ for the conclusion.  
• CONJECTURED combines HYPOTHETICAL and NEW INFORMATION, establishing a logical 
relation between the contents of the two. It expresses a non-definitive conclusion (the 
content of HYPOTHETICAL) along with a piece of immediate evidence (the content of NEW 
INFORMATION) which is conceived as a ‘sign’ for the conclusion.  
In the volitional domain, 
• ASSERTED combines ACCEPTED and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION, establishing an intentional 
relation between the contents of the two. It expresses a reflection taken as real (the content 
of ACCEPTED) along with an immediate intention of the speaker (the content of IMMEDIATE 
CONTRIBUTION).  
• WANTED combines ENVISIONED and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION, establishing an intentional 
relation between the contents of the two. It expresses a reflection that the speaker wants to 
be real (the content of ENVISIONED) along with an immediate intention of the speaker (the 
content of IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). 
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4.2 Finer distinctions and additional dimensions as ‘specifications’ 
The 21 basic anchoring categories defined above exhaust the space of possible relations in the three 
domains of anchoring. However, since they are schematically (hence vaguely) defined, anchoring 
relations conveyed in actual utterances are often more specific. For instance, past events are rarely 
presented as just ANTERIOR; the time of occurrence is generally specified with much more precision. 
An inferential utterance (i.e., one which expresses INFERRED) may specify not only the existence, 
but also the perceptual type of available evidence. Different directive utterances (e.g., requests, 
orders, obligations, advices, etc.) can all be analyzed as expressing WANTED, but they may signal 
different degrees of strength of the speaker’s desire, and may additionally index differences in 
social status, a concern for the willingness of the addressee(s), etc. Even culture-specific semantic 
dimensions can be conveyed in directive utterances, which play an important role in regulating 
social relations. I will use the term specification to refer to semantic dimensions and distinctions 
which are more specific or more fine-grained than what is included in the characterizations of the 
basic anchoring categories. Specifications can be conveyed as part of conventional meanings of 
grammatical markers, or expressed by lexical strategies such as adverbials.  
When necessary, specifications will be represented with descriptive labels given between slash 
signs (/). Below are some examples with grammatical expressions of anchoring categories. Both 
(4.1) and (4.2) express ANTERIOR, but with different specifications. Similarly, (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) all 
fit the schematic definition of PERFECT; various subtypes of this general category are indicated as 
specifications. (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) are all schematically analyzed as entailing PROBABLE, but they 
convey different degrees probability. In the same vein, the expression of wish, the request, the 
obligation, and the order in (4.9) to (4.12) all fit the schematic definition of WANTED (in that they all 
convey speaker’s wish or desire for a projection to be realized). One can always go into deeper 
analyses of such specifications as to their exact semantic composition, but the level of detail set by 
the definitions of the basic anchoring categories will be sufficient for the analytic goals of this 
dissertation: 
(4.1) He came yesterday. (ANTERIOR/yesterday/) 
(4.2) He came two hours ago. (ANTERIOR/two hours ago/) 
(4.3) John has lost his keys. (PERFECT/result/) 
(4.4) I have read this book. (PERFECT/experience/) 
(4.5) The bus has just arrived. (PERFECT/recent/) 
(4.6) He might be working now. (PROBABLE/low/) 
(4.7) He may be working now. (PROBABLE/medium/) 
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(4.8) He will be working now. (PROBABLE/high/) 
(4.9) I wish I had the keys. (WANTED/wish/) 
(4.10) Can you give me the keys please? (WANTED/request/) 
(4.11) You have to give me the keys! (WANTED/obligation/) 
(4.12) Give me the keys! (WANTED/order/) 
4.3 Anchoring categories at the level of illocutionary act 
4.3.1 A communicative constraint on the expression of volitional categories 
In personal communication,48 every utterance transmits the speaker’s intentions at the immediate 
communicative context.49 In other words, the following constraint holds:  
(4.13) Every utterance in personal communication necessarily expresses the speaker’s immediate 
intentions. 
This constraint can be seen as a specific manifestation of Grice’s Maxim of Relation (which 
simply reads as ‘be relevant’; see Grice 1975: 308),50 because it actually expresses the necessity of a 
personal utterance to establish ‘relevance’ to the speaker’s immediate volitional state. More 
specifically, it can be seen as a manifestation of Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) Principle of Relevance, 
which basically says that “communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance” 
(Sperber & Wilson 1987: 82):51 
This constraint predicts that the final layer in the anchoring of a main clause (finite utterance) 
must be either IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (which is defined as reflecting the speaker’s immediate 
intentions), or one of the two volitional relevance categories, namely, ASSERTED and WANTED 
(which, by definition, entail IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). ACCEPTED, ENVISIONED and ACCEPTABLE 
cannot be signaled on their own in a main clause, because they do not convey the speaker’s 
immediate intentions. Statements which express GENERAL STATEMENT are exempt from this 
constraint, because they present a message from an impersonal point of view (i.e., without 
                                                           
48 The phrase ‘personal communication’ here refers to communicative contexts in which the speaker 
‘speaks for herself’ in order to create specific cognitive effects in the addressee(s) in accordance to her own 
communicative goals. It hence excludes official or institutional statements like public announcements, laws, 
regulations, reports, be they in the written form or voiced by spokesmen. 
49 The role of intentions in linguistic communication has been emphasized most notably in the work of 
Grice (1957, 1965, 1975) and his followers. 
50 Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Relation is one of his four conversational maxims which constitute the Principle 
of Cooperation: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the state which it occurs, by 
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1975: 307). 
51 Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory aims to account for the context-sensitive aspects of 
communication, including reference assignment, disambiguation and implicatures, on the basis of a single 
Principle of Relevance, which is intended to subsume Grice’s (1975) four conversational maxims. 
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signaling any contingent relation to the speaker’s immediate will). The consequences of this 
constraint on the expression of volitional anchoring categories will be further explored in the next 
chapter, where the basic anchoring categories are elaborately characterized and illustrated. 
4.3.2 Immediate intentions as illocutionary intentions 
In section 4.1.1, immediate intentions were defined as the contents of the projection created on the 
spot by virtue of the speaker’s act of utterance. The immediate intention of a speaker in making an 
utterance is simply an intention to carry out a specific illocutionary act. This act may consist of 
making a remark, raising an objection, making a claim, issuing an order, making a promise, 
declaring war, giving apologies, or another one of the numerous illocutionary acts, some which are 
cited and classified in Austin (1962: 150-163) and in Searle (1975a). Simply stated, immediate 
intentions are equivalent to illocutionary intentions.52 Hence, a description of speaker’s immediate 
intentions in making an utterance is a description of the illocutionary act she intends to perform.  
4.3.3 The emergence of the illocutionary force 
In the current framework, the illocutionary force of an utterance is not taken as part of its 
convention-bound meaning (semantic value). ‘Force’, as an action-theoretic notion, emerges from 
the recovery of the speaker’s immediate intention in particular communicative contexts.53 The 
semantic value of an utterance does not completely determine its illocutionary force, although it 
may directly reflect the speaker’s immediate intention or firmly guide its inference. Although all of 
the components of the semantic value (SoA-internal, temporal, epistemic, and volitional) contribute 
to the transmission of the speaker’s immediate intention (hence, to the recovery of the illocutionary 
force), the most operative semantic component in this process is the volitional relation signaled in 
the main clause of an utterance.54 
                                                           
52 As such, perlocutionary goals, conversational implicatures, and indirect illocutions are excluded from 
what is referred to here as ‘immediate intentions’. One specific kind of intention which is central in Grice’s 
(1957, 1968, 1975) work, namely, the ‘communicative intention’, should not be confused with what is referred 
to here as ‘immediate intentions’. The recognition of the speaker’s self-reflexive communicative intention 
provides the basis for the recovery of the speaker’s immediate intentions. 
53 The need for separating the actional notion of ‘force’ from the representational notion of ‘meaning’ has 
been argued for by a number of philosophers (e.g., Stenius 1967; Davidson 1979), as well as linguists and 
pragmaticians who emphasized the inferential aspects of communication (e.g., Bach & Harnish 1979; Leech 
1983: 30-35; Wilson & Sperber 1988, and Bach 2005). This position is opposed to that of Searle (1969, 1975a) 
and Searle & Vanderveken (1985), who take illocutionary force as part of the sentence meaning and locate it at 
the same level of representation as that of the propositional content (as reflected in the formula F(P), where P 
denotes the ‘propositional content’ and F the ‘illocutionary force’ of an utterance). See also Wierzbicka (1998) 
for a Searlian view of illocutionary force. 
54 A similar position is defended in Bach & Harnish (1979), who relate the illocutionary force to the 
expression of speaker’s ‘attitudes’ (see also Bach 2005). Wilson & Sperber (1988) propose to analyze ‘non-
declarative moods’ in a similar way, i.e., as entailing a component of ‘desirability’. 
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4.4 Anchoring categories and considerations of form 
4.4.1 Strategies of expression for anchoring categories 
Anchoring categories are defined in purely semantic terms and conceived independently of 
particular strategies of expression. They can be expressed by lexical, grammatical, or semi-
grammatical strategies, which may involve, e.g., bound inflectional morphemes, stem changes, 
clitics, particles, auxiliary verbs, predicatively used adjectives, lexical or complex adverbials, 
mental state verbs, intonational units, specific syntactic constructions, a combination of these, or 
zero-marking. Languages vary as to their resources for encoding (signaled or designated) 
anchoring categories. A temporal category like ‘future’ or an evidential category like ‘inference’ can 
be associated with grammatical strategies in one language, and only with lexical strategies in 
another. Similarly, a question or an exclamation can be expressed by a particle in one language, 
and signaled exclusively by distinctive prosodic contours in the next one. More than one strategy 
may also contrast within a language in conveying the same anchoring category. For instance, in 
English, a high degree of likelihood can be expressed by an adverb like probably, with an auxiliary 
like must, or with a copular sentence with the adjectival predicate likely.55 Similarly, a command can 
be issued by an imperative form like Go! or by an explicit performative like I order you to go!. In 
such cases, the speaker’s choice among alternative strategies correlates with whether the category 
is ‘onstage’ (designated) or ‘offstage’ (signaled), and with its intended degree of specificity. 
Although grammaticality is not part of the definitions of the 21 anchoring categories defined 
above, they largely exhibit the hallmarks of grammatical meaning mentioned in Bybee, Perkins & 
Pagliuca (1994: 4-8): They exhibit semantic generality (because they are defined in a schematic 
way), they are highly dependent in meaning (because they are interpreted relative to cognitive 
states which make part of the communicative context), they have fixed scope (due to the 
hierarchical organization of the semantic value), and they are very frequently used (because one 
category from each domain is signaled in each utterance). Indeed, these anchoring categories are 
typically expressed by grammatical TAM markers (including zero-marking) and optionally 
specified by lexical strategies (adverbials).56 
                                                           
55 See Nuyts (2001a), who investigates the factors which affect speakers’ choices among alternative 
strategies in the expression of epistemic modality in Dutch, German, and English. 
56 Although grammatical markers (e.g., inflectional TAM markers) are normally more general in meaning 
compared to lexical items (e.g., mental state predicates or adverbs), they can still express very specific 
meanings. Some languages have developed elaborate grammatical paradigms for highly fine-grained 
anchoring relations, for instance, tense systems with remoteness distinctions (Dahl 1985: 120-128), or elaborate 
paradigms for source of evidence (Palmer 2001: 35-47). 
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4.4.2 Conventional implication in the grammatical expression of categories of  
relevance 
Categories of relevance (PERFECT, PROSPECTIVE, INFERENCE, CONJECTURE, ASSERTED and WANTED) 
were defined in section 4.1.6 as compound categories which express an immediate content along 
with an actual or a non-actual content. When a category of relevance is signaled in a main clause by 
a grammatical strategy, the content of the actual or non-actual category is explicitly given, while 
the immediate content is only conventionally implied. This is illustrated below with three 
categories of relevance (PERFECT, INFERRED, and ASSERTED). 
When PERFECT is signaled (e.g., by a grammatical marker or by zero-marking), the content of 
the ANTERIOR temporal location or range (i.e., a past SoA) is explicitly conveyed, while the contents 
of the SIMULTANEOUS temporal location (i.e., immediate conditions, conceived as the ‘results’ of the 
past occurrence) remain implicit. In other words, although a ‘perfect’ sentence is about the 
temporal center (i.e., the reference time, which is the ‘present time’ if no temporal displacement is 
involved), the SoA it designates is one which happened in the past. For instance, in the following 
English example, the explicitly conveyed SoA (‘the speaker eating lunch’) is one which happened 
in the past, while its present results (e.g., the speaker not being hungry, she not wanting join the 
addressee for lunch, etc.) are only conventionally implied: 
(4.14) I have eaten lunch. 
An utterance which signals INFERRED (e.g., by a grammatical marker or by zero-marking), 
explicitly conveys the content of a CERTAIN thought (i.e., a definitive conclusion), while it only 
implies the contents of NEW INFORMATION (i.e., immediate evidence, conceived as the ‘proofs’ for 
the conclusion). Just as immediate conditions (SoAs which hold at the reference time) are not 
explicitly given in PERFECT, so is the case for immediate evidence in INFERRED. For instance, in the 
Tucano (Tocanoan) inferential sentence below (from Aikhenvald 2004), what is explicitly given is 
the proposition inferred to be true by the speaker (i.e., the conclusion). The evidence (e.g., “the fish 
is gone, there are bones scattered around, and the dog looks happy and satisfied” (Aikhenvald 
2004: 52)) is not explicitly communicated: The inferential marker -ápĩ only conventionally implies 
that such evidence exist in the immediate context: 
(4.15) diây wa’îre    yaha-ápĩ. 
dog fish-TOP.NON.A/S steal-REC.P.INFR.3sgnf 
‘The dog stole the fish.’ (I inferred it) 
In the same vein, when ASSERTED is signaled in an utterance (e.g., by a grammatical marker or 
by zero-marking), what is explicitly voiced is the content of an ACCEPTED projection (i.e., the 
reflection accepted as real); the contents of IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (i.e., the speaker’s 
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immediate/illocutionary intentions) remain implicit. For instance, in the following assertive 
utterance from English (where assertion is morphosyntactically unmarked), the reflection accepted 
as real by the speaker (i.e., ‘that John is not happy’) is explicitly conveyed, while the speaker’s 
illocutionary intention (e.g., whether she ‘suggests’, ‘claims’, ‘admits’, ‘insists’, etc. that John is not 
happy) is implicit (hence should be recovered from the utterance context): 
(4.16) John is not happy. 
This limitation in the (grammatical) signaling of categories of relevance is presumably tied to 
the restriction for human language to express at most one SoA, at most one proposition, at most 
one reflection, and at most one message per clause (see section 3.1.3).  
4.4.3 Form-meaning mappings in the grammatical expression of anchoring categories 
The grammatical resources of a language can be seen to be shaped by the interaction of two 
opposing functional motives: economy and expressivity (or, ‘iconicity’ as called in Croft 2003: 101-
102). Economy forces languages to employ minimal formal resources for expressing a maximal 
range of meanings. Conversely, expressivity pushes for more alternative strategies and more 
combinatory possibilities to allow its speakers express semantic distinctions at the intended level of 
specificity. 
Under the pressure of expressivity, a certain anchoring category can be conveyed by a number 
of different grammatical strategies. The choice among available alternatives may be sensitive to 
various factors, including interactions with other anchoring categories, person, gender, number, 
transitivity, information structure, etc. Economy has a number of consequences in grammar. One 
of its manifestations is zero-marking, i.e., the expression of a semantic category without overt 
grammatical marking.57 This is the case, for instance, in the expression of CERTAIN and ASSERTED in 
English (as well as in many other languages). Second, a TAM marker can cumulatively express more 
than one anchoring category in a specific use (behaving as a so-called ‘portmanteau’ morpheme). 
For example, the predictive use of the English auxiliary will (e.g., in conditional apodoses) involves 
both ‘future’ (POSTERIOR) and ‘epistemic modality’ (PROBABLE). Third, TAM markers are typically 
polysemous, i.e., conventionally associated with more than one distinct (though related) use. For 
                                                           
57 The lack of an overt grammatical marking for a TAM category (as well as any other inflectional 
category) is most typical in morphologically isolating languages such as Vietnamese or Chinese. In general, 
zero-marking is facilitated by the strongly context-dependent nature of TAM meanings, which makes an 
explicit marking redundant in most contexts: 
The high frequency of grams is in part due to their semantic generality, which allows them 
to occur in a wide range of contexts, but it is also due to the use of the grams in 
environments where their contribution is actually redundant. That is, grams come to be 
used not just where the meanings they supply are strictly necessary, but also any time that 
meaning is compatible with the general context and the speaker’s intentions (Bybee, Perkins 
& Pagliuca 1994: 8). 
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instance, the auxiliary must in English has at least three distinct uses (identified as ‘participant-
internal necessity’, ‘epistemic necessity’, and ‘deontic necessity’ in van der Auwera & Plungian 
1998). When at least two conventional uses of a marker are very close to each other, polysemy can 
appear as vagueness. For instance, the English have…en/ed strategy covers all three of ‘perfect of 
result’, ‘perfect of recent past’, and ‘perfect of experience’. Similarly, the second person imperative 
strategy (bare verbal stem) can be used in both orders and advices. Zero-marking, cumulative 
expression and polysemy pervade TAM systems of the world’s languages: They typically possess 
much fewer TAM markers than what full transparency in semantic composition and paradigmatic 
differentiation would require.  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter defined 21 basic anchoring categories in terms of relational qualifications of higher-order 
entities in each domain of anchoring. In each domain, it delimited one category of immediacy, one 
of actuality, one of potentiality, one of quantification, one of genericity as well as two categories of 
relevance. It then introduced a communicative constraint on the appearence of volitional categories 
in the final layer of anchoring in a main clause: Every utterance in personal communication 
necessarily establishes an intentional relevance to the speaker’s immediate volitional state (i.e., 
expresses IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION, either directly or as part of ASSERTED and WANTED). Finally, it 
mentioned various modes of formal expression for anchoring categories and pointed to the 
pervasiveness of zero-marking, cumulative expression and polysemy in their grammatical 
marking. 
In the next chapter, the anchoring categories defined here are characterized in more usage-
based terms and illustrated with data from English and other languages. 
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Chapter 5 
Cross-linguistic illustrations of basic anchoring categories 
This chapter characterizes the 21 basic anchoring categories defined in Chapter 4 in terms of their 
uses in actual communicative contexts and illustrates them with examples from English and other 
languages.  
Since the seven basic anchoring categories defined in each domain of anchoring are 
paradigmatic and mutually exclusive, each of the given examples will match one and only one 
category in each domain. However, since the basic anchoring categories are defined in a broad 
way, they will generally underspecify the temporal, epistemic or volitional relation actually 
expressed in an example. When necessary, semantic dimensions which go beyond the schematic 
definitions of the basic anchoring categories will be represented as ‘specifications’ (see section 4.2). 
Although anchoring categories can be expressed by grammatical as well as lexical strategies, 
the examples will mainly illustrate grammatical TAM markers. For some of the examples, a 
minimal utterance context will be specified in order to clarify what the utterance under question is 
actually meant to convey. This will be necessary for two main reasons. First, anchoring relations 
are, by definition, context-dependent (i.e., relative to cognitive states defined in the communicative 
background) and may index various elements in the communicative context. Second, due to the 
pervasiveness of polysemy in TAM markers (see section 1.4.6), anchoring categories are not always 
associated with distinctive grammatical markers.  
When semantically analyzing an utterance in actual communication, one first needs to make 
sure that (s)he has correctly understood what the speaker actually intended to convey by means of 
conventional devices available in her langauge (i.e., the full semantic value of the utterance; see 
section 1.4.2). But polysemy in the grammatical marking of TAM can make it difficult to pinpoint 
which anchoring category is at stake in a given sentence, especially if one does not have access to 
the utterance context. For instance, it may be difficult to judge whether a sentence involves 
CONJECTURED (evidential uncertainty) or PROBABLE (epistemic modality) if a language does not 
code them differentially in grammar. Ideally, a semantician needs to take into consideration not 
only the semantic distinctions which are differentially marked in grammar, but also the relevant 
elements in the immediate communicative context.58 
                                                           
58 However, the mere existence of contextual conditions for the use of an anchoring category is not 
sufficient for identifying that category in an utterance. For instance, the immediate context of an utterance 
may include pieces of evidence for a proposition, but the speaker may not allude to them by using formal (not 
just grammatical) resources available in her language. 
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Since the semantic space in each domain of anchoring is exhaustively (albeit schematically) 
partitioned by seven basic anchoring categories, they are best understood in the context of their 
relations with other categories in the same domain. Hence, in each of the three main sections 
below, temporal, epistemic and volitional anchoring categories are characterized in terms of how 
they contrast with other options in the same domain, before individual categories are illustrated. 
5.1 Temporal Anchoring Categories 
Given below are the usage-based characterizations for the seven temporal categories, which 
directly follow from their definitions in terms of relative qualifications of temporal locations given 
in section 4.1. In the context of an utterance, 
• SIMULTANEOUS presents an event as unfolding or a state as obtaining at the temporal 
center. (i.e., it expresses an ‘immediate condition’.) 
• ANTERIOR presents a SoA as having occurred before the temporal center. 
• POSTERIOR presents a SoA as potentially occurring after the temporal center. 
• PERFECT expresses a past SoA as well as its effects at the temporal center (immediate 
conditions). 
• PROSPECTIVE expresses a potential event in the future as well as its causes at the temporal 
center (immediate conditions). 
• RECURRENT expresses a repeated occurrence of a SoA in a temporal range around the 
temporal center. It can specify a frequency of occurrence which may range from ‘rarely’ to 
‘always’. 
• ATEMPORAL presents the occurrence of a SoA as free from any temporal restriction relative 
to the temporal center.  
Here is a concise account of how the temporal anchoring categories contrast to each other: 
Both SIMULTANEOUS and RECURRENT are ‘about’ the temporal center, but while the former focuses 
on an occurrence at the temporal center, the latter specifies a (vague or precise) frequency for 
occurrences in a temporal period in the vicinity of the temporal center. ATEMPORAL differs from 
both SIMULTANEOUS and RECURRENT in that it indicates no specific relation to the temporal center; it 
rather presents the occurrence of a SoA as not contingent to any temporal perspective (although 
the presupposed lifetimes of the SoA participants may imply temporal restrictions). Both PERFECT 
and ANTERIOR involve a reference to the past (relative to the temporal center). But while ANTERIOR 
solely focuses on a past occurrence, PERFECT is about the temporal center (‘present’ if no temporal 
displacement is involved) as much as about past. Similarly, both POSTERIOR and PROSPECTIVE 
involve a reference to the future, but while POSTERIOR exclusively focuses on a future occurrence, 
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PROSPECTIVE additionally indexes present causes (e.g., an intention, a tendency, or any other sort of 
potential) for a future event. 
5.1.1 SIMULTANEOUS 
SIMULTANEOUS expresses the semantic enclosure of ‘continuous aspect’ as defined in Comrie (1976: 
25-26), including the ‘non-progressive’ (with states) and the ‘progressive’ (with dynamic-durative 
events) subtypes. As a purely semantic category, it can be identified even when an explicit aspect 
marker is lacking. English sentences below illustrate deictic uses of SIMULTANEOUS:  
(5.1) John is taking a shower. 
(5.2) John is sleeping. 
(5.3) I am going to the office.  
(5.4) He knows the answer.  
(5.5) The keys are on the table. 
In (5.6) and (5.7), SIMULTANEOUS is relative to backward-displaced, and in (5.8) and (5.9), 
forward-displaced temporal centers: 
(5.6) When I left, John was sleeping. 
(5.7) Yesterday at five, the keys were on the table. 
(5.8) Tomorrow at five, John will be sleeping. 
(5.9) When I leave, the keys will be on the table. 
Utterances with SIMULTANEOUS always designate a durative SoA (an activity, a state, or an 
accomplishment).59 Therefore, although SIMULTANEOUS focuses on the temporal center only, the 
whole occurrence of the SoA is actually somehow extended in time. This implicit sense of temporal 
extension is normally stronger with states than with events since states describe a more stable 
energetic condition. Some examples are given below: 
(5.10) He is living in Amsterdam. 
(5.11) The whether is nice today. 
(5.12) That painting is being exhibited in the National Gallery this month. 
                                                           
59 SIMULTANEOUS cannot appear with punctual SoAs (achievements and semelfactives), because by 
definition, such SoAs lack an inherent duration within which to locate the temporal center (see, e.g., Comrie 
1976: 42-43). Note that this is a purely semantic restriction: A specific marker in a language primarily 
identified as a marker of ‘continuous’ or ‘progressive’ aspect may appear with a verb which primarily has a 
punctual meaning. In this case, either the temporal dimension will not be interpreted as SIMULTANEOUS (but, 
e.g., as an ‘imminent future’) or the SoA-type not as punctual (but, e.g., as a state which results from a 
punctual change). 
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Although Smith (1997: 34) identifies the example replicated in (5.13) as an ‘habitual sentence’, 
it is also taken here as expressing SIMULTANEOUS with a relatively extended state (but ‘habitual 
sentences’ which involve repeated occurrences are taken as expressing RECURRENT; see section 
5.1.6): 
(5.13) Susan is happy.  (Smith 1997: 34) 
SIMULTANEOUS relative to a past temporal center is marked in some languages by a formally 
non-compositional grammatical strategy, often called a ‘past imperfective’ or only ‘imperfective’. 
One example is the French imparfait:60  
(5.14) Il pleuvait. 
it rain.imparfait 
‘It was raining.’  
SIMULTANEOUS can be seen as constituting one of the ‘semantic foci’ of the cross-linguistic 
category types IPFV and PROG in Dahl (1985: 69-89, 90-93), which are distinguished from category 
types associated with habitual and generic sentences (i.e., HAB, HABG, and HABPAST). Similarly, 
markers identified as instantiating the semantic labels ‘imperfective’ and ‘progressive’ in Bybee, 
Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 128-129, 142-143) can be seen as entailing SIMULTANEOUS. 
5.1.2 ANTERIOR 
Utterances which express ANTERIOR specify an occurrence (or a series of occurrences) of an event or 
state at a temporal location or in a temporal range which precedes the temporal center (reference 
time). Unlike PERFECT, which also implies results at the reference time, ANTERIOR solely focuses on 
a past occurrence. Therefore, a specification of the occurrence time is essential. This specification 
can be explicitly given in the utterance, or anaphorically received form the discursive context (see 
section 3.2.2). It can be vague (e.g., in the evening, last month, etc.) or relatively precise (e.g., at eight 
past five). Below are given some English examples which illustrate the use of ANTERIOR in a deictic 
way: 
(5.15) The meeting started at six. 
(5.16) We went to the movies yesterday. 
(5.17) I was born in 1971. 
(5.18) He must have stopped working at five past six. 
(5.19) I wish he had come yesterday. 
                                                           
60 Imparfait has a number of uses which are not strictly temporal. See, for instance, De Mulder & Vetters 
(2002). 
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ANTERIOR can also appear relative to a temporal center displaced to past, especially when the 
speaker wants to emphasize a chronological relation, as seen in the second sentence below 
(PERFECT, which additionally implies a causal relevance to the displaced center, is more common 
than ANTERIOR in such contexts): 
(5.20) Yesterday at eight, I was still waiting for John. He had left his office at six. 
Most utterances traditionally identified as ‘past’, ‘preterit’ or ‘past perfective’ express the 
semantic category labeled as ANTERIOR here. ANTERIOR entails ‘perfectivity’ (unless it functions 
anaphorically; see ANTERIORANA in section 6.2.1, since it presents an occurrence (or a series of 
occurrences) as a whole and without reference to its temporal phases.61 But perfectivity, conceived 
as a purely semantic dimension, should not be strictly associated with ANTERIOR. For instance, most 
future utterances also present an occurrence as a single whole (see section 5.1.3 on POSTERIOR). 
Some languages have tense systems which distinguish ‘degrees of remoteness’ in the past (see, 
e.g., Comrie 1985: 83-101; Dahl 1985: 121-128; Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 98-104). Comrie 
(1999: 367) illustrates a three-partite past system in Haya (Bantu), symbolizing the three past tenses 
as P1, P2, and P3. As seen below, P1 is restricted to ‘today’, P2 to ‘yesterday’, and P3 to ‘before 
yesterday’. Within the current semantic framework, all three of these sentences would be analyzed 
as entailing ANTERIOR, with different (still schematic) specifications: 
(5.21) Twákôma mbwéènu/*nyéígolo/*íjo. 
‘We-tied-up (P1) today/*yesterday/*the day before yesterday.’ 
 (Comrie 1999: 367)  
(5.22) Tukomile *mbwéènu/nyéígolo/*íjo. 
‘We-tied-up (P2) *today/yesterday/*the day before yesterday.’ 
 (Comrie 1999: 367)  
 (5.23) Túkakôma *mbwéènu/*nyéígolo/íjo. 
‘We-tied-up (P3) *today/*yesterday/the day before yesterday.’ 
 (Comrie 1999: 367)  
Markers identified as instances of the category type PFV (and its variants), PAST (and its 
variants), and PLUPERFECT (PLPFCT) listed in Dahl (1985: 70, 115-116, 145) can be seen as 
entailing ANTERIOR as their primary semantic foci, many of which also conveying other semantic 
dimensions in their various uses. The semantic labels ‘simple past’ and ‘perfective’ in Bybee, 
Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 54-55) also match the definition of ANTERIOR as defined here.62 
                                                           
61 ‘Perfective aspect’ is defined in Comrie (1976: 16) as indicating “the view of the situation as a single 
whole, without distinctions of the various phases that make up the situation”. 
62 ‘Past’ and ‘perfective’ are distinguished in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994) (also in Dahl 1985) only on 
the basis of the availability of an ‘imperfective’ gram in a language:  
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5.1.3 POSTERIOR 
POSTERIOR is signaled in most utterances traditionally identified as involving future time reference. 
In English assertive utterances, POSTERIOR is typically expressed by the auxiliary verb will (5.24). 
The present tense can also be used, e.g., in ‘scheduled futures’ as in (5.25):  
(5.24) The repairman will come at nine. 
(5.25) The match starts at eight. 
Like ANTERIOR, POSTERIOR also entails ‘perfectivity’ (unless it makes part of an anaphoric time 
expression; see POSTERIORANA in section 6.2.1), because it also presents an occurrence in its totality, 
without concern for the internal stages of unfolding. 
POSTERIOR can be used relative to a backward-displaced temporal center, as the second 
sentence below illustrates:  
(5.26) I came home at six. The match would start at seven. 
Some languages have grammatical distinctions for different degrees of remoteness in the 
future. For instance, Bemba (Bantu) grammatically marks four degrees in future, in addition to the 
almost symmetrical four-way system for past (Givón 1972; cited in Chung & Timberlake 1985: 208-
209):  
(5.27) ba-áláá-bomba 
‘They’ll work (soon, within three hours).’ 
(5.28) ba-léé-bomba 
‘They’ll work (later today).’ 
(5.29) ba-kà-bomba 
‘They’ll work (tomorrow).’ 
(5.30) ba-ká-bomba 
‘They’ll work (after tomorrow).’ 
Some scholars attribute a ‘modal’ character to future, or consider it as an epistemic, rather 
than a temporal category, because of its inherent indeterminacy as to possible alternatives of 
unfolding. Within the current semantic framework, POSTERIOR is taken as a purely temporal 
category, and the sense of indeterminacy is attributed to the inherent contrast of ‘actuality’ vs. 
‘potentiality’ within the temporal domain. A future SoA can be associated with certainty as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Whether a particular gram is interpreted as past of perfective depends on whether the 
language in which it occurs has an imperfective and whether the gram in question contrasts 
with the imperfective, in which case it is a perfective, or co-occurs with it, in which case it is 
a past (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 51). 
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with epistemic modality.63 Although English will is used in both categorical (CERTAIN) and 
predictive (PROBABLE) futures, many languages grammatically distinguish these two uses. For 
instance, futures with -(y)AcAG in Turkish indicate personal certainty (5.31), while those with -Xr 
convey a less-than-certain judgment (5.32) (see also the discussion in section 8.4.8). Givón’s (1995: 
147) examples from Bemba illustrate a similar contrast: the future sentence in (5.33) conveys a 
higher degree of certainty than the one in (5.34), which uses a subjunctive (or, irrealis) marker:  
(5.31) Gel-ecek. 
come-(y)AcAG 
‘(S)he will/is going to come.’ 
(5.32) Gel-ir. 
come-Xr 
 ‘(S)he will probably / she may come.’ 
(5.33) a-kà-isa. 
s/he-FUT-come/INDIC 
‘She will come.’ 
 (Givón 1995: 147)  
(5.34) a-inga-isa. 
s/he-SUBJUN-come 
‘She may / might / could come.’ 
 (Givón 1995: 147) 
In languages which systematically mark a ‘realis’-’irrealis’ distinction in their grammar, it is 
mostly irrealis which is associated with POSTERIOR.64 An irrealis strategy (which can be expressed 
by a separate morpheme or by a choice between alternative verbal stems) may include POSTERIOR 
in its overall semantic range, as in the example (5.35) from Muyuw (Papuan Tip) (Bugenhagen 
1994; cited in Palmer 2001) and in example (5.36) from Mao Naga (Tibeto-Burman) (Bhat 1999: 67). 
An irrealis marker can also combine with a separate future marker, as seen in the Takelma 
(Penutian; extinct) sentence in (5.37) (Sapir 1912; cited in Chung & Timberlake 1985) and in the 
Serrano (Uto-Aztecan; nearly extinct) sentence in (5.38) (the ‘dubitative’ particle t(a) taken as an 
irrealis marker by Palmer 2001: 167): 
                                                           
63 Dahl (1985: 106) notes that “ ‘future time reference’ is a more constant element of [the category type] 
FUT, […] than the modal features of this category, which in most cases may or may not be present”. 
64 There are exceptions. For instance, the two future markers in Central Pomo are grammatically classified 
as realis (Chafe 1995: 358-359). 
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(5.35) yey b-a-n   Lae nubweg. 
I  IRR-1sg-go Lae tomorrow 
‘I will go to Lae tomorrow.’ 
 (Bugenhagen 1994: 18; cited in Palmer 2001: 145) 
(5.36) ai izo ocü vuta le.  
I today home go  IRREALIS 
‘I will go home today.’ 
 (Bhat 1999: 67)  
(5.37) yaná-t’e. 
go(IRR)-1sg(FUT) 
‘I will go.’ 
 (Sapir 1912; cited in Chung & Timberlake 1985: 204)  
(5.38) ‘i:p t  wahi’  pinkiv.  
here DUB coyote pass+FUT 
‘The coyote will pass here.’ 
 (Hill 1967: 21; cited in Palmer 2001: 167) 
Many languages mark ‘scheduled’ or ‘expected’ futures differently from categorical or 
predictive futures. One common strategy is the use of ‘present’ or ‘imperfective’ forms in such 
uses, as Comrie (1985) illustrates with the English sentence in (5.39). Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 
(1994) identify the Inuit (Eskimo-Aleut) suffix sussaa as a marker which exclusively conveys 
expected future (5.40):  
(5.39) The train departs at five o’clock tomorrow morning. (Comrie 1985: 47) 
(5.40) aqagu   avalattussaavunga 
tomorrow go.to.Denmark.is.to.1.s:INDIC 
‘Tomorrow I am to go to Denmark.’ 
 (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 250) 
Expressions of epistemic modality or of volitional moods often entail POSTERIOR, even when it 
is not expressed with a separate marker. For instance, the English auxiliary verbs may, might, and 
could (5.41) can signal POSTERIOR in addition to epistemic possibility (PROBABLE). POSTERIOR is also a 
semantic ingredient of most expressions of wish or hope (5.42) and directive utterances (5.43). In 
languages which use a double marking in directives, one of the markers is often a generalized 
irrealis marker (rather than a specific marker for future), as in the expression of obligation in 
Caddo (Southern Caddoan) (5.44): 
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(5.41) He may/might/could come tomorrow. 
(5.42) I hope he comes tomorrow. 
(5.43) Can you come back at five? 
(5.44) kas-sa-náy=?aw 
OBLIGATIVE-3RD.AGENT.IRREALLIS-sing 
‘He should/is supposed to sing.’ 
 (Chafe 1995: 356) 
Markers identified as instantiating the major category type FUT in Dahl (1985: 104) can be 
seen as entailing POSTERIOR as their primary semantic focus. POSTERIOR can also be identified in the 
less frequent category type PRED (which can also be used in habitual contexts), as well as in the 
grams identified as primarily conveying the ‘future’ meaning in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 
252-253). 
5.1.4 PERFECT 
The basic anchoring category PERFECT matches the ‘perfect aspect’ defined in Comrie (1976: 52) as 
indicating “the continuing present relevance of a past situation”. The four main types of perfects 
identified in Comrie (1976), namely, ‘perfect of result’, ‘perfect of recent past’, ‘experiential perfect’, 
and ‘persisting perfect’ all fit the schematic definition of PERFECT.65 They will be distinguished here 
with different specifications, as PERFECT/result/, PERFECT/recent past/, PERFECT/experience/ and 
PERFECT/persistent/.  
The element of ‘causal relevance’ inherent in the definition of PERFECT is most transparently 
visible in the perfect of result. For instance, (5.45) conventionally implies that John does not have 
his keys with him at the time of utterance. The sense of ‘experience’ involved in examples like 
(5.46) can also be construed as a causal consequence of past events. In a perfect of recent past as in 
(5.47), the occurrence is virtually adjacent to the temporal center, which directly makes it causally 
relevant to the temporal center.66 A persisting perfect as in (5.48) establishes a causal link between 
                                                           
65 In the ‘perfect of result’, “a present state is referred to as the continuing relevance of a previous 
situation” (Comrie 1976: 56). The ‘experiential perfect’ indicates “that a given situation has held at least once 
during some time in the past” (Comrie 1976: 58). The ‘perfect of recent past’ is used “where the present 
relevance of the past situation referred to is simply one of temporal closeness, i.e., the past situation is very 
recent” (Comrie 1976: 60). The ‘perfect of persisting situation’ (Comrie 1976: 60) is used for events or states 
which begun in the past and are still continuing at the reference time.  
66 As Comrie (1976: 60) puts it, “[…] while present relevance does not imply recentness, recentness may be 
a sufficient condition for present relevance”. 
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an ANTERIOR temporal range and the SIMULTANEOUS temporal location by indicating that a specific 
SoA obtains throughout the whole period.67 
(5.45) John has lost his keys. (PERFECT/result/) 
(5.46) Have you ever been to Stockholm? (PERFECT/experience/) 
(5.47) John has just left. (PERFECT/recent/) 
(5.48) John has been away for three months. (PERFECT/persisting/) 
PERFECT can also appear under the scope of a temporal displacement. (5.49) and (5.50) 
illustrate PERFECT/result/ and PERFECT/experience/ in temporal frames displaced to past, and 
(5.51), PERFECT/recent/ in one displaced to future: 
(5.49) I had to spend the night in a hotel because I had lost my keys. 
(5.50) When I was twenty, I had never been to New Zealand. 
(5.51) At five, he will just have arrived. 
Not all languages grammatically distinguish ANTERIOR (past perfective) from PERFECT. For 
instance, Turkish expresses both past perfective and different types of perfect (other than persisting 
perfect) with the suffix -DI (or -mIş in some morphosyntactic contexts) (see Kornfilt 1997: 349-351, 
Arslan 2001). Similarly, in spoken French, a combination of the auxiliary verbs avoir or être with the 
past participle form of the verb is used in expressing both categories. 
Dahl (1985: 130) gives a list of markers which code varieties of the cross-linguistic gram type 
PFCT, noting that it mostly receives periphrastic expression across languages (Dahl 1985: 129). 
Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 61-63) use the label ‘anterior’ rather than ‘perfect’, to avoid 
confusion caused by the similarity of the term ‘perfect’ to ‘perfective’. Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 
(1994: 64-65) give a list of markers from 43 languages, which exclusively convey the ‘anterior’ 
meaning (‘young anteriors’).  
PERFECT is often included in the semantic range of a more general marker which is also used 
for conveying e.g., state of result, new information, inference, or hearsay. For instance, Bybee, 
Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 79) provide a list of markers (‘old anteriors’) which can be used for 
‘anterior’ among other meanings in 25 languages. Li, Thompson & Thompson (1982) characterize 
the Chinese marker le as indicating ‘currently relevant state’, which includes not only temporal, but 
                                                           
67 ‘Persisting perfect’ is somewhat different from other types of perfect illustrated here, because it does not 
imply any immediate conditions at the temporal center other than the continued holding of the expressed 
SoA. Although it could have been delimited as a separate anchoring category on the semantic space of 
anchoring relations, for convenience, it will be taken here as a subcategory of PERFECT and labeled as 
PERFECT/persisting/. 
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also epistemic and illocutionary relevance. Anderson (1982) compares ranges of polyfunctionality 
of ‘perfect’ markers in English, Turkish, and Mandarin Chinese.  
5.1.5 PROSPECTIVE 
The anchoring category PROSPECTIVE implies present causes for a potential event in the future. A 
present cause may involve a decision, an intention, an energetic potential, or another sort of 
propensity towards a future event. Below are two examples from English. (5.52) conventionally 
implies John’s present decision or intention to resign, and (5.53) implies unfavorable factors at the 
time of utterance: 
(5.52) John is going to resign. 
(5.53) John is bound to fail.  
PROSPECTIVE is named after and conceived in the same way as what Comrie (1976: 64-65) dubs 
the ‘prospective aspect’ and characterizes as the mirror image of the perfect aspect. In his example 
below, Bill’s intention to throw himself off the cliff is conceived as “already present seeds of some 
future situation” (Comrie 1976: 65):  
(5.54) Bill is going to throw himself off from the cliff.   (Comrie 1976: 64, 65) 
Comrie subsumes expressions of ‘imminent future’ as in (5.55) and (5.56) under ‘prospective 
aspect’, since imminence automatically implies a causal connection to the current temporal state. 
Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 245-248) label similar uses as ‘immediate future’. In their 
examples from Baining (East Papuan) replicated in (5.57) and (5.58), the prefix i- conveys simple 
future and the particle sa expresses immediate future (sa is also used for perfective and imperative 
meanings): 
(5.55) The ship is about to sail.       (Comrie 1976: 64) 
(5.56) The ship is on the point of sailing.    (Comrie 1976: 64) 
(5.57) ik   g oa tes. 
FUT:1/2 1.s  eat 
‘I will eat.’ 
 (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 245)  
(5.58) sa     g oa tes. 
PERF/IMM FUT 1.s  eat 
‘I have eaten’ / ’I will eat immediately.’ 
 (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 245) 
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Imminent (or immediate) future is taken in the present framework as the mirror image of 
PERFECT/recent/, and represented as PROSPECTIVE/imminent/. 
PROSPECTIVE/imminent/ is also involved (along with WANTED) in most directive utterances, 
since they generally urge, invite or permit the addressee(s) to take action right away:  
(5.59) Can you open the window please? 
(5.60) Put him in jail! 
(5.61) You may go now. 
Dahl (1985: 111-112) notes that “there is some evidence for postulating a cross-linguistic 
category PROSP” and identifies the Sudanese (Semitic) marker bade, the French aller (+infinitive) 
and the Afrikaans (Germanic) gaan (+infinitive) constructions as conveying the prospective 
meaning. Grams which convey future with an additional element of ‘intention’ or ‘willingness’ in 
Dahl (1985: 106-108) and in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 256-257) can also be taken as 
expressing PROSPECTIVE in their semantic ranges, since intention and willingness count as potential 
causes for future actions. 
5.1.6 RECURRENT 
RECURRENT expresses repeated occurrences in a temporal range conceived around the temporal 
center. It can be associated with a frequency of occurrence which may range from ‘rarely’ to 
‘always’. The span of the temporal range and the frequency of occurrence may or may not be 
explicitly given. In English, a range can be specified by adverbials such as nowadays, recently, in 
recent years, today, these days, in our time, etc, and a frequency by rarely, sometimes, now and then, 
frequently, often, always, every Friday, in the evenings, etc. RECURRENT differs from the SoA-internal 
dimension (temporal type) ‘iterativity’ in that it specifies repetitions on different occasions rather 
than an iterative pattern on a single occasion. 
Below are some examples of RECURRENT with an achievement (5.62), an accomplishment 
(5.63), an activity (5.64) and a state (5.65). As seen in (5.66) and (5.67), RECURRENT can also be used 
relative to a backward- and forward-displaced temporal center: 
(5.62) John come by every now and then. 
(5.63) Mary cooks delicious pies nowadays.  
(5.64) Mary rarely cooks nowadays. 
(5.65) This boy stands in the same place every evening. 
(5.66) In the past, we rarely went to movies. 
(5.67) Next month, I will cook more often than I do now. 
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The definitions of ‘habitual aspect’ in Comrie (1976: 27-28) and in Smith (1997: 34-35) entail, 
but do not exactly match the definition of RECURRENT, since they do not necessarily involve 
repeated occurrences.68,69 Below are some of Comrie’s and Smith’s examples of ‘habitual aspect’ 
which match the anchoring category RECURRENT as defined here: 
(5.68) Sally used to throw stones at my window in the morning.  (Comrie 1976: 28)  
(5.69) We’re going to the opera a lot these days.       (Comrie 1976: 37) 
(5.70) At that time I was working the night shift.      (Comrie 1976: 37) 
(5.71) My cat eats mice frequently.           (Smith 1997: 34) 
(5.72) Fiona was often in love.            (Smith 1997: 34) 
(5.73) Ewa got up at noon last summer.         (Smith 1997: 35) 
Markers identified as instantiating the cross-linguistic category type HAB (and HABPAST) in 
Dahl (1985: 95-98) can be taken as containing RECURRENT in their semantic range, as they “express 
actions that take place habitually or repeatedly” (Dahl 1985: 95) and typically involve 
“quantification over a set of occasions which is given explicitly or by context” (Dahl 1985: 97). 
Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca’s (1994: 127, 153-154) semantic label ‘habitual’, characterized following 
Comrie (1976), subsumes both RECURRENT and ATEMPORAL, since it does not consistently 
distinguish repeated occurrences from gnomic or characterizing predications. The semantic label 
‘frequentative’ (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 127) also matches the schematic definition of 
RECURRENT, with the additional specification that the expressed event occurs frequently. 
5.1.7 ATEMPORAL 
ATEMPORAL presents the occurrence of a SoA without implying any temporal restriction relative to 
the temporal center. It can appear with generic subjects (i.e., kinds) as well as specific subjects (i.e., 
individuals), respectively yielding ‘gnomic’ utterances, as in (5.74) and (5.75), and ‘characterizing’ 
utterances, as in (5.76) and (5.77). Gnomic and characterizing utterances are similar in that they 
both denote a predication which is not restricted to any particular temporal location or temporal 
range. As such, they typically express an inherent or characteristic behavior or property of the 
subjects:  
                                                           
68 Comrie (1976: 26-32) subsumes under ‘habitual aspect’ regular occurrences in a period as well as gnomic 
and characterizing sentences (i.e., which refer to essential, inherent, or characteristic properties or behaviors of 
kinds or individuals). In Comrie (1985: 39-40), both (temporally restricted) habituals and gnomic-
characterizing sentences are subsumed under the rubric ‘present tense’. In the present framework, gnomic 
and characterizing sentences are analyzed as expressing ATEMPORAL rather than RECURRENT (see section 
4.5.1.6). 
69 Smith’s (1997) ‘habitual’ includes states which are relatively extended in time. Here, only utterances 
which involve repeated occurrences are taken as expressing RECURRENT; those which involve a single extended 
occurrence of a state are taken as expressing SIMULTANEOUS (see section 5.1.2). 
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(5.74) Cats see in the dark. 
(5.75 A whale is a mammal. 
(5.76) John is smart. 
(5.77) Marry adores ice cream. 
What are called ‘generic’ sentences in Dahl (1975, 1985) match the anchoring category 
ATEMPORAL defined here; they too may involve both kinds and individuals: “The characteristic 
property of those (generic) sentences is their ‘nomic’ or ‘lawlike’ character - they describe the 
typical or characteristic properties of a species, a kind, or an individual” (Dahl 1985: 99). Carlson’s 
(1977, 1989) definition of ‘generic sentences’ is also similar; they express properties of kinds or 
objects and do not refer to specific temporal stages. (5.78) and (5.79) are examples from Dahl (1975), 
(5.80) and (5.81) from Carlson (1989): 
(5.78) Beavers build dams.   (Dahl 1975: 99) 
(5.79) John smokes cigars.   (Dahl 1975: 99) 
(5.80) Dogs bark.      (Carlson 1989: 167) 
(5.81) The sun rises in the east.   (Carlson 1989: 167) 
Dahl (1985: 100) notes that cross-linguistically generic sentences tend to lack overt 
grammatical marking: “[…] ‘generic’ sentences seem to be the cases that are most often unmarked 
for TMA”. In English too, ATEMPORAL is typically expressed by the formally least marked TAM 
strategy, namely, the ‘present tense’, as seen in the examples above. But it can also be conveyed by 
the auxiliary verb will, as illustrated by the following sentence, which is identified by Bybee, 
Perkins, & Pagliuca (1994: 157) as conveying a ‘characteristic behavior’: 
(5.82) Water will boil at 100 degrees Celcius.  (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 157) 
ATEMPORAL does not specifically convey an actual occurrence at the temporal center. It rather 
presents the happening or obtaining of a SoA as independent of any specific time point or period. 
But this does not mean that it claims ‘eternal validity’.70 An utterance which expresses ATEMPORAL 
can be associated with temporal restrictions due to the presupposed lifetimes of SoA-participants 
(which are normally shorter for individuals than for kinds). For instance, (5.83) is true of John as 
we know him now; it does not say that John has always been and will always remain wise. 
Similarly, (5.84) is only true of typical cats as we know them today: 
                                                           
70 As ter Meulen (1986: 127) puts it, “the timeless or ‘eternal’ character of generic information does not 
mean such information remains true for once and for all. As with all other parts of our knowledge about the 
world, it is permanently up for revision”. 
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(5.83) John is a wise man. 
(5.84) Cats hate to get wet. 
The subjects of gnomic sentences can be coded in different ways. All three of ter Meulen’s 
(1986) examples below are gnomic sentences (dubbed ‘generic’ in ter Meulen), in that they denote a 
characteristic property or behavior of a species (rather than a definite entity). The subject is a bare 
plural in (5.85), it includes an indefinite article in (5.86) and a definite article in (5.87):71 
(5.85) Donkeys are stubborn.   (ter Meulen 1986: 124) 
(5.86) A donkey is stubborn.   (ter Meulen 1986: 124) 
(5.87) The donkey is stubborn.   (ter Meulen 1986: 124) 
In the literature on TAM categories, ‘temporal unrestrictedness’ (which is associated with 
ATEMPORAL here) is not always distinguished from the repeated occurrences in a certain temporal 
period (associated with RECURRENT here). For instance, Comrie (1976: 27-28) and Bybee, Perkins & 
Pagliuca (1994: 127, 153-154) tend to subsume both of these temporal values under what they call 
the ‘habitual’ meaning. 
Some languages grammatically distinguish ATEMPORAL from contingent temporality only in 
copular sentences. Comrie (1976: 104) reports that in Irish, the copular verb is conveys an ‘absolute’ 
state, while tá conveys a ‘contingent’ state (the same contrast is exhibited by Scots Gaelic 
opposition between is and tha). While the sentence in (5.88) “simply tells us that the paper is 
white”, that in (5.89) “implies that the whiteness of the paper is only a temporary state” Comrie 
(1976: 104). In terms of the semantic space of anchoring, the ‘absolute’ predication in (5.88) 
amounts to the signaling of ATEMPORAL, and the ‘contingent’ predication in (5.89), to that of 
SIMULTANEOUS: 
(5.88) Tá an páipéar bán. 
‘The paper is white.’ (as a property) 
 (Comrie 1976: 104) 
(5.89) Is bán an páipéar é. 
‘The paper is white.’ (as it stands now) 
 (Comrie 1976: 104) 
The same contrast is found between the Spanish copular verbs ser and estar (in non-locative 
contexts) (Comrie 1976: 106, Maienborn 2005), the Portuguese ser and estar (Comrie 1976: 106) and 
between the existence and lack of a pronominal copula in Hebrew (Greenberg 1994, 2002). Within 
                                                           
71 See Behrens (2000) for a typological study of how the coding of nominal arguments interacts with 
genericity. 
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the present semantic framework, the Spanish sentence in (5.90) and the Hebrew sentence in (5.92) 
would be analyzed as expressing ATEMPORAL and the corresponding sentences in (5.91) and (5.93) 
as expressing SIMULTANEOUS: 
(5.90) Juan es   enfermo. 
Juan ser.3SG ill 
‘Juan is ill (i.e., he is an invalid).’ 
 (Comrie 1976: 105)  
(5.91) Juan está  enfermo. 
Juan estar.3SG ill 
‘Juan is ill (i.e., he is now ill).’  
 (Comrie 1976: 105) 
(5.92) ha-Samayim  hem   kxulim. 
the-sky   3.PL.MASC blue 
‘The sky is blue (generally blue, blue by its nature).’ 
 (Ben David 1971; cited in Greenberg 1994: 54)  
(5.93) ha-Samayim  kxulim.  
the-sky   blue 
‘The sky is blue (now/today)’ 
 (Ben David 1971; cited in Greenberg 1994: 54) 
ATEMPORAL can also appear under the scope of a temporal displacement. An example is given 
in (5.94), which is taken by Dahl (1975, 1985: 100) as a generic sentence with past time reference. In 
terms of the semantic framework of anchoring, such sentences involve a temporal displacement to 
the past. Such temporal shifts are generally triggered by the temporal connotations of a SoA-
participant, such as dinosaurs in (5.94) below. This example will be seen as conveying ATEMPORAL 
under the scope of a temporal displacement, since it denotes a characteristic behavior of a kind, 
rather than expressing a contingent occurrence (or a series of occurrences) at a specific temporal 
point or in a specific temporal range: 
(5.94) Dinosaurs ate kelp.   (Dahl 1985: 100) 
Due to their rule-like and definitional character, gnomic statements are typically found in 
scientific and philosophical discourse. But they can also appear in casual talk and ordinary 
conversation, to provide information about properties and behavior of kinds or species. 
ATEMPORAL can be identified as the primary semantic focus of the cross-linguistic category 
type labeled as HABG in Dahl (1985: 98-100).  
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5.2 Epistemic Anchoring Categories 
The basic epistemic anchoring categories, which were defined in section 4.1 in terms of relative 
qualifications of ‘thoughts’, are characterized below in more usage-based terms. In the context of 
an utterance, 
• NEW INFORMATION presents a proposition as new and not well-integrated into the current 
knowledge state (i.e., it expresses a piece of immediate evidence.) 
• CERTAIN presents a proposition as already well-assimilated to the current knowledge state.  
• HYPOTHETICAL presents a proposition as unknown relative to the current knowledge state. 
• INFERRED expresses a definitive (certain) conclusion on the basis of immediate evidence. 
• CONJECTURED expresses a non-definitive (uncertain) conclusion on the basis of immediate 
evidence. 
• PROBABLE expresses an evaluation as to the likelihood of the truth of a proposition. It can 
specify a degree of probability which may range from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘virtually certain’. 
• GENERAL FACT presents a proposition as one for which the truth is taken as generally valid, 
rather than as being part of a personal knowledge base. 
Epistemic anchoring categories contrast to each other along three parameters: (i) whether or 
not they involve an evidential dependency (ii) whether or not they involve categorical certainty, (i) 
whether they involve general validity (strong factuality) or personal certainty (contingent 
knowledge). 
The categories which indicate evidentiality are NEW INFORMATION, INFERRED, and 
CONJECTURED.72 NEW INFORMATION is an evidential category simply because it conveys a piece of 
immediate evidence (i.e., a proposition which has newly come into awareness and not (yet) been 
integrated to the current knowledge state). INFERRED is evidential simply because it entails NEW 
INFORMATION; it conveys that a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of immediate evidence. Simply 
stated, while NEW INFORMATION expresses a piece of immediate evidence itself, INFERRED expresses 
what this evidence points to (what the speaker concludes from it). CONJECTURED differs from 
INFERRED in the degree of certainty it expresses for the conclusion of an evidence-based reasoning. 
While INFERRED involves a definitive conclusion (i.e., one associated with certainty), CONJECTURED 
involves a non-definitive one (one associated with hypotheticality). Although these evidential 
categories (especially NEW INFORMATION) are most easily identified in contexts where surprising (or 
                                                           
72 Any piece of information conveyed in language is based on some kind of evidence (subjective or 
objective, acquired via personal experience, introspection, reasoning, teaching, etc.). But in the present 
framework, an utterance is identified as evidential only if it (explicitly or implicitly) refers to a piece of 
evidence (or to the existence and/or type of a piece of evidence). 
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unexpected) information comes to light, ‘surprise’ (or, ‘mirativity’) is not a necessary ingredient in 
all their manifestations. 
The other epistemic categories, namely, CERTAIN, GENERAL FACT, PROBABLE and HYPOTHETICAL 
are non-evidential, because they indicate neither the existence nor the type of any evidence. Both 
CERTAIN and GENERAL FACT express categorical certainty. But while GENERAL FACT associates a 
proposition with general validity (e.g., expressions of world-knowledge, culturally-sanctioned 
knowledge, or encyclopedic information), CERTAIN presents a piece of information as contingent to 
the current, personal knowledge state (e.g., a piece of information acquired via direct experience). 
As such, GENERAL FACT denotes stronger factuality compared to CERTAIN. PROBABLE corresponds to 
the traditional category of ‘epistemic modality’. It expresses a (precisely or vaguely specified) 
degree of probability (which includes epistemic possibility and epistemic necessity) for the truth of 
a proposition, without indexing any evidential dependency. HYPOTHETICAL is similar to PROBABLE, 
because it too involves uncertainty and is non-evidential. But while PROBABLE expresses a (specific 
or vague) degree on a scale of probability, HYPOTHETICAL does not suggest any specific epistemic 
assessment; it merely identifies a proposition as one of which the truth is ‘unknown’.  
5.2.1 NEW INFORMATION 
NEW INFORMATION conveys a newly apprehended or an immediately significant piece of 
information. In its most typical manifestation, it expresses a piece of evidence which is manifest to 
the speaker at the time of utterance. It is generally (but not necessarily) coupled with an element of 
surprise or unexpectedness. It is different from INFERRED in that it does not imply any epistemic 
indirection (i.e., does not signal a conclusion inferred from evidence); it directly expresses the 
immediate evidence itself. 
NEW INFORMATION matches what Nichols (1986) calls ‘immediate meaning’. Nichols identifies 
this semantic dimension in the use of the Chinese Pidgin Russian marker est. Speakers can use est 
“in a more or less spontaneous reaction to a new, salient, often surprising event as it just happens” 
(Nichols 1986: 248).73 For instance, the sentence in (5.95) is uttered by Dersu Uzala, while he, 
“standing at a riverbank as a storm approaches, notices high water and remarks on it” (Nichols 
1986: 250).74 But the corresponding sentence in (5.96) without est does not convey any immediate 
reaction to a newly perceived situation: “Dersu has been aware for some time that a flood might 
take place” (Nichols 1986: 251):  
                                                           
73 Nichols (1986) also shows that est, when used with punctual verbs, can convey the ‘inferential’ meaning 
in past contexts (with third persons), and the ‘predictive’ meaning (e.g., prediction based on present evidence) 
in future contexts. 
74 Nichols (1986) uses a corpus which she draws from the writings of the ethnographer Arsen’ev (1960a, 
1960b), who recorded his linguistic interactions with his Tungusic guide in Chinese Pidgin Russian. The two 
sentences given here are of Arsen’ev’s Nanai guide Dersu Uzala. 
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(5.95) Voda  pribavljaj  est. 
water  rise   est 
‘The water’s RISING.’  
 (Arsen’ev 1960a: 42; cited in Nichols 1986: 250) 
(5.96) Kamni smotrju: voda  pribavljaj. 
rocks  look  water  rise 
‘I’m looking at the rocks: the water’s rising.’ 
 (Arsen’ev 1960b: 47; cited in Nichols 1986: 250) 
NEW INFORMATION partly overlaps with the meaning of the grammatical category ‘mirative’, 
defined in DeLancey (1997: 35-36, 2001: 369, 379) as marking information which is ‘new to the 
speaker’.75 For instance, the Hare (Athapaskan) sentence-final particle lõ, discussed in DeLancey 
(1997: 38-40), can convey NEW INFORMATION when used with imperfective verbs. (It can also code 
‘inference’ or ‘hearsay’, especially with perfective verbs). For instance, (5.97) could be uttered “on 
finding someone who was supposed to be an abstainer putting a glass of liquor to his lips” 
(DeLancey 1997: 40). In a similar example (5.98) from Western Apache (Athapaskan), de Reuse 
(2003: 81) identifies the particle ląą (which is the cognate of the Hare lõ) as “more fundamentally a 
mirative than an inferential”. The prefix rahe- in the Nepali (Indo-Iranian) example in (5.99), which 
is uttered upon the speaker’s instantaneous realization of the beauty of a lake (Michailovsky 1996; 
cited in Lazard 2000), also expresses NEW INFORMATION:  
(5.97) ĩdõ  lõ. 
drink.2 lõ  
‘You’re drinking!’ 
 (Delancey 1997: 40)  
(5.98) Kīī  Nnēē itisgo nłt’ēēgo         ch’idits’ad      ląą! 
he  Apache more 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.good=SUB  SG.IMPERF.ASP.understand MIR 
‘He understands Apache better!’  
 (de Reuse 2003: 81)  
                                                           
75 Under ‘mirativity’ DeLancey (1997: 36) covers semantic dimensions variously described as information 
for which the speaker is ‘not prepared’ (Slobin & Aksu 1982), ‘non-expected’ information (Egerod & Hansson 
1974), ‘new knowledge’ (DeLancey 1986, 1990) and ‘immediate meaning’ (Nichols 1986). But ‘mirative’ 
(DeLancey 1997, 2001; Guentchéva 1996a,b and Lazard 1996, 1999, 2000) and ‘admirative’ (Friedman 1986, 
2000, 2003) include not only direct expressions of newly emerged evidence, but often also inferences based on 
such evidence. In the present framework, NEW INFORMATION is restricted to the former case, and markers 
which signal a change in the knowledge state due to a direct or indirect inference are taken as expressing 
INFERRED rather than (just) NEW INFORMATION (see section 5.2.4). Moreover, while ‘mirative’ and ‘admirative’ 
entail ‘surprise’ by definition, surprise is not taken a here s a necessary ingredient of NEW INFORMATION.  
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(5.99) āhā , kasto rāmro  pokhrī rahecha! 
ah  que beau  lac   est 
‘Ah! qu’il est beau, le lac!’ 
 (Michailovsky 1996: 111; cited in Lazard 2000: 211) 
English does not possess any grammatical opposition which consistently distinguishes old (or 
well-integrated) information (CERTAIN) from new (or not integrated) information (NEW 
INFORMATION). But DeLancey (2001: 377) states that mirativity can be expressed in English by a 
special intonational pattern, which is “an exaggerated version of the declarative intonation, with 
the tonic rise considerably higher”. Brisard (2002b) goes one step further and illustrates the use of 
the English progressive for expressing surprise. Brisard (2002b: 270) suggests that the 
‘imperfectivization’ in (5.100) below indicates that the subject’s behavior “is not what one would 
expect, given what is known about the subject, but that it constitutes something of a surprise”: 
(5.100) You are being silly.      (Brisard 2002b: 270) 
Brisard’s observation as to the association of the English progressive with surprise is in line 
with Nichols’ (1986: 254-256) generalization as to the covariance of ‘perfectivity’ with the 
‘inferential’ meaning (INFERRED as defined here), and of imperfectivity with the ‘immediate’ 
meaning (NEW INFORMATION as defined here). As Nichols also proposes, the ‘immediate’ meaning 
(NEW INFORMATION) is most likely combined with present continuous (SIMULTANEOUS), because it 
will often be conditioned by the perception of newly emerging and currently ongoing situations. 
(5.101) and (5.102) below illustrate English expressions in which both SIMULTANEOUS and NEW 
INFORMATION (with surprise) are signaled.  
(5.101) There is a cat on my bed!  
 (e.g., the speaker enters the room and sees a cat sitting on her bed.) 
(5.102) You are still working! (e.g., the speaker finds the addressee working at a very late hour.) 
But NEW INFORMATION is not strictly coupled with SIMULTANEOUS. As illustrated by the 
following expressions of surprise, it can also be there in expressions about relatively recent events 
(PERFECT/recent/) (5.103), imminent happenings (PROSPECTIVE/imminent/) (5.104), and even in 
expressions of newly discovered facts concerning habitual or gnomic SoAs (ATEMPORAL) (5.105): 
(5.103) The man has jumped to the river! 
(5.104) The man is going to jump to the river! 
(5.105) These rats see in the dark! (e.g., a recent discovery by a biologist) 
NEW INFORMATION does not necessarily convey that the expressed piece of information is new 
for the speaker (which is, nonetheless, mostly the case in causal speech). It can also be identified 
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when a piece of information is presented as new or immediately significant relative to the 
knowledge state of the addressee(s) (for instance, in reporting ‘hot news’), or relative to a 
knowledge state assumed to be shared by the interlocutors (e.g., in the informative segments of an 
argumentative discourse). 
5.2.2 CERTAIN 
CERTAIN expresses a contingent piece of information which is well-integrated to the current 
knowledge state, without indexing any evidence. In its most typical manifestation, it expresses the 
speaker’s personal knowledge, which can be based on her experience, observation, perception, 
introspection, or on information received from another source. 
The semantic enclosure of CERTAIN includes what Faller (2002) calls ‘personal information’ (as 
opposed to ‘encyclopedic information’), which she characterizes as “information about events in 
the speaker’s private life” (Faller 2002: 18, 133). DeLancey’s (2001) characterization of ‘unmarked 
knowledge status’ also largely matches the anchoring category CERTAIN defined here: 
The unmarked knowledge status is a proposition which is known by the speaker 
by direct experience, is assumed to be certainly true, and is fully consistent with 
the rest of speaker’s knowledge of the world (DeLancey 2001: 380). 
CERTAIN is grammatically unmarked in English: 
(5.106) John lives in the neighborhood. 
(5.107) He was here yesterday. 
(5.108) John is working hard nowadays. 
(5.109) They will be in Ankara next week. 
In languages which grammatically mark evidential distinctions, one often encounters 
paradigms labeled as ‘direct evidence’, ‘direct experience’, ‘unmarked evidential’, or ‘visual’. In 
some cases, a closer inspection may reveal that these actually express personal certainty without 
specifically indexing the existence of any piece of evidence. For instance, Aikhenvald (2003b: 134) 
identifies -naka in the present, -ka in the recent past and -na in the remote past as constituting the 
‘visual’ paradigm in Tariana (Maipuran; nearly extinct). An example with -ka is replicated in 
(5.110) below. In the current framework, this paradigm is taken as signaling CERTAIN (rather than 
one of the evidential categories NEW INFORMATION, INFERRED or CONJECTURED), because it is not 
only used for information acquired through seeing, but also for “events for which speaker takes 
full responsibility and/or has personal involvement” (Aikhenvald 2003b: 136).76 The same holds 
                                                           
76 The semantic range of the Tariana ‘visual’ also seems to cover GENERAL FACT, as it is also used for 
“generally known” facts (Aikhenvald 2003b: 136). 
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with what Barnes (1984: 257, 259) (as well as Palmer 2001: 36-37 and Aikhenvald 2004: 60, 86) 
identifies as the ‘visual’ paradigm in Tuyuca (Tucanoan), since it is used not only for events 
actually observed by the speaker, but also for “those he himself is the actor” as in (5.111), as well as 
for “ ‘timeless’ expressions that are within the realm of the speaker’s experience” (Barnes 1984: 259) 
as in (5.112): 
(5.110) Ceci  tfinu-nuku   du-kwisa-ka. 
Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3sgf-scold-REC.P.VIS 
‘Cecília scolded the dog (I saw it).’ 
 (Aikhenvald 2003b: 134)  
(5.111) atí-w. 
‘I came.’ 
 (Barnes 1984: 259)  
(5.112) sa kõne a hıı-a. 
‘We call them woodpeckers.‘ 
 (Barnes 1984: 259)  
5.2.3 HYPOTHETICAL 
HYPOTHETICAL presents a proposition as merely unknown but possible. It neither conveys any 
estimation of likelihood nor indexes any immediate evidence.  
Giridhar (1994: 309-310) reports that the construction v-e v in Mao Naga (Tibeto-Burman), 
where v denotes a verb and -e is a concessive mood marker, can be used to convey what he calls 
‘Stressed Possibility’ (in addition to its use for ‘Unconcerned Neglect’). The meaning expressed by 
this construction fits well the epistemic category HYPOTHETICAL as defined here: 
(5.113) sibo-no hayi  sho-e  sho-tie  (pe-loshüe) 
Sibo  ricebeer drink-e drink-that can’t say 
‘It is possible that Sibo drank ricebeer (can’t say).’ 
 (Giridhar 1994: 310) 
HYPOTHETICAL is somehow similar to PROBABLE, which is the anchoring category used for 
expressing epistemic modality. But unlike PROBABLE, it does not express any estimation as to the 
degree of likelihood of a proposition. In Mao Naga, a degree of likelihood is expressed by another 
suffix, namely, -amolo (which is labeled as ‘Dubitative’ in Giridhar 1994: 308-309; see section 5.2.6 
on PROBABLE): 
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(5.114) pfo ta-amoloe. 
he  go-may/might 
‘He may/might go.’ 
 (Giridhar 1994: 309) 
Although HYPOTHETICAL is not differentially marked in English, it can be identified in 
utterances like (5.115) and (5.116) below. The second example involves the designation of this 
category by the adjectival predicate possible:  
(5.115) He may have died or not. (e.g., I have no idea) 
(5.116) It is possible that he died. (e.g., I have no idea) 
HYPOTHETICAL is involved in directive utterances and in most statements of wish (other than 
counterfactual ones, which express negated certainty). All of the following sentences, besides 
signaling the volitional anchoring category WANTED, entail HYPOTHETICAL as a non-prominent 
epistemic category. They do not specify any particular epistemic evaluation for the future action 
they designate, but only presuppose mere possibility as to its occurrence: 
(5.117) I wish he comes with us. 
(5.118) Stay here! 
(5.119) Can you open the window? 
5.2.4 INFERRED 
INFERRED is a typical evidential category; it expresses a definitive conclusion on the basis of 
immediate evidence. By definition, ıt entails NEW INFORMATION in its semantic constitution. Hence, 
just like NEW INFORMATION alone, it may or may not entail an element of surprise. 
In his discussion of the Hare (Athapaskan) particle lõ, DeLancey (1997: 38-40, 2001: 375-378) 
gives an example of a definitive (certain) inference. The sentence in (5.120) is appropriate if the 
speaker has actually witnessed a bear’s walking around at the specified location. But in a context in 
which “a speaker has just come out of the house in the morning and finds bear tracks around the 
door”, she would utter the inferential sentence in (5.121) (The particle lõ has uses other than 
inference. In addition to ‘hearsay’, it can convey ‘mirativity’ without inference when used with 
imperfective verbs; see NEW INFORMATION in section 5.2.1): 
(5.120) júhye   sa  k’ínayeda. 
hereabout bear SG.go.around/3SG.SUBJ/PERF 
‘There was a bear walking around here.’ 
 (DeLancey 2001: 375)  
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(5.121) júhye   sa  k’ínayeda       lõ. 
hereabout bear SG.go.around/3SG.SUBJ/PERF  lõ 
‘I see there was a bear walking around here.’ 
 (DeLancey 2001: 375)  
The Turkish marker -mIş, in addition to its other uses, typically expresses inference (see, e.g., 
Slobin & Aksu 1982, Johanson 2003, and section 8.1.2 in the current work). For instance, a speaker 
of Turkish would use -mIş in the inferential context described for (5.121) above:  
(5.122) Burada bir  ayı yürü-müş. 
here  a  bear walk-mIş 
‘(I understand that/ it turns out that) There was a bear walking around here.’ 
English has no grammatical marker for INFERRED. The English auxiliary must is sometimes 
taken as involving evidentiality (see, e.g., van der Auwera & Plungian 1998, Palmer 2001: 34-35). 
Although must can be used for ‘non-definitive’ inferences (see CONJECTURED in section 5.2.5 for 
such evidential uses of must), it is not used for expressing ‘definitive’ conclusions. For instance, in 
the context given for (5.121) and (5.122) above, an English speaker who is certain that the footsteps 
are of a bear would utter (5.123) rather than (5.124):77 
(5.123) A bear has walked around here. 
(5.124) A bear must have walked around here. 
Below are some examples of grammatical markers of INFERRED. (5.125) illustrates the Mao 
Naga (Tibeto-Burman) marker -ahi, characterized by Giridhar (1994: 338) as conveying ‘virtually 
infallible’ inferences. Aikhenvald (2003b: 135) illustrates the ‘specific inferred’ marker in Tariana 
(Maipuran) with the sentence in (5.126), which can be uttered in a context where the speaker “saw 
Cecília with a stick in her hand, and the scarred dog running away” (ni-hka is the recent past form 
of ‘specific inferred’): 
                                                           
77 van der Auwera & Plungian (1998: 85-86) equate ‘inferential evidentiality’ with ‘epistemic necessity’ (see 
also Plungian 2001: 354). These two dimensions are distinguished in the current framework: Epistemic 
necessity (PROBABLE/high/; see section 5.2.6) expresses a less-than-certain judgment without expressing any 
evidential dependency. And an evidential utterance may involve either categorical certainty (INFERRED; see 
section 5.2.4) or less-then-certainty (CONJECTURED; see section 5.2.5). While van der Auwera & Plungian (1998: 
85-86) take English must as expressing a single semantic category in which inference and epistemic necessity 
overlap, must is identified here as expressing either epistemic necessity (PROBABLE/high/) or a non-certain 
inference (CONJECTURED) in different contexts.  
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(5.125) pfano idu   rü-oTi-ahi. 
he  yesterday write-IRRELEVANT-INFERRED 
‘He must have written yesterday.’78 
 (Giridhar 1994: 338; cited in Bhat 1999: 69)  
(5.126) Ceci  t∫inu-nuku   du-kwisa-nihka. 
Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-scold-SPEC.INFR.REC.P 
‘Cecília scolded the dog.’ (I infer it on the basis of obvious evidence). 
 (Aikhenvald 2003b: 135) 
An utterance can signal, in addition to the existence of some evidence, the sensory type of the 
evidence. Such utterances can fit the schematic definition of INFERRED, as they index the existence 
of sensory evidence (they will match CONJECTURED if the conclusion is signaled as uncertain). The 
type of evidence (or, mode of perception) can be indicated by an explicitly designated perception 
verb, as in the English examples (5.127) and (5.128) below. It can also be specified by an adverbial 
constituent, as in (5.129). Languages may also possess grammatical markers for different modes of 
perception. For instance, the evidential marking in the Foe (Trans-New Guinea) sentence in (5.130) 
indicates that the speaker ‘sees’ the coming of an airplane (Rule 1977: 71-74; cited in Aikhenvald 
2004). Similarly, Aikhenvald (2004: 37) (with reference to Linn 2000 and Mithun 1999: 571) reports 
that the Euchee (isolate, USA) sentence with ‘auditory evidential’ marking given in (5.131) “can be 
rephrased with a lexical verb ‘hear’ ”.79 
(5.127) I can see that he is very tired. 
(5.128) I hear him approach. 
(5.129) As I can see, he is very tired. 
(5.130) aiya bare  wa-boba’ae. 
air plane  come-VIS.EV 
‘An airplane is coming.’ (can see it: VISUAL) 
 (Rule 1977; Aikhenvald 2004: 62) 
                                                           
78 Giridhar and Bhat translate this sentence using must, as is often done in rendering inferential sentences 
into English. But phrases such as it turns out that or I now realize that are more appropriate for such definitive 
(infallible) inferences. 
79 The Foe and Euchee examples here represent relatively clear cases of grammatical marking of the 
sensory type of evidence. As already mentioned under CERTAIN (section 5.2.2), many examples of ‘visual 
paradigm’ in the evidentiality literature are not clear as to whether they unequivocally specify the mode of 
perception as ‘visual’ or just express a contingent, personal certainty (i.e., CERTAIN here). Similarly, some 
examples of ‘non-visual sensory’ or ‘auditory’ marking in the literature may well turn out to express a non-
definitive conclusion on the basis of partial or unclear evidence (i.e., CONJECTURED) without indicating any 
specific mode of perception. 
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(5.131) ‘ahe ‘i-gō-ke. 
here 3sg.ACTOR-come-AUD.EV 
‘They are coming (I hear them).’ 
 (Aikhenvald 2004: 37) 
In the grammatical expression of INFERRED, the conventionally implied evidence can be a very 
direct indication of the expressed conclusion. For instance, the appearance of a person can be 
construed as evidence for that person’s having come, a feeling of taste for a dish’s being delicious, 
a sensation of pain for one’s having cut one’s finger, etc. Such utterances will be taken as signaling 
INFERRED (based on direct evidence) rather than (just) NEW INFORMATION if they indicate that the 
speaker has discovered something that has been manifest for some time ‘only now’ (i.e., if they 
signal a recent change in the knowledge state, or a component of ‘I-didn’t-know-before’). This is 
because such an indication points to a (however minimal) process of reasoning from a piece of 
evidence to a conclusion, which fits the definition of INFERRED rather than that of NEW 
INFORMATION. This subtype of INFERENCE, which involves ‘direct’ or ‘unmediated’ evidence, will be 
represented here as INFERRED/direct/. 
The uses of Turkish suffix -mIş identified by Slobin & Aksu (1982) as expressing ‘surprise’ 
nicely illustrate INFERRED/direct/. For instance, (5.132) can be uttered in a context where “the 
speaker hears someone approach, opens the door, and sees Kemal - a totally unexpected visitor” 
(Slobin & Aksu 1982: 187). Similar utterances are illustrated in Laprade (1981) and in Faller (2002). 
Laprade (1981: 223-224) illustrates the use of ‘pluperfect’ in Spanish dialect of Paceño in conveying 
“surprise and nonpersonal knowledge upon encountering an unknown or something seen for the 
first time that occurred without one realizing it” (Laprade 1981: 223; see also Fleischman 1989: 28-
30). One of Laprade’s examples is replicated in (5.133) below. Similarly, Faller (2002: 31) 
exemplifies the use of the Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan) ‘past participle’ suffix -sqa in a context in 
which the speaker is “surprised at finding out” that Marya is there (5.134):  
(5.132) Kemal gel-miş! 
Kemal come-mIş 
‘Kemal came.’ 
 (Slobin & Aksu 1982: 187)  
(5.133) Me había cortado mi dedo. 
‘Oh! I cut my finger! (I hadn’t realized)’ 
 (Laprade 1981: 224; cited in Fleischman 1989: 29)  
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(5.134) Kay-pi-má ka-sha-sqa  Marya-qa.  
this-LOC-má be-PROG-sqa  Marya-TOP 
‘Marya is here.’ 
 (Faller 2002: 31) 
Friedman’s (2003: 197, 200) examples for the Albanian admirative (which “expresses surprise 
at unexpected new information based on immediate observation”) and for the Macedonian l-past, 
replicated in (5.135) and (5.136) below, also fit the definition of INFERRED/direct/ (with surprise) 
rather than just NEW INFORMATION, as they conventionally signal a component of 
‘I-didn’t-know-before’. Most of the ‘mirative’ examples in DeLancey (1997, 2001) are similar. For 
instance, the Hare (Athapaskan) sentence with lõ in (5.137) can be uttered by a speaker who “has 
just gone to Mary’s house and found her working on a hide, with no prior expectation of that being 
the case” (DeLancey 1997: 39). Similarly, a speaker of Lhasa Tibetan (Tibeto-Burman) “who reaches 
into his pocket and discovers money that he didn’t know he was carrying” (DeLancey 1997: 44) 
would use the existential copula ‘dug (5.138) (rather than yod) in order to signal that he has just 
discovered something that he did not know before: 
(5.135) Ti  kërcye-k-e    shumë mirë! 
you dance-ADM-PRES-2SG very  well 
‘You dance very well!’ 
 (August 1995; cited in Friedman 2003: 197)  
(5.136) Ti  si  bi-l  Rom! Ne  sum    znae-l!  
you be+PRES+2SG Rom NEG be+PRES+1SG know-L+MASC 
‘You’re a Rom! I didn’t know!’ 
 (Friedman 2003: 200)  
(5.137) Mary e-wé’  ghálayeda lõ. 
Mary its-hide work.IMPF lõ 
‘Mary is working on hides.’ 
 (DeLancey 1997: 39)  
(5.138) nga-r dnugul tog=tsam  ‘dug. 
I-LOC money some   exist 
‘I have some money.’ (quite to my surprise) 
 (DeLancey 1997: 44) 
As can be seen in the examples above, INFERENCE mostly combines with the temporal 
categories ANTERIOR, PERFECT or SIMULTANEOUS. This is simply because direct or indirect evidence 
mostly comes from the perception of what has already happened or happening at the time of 
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utterance.80 But INFERRED can also combine with other temporal categories, as seen in the Paceño 
Spanish sentence below, which includes a ‘habitual’ (ATEMPORAL) content (Laprade 1981: 224; cited 
in Fleischman 1989: 30): 
(5.139) Habían sabido fumar. 
‘They do smoke (I just found out).’ 
 (Laprade 1981: 224; cited in Fleischman 1989: 30) 
The conclusion expressed by INFERRED can be totally contrary to what the speaker had known 
before. Some languages have special strategies which emphasize such an element of contrariness. 
One example is the combination of ‘Inferential II’ -bi- and ‘Absolutive’ -w in Kashaya (Hokan) 
(5.140) (Oswalt 1986; cited in Palmer 2001: 55). Similarly, the Turkish sentence initial particle meğer 
‘to my surprise’, used in addition to -mIş, emphasizes contrariness to the previous knowledge state, 
as illustrated with Taylan’s (2000) example in (5.141): 
(5.140) khe hí?baya=?-bi-w. 
my man-ASS-INF-ABSOL 
‘It turned out to be my man.’ 
 (Oswalt 1986: 42; cited in Palmer 2001: 55) 
(5.141) Meğer   o  ne  kadar  akıllı-ymış. 
to.my.surprise (s)he how much  smart-EPASTe 
‘How smart he is!’ 
 (Taylan 2000: 135) 
Grammatical markers of INFERRED are often polysemous and may include ‘resultative’, 
‘perfect’, ‘mirative’ and ‘hearsay’ in their semantic ranges (see, for instance, Bybee, Perkins & 
Pagliuca 1994: 95-97, and various contributions in Johanson & Utas 2000 and in Aikhenvald & 
Dixon 2003). In the present framework, ‘hearsay’ (i.e., second-hand linguistic information, often 
also labeled as ‘report’ or ‘quotative’) is distinguished from INFERRED and other evidential 
categories. Conditions of use of ‘hearsay’ and INFERRED can be similar, and many languages 
grammatically express both dimensions in the same way. But while INFERRED involves the 
speaker’s own reasoning in reaching a conclusion (on the basis of immediate evidence) ‘hearsay’ 
only transmits what she has heard from another illocutionary source (with or without an element 
of commitment). Hence, from a purely semantic perspective, ‘hearsay’ is not an evidential 
category. In section 6.2.3 it will be analyzed as a specific type of volitional displacement, on a par 
with indirect or reported speech. 
                                                           
80 See Nichols (1986: 254-256), who proposes a universal covariance between ‘perfective’ (past) and 
‘inferential’ on the one hand, and ‘imperfective’ (present) and ‘immediate’ on the other. 
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5.2.5 CONJECTURED 
CONJECTURED expresses a non-definitive (uncertain) conclusion on the basis of immediate evidence. 
While in INFERRED the evidence is full or clear (hence leads to a CERTAIN conclusion), in 
CONJECTURED the evidence is partial or non-clear (so that the conclusion remains essentially 
HYPOTHETICAL).  
In English, CONJECTURED generally appears as a designated anchoring relation, e.g., with the 
impersonal predicates appear or seem (5.142 and 5.143). It can also be specified with adverbs like 
seemingly or apparently (5.144):81 
(5.142) It seems/appears that Mary left long ago. (e.g., after inspecting Mary’s room) 
(5.143) John seems to/appears to have failed the exam. (e.g., upon noticing John’s bad temper)  
(5.144) Apparently/seemingly, John failed the exam. (e.g., upon noticing John’s bad temper) 
A grammatical marker of CONJECTURED (like one of INFERRED) may signal the type of sensory 
evidence (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile etc.) in addition to the existence of a piece of evidence. For 
instance, the ‘uncertain visual’ marker -caqi in the Makah (Wakashan; extinct) sentence in (5.145) 
(from Palmer 2001) conveys a less-then-certain judgment, specifying the mode of perception for the 
evidence as ‘visual’: 
(5.145) čapaccaqil. 
‘It looks like a canoe’.  
 (Palmer 2001: 50) 
The English auxiliary must is mostly used to convey a high degree of probability, without 
specifically indexing any piece of evidence (see PROBABLE in section 5.2.6). But it can also be used in 
contexts where immediate, circumstantial evidence strongly (but not definitively) points to a 
conclusion. DeLancey (2001) exemplifies the use of must in an evidential context: 
(5.146) He must have gotten lost. (e.g. “of someone who has failed to show up when expected”.) 
 (DeLancey 2001: 370) 
The meaning conveyed by the Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan) enclitic-particle combination -chu 
hina, discussed in Faller (2002: 173-176), also fits the anchoring category CONJECTURED as defined 
here.82 Like -chá (see example (5.169) in section 5.2.5), -chu hina indicates a less-than-certain 
conclusion. But unlike -chá, it also indexes the existence of immediate evidence. For instance, a 
Cuzco Quechua speaker who uses a pair of binoculars to scan a village may utter (5.147) “if (s)he is 
                                                           
81 Apparently may indicate a ‘definitive’ judgment too (i.e., can be used in the sense of evidently or 
obviously). In such cases it should be analyzed as expressing INFERRED rather than CONJECTURED. 
82 Faller (2002) labels -chá, and not -chu hina as a ‘conjectural enclitic’. Here I identify -chu hina as conveying 
CONJECTURED. This is only a terminological discrepancy. 
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too far away to get a clear view even with binoculars, […] in order to indicate that (s)he has direct, 
but unclear evidence” (Faller 2002: 175). Similarly, (5.148) can be uttered, e.g., when the speaker 
thinks she has recognized Marya’s step on the stairs: 
(5.147) Mario-qa  wasi-n-ta-chu hina  llinphi-sha-n. 
Mario-TOP house-3P-ACC-chu hina paint-PROG-3P 
‘Mario is painting his house.’ 
 (Faller 2002: 175)  
(5.148) Chay-qa Marya-chu hina. 
this-TOP Marya-chu hina 
‘This appears to be Marya.’ 
 (Faller 2002: 175) 
The Mao Naga (Tibeto-Burman) marker le, in combination with -oTi, also seems to mark 
CONJECTURED as defined here. Unlike -ahi, which can be used for definitive conclusions (see 
example (5.125) in section 5.2.4), it conveys a weak inference in a context where the evidence is not 
‘infallible’ or ‘reliable’ (Giridhar 1994: 338; cited in Bhat 1999: 69-70): 
(5.149) pfano  idu   rü-oTi    le. 
he   yesterday write-IRRELEVANT IRREALIS (Glosses from Bhat 1999) 
‘He must have written yesterday.’ 
 (Giridhar 1994: 337; cited in Bhat 1999: 69) 
Another marker which appears to express CONJECTURED is the Western Apache (Athapaskan) 
particle goln īī. de Reuse (2003: 81-82) identifies it as a ‘non-mirative inferential’ particle and 
comments that it is often translated into English as ‘I think’, ‘it seems like’, or ‘apparently’. He 
illustrates it with “a statement by a father inferring on his children’s wishes”: 
(5.150) Chaghąshé doo áku nádabini’    da  golnīī. 
children  NEG there 3PL.want.to.go.back NEG INF.NON.MIR 
 ‘I think the children do not want to go back there.’ 
 (de Reuse 2003: 81-82) 
5.2.6 PROBABLE 
PROBABLE expresses an estimation of likelihood. It can present a proposition vaguely as likely or 
signal a more fine-tuned probability ranging from very unlikely to virtually certain. It hence 
closely matches the traditional category ‘epistemic modality’.  
PROBABLE is a non-evidential category, because it does not specifically index (neither directly 
express nor imply) the existence of any piece of evidence. It is rather based on the speaker’s general 
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knowledge, observation of regular occurrences, previous assumptions, or expectations. In this 
respect, PROBABLE is associated with Palmer’s (1986) class of ‘judgments’ (Palmer 1986: 57-66) 
rather than that of ‘evidentials’ (Palmer 1986: 66-76).  
PROBABLE was defined in section 5.2.6 as expressing a quantificational value over a range of 
thoughts close to the epistemic center (the current knowledge state). This may sound 
counterintuitive at first, since it would be natural to think that an expression of epistemic 
possibility or necessity expresses ‘just one thought’ rather than a range of thoughts. But the 
definition captures the fact that when a speaker presents a proposition as ‘probably true’, she 
allows not only epistemic representations of the world (thoughts) in which the proposition holds 
but also those in which it does not hold.83 
Different languages may grammatically partition the scale of probability differently. One often 
finds an opposition between relatively low (or medium) and relatively high degrees of probability 
(i.e., ‘epistemic possibility’ and ‘epistemic necessity’). This opposition, captured here as 
PROBABLE/low/ (or PROBABLE/medium/) vs. PROBABLE/high/, is expressed by the auxiliary verbs 
may and must in English: 
(5.151) John may have failed the exam. 
(5.152) John must have failed the exam. 
In English, PROBABLE can also be expressed with epistemic adverbs, e.g., with probably as in 
(5.153) below. It also takes part in the meanings of mental state predicates such as think, suppose, or 
assume (5.154) or predicative adjectives such as likely, unlikely, or probable (5.155): 
(5.153) She has probably left 
(5.154) I think/assume/suppose she has left. 
(5.155) It is unlikely/probable/likely that she has left. 
In what Dancygier (1993, 1998) calls ‘predictive conditionals’ in English, will (or its past form 
would) conveys a high degree of probability in combination with future time reference, as shown in 
(4-6) below. Within the current framework, the apodoses of these sentences are analyzed as  
 
                                                           
83 This idea of ‘quantification over a range of thoughts’ is basically similar to the idea of ‘quantification 
over possible worlds’ in modal logic, where the modal value of a proposition is expressed in terms of the 
possible worlds in which it is true and those in which it is false (e.g., Hintikka (1962), Kripke (1963), Lewis 
(1986) in philosophical logic, Kratzer (1981, 1991) in linguistics). The current account differs from that of 
‘possible words’ in the way it approaches linguistic meaning: It characterizes meaning in an intensional way 
(with reference to the speaker’s cognitive states) rather than extensionally (it in terms of truth values defined 
by relations of correspondence to objectively defined ‘models’ of reality). Instead of ‘possible worlds’, the 
present framework speaks of subjectively construed ‘temporal locations’ (that contain various ‘SoAs’), 
‘thoughts’ (that contain various ‘propositions’) and ‘projections’ (that contain various ‘reflections’). 
 85
signaling the combination of POSTERIOR with PROBABLE/high/ (relative to a hypothetical (5.156), an 
unlikely (5.157), and a counterfactual epistemic frame (5.158)): 
(5.156) If it rains, the match will be cancelled.        (Dancygier 1993: 405) 
(5.157) If it rained, the match would be cancelled.       (Dancygier 1993: 405) 
(5.158) If it had rained, the match would have been cancelled.   (Dancygier 1993: 405) 
Will, in its predictive use, can appear in independent sentences too, as in (5.159) below. It can 
even be used in estimations which do not refer to the future (5.160). In such cases it is analyzed as 
signaling PROBABLE/high/ without POSTERIOR: 
(5.159) (Don’t worry.) He will come back. 
(5.160) This will be John. (e.g., upon hearing someone ringing the doorbell). 
Languages may recruit grammatical strategies for modulating degrees of probability. One 
example is the English past morphology. In their epistemic senses, might and could are weaker than 
may; would is weaker than will; and should and ought to are weaker than must (see, e.g., Coates 1983, 
Palmer 2001: 203-204).  
A language may also possess a grammatical marker which can be used for any degree of 
epistemic modality. The Wintu (Penutian) ‘expectational’ marker -el (Schlichter 1986: 52-53; 
identified in Palmer 2001: 29-30 as an ‘Assumptive’ marker) appears to be such a general marker of 
PROBABLE (in addition to its use for ‘hearsay’; see Schlichter 1986: 53) (5.161, 5.162). The Turkish 
enclitic -DIr is similar, in that in can also signal different degrees of likelihood (5.163):  
(5.161) Tima min-el  pira·-el.  
cold die-EXPECT starve-EXPECT 
‘He might freeze to death, he might starve (its cold and he’s alone, helpless, sick).’ 
 (Schlichter 1986: 52; cited in Palmer 2001: 30) 
(5.162) imto·n nuqa·--l. 
berries ripe-EXPECT 
‘The berries must be ripe (it’s that time of the year).’ 
 (Schlichter 1986: 52; cited in Palmer 2001: 30)  
(5.163) (bir ihtimal-le  /  belki / mutlaka)  gel-miş-tir. 
one probability-COM maybe absolutely come-EPAST-JDGe 
‘(S)he might have come / she may have come / she must have come.’ 
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Other examples of PROBABLE include the Tuyuca (Tucanoan) paradigm labeled ‘assumed’ in 
Barnes (1984: 257) and ‘Assumptive’ in Palmer (2001: 29) (5.164), the Ladhaki (Tibeto-Burman) 
suffix -cen which is described in Koshal (1979: 193) and in Bhat (1999: 72) as expressing a ‘probable 
event’ (5.165), the Mao Naga (Tibeto-Burman) suffix -amolo which is labeled as ‘Dubitative’ in 
Giridhar (1994: 308-309) (5.166) and the Mapuche (Araucanian) particle chi which is also taken as a 
marker of ‘dubitative’ in Hengeveld (2004: 1197) (5.167): 
(5.164) díiga  apé-hĩyi. 
soccer  play+3sg+PAST-ASSUM 
‘He played soccer. (It is reasonable to assume that he did.)’ 
 (Barnes 1984: 257; cited in Palmer 2001: 29) 
(5.165) kho-	  thore   
e  	-čo   thuk-cen. 
he-ERG tomorrow my brother-DIR meet-may 
‘He is likely to meet my brother tomorrow.’ 
 (Koshal 1979: 193; cited in Bhat 1999: 72)  
(5.166) pfo ta-amoloe. 
he  go-may/might 
‘He may/might go.’ 
 (Giridhar 1994: 309) 
(5.167) Amu-y  chi. 
go-DECL.3 DUB 
‘Maybe he went away.’ 
 (Smeets 1989: 431; cited in Hengeveld 2004: 1197) 
Suppositions, guesses, or assumptions which do not specifically index any immediate 
evidence are sometimes discussed in connection with evidentiality, and identified as expressing 
‘inference’ from general knowledge or expectations. For instance, Aikhenvald (2003b: 135-140) 
labels the Tariana (Maipuran) markers -si-ka (in recent past), and -si-na (in remote past) as ‘generic 
inferred’. Accordingly, she identifies the sentence in (5.168), uttered in a context where the speaker 
sees a dog “looking abashed and hiding from people”, as expressing an “inference based on 
general knowledge about how dogs behave”. Another example is the Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan) 
‘conjectural enclitic’ -chá. Although Faller (2002: 176-179) states that -chá is used when “the speaker 
bases a statement on his or her own reasoning”, and identifies its modal value as ‘possibility’, she 
nevertheless takes it as an evidential marker.84 One example is replicated in (5.169) below, which 
could be used when the speaker “was expecting Marya for about that time, which would allow 
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(the speaker) to reason that it must be her at the door” (Faller 2002: 176-177). Both sentences would 
be taken as expressing PROBABLE within the current framework, since they make guesses on the 
basis of general knowledge or expectations without specifically indexing any piece of immediate 
evidence: 
(5.168) Ceci  t∫inu-nuku   du-kwisa-sika 
Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-scold-REC.P.INFR 
‘Cecília scolded the dog. (I inferred it)’ 
 (Aikhenvald 2003b: 135)  
(5.169) Chay-qa Marya-chá. 
this-top Marya-chá 
‘This is probably/must be Marya.’ 
 (Faller 2002: 175) 
PROBABLE can be identified as a primary semantic focus in the semantic ranges of grams 
identified as conveying ‘epistemic possibility’ and ‘probability’ in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 
206-207). 
5.2.7 GENERAL FACT 
GENERAL FACT presents a proposition as an item of general knowledge rather than as a matter of 
contingent, personal certainty. As such, it conveys a sense of strong factuality. Its most typical 
manifestations include expressions of scientific information, encyclopedic knowledge and 
culturally acknowledged information.  
The semantic enclosure of GENERAL FACT overlaps with what Faller (2002) calls ‘encyclopedic 
information’ (as opposed to ‘personal information’), which “includes knowledge that is taken for 
granted within a culture, and knowledge that is typically taught in school or found in 
encyclopedias” (Faller 2002: 18). 
The following Sherpa (Tibeto-Burman) examples from Woodbury (1986) illustrate the 
opposition between the affixes -nok and -wi and that between the etymologically related linking 
verbs ‘nok and ‘wayi. Woodbury (1986: 191-192) identifies their values in these examples as 
+EXPERIENTIAL (5.170 and 5.172) and -EXPERIENTIAL (5.171 and 5.173), respectively. Within the 
framework of anchoring categories, this epistemic opposition is taken as one between personal, 
contingent knowledge (CERTAIN) and general knowledge (GENERAL FACT): 
                                                                                                                                                                                
84 Faller’s definition of evidentiality is wider than the one adopted here, as it does not require an actual 
reference to a piece of evidence (e.g., by direct expression or by conventional implication). 
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(5.170) d aa saa-p    mi  ti yembur-laa   de -ki-nok. 
rice eat-NOMNLZR man be Katmandu-DAT  stay-HE 
‘The man who is eating rice lives in Katmandu.’ (I see, have seen…) 
 (Woodbury 1986: 191)  
(5.171) d aa saa-p    mi  ti yembur-laa   de -ki-wi. 
rice eat-NOMNLZR man be Katmandu-DAT  stay-GN 
‘The man who is eating rice lives in Katmandu.’ (It is known…) 
 (Woodbury 1986: 191)  
(5.172) di  kha
b-i  na
-laa  pye nok. 
this  house-GEN inside-DAT  rat  LINK 
‘This house has rats.’ (I see, have seen …) 
 (Woodbury 1986: 192)  
(5.173) di  kha
b-i  na
-laa  pye wayi. 
this  house-GEN inside-DAT  rat  LINK 
‘This house has rats.’ (It is known …) 
 (Woodbury 1986: 192)  
The ‘general knowledge’ suffix -ma in Central Pomo (Hokan; nearly extinct), illustrated in 
(5.174) (Mithun 1999: 191; cited in Palmer 2001: 6, 66-67), seems to be a specific marker of GENERAL 
FACT. It expresses a stronger sense of factuality compared to both the formally unmarked option 
(5.175) and the ‘first-hand personal experience’ (usually ‘visual’) marker -ya (5.176): 
(5.174) čhéemul-ma. 
rain fell-GEN.KNOW 
‘It rained.’ (that’s an established fact)  




 (Mithun 1999: 191; cited in Palmer 2001: 6) 
(5.176) čhéemul-ya. 
rain fell-VIS 
‘It rained.’ (I saw it). 
 (Mithun 1999: 191; cited in Palmer 2001: 6) 
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English does not possess any grammatical strategy which distinguishes strong factuality 
(GENERAL FACT) form contingent certainty (CERTAIN). But the following statements can be analyzed 
as signaling GENERAL FACT in the given minimal contexts: 
(5.177) Whales use a complex communication system. (e.g., by an expert on whales) 
(5.178) Homo sapiens evolved about 120.000 years ago. (e.g., in a scientific speech) 
(5.179) World War II began in 1944. (e.g., by a teacher in a classroom) 
Krifka (1999) tends to characterize ‘generic sentences’ primarily as expressing established facts 
with general validity rather than temporal unrestrictedness. For example, he takes both (5.180) and 
(5.181) as ‘generic’ sentences, although the former expresses anteriority in the temporal domain. In 
the semantic space of anchoring relations proposed here, what these two sentences share is 
epistemic generality (GENERAL FACT), not temporal generality (ATEMPORAL):  
(5.180) The banana was brought from the Canary Islands to the New World. (Krifka 1999: 170) 
(5.181) A banana contains vitamins A and C.           (Krifka 1999: 170) 
Markers used in expressing ATEMPORAL (section 5.1.7) often also include GENERAL FACT in their 
semantic ranges, because items of general knowledge mostly involve temporally unrestricted 
SoAs. For instance, in Kornfilt’s (1997: 377) Turkish example which expresses a “definitional truth” 
(5.182), the suffix -DIr expresses ATEMPORAL and GENERAL FACT cumulatively. But -DIr can also 
appear in a past- or future-oriented sentence to emphasize the factuality of a proposition, as seen in 
Sansa’s (1986) examples in (5.183) and (5.184): 
(5.182) Balina memeli  bir  hayvan-dır. 
whale  mammal  a  animal-DIr (glosses mine) 
‘A whale is a mammal.’ 
 (Kornfilt 1997: 377)  
(5.183) Đnsan  doğa-nın  iç-i-ne     sıkı sıkıya yerleş-miş-tir. 
man  nature-GEN inside-POSS-ACC tightly  install-EPAST-DIr 
‘Man is installed in nature tightly.’ 
 (Sansa 1986: 147)  
(5.184) Işık o  ayna-ya,  o  ayna-dan  da  ikinci  ayna-ya  yansı-yacak-tır. 
light that mirror-DAT that mirror-ABL CONJ second mirror-DAT reflect-FUT-DIr  
‘The light will reflect on that mirror and from that mirror to the second one.’ 
 (Sansa 1986: 149) 
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The epistemic category GENERAL FACT characterizes the philosophical, the scientific, and the 
historical discourses. It can also be identified in ordinary conversation when a speaker wants to 
reinforce the factuality of the information she conveys. 
5.3 Volitional Anchoring Categories 
The list below gives the characterizations of the basic volitional anchoring categories in usage-
based terms, on the basis of their definitions in terms of relative qualifications of ‘projections’ given 
in section 4.1. In the context of an utterance, 
• IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION expresses a reflection which stems from the speaker’s will in a 
specific communicative context. In other words, it directly conveys the speaker’s 
immediate (illocutionary) intentions. 
• ACCEPTED presents a reflection as one which is acknowledged to be real. 
• ENVISIONED presents a reflection as one which is in the realm of imagination, rather than as 
one which is part of the accepted reality. 
• ASSERTED makes an intentional contribution to the communicative context by expressing a 
reflection that the speaker takes as real. 
• WANTED makes an intentional contribution to the communicative context by expressing the 
speaker’s desire for the realization of an envisioned reflection. 
• ACCEPTABLE presents a reflection as consented (or, conceded) to some degree rather than as 
fully accepted.  
• GENERAL STATEMENT voices a general announcement of an impersonal (social or 
institutional) authority, rather than making a personal assertion tied to the will of an 
individual in a specific communicative context. 
Here is an outline of how the volitional anchoring categories contrast to each other: ACCEPTED 
qualifies a certain representation of the world (a projection) as real (relative to the speaker). 
ENVISIONED is its opposite; it presents a projection as non-real (i.e., as merely imagined). ASSERTED 
entails an ACCEPTED projection, but makes an intentional contribution to the communicative 
context (i.e., also conveys IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). Similarly, WANTED entails ENVISIONED, but in 
addition to expressing an imagined projection, it also conveys a specific illocutionary (immediate) 
intention of the speaker (again, by also conveying IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). IMMEDIATE 
CONTRIBUTION (as used on its own) differs from ASSERTED and WANTED in that it entails neother an 
ACCEPTED nor an ENVISIONED projection. Hence, utterances which signal IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION 
at the highest layer of their main clauses do not describe anything as true or false in the actual 
world, nor do they articulate any wish; they only make a certain contribution to the immediate 
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conversational context by dint of the immediate illocutionary act. GENERAL STATEMENT is like 
ASSERTED in that it too renders descriptive utterances. But unlike ASSERTED, it does not establish any 
relevance to any volitional center. As such, it appears in official or institutional discourse rather 
than in contexts of personal communication. ACCEPTABLE is different from ASSERTED in that it only 
conveys that the speaker concedes that a certain reflection can be accepted as real, rather than 
willfully asserting it as a personal opinion. 
The appearance of the volitional anchoring categories in finite sentences can only be 
understood in the light of the communicative constraint given in section 4.13, which basically says 
that every utterance in personal communication has to convey the speaker’s immediate 
(illocutionary) intentions. ACCEPTED and ENVISIONED cannot be signaled on their own in a main 
clause, since they do not express any illocutionary intention by themselves. ACCEPTABLE too, 
cannot be signaled in the highest layer of anchoring in a main clause, because it only indicates that 
a message is assertable, rather than presenting the speaker’s original, personal contribution. 
Utterances which signal IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION in their highest layer of anchoring directly 
transmit an immediate (illocutionary) intention of the speaker by virtue of linguistic conventions. 
But, as stated in section 4.4.2, when ASSERTED or WANTED are grammatically expressed (e.g., 
respectively, in descriptive and directive utterances), the speaker’s immediate intentions are not 
explicitly conveyed, but conventionally implied. This means that in such utterances the recovery of 
the speaker’s immediate (illocutionary) intention involves context-sensitive inferences.  
5.3.1 IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION 
IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION expresses the speaker’s immediate (illocutionary) intentions in a specific 
communicative context. It is different from ASSERTED in that it does not entail any ACCEPTED 
projection (i.e., one which is already taken as part of reality). In other words, it does not present 
anything as true, false or possible, but only makes a certain contribution to the immediate 
conversational context by ‘creating’ a projection on the spot. Utterances which signal IMMEDIATE 
CONTRIBUTION in the highest layer of anchoring include declaratory utterances, expressive 
utterances, utterance-level interjections, and explicit performatives.  
As Searle (1975a) makes clear, ‘declarations’ cannot be said to be true or false of the actual 
world, since they do not describe any existing event or state. They are rather used for bringing 
about the state of affairs they designate (and their success generally depends on the social or 
institutional status of the speaker). Some examples are given below:  
(5.185) You are fired. (e.g., by the employer)  (Searle 1975a: 17) 
(5.186) The meeting is closed. (e.g., by the chairperson of a meeting) 
(5.187) The accused is innocent. (e.g., by a judge) 
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Expressive utterances (5.188, 5.189, 5.190) and some utterance-level interjections (5.191, 5.192, 
5.193) are similar to declarations in that they do not express a SoA as true, false, possible, likely, 
etc. They rather make a personal contribution to the communicative context by directly reflecting 
the speaker’s immediate intention. Different from declaratory utterances, expressive utterances and 
utterance-level interjections are typically ‘elliptical’, i.e., what the speaker intends to do is not 
designated as a fully explicit predication: 
(5.188) Thank you. 
(5.189) Congratulations. 
(5.190) I’m sorry. 
(5.191) (You) idiot! 
(5.192) Fuck you! 
(5.193) Damn it! 
Explicit performatives constitute a special type of declaratory utterances: They aim to bring 
about the illocutionary act designated in the utterance. Different from other declaratory utterances, 
they designate the speaker’s immediate (illocutionary) intention (not the contents of the intention as 
in regular declaratives, but the intention itself). As such, they amount to declarations of speaker’s 
immediate intentions:85 
(5.194) I name this ship the Queen Elisabeth.  (Austin 1962: 5) 
(5.195) I apologize (for…).        (Austin 1962: 71) 
(5.196) I promise to come on Wednesday.   (Searle 1989: 158) 
(5.197) I order you to leave the room.    (Searle 1989: 158) 
While assertive and directive illocutionary acts can be described with utterances which 
include subjunctive or indicative subordination (as in (5.198) and (5.199) below), an illocutionary 
act in which IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION is signaled as the highest layer of anchoring cannot. This is 
simply because, unlike assertions and directive utterances, they do not entail any ACCEPTED nor 
ENVISIONED projection. This is illustrated below for declaratory utterances (5.200, 5.201), expressive 
utterances (5.202, 5.203), interjections (5.204, 5.205) and explicit performatives (5.206, 5.207). In 
explicit performatives, the complementizers that or to may appear in the illocutionary act 
description only if they already make part of the original message, as in (5.208) and (5.209): 
                                                           
85 Note that this analysis is consistent with Searle’s (1989) contention that explicit performatives are 
declarations. 
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(5.198) John is a hard worker. 
-> S said/stated/claimed/confirmed/admitted that John was a hard worker. 
(5.199) Go with them! 
-> S advised/ ordered/requested/pleaded H to go with them. 
(5.200) You are fired. 
-> S fired H. 
(5.201) The meeting is closed! 
-> S announced the meeting closed/closed the meeting. 
(5.202) Thank you. 
-> S expressed thanks/showed gratitude. 
(5.203) Congratulations.  
-> S congratulated H. 
(5.204) Fuck you! 
-> S swore at H / S offended H. 
(5.205) Hurray! 
-> S expressed her appreciation/joy. 
(5.206) I name this ship Queen Elisabeth.  
-> S named the ship Queen Elisabeth. 
(5.207) I pronounce you husband and wife. 
-> S pronounced Hs husband and wife. 
(5.208) I maintain that the results are unreliable. 
-> S maintained that the results are unreliable  
(5.209) I order you to stop the machine. 
-> S ordered H to stop the machine. 
A similar observation was already made by Searle (1975: 15-16), who shows that 
subordination by that is not possible in the performative formulations of expressive illocutionary 
acts: 
(5.210) I apologize for stepping on your toe/*I apologize that I stepped on your toe. 
 (Searle 1975: 15) 
(5.211) I congratulate you on winning the race/* I congratulate you that you won the race. 
 (Searle 1975: 15) 
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5.3.2 ACCEPTED 
ACCEPTED expresses what the speaker admits as reflecting reality. It cannot appear as the only 
volitional category in a main clause, because on its own, it does not make any intentional 
contribution to the immediate communicative context (see the constraint in 4.13). But it takes part 
in the compound anchoring category ASSERTED, which in turn can be signaled in a main clause (see 
section 5.3.4 below). 
ACCEPTED can be identified in subordinate contents of the ‘indicative’ type, e.g., in the 
complements of utterances which designate assertive illocutionary acts: 
(5.212) He told me [that John is sick]. 
(5.213) John admits that [he did not react in time]. 
(5.214) John claims that [Mary did her best]. 
(5.215) I insist that [Mary did her best]. 
Such ‘indicative’ complements are often not marked by any specific mood. But they may 
exhibit a formal contrast with complements marked with a distinctive ‘subjunctive’ marker. Such a 
contrast is seen in the Spanish examples below (from Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca: 1994). The 
subordinate clause in (5.216) is analyzed here as one which signals ACCEPTED, and that in (5.217), 
ENVISIONED (see the next section): 
(5.216) Dice  que vienen   ahora. 
say:3.s that come:IND:3.p now 
‘He says they are coming now.’ 
 (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca: 1994: 213) 
(5.217) Dice  que vengan   ahora. 
say:3.s that come:SUBJ:3.p now 
‘He says for them to come now.’ 
 (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca: 1994: 213) 
5.3.3 ENVISIONED 
ENVISIONED expresses an imagined projection rather than one which is already accepted as real. 
Like ACCEPTED, it cannot be signaled on its own in a main clause, because it does not establish any 
relevance to the speaker’s immediate will in itself. But it is included in the semantic constitution of 
WANTED, which can be signaled in a main clause (see section 5.3.5 below).  
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ENVISIONED appears in subordinate clauses of utterances which designate a directive 
illocutionary act. In English, such subordinate clauses are rendered by to: 
(5.218) John asked [Mary to leave]. 
(5.219) I order [you to come here]! 
(5.220) Mary obliges [John to stay home]. 
(5.221) Len advised [Mary to work harder]. 
Languages may use different strategies in distinguishing subordination of ENVISIONED 
contents (‘subjunctive’ subordination) from that of ACCEPTED contents (‘indicative’ 
subordination).86 This may involve the use of an infinitive form (as in the above examples from 
English) or a special ‘subjunctive’ (or ‘irrealis’) marker. Both strategies can be used in the 
subordinate clauses of directive illocutionary verbs in many Indo-European languages. Below are 
examples from Lithuanian (5.222) (from Chung & Timberlake 1985: 249) and Italian (5.223) (from 
Palmer 2001: 139-140). The type of the subordinate content can also be indicated by the choice of a 
complementizer. For instance, -DIG and -mA in Turkish (labeled in Kornfilt 1997 as the ‘factive’ 
and ‘action’ nominalization markers, respectively) can function as markers of ACCEPTED (5.224) and 
ENVISIONED (5.225): 
(5.222) Aš paprašau  jo  eiti  namo / kad eitų  namo. 
I ask   him go(INF) home / that go(IRR) home   
‘I asked him to go home.’ 
 (Chung & Timberlake 1985: 249) 
(5.223) Gli  hanno  ordinato che tacesse     / di  tacere. 
to.him they.have ordered that be.quiet+PAST+SUBJ / PREP be.quiet+INFIN 
‘They ordered him to be quite.’ 
 (Palmer 2001: 139-140)  
(5.224) Hasta ol-duğ-u-nu  / *ol-ma-sı-nı   söyle-di. 
sick AUX-FN-POSS-ACC AUX-AN-POSS-ACC say-PAST 
‘(S)he said that she was sick.’ 
(5.225) Hemen   gel-me-si-ni    / *gel-diğ-i-ni   emret-ti. 
immediately come-AN-POSS-ACC  come-FN-POSS-ACC order-PAST 
‘(S)he ordered him/her to come right away.’ 
                                                           
86 ENVISIONED is defined as a purely semantic category, while ‘subjunctive’ is sometimes used to label 
specific markers in specific languages. A marker labeled as ‘subjunctive’ in a language may convey meanings 
other than ENVISIONED and even appear in a main clause. 
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5.3.4 ASSERTED 
ASSERTED enables a speaker to perform an illocutionary act by signaling that she accepts a certain 
representation of the world as real. It renders descriptive utterances generally characterized as 
having ‘assertive’ or ‘declarative’ mood.87 Below are some English examples: 
(5.226) I have never seen an armadillo.  
(5.227) Antwerp is a big city. 
(5.228) John is about to leave. 
(5.229) Ellen will join us later. 
In section 4.1.6, ASSERTED was defined as a ‘category of relevance’ which combines ACCEPTED 
and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (i.e., one which establishes a link between a reflection taken as real 
and the immediate (illocutionary) intention of the speaker). And in section 4.4.2, it was shown that 
an utterance which signals ASSERTED in its main clause (e.g., by a grammatical marker or by zero-
marking) explicitly conveys an ACCEPTED reflection and only conventionally implies the speaker’s 
illocutionary intention. This suggests that an assertive sentence can be used for performing a 
variety of illocutionary acts depending on the speaker’s intentions in different communicative 
contexts. This is exemplified in (5.230) below. Each of the illocutionary act descriptions (assuming 
that they correctly identify what the speaker intentionally did in uttering the sentence) designates 
S’s immediate intention with an illocutionary predicate, while the ‘indicative’ subordinate clauses 
express the ACCEPTED projection: 
(5.230) S says to H: “The experiment was reliable”. 
 Possible illocutionary act descriptions in different communicative contexts: 
  S states that the experiment was reliable. 
  S admits that the experiment was reliable. 
  S claims that the experiment was reliable. 
  S insists that the experiment was reliable. 
  S suggests that the experiment was reliable. 
  … 
The mutual regulation of the implication (by the speaker) and inference (by the addressee(s)) 
of the speaker’s immediate intentions (and the resultant recovery of the illocutionary force) in 
assertive utterances (as well as in directives; see section 5.3.5 below) is presumably guided by 
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interlocutors’ decisions based on rational human behavior. As such, they can be understood in the 
light of Grice’s (1975) Principle of Cooperation (already mentioned section 4.3.1). 88 
An utterance which expresses ASSERTED does not necessarily involve certainty towards its 
propositional content. In the English sentences (5.231) and (5.232) below, ASSERTED combines with 
different degrees of epistemic modality and in (5.233), with evidentiality. The Tauya (Trans-New 
Guinea) example in (5.234) (MacDonald 1990; cited in Hengeveld 2004) transparently illustrates the 
co-occurrence of ASSERTED with epistemic modality (PROBABLE), since this language possesses an 
overt grammatical marker for assertion (-a; identified as a ‘declarative’ marker in Hengeveld 2004: 
1191): 
(5.231) The meeting may be cancelled. 
(5.232) Sue must have been late. 
(5.233) John appears to have left. 
(5.234) ei-ra   mene-a-rafo-a. 
there-TOP stay-3.SG-DUB-DECL 
‘Maybe he’s there.’ 
 (MacDonald 1990: 209; cited in Hengeveld 2004: 1191) 
Among other examples of overt grammatical marking for ASSERTED are the Greenlandic 
Eskimo mood sign v (glossed as ‘indicative’ in Sadock & Zwicky 1985, it also appears in questions, 
but with a different set of person suffixes) (5.235), and the Somali (Cushitic) classifier waa (labeled 




 (Sadock & Zwicky 1985: 167) 
(5.236) Warkii  waad   dhegeysatay. 
news+the DECL+you listen.to.2sg.PAST 
‘You listened to the news.’ 
 (Saeed 2003: 237) 
                                                                                                                                                                                
87 Not all utterances traditionally classified as ‘assertive’ will be taken here as entailing ASSERTED; they may 
also involve GENERAL STATEMENT (section 4.5.3.6) or IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (section 4.5.3.3). 
88 Although the Principle of Cooperation (with its four maxims of conversation) has mostly been discussed 
in connection with conversational implicatures, Grice actually presents it as the rational basis of human 
communication in general. A conversational implicature arises when a speaker intentionally ‘flouts’ a specific 
conversational maxim without violating the Principle of Cooperation. 
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Languages may possess strategies which emphasize the component of volitional immediacy 
(i.e., IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION) involved in ASSERTED. For instance, Li, Thompson & Thompson 
(1982), who characterize the Chinese sentence final particle le as conveying ‘Currently Relevant 
State’, point to a specific use of the particle which emphasizes “the speaker’s total contribution to 
the conversation at that point” (Li, Thompson & Thompson 1982: 28).89 This particle appears, for 
instance, in an utterance which closes a story: 
(5.237) jiéguo   wŏmen jiu  bān huí  Zhōngguo le.   
in:the:end we   then move return  China   CRS 
‘In the end, we moved back to China.’ 
 (Li, Thompson & Thompson 1982: 39) 
5.3.5 WANTED 
WANTED enables a speaker to perform an illocutionary act by way of expressing her desire towards 
an envisioned (unreal) projection. In appears in different types of utterances, including expressions 
of wish and hope and directive utterances (which include commands, requests, obligations, pleas, 
suggestions, permissions, and questions). WANTED also makes part of the semantic values of 
commissive utterances (promises), since these express what the speaker ‘consents’ to do (for the 
benefit of her addressee(s)). These different utterance types all signal the basic anchoring category 
WANTED with different additional indexations (which may include the forcefulness of the speaker’s 
desire, a concern for the willingness or interests of the addressee(s), social status of the 
interlocutors, moral or ethical norms, etc). Such additional or more fine-grained semantic 
distinctions will be taken here as ‘specifications’ of WANTED.  
In section 4.1.6, WANTED was defined as establishing an intentional relevance between the 
contents of an ENVISIONED projection and the speaker’s immediate (illocutionary) intention in 
making an utterance (i.e., the content of IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). This compound nature of 
WANTED is exposed in (5.328) below. In each of the possible illocutionary act descriptions for the 
given directive sentence, S’s immediate intention is designated with an illocutionary predicate, and 
the ENVISIONED projection is expressed by a ‘subjunctive’ subordinate clause:  
                                                           
89 Li, Thompson & Thompson’s (1982) following remark makes it clear that in such uses, le emphasizes the 
speaker’s immediate (illocutionary) intention:  
For many le sentences in conversations, speakers report the intuition that the le “completes” 
the sentence, that without it, the sentence sounds incomplete, as if the speaker intends to say 
more (Li, Thompson & Thompson 1982: 37). 
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(5.328) S says to H: “Give me the keys.” 
 Possible illocutionary act descriptions in different communicative contexts: 
  S orders H to give her the keys. 
  S obliges H to give her the keys. 
  S requests H to give her the keys. 
  S advises H to give her the keys.  
  S begs H to give her the keys. 
  … 
The example above also illustrates the implicational/inferential nature of the transmission of 
the speaker’s immediate (illocutionary) intention in the (grammatical) signaling of WANTED: The 
same sentence can be used for performing different illocutionary acts in different contexts. 
WANTED is most transparently identifiable in expressions of wish, in which the propositional 
content can be either HYPOTHETICAL (5.239) or counterfactual (5.240). An expression of ‘hope’ 
implies some degree of likelihood (PROBABLE) for the expressed proposition (5.241) in addition to 
expressing WANTED: 
(5.239) I wish to spend this summer in Ankara. 
(5.240) I wish he had not talked like that. 
(5.241) I hope he hasn’t left yet. 
Expressions of wish can be rendered by a variety of grammatical strategies, both within and 
across languages. A language may use a marker from, e.g., an ‘optative’, a ‘subjunctive’, a 
‘volitive’, an ‘imperative’, an ‘irrealis’ or a ‘conditional’ paradigm. In English, wishes can be 
expressed not only by I wish or I hope as in (5.239-5.241) above, but also by special ‘optative’ 
strategies as in (5.242) and (5.243), by a ‘conditional’ strategy as in (5.244), or by an ‘imperative’ 
strategy as in (5.245):  
(5.242) May he come!    (van der Auwera & Schalley 2004: 92) 
(5.243) Long live the Queen!  (van der Auwera & Schalley 2004: 88) 
(5.244) If only she was here! 
(5.245) Get well soon. 
Below are some expressions of wish from other languages. The Nahuatl (Uto-Aztecan) 
sentence in (5.246) involves an ‘optative’ suffix (Andrew 1975; cited in Bybee 1985), the 
Macedonian sentence in (5.247) uses the complementizer da (Kramer 1986; cited in Ammann & van 
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der Auwera 2004), and the Latin sentence in (5.248) uses both a special complementizer and the 
subjunctive mood (Lakoff 1968; cited in Palmer 1986, 2001, and in van der Auwera & Schalley 
2004):  
(5.246) mā chōca. 
PART weep.OPT 
‘If only he would weep.’ 
 (Andrew 1975: 52; cited in Bybee 1985: 171) 
(5.247) Da   pukneš! 
that.MOD burst.Pres.2Sg 
‘May you burst!’ 
 (Kramer 1986: 41; cited in Ammann & van der Auwera 2004: 355) 
(5.248) Ut  illum  di … perduint! 
that him gods destroy+3PL+PRES+SUBJ (Glosses by Palmer 2001) 
‘May the gods destroy him! 
 (Lakoff 1968: 172; cited in Palmer 1986: 39-40, 2001: 109, and in van der Auwera & 
Schalley 2004: 88)’ 
Utterances sometimes identified as ‘first person imperatives’ or ‘jussives’ can also be taken as 
expressions of wish (rather than as genuine directives). Below are some examples. The English 
sentence in (5.249) uses the periphrastic strategy let, the Turkish sentence in (5.250) an ‘optative’ 
marker, and the French sentence (5.251), a ‘complementizer plus subjunctive’ strategy: 
(5.249) Let me sing!  (van der Auwera, Dobrushina & Goussev 2004: 56) 
(5.250) Gid-e-yim. 
go-OPT-A1SG 
‘Let me go.’ 
(5.251) Que je te  réchauffe contre moi! 
that I you warn.SUBJ against me  (Glosses mine) 
‘Let me warn you against me!’ 
 (Kordi 2001: 377, cited in van der Auwera, Dobrushina & Goussev 2004: 62) 
WANTED is the most essential semantic ingredient of directive utterances, which include not 
only orders and requests but also promises, offers, suggestions and warnings. Different from 
simple expressions of wish, they additionally involve a component of ‘appeal’ to the addressees to 
fulfill what the speaker wants.90 They are typically marked with an ‘imperative’ mood,91 but can 
                                                           
90 van der Auwera, Dobrushina & Goussev (2004) take the presence of an ‘appeal’ as the main criterion in 
identifying an utterance as a semantic imperative. 
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also involve a ‘subjunctive’, ‘optative’, ‘irrealis’, ‘volitive’, or ‘future’ strategy. The English sentence 
in (5.252) and the Yakut (Turkic) sentence in (5.253) illustrate imperative marking. (5.254) 
illustrates the English let strategy in expressing an appeal to the first person plural. (5.255) 
exemplifies the use of an ‘optative’ marker in Aleut (Eskimo-Aleut), and (5.256), of an ‘irrealis’ 
marker in Palauan (Malayo-Polynesian):  
(5.252) Come in! 
(5.253) bar-dyn-lar. 
go-IMP.3-PL 
‘Let them go.’ 
 (Birjulin & Xrakovsky 2001: 27) 
(5.254) Let us sing!  (van der Auwera, Dobrushina & Goussev 2004: 56) 
(5.255) haqa-a-xt(a). 
come-OPT-A3SG(PLU) 
‘Let him/them come near.’ 
 (Birjulin & Xrakovsky 2001: 27) 
(5.256) Mo-lim   a  kęrum! 
2SG(IRR)-drink ART your medicine 
‘Drink your medicine!’ 
 (Josephs 1975; cited in Chung & Timberlake 1985: 248) 
Languages may possess strategies which serve to modulate (reinforce or mitigate) the 
forcefulness of the speaker’s appeal. In many languages, as in English, a directive utterance can be 
made more ‘polite’ or ‘tentative’ by using an interrogative construction which literally questions 
the speaker’s ability or willingness: 
(5.257) Can/could you turn the light on? 
(5.258) Will/would you open the window please? 
Expressions of obligation and permission92 can be either descriptive or directive. A descriptive 
use is at stake when an utterance refers to an obligation which is imposed (or a permission which is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
91 Some scholars reserve the term ‘imperative’ to speakers’ appeals for actions by 2nd persons, while some 
use it for all persons. The corresponding mood with 3rd person(s) or 1st person plural is sometimes called a 
‘hortative’. See Xrakovskij (2001) for a typological survey on the expression of the imperative (which he 
defines as including the hortative). 
92 Expressions of obligation and permission are often subsumed under the category label ‘deontic 
modality’, which is sometimes applied to all directive utterances. 
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granted) by a source other than the speaker. A directive use is at stake when the speaker imposes 
or endorses an obligation (or, grants a permission) by dint of her immediate illocutionary act.93  
Examples of descriptive expressions of obligation and permission are given below. (5.259) 
explicitly designates an obligation imposed on John by Mary. (5.260) and (5.261) express ‘states of 
necessity’ (see also section 2.7, examples (2.58-2.62), which involve obligations imposed by John’s 
parents and by religious rules, respectively. Similarly, the permissions involved in (5.262-5.264) are 
all descriptive, because they report situations concerning what the subjects are permitted to do 
without reflecting the speaker’s own volitional attitude. (5.262) designates an act of permission, 
while (5.263) and (5.264) express ‘states of possibility’ (see also section 2.7, examples (2.50-2.56), 
due to permissions granted by John’s parents and school regulations, respectively. In such 
descriptive (assertive) expressions, elements of obligation and permission appear as part of the 
designated SoA. They are analyzed in the present framework as involving ASSERTED in their 
highest layer of anchoring: 
(5.259) Mary obliged John to stay home. 
(5.260) John must/has to return home before midnight (e.g., obligation imposed by John’s 
parents.) 
(5.261) One must/has to take off one’s shoes before entering the mosque. 
 (A socially imposed obligation tied to religious rules) 
(5.262) Mary allowed John to meet his friends. 
(5.263) John may stay with us until midnight. (e.g., permission granted by John’s parents)  
(5.264) Students may take up to six courses per semester. (An institutionally granted permission) 
Below are some directive expressions of obligation and permission. In (5.265), the obligation is 
exclusively imposed by the speaker, without any indexation of social, ethical or moral norms or 
values. In (5.266) the obligation is tied to ethical norms, but is also endorsed by the speaker. (5.267) 
expresses a permission granted by the speaker to the addressee by dint of the immediate 
illocutionary act. Such expressions of obligation and permission are identified as directive 
utterances, because the speaker signals that she ‘wants’ or ‘consents’ with the carrying out of the 
designated action. Like other directives utterances, they are analyzed here as signaling WANTED in 
their main clauses: 
                                                           
93 The opposition between ‘descriptive’ and ‘directive’ uses is similar to that between ‘speaker-oriented’ 
and ‘agent-oriented’ moods in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 179), Bybee & Fleishman (1995: 6), and to that 
between ‘descriptivity’ and ‘performativity’ in Nuyts’ (2001a) (who applies this distinction to ‘attitudes’ in 
general, i.e., to epistemic and evidential qualifications in addition to deontic and directive ones). What is 
identified here as ‘directive’ expressions of obligation and permission are analyzed in Palmer (2001: 75) as 
involving ‘subjectivity’. 
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(5.265) You have to tell me where he is! (Obligation exclusively exerted by the speaker) 
(5.266) You should tell the truth! (Obligation ethically imposed, also exerted by the speaker) 
(5.267) You may leave now (e.g., I allow you to). (Permission granted by the speaker) 
Markers identified as conveying ‘speaker-oriented modality’ in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 
(1994: 179) (specifically, ‘imperative’, ‘prohibitive’, ‘optative’, ‘hortative’, ‘admonitive’ and 
‘permissive’) can all be seen as including the anchoring category WANTED in their overall semantic 
ranges. 
5.3.6 ACCEPTABLE 
ACCEPTABLE conveys that a reflection is admitted or conceded to some degree. It qualifies a certain 
projection (typically one which has just been pronounced by the addressee) as acceptable, rather 
than fully accepting it or presenting it as an original, personal contribution. Since it does not make 
any intentional contribution to the communicative context on its own, it cannot appear at the 
highest layer of anchoring in a main clause (see the constraint 4.13 in section 4.3.1). It typically 
appears in conjunction with a main clause which expresses the speaker’s actual illocutionary 
intention.  
ACCEPTABLE was defined in section 4.1.4 as expressing a quantificational value over a range of 
projections. This technical definition extends the similar quasi-logical formulation of RECURRENT (as 
‘quantification over a range of temporal locations’) and of PROBABLE (as ‘quantification over a range 
of thoughts’) to the volitional domain, in order to grasp the idea of a ‘scale of acceptability’. 
Below is an example of ACCEPTABLE from English. The auxiliary may in this sentence does not 
express epistemic modality (PROBABLE), for it can be uttered even when the speaker is certain that 
the proposition in the conceded message is true. For instance, it can follow the addressee’s praise of 
a certain novelist for winning a literary prize:  
(5.268) He may have won the literary prize, but I don’t like his novels. 
In such utterances, may indicates that the speaker concedes the acceptability of what the 
addressee has just suggested, rather than (just) its truth. This semantic dimension operates in the 
volitional domain, taking scope over the epistemic relation expressed in the utterance. This can be 
more transparently seen in the following example, which signals that the speaker can admit an 
assessment of probability, which may have been expressed upon a statement like ‘He is likely to 
succeed’: 
(5.269) He may be likely to succeed, but this does not mean anything to me. 
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Indeed, Sweetser (1990) identifies such uses of may as involving ‘speech act modality’ rather 
than epistemic modality or doubt. For instance, the sentence in (5.270) is roughly equivalent to “I 
admit that he’s a university professor, and I nonetheless insist that he is dumb” (Sweetser 1990: 70). 
The same meaning can also be expressed by an if-clause in English, as seen in Sweetser’s example 
in (5.271): 
(5.270) He may be a university professor, but he sure is dumb.  (Sweetser 1990: 70) 
(5.271) If he is a stuffed shirt, he’s not a fool.       (Sweetser 1990: 139) 
Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 225-228) and Palmer (2001: 11, 31, 123-124) subsume similar 
uses under the more general title ‘concessive clauses’,94 and Palmer (2001) further takes them as 
instances of the typological category ‘Presupposed’. Palmer’s following examples from Italian 
(5.272) and Latin (5.273) can be taken as expressing ACCEPTABLE as defined here, for they do not 
contrast two ‘propositions’ in a strictly veridical sense, but two ‘linguistic messages’ (one taken by 
the speaker as acceptable or assertable, and one which she willfully asserts): 
(5.272) Sia      pure  come dici tu   ma io non vengo. 
be+3SG+PRES+SUBJ perhaps as  say you  but I not come 
‘It may be as you say, but I’m not coming.’ 
 (Palmer 2001: 31)  
(5.273) Quamvis  sis      molestus,  numquam te  esse confitebor 
 malum. 
although  be+2SG+PRES+SUBJ troublesome  never   you to.be I.will.confess
 evil 
‘Although you are troublesome, I will never admit you to be evil.’ 
 (Palmer 2001: 123) 
5.3.7 GENERAL STATEMENT 
GENERAL STATEMENT presents a message as one which is not strictly confined to a certain speaker’s 
will in a specific communicative context. It rather expresses an impersonal statement issued by a 
social or institutional authority. It is hence typically found in official or administrative discourse 
and in the written form, e.g., in announcements, reports, regulations, legal documents, certificates, 
and other legislative texts. It can also appear in the spoken register, e.g., in announcements by 
spokesmen of official institutions or in news reports. Below are some examples: 
                                                           
94 Note that a ‘concessive clause’ can also convey an epistemic meaning, describing “a situation which 
would ordinarily lead to a negative implication about the main clause” (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 225). 
Epistemic concessive clauses are typically rendered by although in English (see, e.g., König 1986). 
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(5.274) The executive committee consists of five members. 
 (e.g., as a statement in a booklet of regulations) 
(5.275) The office will be closed on Monday 27 August. (e.g., as an announcement by a company) 
(5.276) It is dangerous to enter the construction area. (e.g., as a warning on a signboard) 
As seen in the examples above, English does not grammatically distinguish GENERAL 
STATEMENT from ASSERTED; it expresses both with the zero-marked ‘indicative’ mood. It is the 
utterance context which makes it clear which anchoring category is at stake (i.e., whether it is 
produced in a personal communicative setting of in a context of impersonal communication). The 
Turkish enclitic -DIr provides an example of an overt marker of GENERAL STATEMENT.95 For 
instance, (5.277) below can appear in a vacancy announcement by an institution or a company. If 
the same message would be conveyed by a speaker in a non-official context, -DIr would not be 
there: 
(5.277) Başvuru-lar-da   en  az  iki  yabancı dil   şart-ı    ara-n-acak-tır. 
application-PLU-LOC most few two foreign language condition-POSS seek-PASS-
FUT-DIr 
‘Applicants will be required to speak at least two foreign languages.’ 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter provided usage-based characterizations for the basic anchoring categories, expanded 
on how they contrast to each other in each domain and illustrated each category with grammatical 
strategies across a wide range of languages. 
The next chapter shows how the semantic value of an utterance can be represented as a whole 
in the metalanguage of anchoring categories. 
                                                           
95 -DIr can also express ATEMPORAL, GENERAL FACT, and PROBABLE; see Chapter 8.  
 106
Chapter 6 
Semantic values in the metalanguage of anchoring categories 
This chapter introduces a metalanguage which enables one to represent the semantic value (the 
convention-bound part of the overall meaning) of a natural language utterance in terms of basic 
anchoring categories. It is not intended as a full-fledged formal language and not coupled with any 
evaluative procedures which rely on models of ‘actual’ or ‘possible’ worlds. This metalanguage 
only aims to restate what the original utterances already state (with greater precision and 
efficiency) in such a way as to make various semantic components maximally transparent and 
cross-linguistically comparable. 
6.1 The layered representation of the semantic value in the metalanguage 
A well-formed expression in the metalanguage of anchoring categories includes a volitional 
category, an epistemic category, a temporal category, and an abstract predicational content (SoA), 
taking scope over one another in this respective order. This hierarchical semantic value, already 
motivated in sections 2.6 and 3.1.2, is given below: 
(6.1) Volitional category(Epistemic category(Temporal category(SoA))) 
The procedure of translating a natural language utterance into the metalanguage simply 
consists in checking the convention-bound meaning of the utterance against the characterizations 
given for the 21 anchoring categories in the preceding two chapters. Since the semantic space in 
each domain of anchoring is exhaustively (albeit schematically) partitioned by seven basic 
categories, every utterance will match one and only one anchoring category from each domain. 
Semantic ingredients which go beyond the schematic definitions of anchoring categories (be them 
conveyed by grammatical markers or lexical items) will be represented as ‘specifications’ (see 
section 4.2). For instance, (6.2) below matches POSTERIOR in the temporal domain, with the 
additional specification ‘at five’. The sentence expresses PROBABLE in the epistemic domain 
(specifying a ‘medium’ degree of likelihood), and straightforwardly matches ASSERTED in the 
volitional domain (as it ‘describes’ a possibility rather than, e.g., signaling the speaker’s wish): 
(6.2) John may take the train at five. 
 temporal domain: POSTERIOR/at five/ 
epistemic domain: PROBABLE/medium/ 
volitional domain: ASSERTED 
The notations used in the metalanguage are shown in the following examples. A signaled 
anchoring category is indicated by small capital letters. Designated contents (SoAs) are represented 
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in the form of a predicate and its arguments, which are shown in square brackets ([ ]). 
Specifications of signaled anchoring categories are placed between slash signs (//). Semantic 
elements which directly qualify the predicate (e.g., ‘adjuncts’ to verbs which specify manner, 
speed, etc.) are taken as specifications of the predicate, as with quickly in (6.3). SoA-participants are 
not analyzed for their referential status (i.e., for their ‘entity anchoring’); they appear in the 
metalanguage in the same way as they do in the source language (or in the English translation), as 
shown with the train and a train in (6.4) and (6.5): 
(6.3) Get up quickly! 
WANTED/order/(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(get up/quickly/[you])))  
(6.4) John may take the train at five. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE/medium/(POSTERIOR/at five/(take[John, the train]))) 
(6.5) John might have taken a train. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE/low/(PERFECT/result/(take[John, a train]))) 
A copular sentence is one which involves a non-verbal (e.g., adjectival, nominal, directional or 
locative) expression as the predicate. Below are some examples of how copular predication is 
represented in the metalanguage: 
(6.6) John is sick. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(sick[John]))) 
(6.7) I am in the library. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(in the library[I]))) 
(6.8) John is a good teacher. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ATEMPORAL(a good teacher[John]))) 
Below are examples with various English sentences, some of which associated with a minimal 
context. The metalinguistic translations reflect how the conventional meanings of the utterances (in 
the given contexts) match the basic anchoring categories defined and characterized in Chapters 4 
and 5. (Note that these examples are expository only; they are not meant as a thorough semantic 
analysis of the English TAM markers): 
(6.9) John is having his meal. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(have[John, his meal]))) 
(6.10) Lucy is going to have a baby. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(PROSPECTIVE(have[Lucy, a baby]))) 
(6.11) They may have left. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE/medium/(PERFECT/result/(leave[they]))) 
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(6.12) John might have taken a train. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE/low/(PERFECT/result/(take[John, a train]))) 
(6.13) John must be working hard nowadays. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE/high/(RECURRENT/nowadays/(work/hard/[John]))) 
(6.14) The whale is a mammal. (e.g., uttered by a biology teacher in the class.) 
ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(ATEMPORAL(a mammal[the whale]))) 
(6.15) John seems to have failed the exam. (e.g., upon noticing John’s bad temper.) 
ASSERTED(CONJECTURED(PERFECT/result/(fail[John, the exam]))) 
(6.16) You are smoking! (e.g., upon seeing the addressee smoking.) 
ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(SIMULTANEOUS(smoke[you]))) 
(6.17) John has come! (e.g., upon seeing John’s shoes in the hall.) 
ASSERTED(INFERRED(PERFECT(come[John]))) 
(6.18) He may be a good teacher, (but …) 
ACCEPTABLE(CERTAIN(ATEMPORAL(a good teacher[he]))) 




(6.21) Get up quickly! 
WANTED/order/(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(get up/quickly/[you]))) 
(6.22) I shall bring you the book tomorrow. 
WANTED/promise/(HYPOTHETICAL(POSTERIOR/tomorrow/(bring[I, you, the book]))) 
(6.23) You are fired! (e.g., as uttered by the boss) 
IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION(NEW INFORMATION(SIMULTANEOUS(fired[you]))) 
All of the examples above consist of simple affirmative utterances which involve deictic 
anchoring relations. The metalinguistic representations of utterances which involve center 
displacements, subordinate contents, negation and interrogation are given in the following 
sections. 
6.2 Displacements in the metalanguage 
A displaced temporal, epistemic, or volitional frame (see section 3.2.1) can be related to its parent 
frame by any anchoring category except one of immediacy (SIMULTANEOUS, NEW INFORMATION or 
IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). This is because a displacement, by definition, represents a detachment 
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from the deictic center. A specific displacement may be exhaustively characterized in terms of a 
basic anchoring category, but it may also be associated with more fine-grained semantic 
dimensions. The convention of indicating such additional semantic dimensions as ‘specifications’ 
will be followed in representing utterances which involve displacements too. 
6.2.1 Representing temporal displacements 
The examples below show how local temporal displacements are represented in the metalanguage 
of anchoring categories. A referential time expression which induces a displacement is shown 
between slash signs (as a specification), and the anchoring category presupposed by this 
expressions is indicated between curly brackets ({ }). The temporal displacement trigger as a whole 
is indicated by the subscript DISP-T, and the newly constructed temporal frame is assigned a label 
(e.g., frametmp). Dependent utterances within the displaced frame are given in a separate line, 
between angle brackets (< >): 
(6.24) Yesterday at six, … 
/yesterday at six/{ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
(6.25) Next month, … 
/next month/{POSTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
(6.26) Sometimes, … 
/sometimes/{RECURRENT}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
Subordinate clauses with when, as, whenever, by the time, the day, the moment in English trigger 
local temporal displacements by ‘retrieving’ the presupposed temporal value associated with an 
occurrence. This retrieval function is represented in the metalanguage as time_of (or as one of its 
more specific variants like range_of, day_of, times_of, etc.). Below are some examples:96 
(6.27) When John comes … 
time_of(come[John]){POSTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
(6.28) As I saw him, … 
time_of(see[I, him]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
                                                           
96 Cross-linguistically, clauses which appear in such time-retrieving constructions may or may not retain 
their explicit temporal marking. For instance, in English, past is explicitly marked (as in When John came) while 
future is unmarked (i.e., it receives present tense, as in When John comes). 
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(6.29) While John was painting, … 
range_of(paint[John]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
(6.30) The day you left, … 
day_of(leave[you]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp  
frametmp: <…> 
(6.31) Whenever I see her, … 
times_of(see[I, her])(RECURRENT) DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <…> 
As already mentioned in section 3.2.2, dependent clauses which appear under the scope of 
temporal displacements include anaphoric time reference. Depending on the type of the temporal 
displacement, this reference can be to past, to future, or to repeated occasions. Anaphoric reference 
is represented in the metalanguage with the subscript ANA. Below are examples which involve 
ANTERIORANA, POSTERIORANA, and RECURRENTANA: 
(6.32) Yesterday at two, Mary was reading a book. 
/yesterday at two/{ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS(read[Mary, a book]))))> 
(6.33) When John came, Mary had left. 
time_of(come[John]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(PERFECT(leave[Mary]))))> 
(6.34) When John came, Mary was about to leave. 
time_of(come[John]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(PROSPECTIVE(leave[Mary]))))> 
(6.35) Tomorrow at six, Mary will have left. 
/tomorrow at six/{POSTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(POSTERIORANA(PERFECT(leave[Mary]))))> 
(6.36) Whenever I see John, he is in a hurry.  
times_of(see[I, John]){RECURRENT}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(RECURRENTANA(SIMULTANEOUS(in a hurry[John]))))> 
A temporally dependent clause may also specify a perfective occurrence within a backward-
displaced temporal frame, as exemplified in (6.37) below. This specific temporal relation will be 
described here as ‘occurrence in past’, and represented as ANTERIORANA.OC. Like ANTERIORANA, 
ANTERIORANA.OC is also anaphoric, because it also refers back to the time specification given in a 
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preceding clause or sentence. But it additionally advances time (i.e., shifts the temporal center 
forward) along the back-shifted time axis: 
(6.37) As John entered, I left. 
time_of(enter[John]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA.OC(leave[I])))> 
ANTERIORANA,OC may indicate either ‘sequentiality’ or ‘concurrence’. The sentence in (6.37) 
above implies that the speaker’s leaving follows John’s entry, hence it indicates sequentiality. But 
(6.38) below implies that the speaker’s leaving ‘fits into’ the temporal range introduced by the 
preceding clause, hence it indicates concurrence. This difference in interpretation can be attributed 
to the type of the time-retrieving expression (time_of by when in (6.37) and range_of by while in 
(6.38)): 
(6.38) While John was working, I left. 
range_of(work[John]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA.OC(leave[I])))> 
One can also find ‘occurrence in future’ (POSTERIORANA.OC), as illustrated in the temporally 
dependent clause in (6.39). ‘Habitual occurrence’ (RECURRENTANA.OC) is also possible, when the 
displacement is to a plurality of temporal locations around the temporal center (6.40): 
(6.39) When John comes, I will leave. 
time_of(come[John]){POSTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(POSTERIORANA.OC(leave[I])))> 
(6.40) Whenever I come across John, he walks away from me. 
times_of(come across[I, John]){RECURRENT}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(RECURRENTANA.OC(walk away[he, me])))> 
Temporally dependent clauses are not necessarily associated with certainty and assertion. 
They may involve, for instance, epistemic modality (6.41), or a request (6.42): 
(6.41) While John was working, Jill may have left. 
range_of(work[John]){ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(PROBABLE(ANTERIORANA.OC(leave[Jill])))> 
(6.42) When John comes, call me. 
time_of(come[John]){POSTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <WANTED/request/(HYPOTHETICAL(POSTERIORANA.OC(call[you, me])))> 
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In discourse-level temporal displacements, anaphoric time reference is generally involved in 
dependent sentences rather than dependent clauses. For instance in narratives,97 ANTERIORANA 
appears in the ‘background segments’ (where a certain stage in the storyline is elaborated with 
relevant events or states) and ANTERIORANA.OC appears in ‘foreground’ segments (where the time-line 
is advanced by sequential events).98 Below are sample analyses for two short narrative segments: 
(6.43) Yesterday at eight, I left home. I had been awake all night. I felt tired… 
/yesterday at eight/{ANTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA.OC(leave[I, home]))), 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(PERFECT (awake[I])))), 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANOEUS(tired[I]))))> 
(6.44) Thursday morning, John will have received the results. He will inform you. 
/Thursday morning/{POSTERIOR}DISP-T: frametmp 
frametmp: <ASSERTED(CERTAIN(PERFECT(receive[John, the results]))), 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(POSTERIORANA.OC(inform[he, you])))> 
6.2.2 Representing epistemic displacements 
Epistemic displacements typically occur in conditional sentences. Conditional sentences are 
structurally similar to when-sentences: Just like a ‘when’-clause which retrieves the temporal value 
associated with a given SoA, an if-clause (a protasis) retrieves the epistemic value associated with a 
given proposition. In an epistemic conditional, the premise can be presupposed to be likely, 
unlikely, or counterfactual.99 The apodosis of the conditional is anaphorically associated with this 
epistemic value.  
Similar to the time_of function which retrieves a temporal relation in ‘when’-clauses, the 
epistemic retrieval function in if-clauses is represented as thought_of. This epistemic displacement 
trigger which includes this function is shown with the subscript DISP-E, and the displaced epistemic 
frame is labeled as frameep. In the following examples, anaphoric reference within the displaced 
epistemic frames is indicated with PROBABLE/medium/ANA (6.45) and PROBABLE/low/ANA (6.46). The 
predictions relative to these epistemic frames is represented as PROBABLE/high/: 
                                                           
97 The term ‘narrative’ is used here to denote stretches of discourse where a speaker recounts events in a 
certain temporal sequence. Narrarives are not restricted to past; they can also be about events in the future or 
about regularly occurring events. A narrative can further be associated with certainty, evidentiality and it can 
be meant to represent real or fictive stories. 
98 Some languages have special tenses for sequential occurrences in narratives, e.g., ‘narrative tenses’ 
mentioned in Dahl (1985: 113-114), the Swahili ‘consecutive tense’ mentioned in Hopper (1979) and in Givón 
(2002: 244-245). Such forms, (in general, markers of the category type PASTn (‘narrative pasts’) in Dahl (1985)) 
can be taken as specialized markers of ANTERIORANA.OC which appear in past narratives. 
99 Just like temporal marking in ‘when’-clauses, explicit marking of epistemic evaluations in ‘if’-clauses 
exhibits cross-linguistic variation. A language may or may not explicitly mark differences between possible, 
probable, unlikely and counterfactual premises. 
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The protasis in (6.47) below also introduces a premise which is presupposed to be likely 
(probable). It differs from (6.45) above in only the temporal relation its signals.  
(6.47) If John has come Marry will stay home. 
thought_of(PERFECT(come[John])){PROBABLE}DISP-E: frameep 
frameep: <ASSERTED(PROBABLE ANA(PROBABLE/high/(POSTERIOR(stay[Marry, home]))))> 
The conditional sentence in (6.48) below is different from the ones above not only in the 
temporal relation expressed in its protasis, but also in the temporal and epistemic relations in its 
apodosis: 
(6.48) If John is here Marry has definitely stayed home. 
thought_of(SIMULTANEOUS(come[John]){PROBABLE}DISP-E: frameep 
frameep: <ASSERTED(PROBABLEANA(CERTAIN(PERFECT(stay[Marry, home]))))> 
6.2.3 Representing volitional displacements 
While a temporal displacement basically occurs along a one-dimensional temporal axis, 
displacements in the epistemic and the volitional domains can be qualified in many different ways. 
Especially, volitional displacements can target centers (volitional states) which can be related to the 
parent frame in highly specific ways. When such a relation is too specific to be straightforwardly 
analyzed in terms of the schematically delimited basic anchoring categories, it will be indicated in 
the metalanguage with small letters. For instance, the speaker may create a sense of communicative 
‘distance’, by virtually shifting her volitional center away from the communicative situation (6.49). 
Or, an utterance may involve a report of what the speaker has heard from another illocutionary 
source (‘hearsay’), as in (6.50):100 
                                                           
100 Hearsay (or ‘report’) is taken in the present framework a specific kind of volitional displacement similar 
to what is at stake in ‘reported speech’ or ‘indirect speech’ rather than an evidential category in the strict sense 
of the term ‘evidential’ (see the end of section 5.2.4 and section 6.2.3). The anaphoric reference to the volitional 
frame construed around the will of another illocutionary agent is represented as hearsayANA. 
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me, the pen]))))> 
(6.50) Reportedly, Marry went to New York yesterday. 
hearsayDISP: framevol 
framevol: <hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR/yesterday/(go[Marry, to New 
York]))))> 
6.3 Subordination in the metalanguage 
This section shows how subordination is represented in the metalanguage of anchoring categories. 
As already mentioned in section 3.3, anchoring relations are designated by temporal, epistemic, 
volitional, or illocutionary predicates, resulting in complex sentences (i.e, those with subordinate 
clauses). Different types of anchoring predicates take as complement the semantic contents listed in 
Table 2 below: 
 
Type of the predicate Complement 
Temporal predicate A SoA 
Epistemic predicate A proposition: T[t](SoA) 
Volitional predicate A reflection: E[h](T[t](SoA)) 
Illocutionary predicate A message: V[p](E[h](T[t](SoA))) 
Table 2. Different types of predicates involved in complex sentences and their complements. 
Some examples are given below. (6.51) includes a temporal predicate, (6.52-6.54) include 
epistemic predicates, (6.55-6.57), volitional predicates, and (6.58-6.62), illocutionary predicates. As 
can be transparently seen in the metalinguistic translations below, the main clause of a complex 
sentence is always associated with its own three layers of signaled anchoring categories: 
(6.51) It was in 1990 that I saw him. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR(in 1990[see[I, him]])))  
(6.52) Mary knew that John is often out of town nowadays.  
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR(know[Mary, RECURRENT/often/(out of town[John])]))) 
(6.53) Mary may be thinking that John was out of town yesterday. 
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ASSERTED(PROBABLE(SIMULTANEOUS(think[Mary, ANTERIOR/yesterday/(out of 
town[John])]))) 
(6.54) I believe that John is alive. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(believe[I, SIMULTANEOUS(alive[John])]))) 
(6.55) They will regret that she cannot come. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(POSTERIOR(regret[they, CERTAIN(POSTERIOR(come/state of 
possibility/[she]))]))) 
(6.56) John hopes that Mary has passed the exam. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(hope[John, PROBABLE(PERFECT(pass[Mary, the exam]))]))) 
(6.57) John probably wants Mary to stay with us. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE/high/(SIMULTANEOUS(want[John, 
HYPOTHETICAL(POSTERIOR(stay[Mary, with us]))]))) 
(6.58) John may insist that there is a mistake in the calculation. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(insist[John, ACCEPTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(exist[a 
mistake, in the calculation])))]))) 
(6.59) John told me that Jill may have been late. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR(tell[John, me, ACCEPTED(PROBABLE/medium/(PERFECT 
(late[Mary])))]))) 
(6.60) John ordered Mary to stop the machine. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN (ANTERIOR(order[John, Mary, 
ENVISIONED(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(stop[Mary, the machine])))]))) 
(6.61) Ask him to come back in an hour. 
WANTED/request/(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(ask[you, 
ENVISIONED(HYPOTHETICAL(POSTERIOR/in an hour/(come back[he])))]))) 
(6.62) I order you to stop the machine! 
IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION(NEW INFORMATION(SIMULTANEOUS(order[I, you, 
ENVISIONED(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(stop[you, the machine])))]))) 
The designation of an anchoring predicate can also trigger a center displacement, e.g., as in the 
examples above where the verbs are predicated over non-first person subjects (all except 6.54 and 
6.62). Such displacements will not be represented in the metalanguage in the form of separate 
frames (i.e., between < > signs as in the examples under section 6.1 above). This would be 
redundant, for the scope of a displacement in such cases overlaps with that of the subordinate 
clause. 
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The last example above shows how explicit performatives are represented in the 
metalanguage of anchoring categories: Like other declarative utterances, they express categories of 
immediacy in all the three domains of anchoring, and they explicitly designate the speaker’s 
immediate intention, i.e., the illocutionary act she intends to perform. 
6.4 Negation in the metalanguage 
Negation amounts to the exclusion of a semantic content from a higher-order entity. Three types of 
negation are identified as to the semantic domain in which they operate: 
• Temporal negation excludes a SoA from a temporal location (or temporal range). 
• Epistemic negation excludes a proposition from a thought (or a range of thoughts). 
• Volitional negation excludes a reflection from a projection (or a range of projections).101 
Negation is represented in the metalanguage with the sign ¬ (e.g., ¬ANTERIOR, ¬CERTAIN, 
¬WANTED, etc.). 
The type of negation that is actually involved in a negative utterance may not be easily 
identifiable, because languages do not always formally distinguish different types of negation. As 
an example, consider the assertive utterance with a factual proposition in (6.63), which is assigned 
a metalinguistic representation and an approximate illocutionary act description. 
(6.63) Sue surprised me yesterday. 
ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR/yesterday/(suprise[Sue, me]))) 
-> The speaker asserts that it is certainly true that the SoA ‘Sue’s surprising her’ occurred in the 
temporal range specified as yesterday. 
The negative counterpart of (6.63) is given in (6.64). It can be meant to convey a temporal 
negation (i.e., the exclusion of the SoA from the temporal range specified as yesterday), as in (6.64a). 
But it can also be intended to express an epistemic negation (i.e., the exclusion of the proposition 
from the range of thoughts qualified as CERTAIN) as in (6.64b), or a volitional negation (i.e., the 
exclusion of the reflection from the range of ACCEPTED projections involved in the speaker’s 
assertion) as in (6.64c): 
                                                           
101 Temporal negation basically corresponds to ‘predicational negation’ in the Functional Grammar 
framework (e.g., Dik 1997) and partially overlaps with what de Haan (1997: 12) calls ‘narrow scope’ negation. 
Epistemic negation corresponds to ‘propositional negation’ in Dik’s (1997) system and covers what is called 
‘modal negation’ in most logical frameworks. Volitional negation includes what (Horn 1985, 1989) calls 
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(6.64) Sue didn’t surprise me yesterday. 
(a) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(¬ANTERIOR/yesterday/(suprise[Sue, me]))) (e.g., … she surprised me 
today.) 
-> The speaker asserts that it is certainly true that the SoA ‘Sue’s surprising her’ is excluded from 
the temporal range specified as yesterday. 
(b) ASSERTED(¬CERTAIN(ANTERIOR/yesterday/(surprise[Sue, me]))) (e.g., … this is not true.) 
-> The speaker asserts that the proposition ‘Sue’s surprising her yesterday’ is excluded from what 
she knows to be certainly true of the world (i.e., she says that the proposition is false). 
(c) ¬ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR/yesterday/(surprise[Sue, me]))) (e.g., … she shocked me.) 
-> The speaker excludes the reflection ‘it is true that Sue surprised her yesterday’ from what she 
intentionally asserts (i.e., she does not say “Sue surprised me yesterday”). 
Negation in a domain can entail (i.e., semantically imply) negation in another domain. In 
general, in the context of an assertive and factual utterance, temporal negation entails epistemic 
negation, which, in turn, entails volitional negation.102 For instance, the semantic value given in 
(6.64a) above entails the ones given in (6.64b) and (6.64c). But in utterances which express 
anchoring relations other than certainty and assertion, the intended locus of negation may result in 
substantially different semantic values (and may be expressed by different formal strategies). 
Consider the expression of epistemic possibility in (6.65). The negative counterpart with may not in 
(6.66) involves a temporal (or, ‘internal’) negation. But the one in (6.67) with cannot involves an 
epistemic (or, ‘external’) negation, which yields a totally different meaning: 
(6.65) John may be sleeping. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE(SIMULTANEOUS(sleep[John]))) 
-> The speaker asserts that it is probably true that the SoA ‘John’s sleeping’ holds now. 
(6.66) John may not be sleeping. 
ASSERTED(PROBABLE(¬SIMULTANEOUS(sleep[John]))) 
-> The speaker asserts that it is probably true that the SoA ‘John’s sleeping’ is excluded from now 
(i.e. qualifies the negative proposition as ‘possible’). 
                                                           
102 This monotonic chain of implication is presumably related to the containment relations among entities 
in the three domains: By excluding a SoA from a temporal location in the context of an utterance, one will also 
have excluded it from the thought which contains this temporal location, and from the projection which 
contains this thought. 
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(6.67) John cannot be sleeping. 
ASSERTED(¬PROBABLE(SIMULTANEOUS(sleep[John]))) 
-> The speaker asserts that the proposition ‘John is sleeping now’ is excluded from the range of 
thoughts that she takes to be close to her current knowledge state (i.e., qualifies the proposition as 
‘impossible’). 
The following examples illustrate the contrast between temporal and volitional negation in the 
context of a deictic (speaker-oriented) obligation. In (6.68) the speaker prescribes the addressee to 
go. The negative sentence in (6.69) prescribes the addressee not to go. But that in (6.70) does not 
prescribe anything; it signals that the speaker does not include the addressee’s imminent leaving in 
the projections that she strongly wants to be real: 
(6.68) You must/have to go. 
WANTED/obligation/(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(go[you]))) 
-> The speaker strongly wishes for a projection in which the addressee’s going is ‘included’ in the 
imminent future (i.e. she prescribes the addressee to go).  
(6.69) You must not go. 
WANTED/obligation/(HYPOTHETICAL(¬PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(go[you]))) 
-> The speaker strongly wishes for a projection in which the addressee’s going is ‘excluded’ from the 
imminent future (i.e. she prescribes the addressee not to go). 
(6.70) You don’t have to go. 
¬WANTED/obligation/(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(go[you]))) 
-> The speaker ‘excludes’ the addressee’s going in the imminent future from the projections that she 
strongly wishes for (i.e. she does not prescribe the addressee to go). 
Epistemic negation is critically involved in the expression of ‘counterfactuality’ (i.e., the 
indexation of the presupposition that a proposition is contrary to what is known to be true) in 
conditional sentences. The following examples illustrate the two types of negation that can be 
involved in conditional protases. (6.72) expresses temporal negation only, (6.73) expresses 
counterfactuality, and (6.74) expresses both temporal negation and counterfactuality. 
Counterfactuality is analyzed in the metalanguage of anchoring categories as negation in the 
context of an epistemic displacement: The proposition expressed in the protasis is presupposed to 
be excluded from the thought to which the displacement occurs, which is qualified as CERTAIN: 




(6.72) If John has not come … (temporal negation) 
thought_of(¬PERFECT(come[John])){PROBABLE}DISP-EP : frameep 
frameep: <…> 
(6.73) If John had come … (presupposed epistemic negation ) 
thought_of(PERFECT(come[John])){¬CERTAIN}DISP-EP: frameep 
frameep: <…> 
(6.74) If John had not come … (temporal negation and presupposed epistemic negation) 
thought_of(¬PERFECT(come[John])){¬CERTAIN}DISP-EP: frameep 
frameep: <…> 
Below is given a full metalinguistic translation of a simple counterfactual conditional: 




6.5 Interrogation in the metalanguage 
As already mentioned in section 2.3, questions constitute a special subtype of directive utterances, 
in that they appeal the addressee(s) to provide a certain piece of information. Like other types of 
directives, they index a certain volitional attitude of the speaker (WANTED). But different from other 
directives, they do not express that the speaker wants the designated SoA to be realized. They 
rather signal that speaker wants to receive ‘information’ about (the participants of) a certain SoA. 
This volitional component will be represented in the metalanguage as WANTED/information/, 
without further analyses as to its more fine-grained semantic ingredients. The signaling of this 
volitional category yields an illocutionary force which urges the addressee(s) to provide the 
requested information. 
In a ‘yes/no’-question, what the speaker wants to learn is whether a proposition, which is 
currently ‘hypothetical’ for the speaker, is true of false. The examples below illustrate how 
‘yes/no’-questions are translated into the metalanguage of anchoring categories: 
(6.76) Is John at home? 
WANTED/information/(HYPOTHETICAL(SIMULTANEOUS(be[John, home]))) 
(6.77) Are you going to sleep? 
WANTED/information/(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE(sleep[you]))) 
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In a ‘wh’-question, the speaker signals that she wants to receive a piece of information (which 
may be part of the designated SoA or a temporal specification) which would complete a 
proposition which is already associated with certainty. In the following examples, the items for 
which the speaker seeks information are underlined: 
(6.78) What are you looking for? 
WANTED/information/(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(look for[you, what]))) 
(6.79) Where will the meeting take place? 
WANTED/information/(CERTAIN(POSTERIOR (take place[meeting, where]))) 
(6.80) When did John come? 
WANTED/information/(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR/when/(come[John]))) 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter demonstrated how the semantic values of natural language utterances can be 
expressed in the metalanguage of anchoring categories, transparently reflecting the semantic 
composition of a predicational content (SoA), a temporal category, an epistemic category, and a 
volitional category. It also showed how local and discourse-level displacements, different types of 
subordination and negation, and finally, interrogation, are represented in this metalanguage.  
This chapter marks the end of Part I, which developed a purely semantic framework which 
can be used for analyzing tense, aspect and mood categories in any language. Part II will apply this 
framework in the synchronic and diachronic analyses of the ranges of polysemy associated with 










A semantic analysis of the Turkish TAM markers 
-Xr, -DIr, and -Iyor 
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Chapter 7 
General properties of Turkish and its TAM system 
This chapter outlines the structural properties of the Turkish language, introduces the general 
structure of its TAM system and mentions the main strategies of subordination. It is intended as a 
background for the analysis of the TAM markers -Iyor, -Xr, and -DIr, which will be presented in the 
subsequent chapters. 
7.1 The main parameters of the morphosyntax 
Turkish is a head-final language of the agglutinating type. It uses suffixes for inflectional 
categories, which line up to the right of the verbal or nominal root: 
(7.1) Uyu-yabil-ecek-ti-m. 
sleep-ABIL-FUT-PASTe-A1SG 
‘I would be able to sleep.’ 
(7.2) sokak–ta–ki–ler–in 
street-LOC-REL-PLU-GEN 
‘of those who are on the street’ 
The most frequent order in assertive sentences is the verb final construction where the initial 
position is occupied by the subject (SOV). But constituents can go in any position in the sentence, 
creating grammatical sentences with different information-structural distributions: 
(7.3) Adam elma-yı  ye-di. 
man  apple-ACC eat-PAST 
‘The man ate the apple.’ 
(7.4) Adam yedi elmayı. 
(7.5) Elmayı adam yedi. 
(7.6) Elmayı yedi adam. 
(7.7) Yedi adam elmayı. 
(7.8) Yedi elmayı adam. 
Turkish exhibits person agreement in finite clauses and in possessive constructions. It doesn’t 
have any object agreement. The person agreement markers are listed in Table 3 below: 
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 Clausal paradigm (finite clauses) Nominal paradigm (possessive constructions) 
 Pronoun (Nominative) Agreement  Pronoun (Genitive) Agreement (Possessive) 
1SG ben -(y)Im ben-im nominal-(I)m 
2SG  sen -sIn sen-in  nominal-(I)n 
3SG o (nominal) -Ø o-nun (nominal-(n)In) nominal-(s)I 
1PL biz -(y)Iz biz-im nominal-(I)mIz 
2PL siz -sInIz siz-in nominal-(I)nIz 
3PL onlar (nominal-lAr) (-lAr) (onlar-ın) 
(nominal-(lAr)In) 
nominal-(s)I/lArI 
Table 3. Personal pronouns and agreement marking in clausal and nominal constructions. (Exceptions in 
clausal agreement are mentioned in section 7.2.) 
Person agreement markers normally follow all other markers on the clausal predicate, 
including the question particle mI (exceptions are mentioned in footnote 108 in section 7.2 below): 
(7.9) Anl-ıyor-sunuz. 
understand-CONT-A2PL  
‘You (pl) understand.’ 
(7.10) Yap-tır-ma-malı mı-yız? 
do-CAUS-NEG-NEC QP-A1PL  
‘Shouldn’t we make (him) do (it)?’ 
In possessive constructions, the possessor is marked with the Genitive case, and the 
possessum is marked by the Possessive person agreement:  
(7.11) siz-in  kedi-niz 
P2PL-GEN cat-POSS.A2SG 
‘your (pl) cat’ 
(7.12) adam-ın  kedi-si 
man-GEN  cat-POSS 
‘the man’s cat’ 
Turkish is a ‘pro-drop’ language; pronouns in the subject position (of a clause or a possessive 
construction) can be omitted, presumably due to the distinctive person agreement paradigm. This 
is illustrated in (7.13) and (7.14) below. When the discursive context allows, pronouns at non-
subject positions can also be dropped (7.15A): 
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(7.13) (Ben) gel-di-m. 
P1SG come-PAST-A1SG 
‘I have come.’ 
(7.14) (siz-in)  kedi-niz 
P2SG-GEN cat-POSS.A2SG 
‘your (pl) cat’ 
(7.15) Q. Adam-ı  kim gör-dü? 
 man-ACC  who see-PAST 
 ‘Who saw the man?’ 
 A.  Ahmet gör-dü. 
 Ahmet see-PAST 
 ‘Ahmet saw (him).’ 
Turkish uses a morphological nominative-accusative case system in marking the relation of 
arguments to their predicates. In addition to the Genitive given in Table 3 above, Turkish makes 








Table 4. Morphological case markers in Turkish. 
The nominative, accusative, dative, and the ablative cases are illustrated below: 
(7.16) Adam-Ø  kadın-a   kitab-ı  ver-di. 
man.NOM woman-DAT  book-ACC give-PAST 
‘The man gave the book to the woman.’ 
(7.17) ders-ten  sonra 
lecture-ABL after 
‘after the lecture’ 
                                                           
103 Some scholars add to this list three additional cases: the Equative (-cA), the Minutive (Associative) (-lI), 
and the Privative (-sIz) (e.g., Banguoğlu 1986). Some also consider the instrumental/comitative suffix -(y)lA as 
a case marker, but it is best taken as the cliticized form of the postposition ile (‘with’). 
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7.2 The general structure of the TAM system and patterns of combination 
Turkish TAM marking is sensitive to whether the predicate is verbal or non-verbal (i.e., nominal, 
adjectival or existential). A set of bound markers attach to verbal roots (which may already be 
marked for negation, causativity, passivity, or reciprocity). A partially corresponding set of enclitics 
and the inflections of the auxiliary verb ol (‘be’) apply to (i) non-verbal predicates or (ii) verbal 
predicates which are already inflected by bound markers. These three paradigms of TAM markers 
are listed in Table 5 below (non-verbal predicates can also appear with zero-marking, which is 
represented here as -Ø): 
 














HABG -DIr  ‘Judgment 
enclitic’ 




CONT    ol-uyor 
-mAktA ‘Progressive’ PROG    ol-makta 
-(y)AcAG ‘Future’ 
‘Definite future’ 
FUT    ol-acak 
-DI  ‘Past’ 
‘Definite past’ 
‘Perfective’ 
PAST -(y)DI ‘Past’ 
‘Past enclitic’ 
PASTe ol-du 
-mIş ‘Evidential past’ 
‘Perfect’ 
EPAST -(y)mIş ‘Evidential’ 
‘Evidential past’ 
EPASTe ol-muş 
-mAlI ‘Necessitative’ NEC    ol-malı 
-(y)Abilir ‘Abilitative’ 
‘Possibility’ 
POS    ol-abilir 
-sA  ‘Conditional’ COND -(y)sA ‘Conditional’ CONDe ol-sa 





IMP    ol-sun 
Table 5. The three paradigms of TAM marking in Turkish.106 
                                                           
104 The ol-series can be further extended by the enclitics. 
105 The full imperative paradigm is as follows: 
1SG: -(y)AyIm 1PL: -(y)AlIm 
2SG:  -Ø 2PL: -(y)In 
3SG: -sIn 3PL: -sIn(-lAr) 
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Example (7.18) below illustrates the inflection of a verbal predicate by a bound marker 
(-(y)AcAG). In (7.19), an enclitic (-DIr) is attached to a non-verbal predicate. In (7.20), the same 
enclitic appears on a verbal predicate already inflected by a bound marker (-mIş). In (7.21) and 
(7.22), an inflection of ol (ol-acak) is applied to a non-verbal and an inflected verbal stem, 
respectively:  
(7.18) Toplantı saat beş-te  başla-yacak. 
meeting hour five-LOC start-FUT 
‘The meeting will start at five.’ 
(7.19) Dünya yuvarlak-tır. 
earth  round-JDGe 
‘The earth is round.’ 
(7.20) Hale  çık-mış-tır. 
Hale leave-EPAST-JDGe 
‘Hale must have left.’ 
(7.21) Mehmet bura-da ol-acak. 
Mehmet here-LOC AUX-FUT 
‘Mehmet will be here.’ 
(7.22) Mehmet çık-ıyor  ol-acak. 
Mehmet leave-CONT AUX-FUT 
‘Mehmet will be leaving.’ 
The enclitics -(y)DI, -(y)mIş and -(y)sA can also resume periphrastic forms, namely, idi, imiş 
and ise, which descend from the inflections of the Old Turkic auxiliary verb är, i.e., är-ti, är-miş and 
är-se (Lewis 1967/1978: 96; Johanson 2000c).107 These periphrastic forms are rarely used in Modern 
Standard Turkish. The examples below illustrate them. The pairs are semantically identical: 
(7.23) Mehmet hasta-ydı  / hasta idi. 
Mehmet sick-(y)DI  sick idi 
‘Mehmet was sick.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                
106 Formal motivations for distinguishing -DI from -(y)DI, -mIş from -(y)mIş and -sA from -(y)sA have been 
mentioned in a number of previous studies, including Sebüktekin 1971, Taylan 1996 and Sezer 2001. It can 
also be noted that while bound markers generally receive word stress, the enclitics cannot be stressed when 
they appear in a finite clause. The correspondence between -Xr and -DIr is acknowledged in Sansa (1986) and 
in Aksu-Koç (1995), mainly on semantic grounds. Sansa (1986) also shows that -Ø functions in non-verbal 
predication as the counterpart of -Iyor in verbal predication. 
107 Similarly, -DIr descends from tur-ur, which is the inflection of the once independent auxiliary tur (now 
dur; ‘stay’ or ‘stand’) with -Xr (Lewis 1967/1978: 96, Johanson 1998b: 115; see also section 9.2). 
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(7.24) Ayşe bugün çalış-ıyor-muş  /  çalış-ıyor  imiş. 
Ayşe today  work-CONT-(y)mIş  work-CONT imiş 
‘Reportedly, Ayşe is working today.’ 
(7.25) Hale gel-ecek-se… / gel-ecek ise… 
Hale come-FUT-(y)sA come-FUT ise 
‘If Hale is going to come…’ 
The general patterns of TAM combination in verbal and non-verbal affirmative sentences are 
given below::108 
(7.26) In non-verbal predication:  
 non-verbal predicate | enclitic / ol-series / -Ø | person agreement 
 In verbal predication:  
 verbal predicate | bound marker | (enclitic / ol-series) | person agreement109 
The examples below illustrate some possible combinations in non-verbal predication. (7.27) 
and (7.28) illustrate zero-marking (-Ø) with adjectival and existential predicates, respectively. In 
                                                           
108 Not all combinations which fit these patterns are acceptable. -DI can only combine with -(y)DI and 
-(y)sA, and -DIr cannot attach to -Xr, -sA, or -(y)A (see Taylan 1996: 166-167). The ol-series does not combine 
with -DI, -(y)A, -sA, -(y)Abilir and -mAlI, and combinations with other bound markers is subject to semantic 
compatibility between elements chosen from each paradigm. Though not too often, -(y)sA and -(y)mIş can also 
attach to another enclitic, as illustrated below:  
(i) Kaç-acak-mış-sa-k… 
run.away-FUT-EPASTe-(y)sA-A1PL 
‘If it is told that we are going to run away…’ 
(ii) Kaç-acak-tı-ymış! 
run.away-FUT-PASTe-(y)mIş 
‘Supposedly, he was going to run away!’ (implying that this is nonsense) 
Certain morphological and phonological contexts trigger exceptions for the phonological shapes of TAM 
markers and their combinatory patterns. -Xr and -Iyor digest the last vowel of verbal roots which end with a 
vowel (e.g., kaşı ‘scratch’: kaş-ır ‘scratches’, kaş-ıyor ‘is scratching’; eri ‘melt’: er-ir ‘melts’, er-iyor ‘is melting’; 
yürü ‘walk’: yür-ür ‘walks’, yür-üyor ‘is walking’; boya ‘paint’: boy-ar ‘paints’, boy-uyor ‘is painting’, ağla ‘cry’: 
ağl-ar ‘cries’, ağl-ıyor ‘is crying’). This is also observed when -Iyor combines with the negative marker -mA (e.g., 
gel-me ‘not come’: gel-m-iyor ‘is not coming’; sor-ma ‘not ask’: sor-m-uyor ‘is not asking’.) With -DI, -(y)DI, and 
-(y)sA, the 1SG agreement marker is -k instead of -(y)Iz, and the 2PL marker is -nIz instead of -sInIz. The 1PL of 
the Optative is -(y)AlIm (the Imperative and the Optative paradigms overlap in the 1SG and 1PL). Although 
person agreement markers normally follow all TAM markers, they precede -DIr, as shown in (i) below. The 
optional 3PL agreement -lAr can be placed either before or after an enclitic (ii): 
(i) Gör-müş-üm-dür. 
see-EPAST-A1SG-JDGe 
‘I may have seen.’ 
(ii) Yürü-mekte-ler-di / yürü-mekte-ydi-ler 
walk-PROG-A3PL-PASTe walk-PROG-PASTe-A3PL 
‘They were walking.’ 
109 The bound TAM markers are often said to function as morphosyntactic ‘nominalizers’. This does not 
mean that they derive genuine nouns or adjectives. As reflected in the pattern of combinability in verbal 
predication given here, bound markers allow the verbal predicate to which they attach to be further marked 
by the enclitics and the ol-series, which can directly attach to nouns and adj
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(7.29), an enclitic (-(y)mIş) is attached to a nominal, and in (7.30), another one (-(y)sA) to an 
existential predicate. (7.31) illustrates the combination of a non-verbal predicate with the auxiliary 
verb ol, which in turn is inflected with a bound-marker (-DI): 
(7.27) Hasta-Ø. 
sick-Ø 
‘(S)he is sick.’ 
(7.28) Dolap-ta  bira var-Ø. 
fridge-LOC  beer EXCP-Ø 
‘There is beer in the fridge.’ 
(7.29) Öğretmen-miş. 
teacher-EPASTe 
‘Reportedly, (s)he is a teacher.’ 
(7.30) Dolap-ta  bira var-sa … 
fridge-LOC  beer EXCP-CONDe 
‘If there is beer in the fridge …’ 
(7.31) Hasta ol-du. 
sick AUX-PAST 
‘(S)he got sick.’ 
The following examples show some possibilities of TAM marking on verbal predicates. (7.32) 
shows the affixation of a bound marker to a verbal root. (7.33)-(7.35) illustrate verbs followed by 
bound markers and enclitics. In (7.36) and (7.37), bound markers are followed by inflections of the 
auxiliary verb ol: 
(7.32) Düş-tü-m. 
fall.down-PAST-A1SG 
‘I fell down.’ 
(7.33) Kal-sa-ydı … 
stay-COND-PASTe 
‘if (s)he had stayed…’ 
(7.34) Gel-ecek-ler-dir. 
come-FUT-A3PL-JDGe 
‘They will probably come.’ 
(7.35) Gir-ebilir-miş-siniz. 
enter-POS-EPASTe-A2PL 
‘Reportedly, you (pl) are allowed to enter.’ 
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(7.36) Gel-miş  ol-malı-yız. 
come-EPAST AUX-NEC-A1PL 
‘We must have arrived.’ 
(7.37) Kalk-acak  ol-du. 
stand.up-FUT AUX-PAST 
‘(S)he attempted to stand up.’ 
The primary strategy of negation in verbal predication is the suffix -mA. It is attached to the 
verbal root and followed by a bound marker:  
(7.38) Ahmet gel-me-di /  gel-me-di-yse     / gel-me-miş-tir /  
 gel-me-miş   ol-abilir   / gel-me-yecek-ti   / gel-me-ye!  
Ahmet come-NEG-PAST  come-NEG-PAST-CONDe  come-NEG-EPAST-JDGe 
 come-NEG-EPAST AUX-POS   come-NEG-FUT-PASTe  come-NEG-OPT 
‘Ahmet did not come / if he did not come / he probably did not come / he may not have come / he was 
not  
 going to come / may he not come!’ 
-Xr and -(y)Abilir constitute exceptions in the compositionality of the negative marker -mA 
with TAM morphemes. The negative of -Xr and -(y)Abilir are, respectively, -mA and -(y)AmA for 
the first persons (7.39, 7.40), and –mAz and -(y)AmAz for other persons (7.41, 7.42):  
(7.39) Dondurma-yı sev-me-m. 
ice cream-ACC like-HABG.NEG-A1SG 
‘I don’t like ice cream.’ 
(7.40) Yarın   gel-eme-yiz. 
tomorrow come-POS.NEG-A1PL 
‘We cannot come tomorrow.’ 
(7.41) Kedi-ler ıslan-mak-tan  hoşlan-maz-lar. 
cat-PLU get.wet-INF-ABL  like-HABG.NEG-A3PL 
‘Cats do not like to get wet.’ 
(7.42) Bura-ya gir-emez-siniz. 
here-DAT enter-POS.NEG-A2PL 
‘You cannot enter here.’ 
A second negative strategy, the particle değil, can only follow a non-verbal predicate or a 
verbal predicate inflected by a bound marker, and person agreement marker comes after değil 
(7.43). Enclitics can be cliticized to değil (7.44). Double negation is possible with both -mA and değil 
(7.45): 
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(7.43) Hasta / git-miş / gid-ecek  değil-im. 
sick  go-EPAST  go-FUT  NEGP-A1SG   
‘It is not the case that I am sick / that I went / that I will go.’ 
(7.44) Ahmet hasta / gel-miş / gel-ecek  değil-di / değil-miş. 
Ahmet sick  come-EPAST come-FUT NEGP-PASTe NEGP-EPASTe 
‘It was not the case / reportedly not the case that Ahmet was sick / had come / would come.’ 
(7.45) Ahmet  gel-me-miş /  gel-me-yecek  değil-di / değil-miş. 
Ahmet come-NEG-EPAST come-NEG-FUT  NEGP-PASTe NEGP-EPASTe 
‘It was not the case / reportedly not the case that Ahmet had not come / would not come.’ 
The negative of the existential copular verb var is yok: 
(7.46) Dolap-ta  bira var-Ø  / yok-Ø. 
fridge-LOC  beer EXCP-Ø / NEG.EXCP-Ø 
‘There is beer in the fridge / There is no beer in the fridge.’ 
The question particle mI follows the bound markers (7.47) and precedes the enclitics (7.48, 
7.49). It can be placed either before or after the ol-series (7.50, 7.51): 
(7.47) Gel-ir   mi? / Gel-miş  mi? / Gel-meli   mi? / Gel-sin  mi? 
come-HABG QP   come-EPAST QP   come-NEC QP   come-IMP QP 
‘Will (s)he come? / Has (s)he reportedly come? / Does (s)he need to come? / Shall (s)he come?’ 
(7.48) Hasta mı-dır? / Hasta mı-ymış? 
sick QP-JDGe  sick QP-EPASTe 
‘Do you think (s)he is sick? / Do they say that (s)he is sick?’ 
(7.49) Gel-miş  mi-dir? / Gel-miş  mi-ydi?  
Come-EPAST QP-JDGe  come-EPAST QP-PASTe 
‘Do you think (s)he has come? / Had (s)he come? ‘ 
(7.50) Đyi  mi  ol-du? / Đyi  ol-du  mu? 
good QP  AUX-PAST  good AUX-PAST QP 
‘Did (s)he get better?’ 
(7.51) Çalış-ıyor mu ol-acak / Çalış-ıyor ol-acak mı?  
work-CONT QP  AUX-FUT  work-CONT AUX-FUT QPRT 
‘Will (s)he be working?’  
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7.3 The main strategies of subordination 
The most typical strategy of subordination in Turkish involves complementizer suffixes which 
nominalize a verbal predicate and make the subordinate clause look like a possessive construction. 
(7.52) and (7.53) below exemplify the two most common complementizers, namely, -DIG and -mA 
(labeled, respectively, as ‘factive nominalizer’ and ‘action nominalizer’ in Kornfilt 1997). -(y)AcAG 
can also serve as a complementizer when the subordinate clause is future-oriented (7.54): 
(7.52) Mehmet’-in  gel-me-si-ni    isti-yor-um. 
Mehmet-GEN come-AN-POSS-ACC  want-CONT-A1SG 
‘I want Mehmet to come.’ 
(7.53) Mehmet’-in  gel-diğ-i-ni   bil-iyor-um. 
Mehmet-GEN come-FN-POSS-ACC know-CONT-A1SG 
‘I know that Mehmet comes (came) / has (had) come / is (was) coming.’ 
(7.54) Mehmet’-in  gel-eceğ-i-ni    bil-iyor-um. 
Mehmet-GEN come-FUT-POSS-ACC know-CONT-A1SG 
‘I know that Mehmet is going to come’. 
When the subordinate clause involves a nominal predicate, complementizers attach to the 
buffer auxiliary ol:  
(7.55) Mehmet’-in  başarı-lı  ol-duğ-u-nu   bil-m-iyor-du-m. 
Mehmet-GEN success-ASC AUX-FN-POSS-ACC know-NEG-CONT-PASTe-A1SG  
‘I didn’t know that Mehmet was successful.’ 
(7.56) Mehmet’-in   başarı-lı  ol-ma-sı-nı    ist-iyor-um. 
Mehmet-GEN success-ASC AUX-FN-POSS-ACC want-CONT-A1SG  
‘I want Mehmet to be successful.’ 
(7.57) Mehmet’-in  başarı-lı  ol-acağ-ı-na   inan-ıyor-um. 
Mehmet-GEN success-ASC AUX-FUT-POSS-DAT believe-CONT-A1SG  
‘I trust that Mehmet will be successful.’ 
Relative clause formation has two main varieties, usually referred to as ‘subject relativization’ 
and ‘object relativization’ (e.g., Hankamer & Knecht 1976). The former is accomplished by –(y)An 
(7.58) and the latter with the factive nominalizer –DIG (7.59): 
(7.58) baykuş-u  gör-en adam 
owl-ACC  see-SREL man 
‘the man who sees/saw the owl’ 
(7.59) adam-ın  gör-düğ-ü baykuş 
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man-GEN  see-FN-POSS owl 
‘the owl that the man sees/saw’ 
In the examples above, -mA, -DIG, and -(y)An attach to the bare verbal stem and do not allow 
TAM markers on the predicate. This makes the subordinate clauses ambiguous with respect to 
temporal qualifications; they get their time reference from the context. Tense and aspect markers 
can appear in subordinate clauses only with the help of the auxiliary verb ol. Even then, the 
primary time reference of the subordinate clause remains underspecified as to past and present: 
(7.60) Mehmet-’in  gel-ecek / gel-miş  ol-duğ-u-nu   bil-iyor-um. 
Mehmet-GEN come-FUT come-EPAST AUX-FN-POSS-ACC know-CONT-A1SG 
‘I know that Mehmet will (would) / has (had) come.’ 
(7.61) Mehmet-’in  gel-ecek / gel-miş  ol-ma-sı-na   sevin-di-m / 
 sevin-miş-ti-m. 
Mehmet-GEN come-FUT come-EPAST AUX-AN-POSS-ACC rejoice-PAST-A1SG 
 rejoice-EPAST-PASTe-A1SG 
‘I am/was happy that Mehmet will (would) / has (had) come.’ 
(7.62) okul-a  gid-ecek / git-miş ol-an   adam 
school-DAT go-FUT   go-EPAST AUX-SREL  man 
‘The man who will (would) / has (had) gone to school.’ 
In subject relativization, certain TAM markers can also be used without ol-an, as seen in the 
examples below: 
(7.63) boya-n-acak  pencere 
paint-PASS-FUT  window 
‘the window to be painted’ 
(7.64) kuru-muş dal-lar 
dry-EPAST twig-PLU 
‘the twigs which have dried out / dry twigs’ 
(7.65) anlaşıl-ır      bir  neden 
understand.PASS-HABG  a  reason 
‘a reason that can be understood / an understandable reason’ 
A ‘when’-clause can be rendered by appending the locative case marker -(n)DA to a 
possessive marker which follows –DIG (7.66). Other main strategies include the use of -(y)IncA, 
which is attached to a verbal root and indicates a punctual occurrence (7.67), and –(y)kAn, which is 
attached to either a non-verbal predicate or a bound TAM marker and indicates a temporal range 
(7.68): 
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(7.66) Mehmet gel-diğ-i-nde… 
Mehmet come-FN-POSS-LOC 
‘When Mehmet came/comes…’ 
(7.67) Mehmet gel-ince… 
Mehmet come-(y)IncA 
‘As Mehmet came/comes…’ 
(7.68) Mehmet gel-ir-ken… 
Mehmet come-(y)kAn 
‘While Mehmet was coming/is coming…’ 
Conditional protases are marked with –sA (COND) or -(y)sA (CONDe), which also function as 
subordination suffixes. Most typically, both the protasis and the apodosis are marked with -Xr, as 
in (7.69) below. TAM markers other than -Xr can also appear in the protasis or the apodosis. If this 
occurs in the apodosis, -DIr is used instead of -Xr. (7.70) and (7.71) illustrate this: 
(7.69) Mehmet gel-ir-se     ben de  gel-ir-im. 
Mehmet come-HABG-CONDe P1SG CONJ come-HABG-A1SG 
‘If Mehmet comes I will come too.’ 
(7.70) Mehmet akşam  yol-a   çık-acak-sa   çoktan ev-e   git-miş-tir.  
Mehmet evening road-DAT  leave-FUT-CONDe already house-DAT go-EPAST-JDGe 
‘If Mehmet is going to leave in the evening, he must have already gone home.’ 
(7.71) Neşe makyaj  yap-ıyor-sa    parti-ye  gid-ecek-tir. 
Neşe make-up  make-CONT-CONDe party-DAT go-FUT-JDGe 
‘If Neşe is putting on a make-up, she is going to go to a party.’ 
When -sA is attached to the verbal root, the protasis indicates a lesser degree of likelihood 
(7.72). Another way of signaling reduced likelihood for a future event is to use the auxiliary ol after 
the future marker -(y)AcAG (7.73). These two strategies illustrate what is often called ‘hypothetical’ 
or ‘remote’ conditionals. If the protasis is presupposed to be false (i.e., an ‘irrealis’ or 
‘counterfactual’ conditional), -(y)DI is attached to -Xr in the apodosis, and optionally to -sA in the 
protasis (7.74, 7.75). One last option in counterfactual conditionals (usually in the spoken language) 
is to use the optative marker -(y)A rather than the conditional marker -sA (7.76): 
(7.72) Mehmet gel-se   iş-imiz   kolaylaş-ır. 
Mehmet come-COND job-POSS.A1PL get.easy-HABG  
‘If Mehmet came things would get easier.’ 
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(7.73) Mehmet gel-ecek  ol-ur-sa    iş-imiz   kolaylaş-ır. 
Mehmet come-FUT AUX-HABG-CONDe job-POSS.A1PL get.easy-HABG 
‘If Mehmet was to come things would get easier.’ 
(7.74) Mehmet-’i  çağır-sa-ydı-n    gel-ir-di. 
Mehmet-ACC invite-COND-PASTe -A2SG come-HABG-PASTe 
‘If you had invited Mehmet he would have come.’ 
(7.75) Mehmet-’i   çağır-sa-n    gel-ir-di. 
Mehmet-ACC invite-COND-A2SG come-HABG-PASTe 
‘If you had invited Mehmet he would have come.’ 
(7.76) Mehmet’i   çağır-a-ydı-n    gel-ir-di. 
Mehmet-ACC invite-OPT-PASTe-A2SG come-HABG-PASTe 
‘If you had invited Mehmet he would have come.’ 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced the main properties of the Turkish language and its TAM system. It 
pointed to the difference in TAM coding between verbal and non-verbal predication and 
formulated the patterns of combination in TAM marking. It finally illustrated the main strategies of 
subordination.  
The next chapter, which constitutes the core of Part II, provides an analysis of the semantic 
ranges of -Iyor, -Xr, -DIr and -Ø on the basis of anchoring categories defined in Part I. 
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Chapter 8 
The ranges of polysemy of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø in terms of 
anchoring categories 
Although the agglutinating morphology of Turkish exhibits a highly transparent correspondence 
between formal and semantic composition, there is no one-to-one correspondance between TAM 
markers and their uses. In other words, Turkish is not exceptional among the world’s languages in 
that polysemy pervades its TAM system. In particular, markers which primarily qualify as aspect 
and tense markers are conventionally associated with several temporal and modal uses. This 
chapter identifies and analyzes the polysemies of the Turkish TAM markers -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and 
zero-marking (-Ø) on the basis of the semantic space of anchoring developed in Part I.  
As shown in Chapter 7 above, -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor (as well as -Ø) can appear on a predicate either 
on their own or in combination with other bound markers or enclitics. Therefore, a full semantic 
analysis of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø in various morphosyntactic contexts requires the identification of 
the semantic ranges of other TAM markers with which they can combine. This is what is intended 
in the next section. 
8.1 A preliminary analysis of TAM markers other than -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø 
This section spots the main uses of the bound markers -DI, -(y)AcAG and -mAktA and the enclitics 
-(y)DI and -(y)mIş in terms of the basic anchoring categories defined in Part I.110 The analysis here is 
preliminary to the detailed treatment of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø given in the next section. 
8.1.1 -DI and -(y)DI 
-DI conveys ‘simple past’ (or ‘past perfective’), which corresponds to ANTERIOR (5.1.2) within the 
current framework. One example is given in (8.1) below. -DI also marks various types of PERFECT 
(5.1.4) (except PERFECT/persisting/). The example in (8.2) involves PERFECT/result/, (8.3) 
PERFECT/experience/, and (8.4), PERFECT/recent/. In all its uses, -DI presents a propositional 
content as an item of personal knowledge which is well-integrated to the speaker’s current 
knowledge state (hence often labeled as ‘definite past’ or ‘past of direct experience’), which 
corresponds to the epistemic category CERTAIN in the present framework:  
                                                           
110 -DI does not combine with any of of -Xr, -DIr, or -Iyor, but it is included in the analysis here in order to 
provide a more complete view of the semantic partitioning of the TAM system in Turkish. 
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(8.1) Ayşe dün   önemli  bir sınav-a  gir-di. 
Ayşe yesterday important a exam-DAT enter-DI 
‘Ayşe took an important exam yesterday.’ 
(8.2) Mustafa anahtar-ı-nı  kaybet-ti. 
Mustafa key-POSS-ACC lose-DI 
‘Mustafa has lost his keys.’ 
(8.3) Ben bu  film-i   gör-dü-m. 
I  this movie-ACC see-DI-A1SG  
‘I have seen this movie.’ 
(8.4) Mustafa az  önce  çık-tı. 
Mustafa little before leave-DI 
‘Mustafa has just left.’ 
The enclitic -(y)DI can anaphorically refer to a backward-displaced temporal frame (ANTERIORANA; 
see sections 3.2.2 and 6.2.1) as exemplified in (8.5), (8.6) and (8.7) below. Like -DI, -(y)DI in such 
uses also signals the speakar’s personal certainty (CERTAIN):  
(8.5) Çocuk-ken ev-den  hiç  çık-maz-dı-m. 
child-DTA house-ABL never exit-NEG.HABG-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘When I was a child, I stayed at home all the time.’ 
(8.6) Sabah  sekiz-de  çoktan ev-den  çık-mış-tı-m. 
morning eight-LOC long  house-ABL leave-EPAST-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘At eight in the morning, I had long left my apartment.’ 
(8.7) Ahmet’i son gör-düğ-üm-de  tatil-e    çık-acak-tı. 
Ahmet last see-FN-POSS-LOC vacation-DAT leave-FUT-(y)DI 
‘When I last saw Ahmet, he was going to leave for a vacation.’ 
-(y)DI can also indicate an anaphoric reference to a counterfactual epistemic frame, as in (8.8) 
below. This anaphoric component is expressed in the metalanguage of anchoring categories as 
¬CERTAINANA (see section 6.2.2). -(y)DI can also refer back to a past temporal frame and a 
counterfactual epistemic frame simultaneously (i.e., it cumulatively expresses ANTERIORANA and 
¬CERTAINANA). This is the case, for instance, in the apodosis of (8.9): 
(8.8) (Şimdi) Ahmet bura-da  ol-sa-ydı     pikniğ-e  gid-er-di-k. 
now  Ahmet here-LOC  AUX-COND-(y)DI picnic-DAT go-HABG-(y)DI-A1PL 
‘If Ahmet was here now, we would go out for a picnic.’ 
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(8.9) (Dün)   hava  güzel ol-sa-ydı    pikniğ-e  gid-ecek-ti-k. 
yesterday weather  good AUX-COND-(y)DI picnic-DAT go-FUT-(y)DI-A1PL 
‘If the weather had been good (yesterday), we would have gone out for a picnic.’ 
-(y)DI is also used for expressing counterfactuality in statements of wish (as attached to the 
conditional marker -sA, and typically with the sentence-initial particle keşke ‘if only’) and in deontic 
judgments (as attached to the necessitative marker -mAlI):  
(8.10) Keşke  bura-da ol-sa-ydı-n. 
if.only here-LOC be-COND-(y)DI-A2SG 
‘I wish/if only you were/had been here.’ 
(8.11) Đş-in-i      zaman-ı-nda bitir-meli-ydi-n. 
work-POSS.A2SG-ACC time-POSS-LOC finish-NEC-(y)DI-A2SG 
‘You should have finished your work in time.’ 
In narratives, both -DI and -(y)DI function anaphorically; i.e., they ‘refer back’ to the temporal 
center set by the previous discourse. The former expresses ‘sequential past’ (ANTERIORANA.OC) and 
the latter, purely anaphoric past (ANTERIORANA) (see section 6.2.1). The narrative segment below 
(from Zeyrek 2003) illustrates such uses of these markers. -DI in (8.12a), (8.12c) and (8.12d) renders 
foreground sentences which advance the time-line; it hence expresses ANTERIORANA.OC. In (8.12b), 
which provides background information at a certain point in the narrative, -(y)DI appears to 
express ANTERIORANA: 
(8.12) (a)  Sırt-ı-nı   ard-ı-nda    dizili  yün  yastık-lar-a  bırak-tı. 
  back-POSS-ACC behind-POSS-LOC ordered woolen pillow-PLU-DAT drop-DI 
  ‘He leaned on the woolen pillows behind him.’ 
 (b)  Kahve-den belli belirsiz bir  buğu  yüksel-iyor-du. 
  coffee-ABL hazy   a  steam  raise-CONT-(y)DI 
  ‘Steam was coming out of his coffee.’ 
 (c)  Uzun,  fokurtu-lu  bir yudum çek-ti. 
  long  bubbling-COM a sip   draw-DI  
  ‘He took a big sip noisily.’ 
 (d)  Kahve-nin yüzey-i-ni    ört-en   köpük bir  ağ  gibi toplan-dı. 
  coffee-GEN surface-POSS-ACC cover-SREL foam  a  net like gather-DI 
  ‘Foam gathered on the coffee just like a net.’ 
   (Zeyrek 2003: 426) 
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8.1.2 -mIş and -(y)mIş 
ANTERIOR and some types of PERFECT (those except PERFECT/persisting/) are expressed by -mIş 
rather than -DI when one of the enclitics -DIr, -(y)DI or -(y)mIş is present. In (8.13) and (8.14) below, 
-mIş expresses ANTERIOR and PERFECT/result/, respectively. In (8.15), it signals PERFECT/recent/ 
relative to a temporal center displaced to the past, and in (8.16), ANTERIOR in the context of a 
message reported from a third party: 
(8.13) Homo habilis 2,5  milyon yıl  önce  evr-il-miş-tir. 
Homo habilis 2.5  million year before evolve-PASS-mIş-JDGe 
‘Homo habilis evolved 2.5 million years ago.’ 
(8.14) Şu  an   itibar-i-yle   bütün  suçlu-lar   tespit ed-il-miş-tir. 
this moment regard-POSS-COM all   criminal-PLU identify-PASS-mIş-JDGe 
‘All of the criminals have been identified by now.’ 
(8.15) Đki  yıl  önce  gel-diğ-imiz-de    Hale yeni mezun ol-muş-tu. 
two year before come-FN-POSS.A1PL-LOC Hale new graduate-mIş-PASTe 
‘When we came two years ago, Hale had just graduated.’ 
(8.16) Mehmet akşam beş-te  gel-miş-miş. 
Mehmet evening five-LOC come-mIş-EPASTe 
‘(Reportedly) Mehmet came at five in the evening.’  
-mIş replaces -DI in the existence of the ol-series too. In (8.17), it conveys PERFECT/result/ 
relative to a temporal center displaced to future (which is anaphorically referred to by ol-acak). 
(8.18) illustrates -mIş with ol-abilir and ol-malı, which signal different degrees of epistemic modality. 
In (8.19), it appears with ol-sa, which renders an expression of wish: 
(8.17) Ekim-’de   Hale-’nin okul-u  bit-miş  ol-acak. 
October-LOC  Hale-GEN  school-POSS finish-mIş AUX-FUT 
‘Hale will have graduated in October.’ 
(8.18) Mehmet gel-miş  ol-abilir / ol-malı. 
Mehmet come-mIş AUX-POSS  AUX-NEC  
‘Mehmet may have come / must have come.’ 
(8.19) Keşke  Mehmet gel-miş  ol-sa. 
if.only Mehmet come-mIş AUX-COND 
‘I hope Mehmet has come.’ 
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When -mIş is used on its own, it can express a ‘state of result’ (see section 2.7), as illustrated in 
(8.20) below. -mIş is also commonly used for expressing INFERRED (see sections 4.1.6 and 5.2.4) or 
hearsayANA (i.e., a report from a third party; see section 6.2.3) cumulatively with either ANTERIOR 
(8.21) or PERFECT (8.22): 
(8.20) Bu  çiçek-ler  sol-muş. 
this flower-PLU fade-mIş 
‘These flowers are wilted.’ 
(8.21) Ahmet dün   gece bura-da kal-mış. 
Ahmet yesterday night here-LOC stay-mIş 
‘It turns out that / reportedly Ahmet slept here last night.’ 
(8.22) Ahmet çok iç-miş. 
Ahmet much drink-mIş 
‘Evidently / reportedly Ahmet has drunk too much.’ 
-(y)mIş, like its counterpart -mIş, can express INFERRED and hearsayANA, as shown in (8.23) and 
(8.24) below. Unlike -mIş, it can signal neither ANTERIOR nor PERFECT in a relative way. But like 
-(y)DI, it can signal anaphoric past (ANTERIORANA). The hearsay utterances in (8.25) and (8.26) 
additionally indicate an anaphoric reference to a back-shifted temporal frame: 
(8.23) Ahmet uyu-yor-muş. 
Ahmet sleep-CONT-mIş 
‘(As I have just found out / reportedly) Ahmet is sleeping.’ 
(8.24) Adam üç  yıl-dır  iş-siz-Ø-miş.  
man  three year-SINCE job-PRIV-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘(As I infer now / reportedly, the man has been unemployed for three years.’ 
(8.25) Önceki gün Ahmet istifa ed-ecek-miş.  
previous day Ahmet resign-FUT-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet was going to resign the day before.’ 
(8.26) Mustafa gel-diğ-i-nde   Mehmet iki  saat önce  çık-mış-mış. 
Mustafa come-FN-POSS-LOC Mehmet two hour before leave-EPAST-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Mehmet had left two hours ago when Mustafa came.’  
-mIş and -(y)mIş are also used in narratives, either when a speaker indirectly recounts a series 
of actual events, as in (8.27) below, or in fictive stories such as myths, jokes, and folktales, as in 
(8.28). Just like -DI and -(y)DI (section 8.1.1 above), -mIş and -(y)mIş in narratives anaphorically 
refer to temporal frames displaced to past (i.e., express ANTERIORANA.OC and ANTERIORANA, 
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respectively). But they additionally signal a volitional displacement to another (which can also be 
an anonymous) illocutionary source (hearsayANA): 
(8.27) Akşam  beş-te  evden   çık-mış.  Bir  arkadaş-ı-nı    gör-ecek-miş. 
 Yol-da Ali-’yle  karşılaş-mış. 
evening five-LOC house-LOC leave-mIş a  friend-POSS-ACC see-FUT-(y)mIş 
 way-LOC Ali-COM come.across-mIş 
‘Reportedly, he left at five in the evening. He was going to see a friend of his. On his way, he came  
 across Ali.’ 
(8.28) Bir  var-mış,   bir  yok-muş.    Bir  padişah ile  üç  kız-ı 
 var-mış.   Bir  gün  bu  padişah  kız-lar-ı-nı     baş-ı-na 
  topla-mış. 
one EXCP-(y)mIş one NEG.EXCP-(y)mIş a  sultan  with three doughter-POSS 
 EXCP-(y)mIş  one day this sultan  daughter-PLU-POSS-ACC head-POSS-DAT 
  gather-mIş  
‘Once upon a time, there was a sultan with three daughters. One day this sultan gathered his 
daughters…’ 
 (From an anonymous folktale) 
8.1.3 -(y)AcAG 
-(y)AcAG expresses either POSTERIOR (section 5.1.3) or PROSPECTIVE (section 5.1.5), as illustrated in 
(8.29) and (8.30) below. It can have the same functions when it combines with the enclitics -DIr, 
-(y)DI or -(y)mIş too. For instance, it signals POSTERIOR in (8.31) and PROSPECTIVE in (8.32) and (8.33):  
(8.29) Yarın   tüm gün çalış-acağ-ız.  
tomorrow all  day work-(y)AcAG-A1PL 
‘We will work all day tomorrow.’ 
(8.30) Gezi-ye   katıl-acak  mı-sın? 
excursion-DAT join-(y)AcAG QP-A2SG 
‘Are you going to join the excursion?’ 
(8.31) Hale heyecanlı-ydı. Beş-te  önemli  bir toplantı-ya  gir-ecek-ti. 
Hale excited-PASTe five-LOC important a meeting-DAT enter-(y)AcAG-PASTe 
‘Hale was excited. She would attend a very important meeting at five.’ 
(8.32) Suçlu  mutlaka  yakala-n-acak-tır. 
criminal absolutely capture-PASS-(y)AcAG-JDGe 
‘The criminal is bound to be captured.’ 
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(8.33) Ahmet istifa ed-ecek-miş.  
Ahmet resign-(y)AcAG-EPASTe 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet is going to resign.’ 
8.1.4 -mAktA 
-mAktA typically appears in combination with -DIr, as in the first three examples below. In (8.34) it 
expresses SIMULTANEOUS (section 5.1.1), in (8.35) RECURRENT (section 5.1.6), and in (8.36) 
PERFECT/persisting/ (section 5.1.4). It can also combine with -(y)DI and -(y)mIş in these semantic 
functions. For example, in (8.37) it expresses SIMULTANEOUS relative to a past temporal center. 
Though not frequently, -mAktA can also appear on its own, especially in formal styles. For instance, 
(8.38) may appear in a curriculum vitae: 
(8.34) Ekolojik  denge  hızla  bozul-makta-dır. 
Ecological balance rapidly deteriorate-mAktA-JDGe 
‘The ecological balance is being destroyed rapidly.’ 
(8.35) Bakanlık  tesis-ler-i      düzenli olarak denetle-mekte-dir. 
ministry  establishment-PLU-ACC regular as   inspect-mAktA-JDGe 
‘The ministry is regularly inspecting the establishments.’ 
(8.36) Şirket  15  yıl-dır  bilişim  sektör-ü-nde  faaliyet göster-mekte-dir. 
company 15 year-SINCE informatics sector-POSS-LOC  function-mAktA-JDGe 
‘The company has been active in the informatics sector for 15 years.’ 
(8.37) Gemi yavaş yavaş  kıyı-ya  yanaş-makta-ydı. 
ship slow.RDUP  shore-DAT approach-mAktA-PASTe 
‘The ship was slowly approaching the shore.’ 
(8.38) Orman Bakanlığ-ı-nda  müsteşarlık  görevi-m-i    sürdür-mekte-yim. 
forest  ministry-POSS-LOC undersecretary duty-POSS.A1SG-ACC continue-mAktA-A1SG 
‘I am continuing to work as an undersecretary in the Ministry of Forestry.’ 
8.1.5 Summary of the semantic associations 
The preliminary analysis above suggests the following semantic associations: 
• -DI can expresses ANTERIOR, ANTERIORANA.OC, PERFECT/result/, PERFECT/experience/ and 
PERFECT/recent/.  
• -(y)DI can express ANTERIORANA, ¬CERTAINANA or a combination of them. 
• -mIş can expresses ANTERIOR, PERFECT/result/, PERFECT/experience/ and PERFECT/recent/ 
when used in combination with the enclitics or the ol-series. When used as the sole TAM 
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marker, it can express these temporal categories (as well as ANTERIORANA.OC) cumulatively 
with either INFERRED or hearsayANA. It can also express a state of result. 
• -(y)mIş can express INFERRED or hearsayANA, or a combination of these with ANTERIORANA. 
• -(y)AcAG can express POSTERIOR and PROSPECTIVE. 
• -mAktA can express SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT and PERFECT/persisting/.  
These results will be used in the next section in delimiting the semantic shares of -Xr, -DIr, 
-Iyor and -Ø in morphosyntactic contexts where they combine with these TAM markers. 
8.2 Uses of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø in terms of anchoring categories  
This section provides an in-depth analysis of the ranges of polysemy associated with -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor 
and -Ø in terms of the basic anchoring categories defined in Part I. Each subsection identifies, 
illustrates, and analyzes the main conventional uses111 of these markers, either as they are used as 
the sole TAM marker on a predicate, or as they combine with other TAM markers.  
The analysis is restricted to finite sentences. The uses of the markers in subordinate clauses 
(e.g., in adverbial components, infinitival arguments, adjective-like relative clauses, complements 
of mental state verbs, conditional protases, ‘when’-clauses, conjunct clauses, etc.) and the 
causativizing use of -DIr (e.g., yap ‘do’, yap-tır ‘make do’) are not included. The combinations of -Xr 
and -Iyor with different inflections of the auxiliary ol (e.g., -Xr ol-du, -Iyor ol-acak, -Iyor ol-sun) are 
also excluded.  
The analysis starts with the uses of -Xr (in verbal predication) and -DIr (in non-verbal 
predication) as they appear on their own on the predicate. It proceeds with the uses of -Iyor and -Ø 
as the sole TAM markers on a predicate (-Ø will be identified as the counterpart of -Iyor in non-
verbal predication, in morphosyntactic contexts where a certain semantic category cannot be 
attributed to any overt TAM marker in a principled way). It then passes on to the uses of -Xr, -Iyor 
and -Ø as they combine with the enclitics -(y)DI and -(y)mIş, and finally to those of -DIr as it 
attaches to the bound markers -mIş, -mAktA, and -(y)AcAG. 
The first part of the analysis is rather mechanistic: Each of the identified uses of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor 
and -Ø (and of their formal combinations) is decomposed into its semantic building-blocks in each 
of the three domains of anchoring (i.e., one temporal, one epistemic, and one volitional category). 
As such, each identified use in each subsection is then matched with a generalized hierarchical 
semantic value expressed in the metalanguage of anchoring categories. Generalizations on the 
overall semantic ranges of each marker, the semantic categories which are most characteristically 
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associated with them, issues about their formal and semantic compositionality, and the merits of 
the present analysis compared to previous studies are only mentioned after each main use of each 
marker (or a combination of markers) has been matched with a hierarchical semantic value. 
8.2.1 Uses of -Iyor and -Ø as the sole TAM markers 
8.2.1.1 -Xr or -DIr: Temporally unrestricted predication 
-Xr (with verbal predicates) and -DIr (with non-verbal predicates) typically appear in temporally 
unrestricted predications, which can either involve ‘gnomic’ utterances (with generic subjects), as 
illustrated in (8.39) and (8.40), or ‘characterizing’ utterances (with specific subjects), as illustrated in 
(8.41), (8.42) and (8.43):  
(8.39) Kedi-ler karanlık-ta  gör-ür. 
cat-PLU darkness-LOC see-Xr 
‘Cats see in the dark.’ 
(8.40) Tavşan-lar otçul-dur. 
rabbit-PLU herbivore-DIr 
‘Rabbits are herbivores.’ 
(8.41) Ay  döngü-sü-nü 28 gün-de tamaml-ar. 
moon cycle-POSS-ACC 28 day-LOC complete-Xr 
‘The moon completes its cycle in 28 days.’ 
(8.42) Mustafa hayvan-lar-ı   çok  sev-er.  
Mustafa animal-PLU-ACC much  love-Xr 
‘Mustafa loves animals so much.’ 
(8.43) Necla dürüst bir  insan-dır. 
Necla honest a  person-DIr 
‘Necla is an honest person.’ 
-Xr and -DIr are typically used in proverbs, which are also supposed to express temporally 
unrestricted facts: 
(8.44) Su  ak-ar,  yatağ-ı-nı  bul-ur. 
water flow-Xr basin-POSS-ACC find-Xr 
Lit: ‘Water flows and reaches its basin.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                
111 As mentioned in section 1.4.5, conventional uses of a marker (or a combination of markers) can be 
identified at different levels of granularity. The analysis here singles out typical and relatively frequent uses, 
omitting those which only obtain in highly specialized contexts. 
 144
(8.45) Akıl  yaş-ta  değil baş-ta-dır. 
wisdom age-LOC NEGP head-LOC-DIr 
Lit: ‘Wisdom is in the head, not in the age.’ 
Such utterances present their predicational content as holding independently of any temporal 
restriction; they do not refer to any particular occurrence (or, series of occurrences) at a specific 
temporal location (or, in a specific temporal range). In other words, they do not signal any 
contingent relation to the temporal center. As such, they express the temporal anchoring category 
ATEMPORAL (sections 4.1.5, 5.1.7). 
Gnomic or characterizing utterances with -Xr or -DIr are not only temporally unrestricted, but 
are also associated with strong factuality: They present their propositional content as a firmly 
established fact. In other words, they signal a sense of ‘general validity’ (rather than one of 
‘contingent certainty’ based on personal knowledge or experience). In the semantic space of 
anchoring, this epistemic value matches the epistemic category GENERAL FACT (sections 4.1.5, 5.2.7). 
(When a temporally unrestricted SoA is presented as a truth contingent to the speaker’s personal 
knowledge (CERTAIN or NEW INFORMATION), -Xr will be replaced by -Iyor, and -DIr by -Ø; see 
section 8.2.2.4 below). 
The examples (8.39) to (8.45) above are simple assertions which can appear in contexts of 
personal, interactive communication (rather than general statements with authoritative or official 
illocutionary forces). They hence straightforwardly match the volitional anchoring category 
ASSERTED (sections 4.1.6, 5.3.4).  
On the basis of the above identified correspondences in the three domains of anchoring, the 
generalized semantic value of temporally unrestricted utterances with -Xr and -DIr can be given 
follows: 
(8.46) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Xr/-DIr) 
8.2.1.2 -Xr or -DIr: Persisting perfect 
-Xr and -DIr (the former in verbal and the latter in non-verbal predication) can also appear in 
utterances which convey that a certain SoA has held in a period which precedes the time of 
utterance and is still holding (i.e., in utterances which involve ‘persisting perfect’). Below are some 
examples: 
(8.47) Osman beş yıl-dır  bu  muhit-te  otur-ur. 
Osman five year-SINCE this district-LOC live-Xr 
‘Osman has been living in this district for five years.’ 
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(8.48) Sekiz yaş-ım-dan   beri saz çal-ar-ım. 
eight age-POSS.A1SG-ABL since saz play-Xr-A1SG 
‘I have been playing saz since I was eight.’ 
(8.49) Bu  heykel otuz yıl-dır  bura-da-dır. 
This statue  thirty year-SINCE here-LOC-DIr 
‘This statue has been standing here for thirty years.’ 
(8.50) Mustafa on  yıl-dır  bu  bölüm-de   görevli-dir.  
Mustafa ten year-SINCE this department-LOC employed-DIr 
‘Mustafa has been employed in this department for ten years.’ 
These sentences all signal the anchoring category labeled as PERFECT/persisting/ in the 
temporal domain (section 5.1.4). Just like temporally unrestricted utterances with -Xr or -DIr 
(section 8.2.1.1 above), they are associated with strong factuality, hence they signal the epistemic 
category GENERAL FACT. (A persisting perfect is rendered by -Iyor or -Ø when it involves the 
speaker’s contingent certainty based on personal knowledge, see section 8.2.2.3 below). Since they 
constitute personal assertions in non-official settings, they are further analyzed as expressing the 
anchoring category ASSERTED in the volitional domain. Such uses of -Xr and -DIr are hence 
associated with the following generalized semantic value: 
(8.51) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA))) (-Xr/-DIr) 
8.2.1.3 -Xr: Prediction 
-Xr is commonly used to make predictions about future occurrences, as illustrated below: 
(8.52) Ahmet yarın   akşam gel-ir. 
Ahmet tomorrow evening come-Xr 
‘Ahmet will (probably) come tomorrow evening.’  
(8.53) Toplantı saat üç  gibi bit-er. 
meeting hour three like finish-Xr 
‘The meeting will (probably) finish at about three o’clock.’ 
(8.54) Bu  yıl  mahsül bol   ol-ur.  
This year crop  abundant be-Xr 
‘The crop will (probably) be abundant this year.’ 
Such future-oriented predictions straightforwardly match the temporal anchoring category 
POSTERIOR (sections 4.1.3, 5.1.3). Since they express a non-certain judgment of the speaker (unlike 
futures with -(y)AcAG, see section 8.1.3), they are also associated with epistemic modality. They 
hence match the epistemic anchoring category PROBABLE (sections 4.1.4, 5.2.6). When used without 
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any epistemic adverb, -Xr normally expresses a relatively high degree of likelihood, which can be 
rendered in English by ‘probably’, as in the translations above. But -Xr is also compatible with 
adverbs which specify different degrees of likelihood (e.g., PROBABLE/low/, PROBABLE/medium/, 
PROBABLE/high/) as illustrated below:  
(8.55) Ali bu  gece bir  ihtimal-le  / belki / herhalde  gel-ir. 
Ali this night one probability-COM  maybe probably  come-Xr 
‘Ahmet might / may / will probably come tonight.’  
-Xr characteristically appears in the apodoses of conditional sentences, again to express the 
combination of POSTERIOR and PROBABLE, as illustrated below. It also appears in future-oriented 
protases, as seen in the first example:  
(8.56) Ahmet gel-ir-se    pikniğ-e  gid-er-iz. 
Ahmet come-Xr-CONDe picnic-DAT go-Xr-A1PL 
‘If Ahmet comes we will go out for a picnic.’ 
(8.57) Kar yağ-mış-sa   maç  iptal ed-il-ir.  
snow fall-EPAST-CONDe match  cancel-PASS-Xr 
‘If it has snowed the match will be cancelled.’ 
A prediction expressed by -Xr can also be about the very near future. For instance, the 
temporal relation in (8.58) below matches the definition of PROSPECTIVE/imminent/ (section 5.1.5): 
(8.58) Ali birazdan gel-ir. 
Ali soon  come-Xr 
‘Ali will (probably) come in a minute.’ 
This predictive use of -Xr almost exclusively appears in non-official settings (typically, in the 
spoken language), where ASSERTED (rather than GENERAL STATEMENT) is at stake. Below are the 
generalized semantic values associated with the predictive uses of -Xr: 
(8.59) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-Xr) 
(8.60) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(SoA))) (-Xr) 
8.2.1.4 -Xr: Deictic volitional uses: Promises, requests, offers 
-Xr has a number of uses in which a deictic (speaker-oriented) volitional component is signaled. 
These include promises, offers, and requests.  
Promises are neither predictions about future events, nor just descriptions of speaker’s 
willingness. They constitute a special type of illocutionary act identified by Searle (1975a) as 
‘commissive’. Within the semantic framework of anchoring, the commissive illocutionary force is 
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primarily linked to the indexation of a volitional relation, which is subsumed under the basic 
anchoring category WANTED (sections 4.1.6, 5.3.5). Although promises with -Xr typically designate 
the speaker as the subject of predication, as in (8.61) and (8.62) below, the reference to the speaker’s 
will is actually offstage (i.e., signaled rather than explicitly designated). This can be demonstrated 
by promises with non-first person subjects, as in (8.63) and (8.64): 
(8.61) Cuma  gün-ü  uğr-ar-ım. 
Friday day-POSS visit-Xr-A1SG 
‘I will come by on Friday.’ 
(8.62) Kitab-ı  yarın    getir-ir-im. 
book-ACC tomorrow bring-Xr-A1SG 
‘I will bring the book tomorrow.’ 
(8.63) Kitap yarın   bura-da ol-ur. 
book tomorrow here-LOC AUX-Xr 
‘The book will be here tomorrow.’ 
(8.64) Kitab-ı  yarın   al-ır-sınız. 
book-ACC tomorrow receive-Xr-A2PL 
‘You will receive the book tomorrow.’ 
-Xr is also typically used in requests, this time in combination with the question particle mI 
(8.65-8.66). Requests constitute a subcategory of directive utterances, because they express the 
speaker’s appeal to the addressee(s) for undertaking a prescribed action. Like all directives, they 
primarily signal the speaker’s desire for the realization of a projection. As such, they also signal the 
general category WANTED in a deictic way: 
(8.65) Makas-ı  ver-ir  mi-sin (lütfen)? 
scissors-ACC give-Xr QP-A2SG please 
‘Will you give me the scissors (please)?’ 
(8.66) Şura-yı  imzal-ar mı-sınız  (lütfen)? 
here-ACC  sign-Xr QP-A2PL please 
‘Will you sign here (please)?’ 
The interrogative construction with -Xr can also be used to make an offer. For instance, (8.67) 
and (8.68) below qualify as offers rather than requests, because they do not urge the addressee(s) to 
take any action. Offers primarily question the willingness of the addressee(s) (who appear(s) as a 
participant of the designated SoA). But they also signal the speaker’s positive volitional attitude for 
the expressed event to happen. In other words, offers express the speaker’s wish for the 
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addressee(s) to undertake the designated action (without urging them to do so). As such, they are 
also analyzed as signaling WANTED in relation to the speaker’s immediate volitional state: 
(8.67) Yarın   akşam opera-ya  gid-iyor-uz.  Sen de  gel-ir  mi-sin?  
tomorrow evening opera-DAT go-CONT-A1PL P2SG CONJ come-Xr QP-A2SG?  
‘We are going to the opera tomorrow evening. Would you like to join?’ 
(8.68) Çay al-ır  mı-sınız? 
tea  take-Xr QP-A2PL 
‘Would you like to have some tea?’ 
The uses of -Xr for promises, requests and offers involve what Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 
(1994: 179) call ‘speaker-oriented’ (rather than ‘participant-oriented’) modality. In terms of the 
semantic framework of anchoring, what they share is that they signal the volitional category 
WANTED in a deictic way. Each class additionally indexes different contextual elements and is 
associated with different conditions of use, which are not pursued here any further. Like most 
other utterances which entail WANTED (e.g., orders, statements of wish, etc.), they entail POSTERIOR 
or PROSPECTIVE in the temporal domain, and HYPOTHETICAL in the epistemic domain (see sections 
5.1.3, 5.1.5 and 5.2.3): 
(8.69) WANTED(HYPOTHETICAL(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-Xr) 
(8.70) WANTED(HYPOTHETICAL(PROSPECTIVE(SoA))) (-Xr) 
8.2.2 Uses of -Iyor and -Ø as the sole TAM markers 
8.2.2.1 -Iyor or -Ø: Present continuous 
In one of its most common uses, -Iyor conveys that an event is ongoing (or a state obtaining) at the 
deictic temporal center (time of utterance). It hence expresses what is traditionally called the 
‘continuous aspect’ in the present time sphere. This use of -Iyor is illustrated below with dynamic 
SoAs (8.71, 8.72, 8.73) and with a stative SoA (8.74). The temporal relation expressed in these 
utterances matches the temporal anchoring category SIMULTANEOUS (sections 4.1.1, 5.1.1): 
(8.71) Ahmet (şimdi / şu  an-da)   kahvaltı  yap-ıyor. 
Ahmet now / this moment-LOC breakfast  make-Iyor 
‘Ahmet is has having his breakfast (now / at the moment).’ 
(8.72) Hatice (şimdi / şu  an-da)   uy-uyor. 
Hatice now / this moment-LOC sleep-Iyor 
‘Hatice is sleeping (now / at the moment).’ 
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(8.73) Đşçi-ler  (şimdi/ şu  an-da)   duvar-lar-ı  boy-uyor-lar. 
worker-PLU now / this moment-LOC wall-PLU-ACC paint-Iyor-A3PL 
‘The workers are painting the walls (now / at the moment).’ 
(8.74) (Şimdi) dinlen-mek ist-iyor-um. 
now  rest-INF  want-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I want to rest (now).’ 
This use of -Iyor can imply that a state obtains in a relatively extended period which includes 
the temporal center, as in (8.75). A temporal period can also be explicitly specified by an adverbial 
component such as bugün ‘today’ (8.76), bu yıl ‘this month’ (8.77), etc.: 
(8.75) Ali Đstanbul’-da  otur-uyor. 
Ali Đstanbul-LOC live-Iyor 
‘Ali is living in Istanbul.’ 
(8.76) Bugün çalış-m-ıyor-um. 
today  work-NEG-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I am not working today.’ 
(8.77) O  heykel  bu  yıl  Antalya Müzesi-’nde  sergile-n-iyor. 
that  sculpture  this year Antalya museum-LOC exhibit-PASS-Iyor 
‘That sculpture is being exhibited in the Antalya Museum this year.’ 
When the predicate is non-verbal, SIMULTANEOUS is conveyed by zero-marking (-Ø) rather 
than -Iyor. The examples (8.78), (8.79) and (8.80) below illustrate this with adjectival, locative and 
existential predicates, respectively. Since all non-verbal predication is stative, -Ø can also imply an 
extension in time around the temporal center, as illustrated in (8.81) and (8.82): 
(8.78) Ahmet (şimdi) çok yorgun-Ø. 
Ahmet now  very tired-Ø 
‘Ahment is very tired (now).’ 
(8.79) (Şu an-da)   toplantı-da-Ø-yım.  
this moment-LOC meeting-LOC-Ø-A1SG 
‘(At the moment) I am in a meeting.’ 
(8.80) (Şu an-da)   para-m    yok-Ø.  
this moment-LOC money-POSS.A1SG NEG.EXCP-Ø 
‘(At the moment) I have no money.’ 
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(8.81) Ali bu  ay   Đstanbul’-da-Ø 
Ali this month Đstanbul-LOC-Ø 
‘Ali is in Istanbul this month.’ 
(8.82) Ahmet şu  sıra-lar  çok meşgul-Ø 
Ahmet this range-PLU very busy-Ø 
‘Ahmet is very busy nowadays.’ 
The above examples with –Iyor (with verbal predication) and -Ø (with non-verbal predication) 
do not involve any sense of uncertainty. They simply signal the speaker’s contingent certainty 
about the truth of the conveyed information (which can be based on her personal experience, 
observation, or otherwise directly acquired knowledge). As such, they express the epistemic 
anchoring category CERTAIN (sections 4.1.2, 5.2.1) in the epistemic domain. Since they are also 
descriptive utterances with simple assertive force, they are also analyzed as entailing the volitional 
category ASSERTED in their overall semantic values. They are hence characterized by the following 
generalized semantic value: 
(8.83) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-Iyor/-Ø) 
-Iyor and -Ø can also convey a piece of information which is not fully assimilated to the 
speaker’s knowledge state, i.e., in contexts for NEW INFORMATION (sections 4.1.1, 5.2.1) rather than 
CERTAIN. Such cases typically obtain in contexts where a speaker has just perceived an ongoing 
SoA. For instance, (8.84) can be uttered just upon seeing Ahmet approaching, and (8.85) upon 
inspecting a room. As shown in section 5.2.1, NEW INFORMATION is generally (but not necessarily) 
accompanied by the indexation of the speaker’s surprise. In Turkish, surprise (or ‘mirativity’) can 
be indicated by intonation alone, by certain interjections (such as aa ‘oh’), or by formulaic phrases 
(such as şu işe bak ‘look at that’; vay be ‘wow’, etc.). (8.86) and (8.87) express the speaker’s surprise, 
respectively upon seeing her addressee smoking and upon suddenly noticing Mustafa: 
(8.84) Bak, Ahmet gel-iyor. 
look Ahmet come-Iyor 
‘Look, Ahmet is coming.’ 
(8.85) Bura-da kimse  yok-Ø. 
here-LOC nobody NEG.EXCP-Ø 
‘There isn’t anybody here.’ 
(8.86) Sen sigara  iç-iyor-sun! 
you smoke-Iyor-A2SG 
‘You are smoking!’ 
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(8.87) Aa! Mustafa da  bura-da-Ø! 
oh  Mustafa CONJ here-LOC-Ø 
‘Oh! Mustafa is also here!’ 
Such uses of -Iyor and -Ø can be coupled with the following generalized semantic value: 
(8.88) ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-Iyor/-Ø) 
8.2.2.2 -Iyor: Repeated occurrences 
-Iyor can express repeated occurrences in a temporal period around the deictic temporal center. 
Such utterances are optionally accompanied by an adverb of frequency: 
(8.89) Şimdi-ler-de  (sık sık) balığa çık-ıyor-um. 
now-PLU-LOC often  fish-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I’m going fishing quite often these days.’ 
(8.90) Ayşe ders-ler-e  (hep)  geç kal-ıyor. 
Ayşe class-PLU-DAT always late stay-Iyor 
‘Ayşe is always being late for classes.’ 
(8.91) Hasan (arada bir)  uğr-uyor. 
Hasan occasionally  drop.by-Iyor 
‘Hasan drops by occasionally.’ 
This use of -Iyor differs from that in which SIMULTANEOUS is signaled, in that the speaker tells 
nothing about whether or not the designated SoA actually occurs at the time of utterance. The 
temporal relation involved in such utterances (repeated occurrences in to a certain period) matches 
the basic anchoring category called RECURRENT (sections 4.1.4, 5.1.6). This use of -Iyor also involves 
speaker’s personal certainty (CERTAIN) and a simple assertive force (ASSERTED). Hence, it matches 
the following generalized semantic value:  
(8.92) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(RECURRENT(SoA))) (-Iyor) 
Although not frequently, -Iyor can also express the immediate discovery of a repeated 
occurrence (a combination of RECURRENT and NEW INFORMATION). This is illustrated in (8.93) below, 
which can be uttered, e.g., by a speaker who is surprised to have encountered her addressee for the 
third time in a weak. (8.94) gives the generalized semantic value associated with such uses: 
(8.93) Bugün-ler-de ne  kadar  sık  karşılaş-ıyor-uz! 
today-PLU-LOC what degree often come.across-Iyor-A1PL 
‘How often we are coming across nowadays!’ 
(8.94) ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(RECURRENT(SoA))) (-Iyor) 
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8.2.2.3 -Iyor or -Ø: Persisting perfect 
In section 8.2.1.2, it was shown that the perfect of persisting situation (PERFECT/persisting/) can be 
expressed by -Xr or -DIr. The same temporal relation can be signaled by -Iyor (with verbal 
predicates) or -Ø (with non-verbal predicates): 
(8.95) Osman beş yıl-dır  bu  muhit-te  otur-uyor. 
Osman five year-SINCE this district-LOC live-Iyor 
‘Osman has been living in this district for five years.’ 
(8.96) Ali iki  saat-tir  sen-i  bekl-iyor. 
Ali two hour-SINCE you-ACC wait-Iyor 
‘Ali has been waiting for you for two hours.’ 
(8.97) Sekiz yaş-ım-dan   beri saz çal-ıyor-um. 
eight age-POSS.A1SG-ABL since saz play-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I have been playing saz since I was eight.’ 
(8.98) Üç  ay-dır    iş-siz-Ø-im. 
three month-SINCE job-PRIV-Ø-A1SG 
‘I have been unemployed for three months.’ 
(8.99) Bu  bina  otuz yıl-dır  bura-da-Ø. 
this  building thirty year-SINCE here-LOC-Ø 
‘This building has been standing here for thirty years.’  
-Xr/-DIr and -Iyor/-Ø can appear in persisting perfects which specify identical temporal 
values. This can be seen by comparing the following examples (replicated from section 8.2.1.2) with 
(8.95) and (8.99) above: 
(8.100) Osman beş yıl-dır  bu  muhit-te  otur-ur. 
Osman five year-SINCE this district-LOC live-Xr 
‘Osman has been living in this district for five years.’ 
(8.101) Bu  heykel otuz yıl-dır  bura-da-dır. 
this statue  thirty year-SINCE here-LOC-DIr 
‘This statue has been standing here for thirty years.’ 
The difference between a persisting perfect with -Xr/-DIr and one with -Iyor/-Ø is basically 
epistemic: While -Xr and -DIr present a proposition as a well-established, objective fact (GENERAL 
FACT), -Iyor and -Ø reflect the speaker’s contingent certainty based on her personal knowledge 
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(CERTAIN).112 The use of -Iyor and -Ø in expressing persisting perfect is hence associated with the 
following generalized semantic value:  
(8.102) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA))) (-Iyor/-Ø) 
Though not too often, one can discover upon some evidence that a situation has been holding 
for some time. For instance, a speaker who is surprised to have found out that a man has been 
standing on a corner for two hours can express her surprise by uttering (8.103) or (8.104), both of 
which signal a combination of PERFECT/persisting/ and NEW INFORMATION (with surprise). Note 
that -Xr and -DIr are totally incongruous in this context: 
(8.103) Aa! Adam hala aynı yer-de  dur-uyor! / #dur-ur! 
oh  man  still same place-LOC stand-Iyor  stand-Xr 
‘Oh! The man is still standing in the same place!’ 
(8.104) Aa! Adam hala aynı yer-de-Ø! / #yer-de-dir! 
oh  man  still same place-LOC-Ø  place-LOC-DIr 
‘Oh! The man is still in the same place!’ 
These last examples can be associated with the following generalized semantic value: 
(8.105) ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA))) (-Iyor/-Ø) 
 
                                                           
112 One might insist on explaining the difference between persisting perfects with -Xr/-DIr and those with 
-Iyor/-Ø in temporal terms, given that -Xr and -DIr are generally incongruous with relatively short periods:  
(i) Sabah-tan  beri sen-i  bekl-iyor-um / ?bekl-er-im. 
morning-ABL since P2SG-ACC wait-Iyor-A1SG wait-Xr-A1SG 
‘I have been waiting for you since the early morning.’ 
(ii) Telefon on  dakika-dır meşgul-Ø / ?meşgul-dür. 
phone  ten  minute-SINCE occupied-Ø occupied-DIr 
‘The line has been busy for ten minutes.’ 
However, attributing the difference to temporality alone cannot explain why –Iyor is possible, while -Xr 
may not be appropriate, with relatively long periods, as in (iii) and (iv) below: 
(iii) Anlaşıl-an     bu  dere-de  on yıl-dır   balık yaşa-m-ıyor / ?yaşa-maz. 
understand.PASS-SREL this stream-LOC ten year-SINCE  fish live-NEG-Iyor   live-NEG.Xr 
‘As I understand, no fish has been living in this stream for ten years.’ 
(iv) Demek ki Ali  uzun zaman-dır  iş-siz-Ø  / ?iş-siz-dir. 
thus  Ali  long time-since  job-PRIV-Ø job-PRIV-DIr  
‘Thus, Ali has been unemployed for very long.’ 
The fact that -Xr cannot be used with relatively short periods can be explained with reference to general 
cognitive factors: A SoA will not be taken as a general fact unless it has been the case for a sufficiently long 
period of time. In other words, events which have occurred a short time ago are not likely to be adopted as 
well-established facts. But the reverse is not necessarily true: Events or situations that have been the case for 
relatively long periods do not necessarily become general facts. 
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8.2.2.4 -Iyor or -Ø: Temporally unrestricted predication with contingent certainty 
As shown in section 8.2.1.1, temporally unrestricted SoAs are normally expressed by -Xr (with 
verbal predicates) and -DIr (with non-verbal predicates). But -Iyor replaces -Xr and -Ø replaces -DIr 
when the speaker presents a temporally unrestricted (ATEMPORAL) predication as a matter of 
personal certainty (CERTAIN) rather than as an item of general knowledge (GENERAL FACT). For 
instance, a speaker who has discovered the moon’s cycle by her own observations would utter 
(8.107) rather than (8.106). Similarly, someone who has come to know Mustafa or Necla by 
personal experience would utter (8.109) and (8.111) rather than (8.108) and (8.110): 
(8.106) Ay  döngü-sü-nü 28 gün-de tamaml-ar. (Replicated from section 8.2.1.1) 
moon cycle-POSS-ACC 28 day-LOC complete-Xr 
‘The moon completes its cycle in 28 days.’ 
(8.107) Ay  döngü-sü-nü 28 gün-de tamaml-ıyor. 
moon cycle-POSS-ACC 28 day-LOC complete-Iyor 
‘The moon completes its cycle 28 days.’ 
(8.108) Mustafa hayvan-lar-ı   çok sev-er. (Replicated from section 8.2.1.1) 
Mustafa animal-PLU-ACC much love-Xr 
‘Mustafa loves animals so much.’ 
(8.109) Mustafa hayvan-lar-ı   çok sev-iyor.  
Mustafa animal-PLU-ACC much love-Iyor 
‘Mustafa loves animals so much.’ 
(8.110) Necla dürüst bir  insan-dır. (Replicated from section 8.2.1.1) 
Necla honest a  person-DIr 
‘Necla is an honest person.’ 
(8.111) Necla dürüst bir  insan-Ø. 
Necla honest a  person-Ø 
‘Necla is an honest person.’ 
The pairs given above are identical in the temporal and volitional values they express, i.e., 
ATEMPORAL and ASSERTED respectively. But here too, while -Xr/-DIr endows the informational 
content with a sense of well-established, general validity (GENERAL FACT), -Iyor/-Ø presents it 
merely as a matter of personal certitude (CERTAIN). The generalized semantic value of the above 
exemplified utterances with -Iyor/-Ø can hence be rendered as follows:  
(8.112) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Iyor/-Ø) 
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-Xr/-DIr will also be replaced by -Iyor/-Ø when the speaker wants to express a temporally 
unrestricted SoA as a new discovery (i.e., as NEW INFORMATION, which, unlike CERTAIN, presents a 
piece of information as not well-assimilated to the current knowledge state). This is best illustrated 
by utterances which indicate the speaker’s surprise. For instance (8.113) could be uttered by a 
scientist who has just discovered that lizards have night vision, and (8.114) by someone who is 
astonished upon encountering a very tall man. (If the speaker wanted to emphasize a change in her 
knowledge state due to her immediate discovery, she would affix -(y)mIş to -Iyor in order to signal 
INFERRED rather than NEW INFORMATION; see section 8.2.3.5.) 
(8.113) Kertenkele-ler karanlık-ta  gör-üyor! 
lizard-PLU  darkness-LOC see-Iyor 
‘Lizards see in the dark!’ 
(8.114) Ne  kadar  uzun bir  adam-Ø! 
what degree tall a  man-Ø 
‘How tall that man is!’ 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, NEW INFORMATION is also there when the speaker emphasizes 
the ‘newness’ or ‘immediate significance’ of a piece of information relative to the knowledge state 
of her addressee(s). For instance, the temporally unrestricted statements below would normally 
(e.g., in a scientific communication) be rendered by -Xr and -DIr respectively. -Iyor and -Ø are 
chosen here in order to emphasize the sense of epistemic immediacy (i.e., in order to ‘foreground’ 
the conveyed information): 
(8.115) Uzun süre-li   alkol  tüketim-i    beyin hücre-ler-i-ne  zarar ver-
iyor. 
long duration-COM alcohol consumption-POSS brain cell-PLU-POSS-DAT damage-Iyor 
‘Long-term alcohol consumption damages brain cells.’ 
(8.116) Böcek tür-ler-i-nin    çeşitliliğ-i  sağlıklı bir ekosistem-in gösterge-si-Ø. 
insect species-PLU-POSS-GEN diversity-POSS healthy a ecosystem-GEN sign-POSS-Ø 
‘The diversity of insect species is an indication of the health of an ecosystem.’ 
The following generalized semantic value represents the use of -Iyor/-Ø in expressing 
temporally unrestricted predications with epistemic immediacy:  
(8.117) ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Iyor/-Ø) 
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8.2.2.5 -Iyor or -Ø: Future with immediate epistemic significance 
-Iyor (with verbal predicates) and -Ø (with non-verbal predicates) appear in what is often called 
‘scheduled futures’: 
(8.118) Tren saat üç-te   kalk-ıyor. 
Train hour three-LOC take.off-Iyor 
‘The train leaves at three o’clock.’ 
(8.119) Bu  akşam Ahmet-’ler gel-iyor. 
this evening Ahmet-PLU come-Iyor 
‘This evening Ahmet and his family are coming to us.’ 
(8.120) Perşembe sabah-ı   Đstanbul’-da-Ø-yız. 
Thursday morning-POSS Istanbul-LOC-Ø-A1PL 
‘We are in Istanbul in Thursday morning.’ 
Future time reference (POSTERIOR) is most typically expressed in Turkish by -(y)AcAG (when 
personal certainty is involved, see section 8.1.3), or by -Xr (when epistemic modality is at stake, see 
section 8.2.1.3). Futures with -Iyor or -Ø differ from those with -(y)AcAG or -Xr in that they place 
emphasis on the immediate informative value of the proposition they express. In other words, they 
present their informative content as an ‘immediately significant’ piece of information. In most 
cases, this sense of epistemic immediacy is linked with the assumed ‘newness’ of the information 
relative to the addressee(s) (as would normally be the case in (8.118-8.120) above). ‘Epistemic 
immediacy’ can also be relative to the speaker herself, in case the expressed piece of information 
has just been discovered and not yet been fully assimilated to her current knowledge state. For 
instance, (8.118) above could also be uttered by a speaker who has just checked the train schedules, 
and (8.119) by one who has just received an phone call announcing a prospective visit. As 
predicted by this account, -Iyor and -Ø will be preferred in expressing future events with an 
element of surprise. For instance, a speaker who has just checked the train schedule and found out 
that the departure hour is unexpectedly early would prefer -Iyor to -(y)AcAG or -Xr: 
(8.121) Ol-amaz!   Tren saat üç-te   kalk-ıyor! / ?kalk-acak!  / #kalk-ar! 
be-NEG.HABG train hour three-LOC take.off-Iyor  take.off-(y)AcAG take.off-Xr 
‘Oh God! The train leaves at three o’clock!’ 
-Iyor and -Ø can also express ‘imminent future’ (PROSPECTIVE/imminent/; see section 5.1.5), 
when the conveyed information is new to the speaker (and/or presented as new to the 
addressee(s)). Below are two examples: 
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(8.122) Çabuk ol-un,   film  başl-ıyor. 
quick  be-IMP.A1PL movie start-Iyor 
‘Be quick! The movie’s gonna start.’ 
(8.123) Çorba  birazdan  hazır-Ø. 
soup  soon   ready-Ø 
‘The soup’s gonna be ready in a minute.’ 
The immediate epistemic significance of -Iyor futures is also demonstrated by information 
seeking questions. -Iyor is particularly apt in questions which are intended to recollect currently 
relevant information: 
(8.124) Şimdi gezi-ye   kim gel-iyor,  kim gel-m-iyor? 
now excursion-DAT who come-Iyor who come-NEG-Iyor 
‘Now, who is coming to the excursion and who not?’ 
In summary, -Iyor and -Ø are used in future utterances (i.e., those which signal POSTERIOR or 
PROSPECTIVE/imminent/) when the conveyed piece of information is construed as ‘immediate 
evidence’ either relative to the knowledge state of the speaker herself or to that of the addressee(s) 
(in case the conveyed piece of information is already well-known to the speaker). As such, they are 
analyzed as signaling NEW INFORMATION in the epistemic domain. Since these utterances are simple 
assertions, they also involve ASSERTED in their highest (volitional) layer of anchoring. The 
generalized semantic values associated with the ‘scheduled future’ and ‘imminent future’ uses of 
-Iyor and -Ø are hence as follows: 
(8.125) ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-Iyor/ -Ø) 
(8.126) ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(PROSPECTIVE/imminent/(SoA))) (-Iyor/ -Ø) 
8.2.2.6 -Iyor: Explicit performatives 
-Iyor typically appears in explicit performatives. For instance, (8.127) can be uttered by an official to 
perform a civil marriage, (8.128) by a chairman to launch a session, (8.129) by a military 
commander to issue a command, and (8.130) by someone who raises an objection: 
(8.127) Siz-i   karı koca  ilan ed-iyor-um. 
P2PL-ACC  wife husband declare-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I declare you husband and wife.’ 
(8.128) Oturum-u aç-ıyor-um. 
session-ACC open-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I open up the session.’ 
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(8.129) Bura-ya gel-me-n-i     emred-iyor-um! 
here-DAT come-AN-POSS.A2SG-ACC order-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I order you to come here!’ 
(8.130) Đtiraz ed-iyor-um! 
object-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I object!’ 
-Xr can also appear in explicit performatives, but only with a strictly limited number (a closed 
set) of verbs which are typically used in official letters, as illustrated in (8.131) and (8.132) below. In 
the spoken register, one finds -Xr only in certain formulaic expressives, e.g., those by which one 
gives thanks (8.133) or congratulates someone (8.134):  
(8.131) Bilgi-ler-iniz-e       arz ed-er-im. 
information-PLU-POSS.A2PL-DAT  offer-Xr-A1SG 
‘I offer this point to your information.’ 
(8.132) Gereğ-i-nin     yap-ıl-ma-sı-nı   rica ed-er-im. 
requirement-POSS-GEN do-PASS-AN-POSS-ACC request-Xr-A1SG 
‘I request you to undertake the necessary action.’ 
(8.133) Teşekkür ed-er-im.  
thank-Xr-A1SG 
‘Thank you.’ 
(8.134) Tebrik ed-er-im!  
congratulate-Xr-A1SG 
‘Congratulations!’ 
Within the semantic framework of anchoring categories, explicit performatives are taken as a 
subtype of declarations, in which the speaker declares her immediate (illocutionary) intention. Like 
all other declarations, they signal the volitional anchoring category IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION 
(sections 4.1.1 and 5.3.1) in the highest layer of anchoring, and entail NEW INFORMATION and 
SIMULTANEOUS in the epistemic and temporal domains (see also example (6.62) in section 6.3): 
(8.135) IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION(NEW INFORMATION(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-Iyor) 
8.2.3 Uses of -Xr and -Iyor in combination with the enclitics -(y)DI and -(y)mIş 
This section identifies the main uses of the combinations of the bound markers -Xr and -Iyor with 
the enclitics -(y)DI and -(y)mIş, namely, -Xr-(y)DI, -Xr-(y)mIş, -Iyor-(y)DI, and -Iyor-(y)mIş. Many of 
the temporal dimensions associated with -Xr and -Iyor used as the sole TAM markers can also be 
observed when they combine with these two enclitics. 
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8.2.3.1 -Xr-(y)DI: Temporally unrestricted predication in a past temporal frame 
In section 8.1.1, -(y)DI was shown to be a marker of anaphoric past (ANTERIORANA). Accordingly, 
-Xr-(y)DI can be used for expressing a temporally unrestricted predication from the perspective of 
a back-shifted temporal center, e.g., in utterances which mention a once-typical behavior of a 
subject: 
(8.136) Ali eskiden çok sigara iç-er-di. 
Ali formerly much smoke-Xr-(y)DI 
‘Ali used to smoke too much.’ 
(8.137) Çocuk-ken ev-den  hiç  çık-maz-dı-m. 
child-DTA house-ABL never leave-NEG.Xr-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘When I was a child, I never left home.’ 
In the examples above, the temporal expressions eskiden and çocukken trigger temporal 
displacements to past. In both sentences, -(y)DI anaphorically refers to the back-shifted temporal 
frames. -Xr signals no specific temporal restriction for the designated SoAs within these frames. In 
other words, both utterances signal the anchoring category ATEMPORAL relative to past frames 
rather than expressing contingent occurrences. When the predicate is non-verbal, zero-marking 
(-Ø) appears rather than -Xr or -DIr: 
(8.138) Mustafa çok akıllı bir  insan-Ø-dı. 
Mustafa very clever a  person-Ø-(y)DI 
‘Mustafa was a very clever person.’  
-(y)DI in the examples above not only conveys an anaphoric reference a past temporal frame 
(ANTERIORANA), but also signals personal certainty (CERTAIN) (see section 8.1.1) and assertive 
illocutionary force (ASSERTED): 
(8.139) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Xr-(y)DI/-Ø-(y)DI) 
8.2.3.2 -Xr-(y)DI: Counterfactual prediction 
As shown in section 8.1.1, -(y)DI also marks counterfactuality. In the counterfactual conditional in 
(8.141) below the conditional marker -sA triggers an epistemic displacement and -(y)DI qualifies 
the displaced epistemic frame as ‘contrary to fact’. -(y)DI on the apodosis anaphorically refers to 
this counterfactual epistemic frame (¬CERTAINANA). Just as -Xr in (8.140) below signals a 
combination of POSTERIOR and PROBABLE in a ‘hypothetical’ epistemic frame, -Xr-(y)DI in (8.141) 
signals the same combination in a ‘counterfactual’ epistemic frame: 
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(8.140) Ahmet gel-ir-se    pikniğ-e  gid-er-iz.  
Ahmet come-Xr-CONDe picnic-DAT go-Xr-A1PL 
‘If Ahmet comes we will go out for a picnic.’ 
(8.141) Ahmet bura-da ol-sa-ydı    pikniğ-e  gid-er-di-k. 
Ahmet here-LOC be-COND-(y)DI picnic-DAT go-Xr-(y)DI-A1PL 
‘If Ahmet was here we would go out for a picnic.’ 
The semantic value of the apodoses of such counterfactual conditionals can be generalized as 
follows: 
(8.142) ASSERTED(¬CERTAINANA(PROBABLE(POSTERIOR(SoA)))) (-Xr-(y)DI) 
As already stated in section 8.1.1, -(y)DI in counterfactual conditionals can refer to either a 
present (deictic) or a past (displaced) temporal frame. In other words, it can function both as a 
temporal and an epistemic anaphor (¬CERTAINANA + ANTERIORANA), as shown below: 
(8.143) (Dün)   Ahmet gel-se-ydi   pikniğ-e  gid-er-di-k. 
yesterday Ahmet come-COND-y(DI) picnic-DAT go-Xr-(y)DI-A1PL 
‘If Ahmet had come (yesterday), we would have gone out for a picnic.’ 
The generalized semantic value of the apodoses of such conditionals can be rendered in the 
metalanguage of anchoring categories as follows:  
(8.144) ASSERTED(¬CERTAINANA(PROBABLE(ANTERIORANA(POSTERIOR(SoA)))) (-Xr-(y)DI) 
8.2.3.3 -Xr-(y)mIş: Uses with hearsay 
In section 8.1.2, it was shown that one of the main uses of the enclitic -(y)mIş is ‘hearsay’ (report 
from a third illocutionary source), which is represented in the metalanguage of anchoring 
categories as hearsayANA. While -Xr is used for deictic assertions of temporally unrestricted facts 
(which signal ATEMPORAL + GENERAL FACT; see section 8.2.1.1 above), -Xr-(y)mIş is used for 
expressing such facts as indirect illocutions. For instance, (8.145) can be used in quoting a statement 
from an encyclopedia, and (8.146), in replicating what a third person has told about Ahmet: 
(8.145) Hipopotam  insan-dan daha hızlı koş-ar-mış. 
hippopotamus human-ABL more fast run-Xr-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, a hippopotamus runs faster than a human.’ 
(8.146) Ahmet hiç  kahve  iç-mez-miş. 
Ahmet never coffee  drink-NEG.Xr-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet never drinks coffee.’ 
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Although temporally unrestricted facts are normally expressed by -DIr with non-verbal 
predicates (see section 8.2.1.1 above), -DIr gives way to zero-marking (-Ø) in hearsay utterances 
with -(y)mIş. Below are two examples. (8.147) involves a gnomic, and (8.148), a characterizing 
utterance: 
(8.147) Bir  mayıssineği-nin ömr-ü   birkaç  saat-Ø-miş. 
a  mayfly-GEN   lifetime-POSS few  hour-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, the lifetime of a mayfly is only a few hours.’  
(8.148) Mustafa çok zeki-Ø-ymiş. 
Mustafa very clever-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Mustafa is a very clever person.’  
Just like -Xr can be used on its own for deictic predictions (POSTERIOR + PROBABLE; see section 
8.2.1.3 above), -Xr-(y)mIş can report a prediction of a third-party: 
(8.149) Ahmet yarın   gel-ir-miş. 
Ahmet tomorrow come-Xr-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet will come tomorrow.’  
The uses of -Xr-(y)mIş and -Ø-(y)mIş illustrated in (8.145-8.148) match the generalized 
semantic value given in (8.150), and that of -Xr-(y)mIş illustrated in (8.149), the one given in (8.151): 
(8.150) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Xr-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
(8.151) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(PROBABLE(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-Xr-(y)mIş) 
Just as -(y)DI can be relative to the present or a past temporal frame in its counterfactual uses, 
-(y)mIş is alike in its use for hearsay. In the examples below, one with a verbal and one with a non-
verbal predicate, -(y)mIş expresses anaphoric past in addition to anaphoric illocution. The 
generalized semantic value associated with such uses is given in (8.154).  
(8.152) Ali eskiden çok sigara iç-er-miş. 
Ali formerly much smoke-Xr-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ali smoked heavily in the past.’ 
(8.153) Mustafa çocuk-ken çok zeki-Ø-ymiş. 
Mustafa child-DTA very clever-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Mustafa was very clever when he was a child.’ 
(8.154) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(ATEMPORAL(SoA))))) (-Xr-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
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8.2.3.4 -Iyor-(y)DI: Uses with temporal displacement to past 
The combination of -Iyor (with verbal predicates) or -Ø (with non-verbal predicates) with the 
anaphoric past marker -(y)DI can express SIMULTANEOUS and PERFECT/persisting/relative to a 
temporal center displaced to past. (8.155-8.158) are examples with SIMULTANEOUS, and (8.159) and 
(8.160), with PERFECT/ persisting/: 
(8.155) Gel-diğ-im-de    Ahmet yemek y-iyor-du.  
come-FN-POSS.A1SG-LOC Ahmet meal  eat-Iyor-(y)DI 
‘When I came Ahmet was having his meal.’ 
(8.156) Ara-dığ-ın-da   sen-i  düşün-üyor-du-m. 
call-FN-POSS.A2SG-LOC 2SG-ACC think-Iyor-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘I was thinking about you when you called me.’ 
(8.157) Dün   saat üç-te   meşgul-Ø-dü-m.  
yesterday hour three-LOC busy-Ø-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘I was busy yesterday at three o’clock’. 
(8.158) Oya çık-tığ-ı-nda   Ahmet büro-da-Ø-ydı. 
Oya leave-FN-POSS-LOC Ahmet office-LOC-Ø-(y)DI 
‘When Oya left Ahmet was in the office.’  
(8.159) O-nu  tanı-dığ-ım-da    onbeş  yıl-dır  sigara  iç-iyor-du  
P3SG-ACC know-FN-POSS.A1SG-LOC fifteen year-SINCE smoke-Iyor-(y)DI 
‘When I met him, he had been smoking for fifteen years.’ 
(8.160) Teklif gel-diğ-i-nde  beş ay-dır    iş-siz-Ø-di-m.  
offer come-FN-POSS-LOC five month-SINCE job-PRIV-Ø-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘When the offer was made I had been unemployed for five months.’ 
The semantic values associated with the above illustrated uses are given below: 
(8.161) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)DI/-Ø-(y)DI) 
(8.162) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)DI/-Ø-(y)DI) 
-Iyor-(y)DI can also express RECURRENT relative to a backward-shifted temporal center, as 
shown in (8.163) below. The generalized semantic value associated with this use is given in (8.164): 
(8.163) O  zaman-lar hafta-da  üç  gün yüz-üyor-du-m.  
that time-PLU  week-LOC three day swim-Iyor-(y)DI-A1SG 
‘At that time I would swim three times a week.’  
(8.164) ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(RECURRENT(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)DI)  
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8.2.3.5 -Iyor-(y)mIş: Uses with inference or hearsay 
In section 8.1.2, it was shown that -(y)mIş can mark an inference based on evidence (INFERRED). The 
combination -Iyor-(y)mIş can be used to signal INFERRED with SIMULTANEOUS, in contexts where the 
speaker has just encountered a proof for a presently ongoing SoA. The evidence in such contexts is 
often ‘direct’: The perception (typically visual or auditory) of an event or state is construed as 
evidence for that event or state (see INFERRED/direct/ in section 5.2.4). For instance, a person who 
enters a room and finds Ahmet sleeping can utter (8.165). Or, a speaker who has just noticed blood 
on her finger can utter (8.166). In such inferential contexts, the speaker may or may not 
additionally signal an element of unexpectedness or surprise, which is often conveyed by 
intonation in Turkish and represented in the examples with an exclamation sign: 
(8.165) Ahmet uyu-yor-muş./! 
Ahmet sleep-Iyor-mIş 
‘Ahmet is sleeping./! (I have just found out.) 
(8.166) Parmağ-ım   kan-ıyor-muş./! 
finger-POSS.A1SG bleed-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘My finger is bleeding./! (I have just found out.)’ 
When the predicate is non-verbal (nominal, adjectival or existential), the inference of a 
SIMULTANEOUS SoA is signaled by -Ø-(y)mIş. For instance, (8.167) can be uttered by someone who 
has just seen Mehmet himself (direct evidence) or Mehmet’s shoes in the hall (indirect evidence). A 
speaker who had no special expectations (or had contrary expectations) about the taste of the soup 
that she is having can utter (8.168) upon tasting it: 
(8.167) Mehmet de  bura-da-Ø-ymış./! 
Mehmet CONJ here-LOC-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Mehmet is also here./! (I have just found out.)’  
(8.168) Çorba  güzel-Ø-miş./! 
soup  nice-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘The soup is delicious./! (I’ve just found out.)’ 
In certain contexts, -Iyor-(y)mIş can also express a semantic combination of INFERRED with 
RECURRENT. For instance, someone who has recently found out that Ahmet meets a friend of his in 
Ankara quite often can utter (8.169). One can even find -Iyor-(y)mIş or -Ø-(y)mIş in conveying an 
inference about a temporally unrestricted (ATEMPORAL) SoA. For instance, a scientist who, contrary 
to his expectations, has discovered that lizards see in the dark, can utter (8.170). Or a speaker who 
has recently come to know Mehmet Bey can utter (8.171): 
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(8.169) Demek ki Ahmet sık sık Ankara-’ya gid-iyor-muş.  
thus   Ahmet often  Ankara-DAT go-Iyor-mIş 
‘Thus (as I realize now), Ahmet is going to Ankara quite often.’  
(8.170) Kertenkele-ler  karanlık-ta  gör-üyor-muş. 
lizard-PLU  darkness-LOC see-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Lizards see in the dark. (I have just discovered.) ‘ 
(8.171) Mehmet Bey alçakgönüllü bir insan-Ø-mış. 
Mehmet Bey modest   a person-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Mehmet Bey is a modest person. (I have recently found out.)’ 
-Iyor and -Ø can be used without -(y)mIş in very similar contexts, to signal NEW INFORMATION 
(see examples (8.84-8.87) in section 8.2.2.1 above). What -(y)mIş additionally does is to emphasize 
that a change occurred in the speaker’s current knowledge state, a characteristic property of the 
anchoring category INFERRED (see section 5.2.4). 
The above exemplified utterances with -Iyor-(y)mIş or -Ø-(y)mIş are all simple assertions rather 
than statements with formal-authoritative illocutionary force. Hence, they all entail the anchoring 
category ASSERTED in the volitional domain. As such, they can be coupled by the following 
generalized semantic values: 
(8.172) ASSERTED(INFERRED(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
(8.173) ASSERTED(INFERRED(RECURRENT(SoA))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş) 
(8.174) ASSERTED(INFERRED(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
Just as in its ‘hearsay’ use (mentioned in section 8.2.3.3 in connection with -Xr), -(y)mIş can 
anaphorically refer to temporal frame displaced to past in addition to signaling INFERRED. For 
instance, (8.175) can be uttered by a police inspector upon evaluating evidence gathered from a 
murder site, and (8.176) by someone who has examined meeting records of a company. The 
utterance in (8.177), which involves RECURRENT rather than SIMULTANEOUS, can be uttered in a 
context similar to (8.169) above, with the difference that the speaker infers that Ahmet’s multiple 
visits to Ankara took place in some period in the past: 
(8.175) Öl-dür-ül-düğ-ü-nde   telefon-la  konuş-uyor-muş. 
die-CAUS-PASS-FN-POSS-LOC phone-COM speak-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘(It turns out that) He was on the phone when he was murdered.’ 
(8.176) O  toplantı-da  Mehmet de   var-Ø-ymış. 
that meeting-LOC Mehmet CONJ EXCP-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘(As I gather now), Mehmet too attended that meeting.’ 
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(8.177) Demek ki Ahmet o  zaman-lar sık sık Ankara-’ya gid-iyor-muş. 
thus   Ahmet that time-PLU  often  Ankara-DAT go-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Thus (as I realize now), Ahmet went to Ankara quite often then.’  
The generalized semantic values associated with the uses of -Iyor-(y)mIş and -Ø-(y)mIş 
exemplified above are as follows: 
(8.178) ASSERTED(INFERRED(ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
(8.179) ASSERTED(INFERRED(ANTERIORANA(RECURRENT(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş) 
-(y)mIş can report an utterance from another illocutionary source when combined with -Iyor or 
-Ø too, as illustrated by the hearsay utterances below. -Iyor and -Ø signal SIMULTANEOUS in (8.180) 
and (8.181), PERFECT/persisting/ in (8.182) and (8.183), and a combination of POSTERIOR and NEW 
INFORMATION in (8.184) and (8.185) (see ‘scheduled future’ in section 8.2.2.5). -Iyor expresses 
RECURRENT in (8.186): 
(8.180) Ahmet şimdi uyu-yor-muş. 
Ahmet now sleep-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet is sleeping now.’ 
(8.181) Hatice ev-de   değil-Ø-miş. 
Hatice house-LOC NEGP-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Hatice is not at home.’ 
(8.182) Ali üç  gün-dür  san-a  ulaş-ma-ya  çalış-ıyor-muş. 
Ali three  day-SINCE P2SG-DAT reach-AN-DAT try-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ali has been trying to reach you for three days.’ 
(8.183) Adam üç  yıl-dır  iş-siz-Ø-miş.  
man  three year-SINCE job-PRIV-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, the man has been unemployed for three years.’ 
(8.184) Ahmet Cuma  gün-ü  gel-iyor-muş. 
Ahmet Friday day-POSS come-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet is coming on Friday.’ 
(8.185) Akşam televizyon-da güzel bir film  var-Ø-mış. 
evening television-LOC nice a movie EXCP-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, there is a good movie on the TV this evening.’ 
(8.186) Can sabah-lar-ı   koş-uyor-muş. 
Can morning-PLU-ACC run-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Can is jogging every morning.’ 
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Below are the generalized semantic values of the above illustrated uses of -Iyor-(y)mIş and 
-Ø-(y)mIş: 
(8.187) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
(8.188) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(RECURRENT(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş) 
(8.189) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
(8.190) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(NEW INFORMATION(POSTERIOR(SoA)))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş/-Ø-(y)mIş) 
Such reportative uses of -(y)mIş can additionally signal relativity to a temporal center 
displaced to past (a combination of ANTERIORANA and hearsayANA), as in the examples below. -Iyor 
and -Ø signal SIMULTANEOUS in (8.191) and (8.192), and PERFECT/persisting/ in (8.193) and (8.194). 
In (8.195), -Iyor signals RECURRENT.  
(8.191) Ahmet ara-dığ-ı-nda  Cem uyu-yor-muş. 
Ahmet call-FN-POSS-LOC Cem sleep-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Cem was sleeping when Ahmet called him.’ 
(8.192) Mehmet dün   saat iki-de  büro-da-Ø-ymış. 
Mehmet yesterday hour two-LOC office-LOC-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Mehmet was in the office yesterday at two.’ 
(8.193) Can ara-dığ-ı-nda   Ahmet üç  saat-tir  bekl-iyor-muş. 
Can call-FN-POSS-LOC Ahmet three hour-SINCE wait-Iyor-(y)mIş  
‘Reportedly, when Can called him, Ahmet had been waiting for three hours.’ 
(8.194) Teklif gel-diğ-i-nde   adam altı ay-dır    iş-siz-Ø-miş. 
offer come-FN-POSS-LOC man six  month-SINCE job-PRIV-Ø-(y)mIş  
‘Reportedly, the man had been unemployed for six months when the offer was made.’ 
(8.195) Ahmet o  zaman-lar sık sık  Ankara-’ya gid-iyor-muş. 
Ahmet that time-PLU  often  Ankara-DAT go-Iyor-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, Ahmet went to Ankara quite often then.’ 
(8.196), (8.197) and (8.198) below represent the generalized semantic values associated with 
the reportative uses of -Iyor-(y)mIş and -Ø-(y)mIş: 
(8.196) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))))) (-Iyor/Ø-(y)mIş) 
(8.197) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(RECURRENT(SoA))))) (-Iyor-(y)mIş) 
(8.198) hearsayANA(ASSERTED(CERTAIN(ANTERIORANA(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA))))) (-Iyor/Ø-(y)mIş) 
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8.2.4 Uses of -DIr in combination with -mIş, -Iyor, -mAktA, -Ø or -(y)AcAG 
This section identifies various uses of the combinations of -DIr with the bound markers (-mIş-DIr, 
-mAktA-DIr, -Iyor-DIr, -Ø-DIr and -(y)AcAG-DIr).  
8.2.4.1 -mIş-DIr, -mAktA-DIr, -Ø-DIr, -(y)AcAG-DIr: General validity 
Section 8.2.1.1 illustrated the use of -DIr with non-verbal predicates for expressing temporal 
unrestrictedness (ATEMPORAL) along with strong factuality (GENERAL FACT). -DIr can exclusively 
expresses the epistemic category GENERAL FACT when it combines with the bound TAM markers 
-mIş, -mAktA, and -(y)AcAG.  
In the examples below, where -mIş signals ANTERIOR and PERFECT/result/ (see section 8.1.2 on 
-mIş), -DIr presents the propositional contents as well-established, general truths. -mIş-DIr in such 
utterances express stronger factuality as compared to -DI (which expresses ANTERIOR or PERFECT 
with contingent, personal certainty; see section 8.1.1): 
(8.199) Homo habilis 2,5  milyon yıl  önce  evr-il-miş-tir. 
Homo habilis 2.5  million year before evolve-PASS-mIş-DIr 
‘Homo habilis evolved 2.5 million years ago.’ 
(8.200) Gün-ümüz-de  lazer teknoloji-si   ileri   bir düzey-e  ulaş-mış-tır. 
day-POSS.A1PL-LOC laser technology-POSS advanced a level-DAT reach-mIş-DIr 
‘Today laser technology has attained an advanced level.’ 
-mAKtA was already shown to be capable of expressing SIMULTANEOUS and RECURRENT (see 
section 8.1.4). Example (8.201) below illustrates -mAktA-DIr in signaling the combination of 
GENERAL FACT with SIMULTANEOUS (with a relatively extended event), and (8.202), with RECURRENT. 
In (8.203) zero-marking (-Ø) appears as the non-verbal counterpart of -mAktA (-Ø can signal 
SIMULTANEOUS with non-verbal predicates on its own too, but then it signals CERTAIN rather than 
GENERAL FACT; see section 8.2.2.1): 
(8.201) Ekolojik  denge  hızla  bozul-makta-dır. 
Ecological balance rapidly deteriorate-mAktA-DIr 
‘The ecological balance is being destroyed rapidly.’ 
(8.202) Bölge-de  çok sık   deprem  etkinliğ-i   kayded-il-mekte-dir. 
region-LOC very frequent earthquake activity-POSS record-PASS-mAktA-DIr 
‘Very frequent earthquake activities are being recorded in the region.’ 
(8.203) Nöroloji  bilim-i   henüz  emekle-me çağ-ı-nda-Ø-dır. 
Neurology science-POSS  still  toddle-FN age-POSS-LOC-Ø-DIr 
‘Neuroscience is yet in the toddling phase.’ 
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-(y)AcAG is the most typical marker of future time reference (POSTERIOR as well as 
PROSPECTIVE) in Turkish (see section 8.1.3). In the scientific forecast below, -(y)AcAG-DIr expresses 
a combination of POSTERIOR with GENERAL FACT:  
(8.204) Petrol rezerv-ler-i   azal-dığ-ı-nda    bir  enerji  kriz-i  
 yaşa-n-acak-tır. 
oil  reserve-PLU-POSS diminish-FN-POSS-LOC  a  energy crisis-POSS 
 live-PASS-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘An energy crisis will arise when oil reserves diminish.’ 
Although such uses of -DIr for general validity (or, strong factuality) are common in the 
scientific register, they can be found in other types of communicative contexts too, when the 
speaker wants to present her statement as a matter of objective truth. For instance, in the example 
below, the speaker endows her personal experience stronger factuality by using -mIş-DIr rather 
than -DI: 
(8.205) Mustafa’-yı  hiç  kır-ma-mış-ım-dır. 
Mustafa-ACC never upset-NEG-mIş-A1SG-DIr 
‘I have never upset Mustafa.’ 
The above illustrated uses of -mIş-DIr, -mAktA-DIr, -Ø-DIr and -(y)AcAG-DIr can be coupled 
with the following generalized semantic values: 
(8.206) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(ANTERIOR(SoA))) (-mIş-DIr) 
(8.207) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(PERFECT(SoA))) (-mIş-DIr) 
(8.208) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-mAktA-DIr/ -Ø-DIr) 
(8.209) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(RECURRENT(SoA))) (-mAktA-DIr) 
(8.210) ASSERTED(GENERAL FACT(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-(y)AcAG-DIr) 
8.2.4.2 -mIş-DIr, -mAktA-DIr, -Ø-DIr, -(y)AcAG-DIr: Strengthened illocutionary force 
-DIr can yield a strong, impersonal illocutionary force, in the same morphosyntactic contexts where 
it conveys GENERAL FACT. For instance, the following examples with -mIş-DIr can be found in 
announcements by a ministry of internal affairs. They respectively signal ANTERIOR and PERFECT in 
the temporal domain. They both express CERTAIN rather than GENERAL FACT in the epistemic 
domain, because they convey contingent pieces of information rather than facts with general 
validity. What -DIr grants to such statements is a formal-authoritative (impersonal) illocutionary 
force, which is linked to the signaling of the volitional category GENERAL STATEMENT (sections 4.1.5, 
5.3.7) in the current semantic framework: 
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(8.211) 13 Haziran 2004 tarih-i-nde  konu-yla  ilgili soruşturma  başlat-ıl-mış-tır. 
13 June  2004 date-POSS-LOC issue-COM about investigation start-PASS-mIş-DIr 
‘An investigation on this issue was started on 13 June 2004.’ 
(8.212) Şu  an   itibar-i-yle   bütün  suçlu-lar   tespit ed-il-miş-tir. 
this moment regard-POSS-COM all   criminal-PLU identify-PASS-mIş-DIr 
‘All of the criminals have been identified by now.’ 
Below are examples of -mAktA-DIr in expressing GENERAL STATEMENT with an ongoing activity 
(SIMULTANEOUS) (8.213), a regularly repeated event (RECURRENT) (8.214), and an activity which 
began in the past and still goes on (PERFECT/persisting/) (8.215), respectively. (8.213) can be 
pronounced by a governmental spokesman, (8.214) can appear in an official report within the 
context of the ministry of health, and (8.215) can be part of a press notice of a company:  
(8.213) Bakan-lar  kurul-u   taslak üzer-i-nde  çalış-makta-dır. 
minister-PLU council-POSS  draft top-POSS-LOC work-mAktA-DIr 
‘The council of ministers is working on the draft.’ 
(8.214) Bakanlık  tesis-ler-i      düzenli olarak denetle-mekte-dir. 
ministry  establishment-PLU-ACC regular as   inspect-mAktA-DIr 
‘The ministry is regularly inspecting the establishments.’ 
(8.215) Şirket  15  yıl-dır  bilişim  sektör-ü-nde  faaliyet göster-mekte-dir. 
company 15 year-SINCE informatics sector-POSS-LOC  function-mAktA-DIr 
‘The company has been active in the informatics sector for 15 years.’ 
In formal-official statements which express SIMULTANEOUS or PERFECT/persisting/, zero-
marking (-Ø) will appear rather than -mAktA when the predicate is non-verbal. For instance, the 
statement in (8.216) can appear on a sign post near a construction area, and (8.217), in a certificate 
of good service:  
(8.216) Đnşaat    alan-ı-na   gir-mek yasak-Ø-tır. 
construction  area-POSS-DAT enter-INF forbidden-Ø-DIr 
‘It is forbidden to enter the construction area.’ 
(8.217) Ali Özer 11 Nisan 1998 tarih-i-nden  beri kurum-umuz   personel-i-Ø-dir. 
Ali Özer 11 April  1998 date-POSS-ABL since institution-POSS.A1PL staff-POSS-Ø-DIr 
‘Ali Özer has been employed in our institution since 11 April 1998.’ 
-(y)AcAG-DIr can be used to express GENERAL STATEMENT in future-pointing utterances. For 
instance, (8.218) can appear in an announcement by an official committee, and (8.219) can appear in 
a notification issued by a branch bank office:  
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(8.218) Toplantı sonra-sı-nda  ayrıntılı açıklama  yap-ıl-acak-tır.  
meeting later-POSS-LOC detailed statement do-PASS-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘A detailed statement will be issued after the meeting.’ 
(8.219) Şube-miz    bayram tatil-i    boyunca açık ol-acak-tır 
branch-POSS.A1PL bairam holiday-POSS during open be-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘Our branch office will be open during the bairam holiday.’ 
The use of -DIr for strengthened illocutionary force is typical of official, administrative and 
political registers. It is hence mostly found in written language, e.g., in regulations, administrative 
bulletins, legislative and juridical documents, etc. It also appears in the spoken announcements, 
e.g., by representatives or spokesmen of official institutions. In non-official communicative settings 
too, speakers can exploit the strong illocutionary force associated -DIr in order to enhance the 
credibility of their statements. For instance, a medical doctor and a police chief who want to 
reassure their addressee(s) about their convictions can utter (8.220) and (8.221), respectively. (The 
temporal relation in these examples matches the definition of PROSPECTIVE rather than POSTERIOR): 
(8.220) Merak et-me-yin;  kız-ı-nız     iyileş-ecek-tir. 
worry-NEG-IMP.A2PL daughter-POSS-A2PL get.well-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘Don’t worry; your daughter will get well.’ 
(8.221) Suçlu  mutlaka  yakala-n-acak-tır. 
criminal absolutely capture-PASS-(y)AcAG-DIr  
‘The criminal is bound to be captured.’ 
On the basis of the analyses above, uses of -mIş-DIr, -mAktA-DIr, -Ø-DIr and -(y)AcAG-DIr in 
statements with strong illocutionary force can be coupled with the following generalized semantic 
values: 
(8.222) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(ANTERIOR(SoA))) (mIş-DIr) 
(8.223) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(PERFECT(SoA))) (mIş-DIr) 
(8.224) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-mAktA-DIr/-Ø-DIr) 
(8.225) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(RECURRENT(SoA))) (-mAktA-DIr) 
(8.226) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(PERFECT/persisting/(SoA))) (-mAktA-DIr)/-Ø-DIr) 
(8.227) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-(y)AcAG-DIr) 
(8.228) GENERAL STATEMENT(CERTAIN(PROSPECTIVE(SoA))) (-(y)AcAG-DIr) 
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8.2.4.3 -mIş-DIr, -Iyor-DIr, -Ø-DIr, -(y)AcAG-DIr: Epistemic modality 
-DIr can also express epistemic modality (PROBABLE) when it combines with the bound markers 
-mIş, -Iyor and -(y)AcAG. The following utterances exemplify such uses of -mIş-DIr, where -mIş 
conveys the temporal categories ANTERIOR (8.229) and PERFECT/result/ (8.230), respectively: 
(8.229) Oya  bugün iş-ten  erken  çık-mış-tır. 
Ahmet today  job-ABL early leave-mIş-DIr 
‘Oya must have left / has probably left the office early today.’ 
(8.230) Konuk-lar gel-miş-tir. 
visitor-PLU come-mIş-DIr 
‘The visitors should have come.’ 
Similarly, -Iyor-DIr can express a guess about a presently ongoing (SIMULTANEOUS) event or 
state (8.231), or one about repeated occurrences in the vicinity of the temporal center (RECURRENT) 
(8.232): 
(8.231) Neşe şimdi kitap ok-uyor-dur. 
Neşe now book read-Iyor-DIr. 
‘Neşe must be reading / is probably reading now.’ 
(8.232) Ali şu   sıra-lar   sık sık Đstanbul-’a  gid-iyor-dur. 
Ali this range-PLU often  Istanbul-DAT go-Iyor-DIr 
‘Ali is probably / must be going to Istanbul quite often these days’.  
Here too, the combination of SIMULTANEOUS with PROBABLE is rendered by -Ø-DIr in place of 
-Iyor-DIr when the predicate is non-verbal: 
(8.233) Ahmet  şimdi çok yorgun-Ø-dur. 
Ahmet  now  very tired-Ø-DIr 
‘Ahmet must be / is probably very tired now.’ 
Although not too often, -Iyor-DIr (or -Ø-DIr) can also appear in guesses about temporally 
unrestricted (ATEMPORAL) SoAs: 
(8.234) Kertenkele-ler  belki  de  karanlık-ta  gör-üyor-dur. 
lizard-PLU   maybe CONJ darkness-LOC see-Iyor-DIr 
‘Maybe lizards see in the dark.’ 
(8.235) Armadillo herhalde  soğukkanlı  bir  hayvan-Ø-dır. 
Armadillo probably  cold-blooded a  animal-Ø-DIr 
‘Armadillo is probably a cold-blooded animal.’ 
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As shown in section 8.2.1.3 above, predictions about future occurrences (which express the 
combination of POSTERIOR with PROBABLE) are normally rendered by -Xr. -(y)AcAG-DIr is also 
acceptable in this use, as seen in (8.236) below. But -(y)AcAG-DIr is better suited for guesses about 
what one intends to do (8.237), an element which lacks in predictions with -Xr. In other words, 
estimations with -(y)AcAG-DIr generally involve PROSPECTIVE (which indexes a present cause for a 
future occurrence, see sections 4.1.6, 5.1.5) rather then POSTERIOR: 
(8.236) Ali bu  akşam gel-ecek-tir. 
Ali this evening come-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘Ali will (probably) come tomorrow evening.’ 
(8.237) Belki  de  yeni bir  iş   kur-acak-tır.  
maybe CONJ new a   business establish-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘Maybe (s)he intends to / is going to establish a new business.’ 
The behavior of -DIr in its use for PROBABLE is very similar to that of -Xr in expressing 
predictions: It denotes a relatively high degree of likelihood when used without epistemic adverbs 
(as seen in the examples above), but can be coupled with epistemic adverbs which specify different 
degrees of likelihood. Below are examples with -(y)mIş-DIr and -Iyor-DIr: 
(8.238) Ali bir  ihtimal-le  / belki / herhalde  saat beş-te  gel-miş-tir. 
Ali one probability-COM  maybe probably  hour five-LOC come-mIş-DIr 
‘Ali might / may / must have come at five.’ 
(8.239) Ali bir  ihtimal-le /  belki / herhalde  biz-i   bekl-iyor-dur.  
Ali one probability-COM  maybe probably  P1PL-ACC  wait-Iyor-DIr 
‘Ali might / may / must be waiting for us.’ 
Again like -Xr, -DIr in this epistemic function typically appears in conditional apodoses. 
Below are examples which involve combinations of -DIr with -mIş, -(y)AcAG, -Iyor, and -Ø: 
(8.240) Kar yağ-dı-ysa   maç  iptal ed-il-miş-tir. 
snow fall-PAST-CONDe match  cancel-PASS-mIş-DIr 
‘If it snowed the match was (probably) cancelled.’ 
(8.241) Ahmet hazırlık  yap-ıyor-sa   parti-ye  gel-ecek-tir. 
Ahmet preparation do-CONT-CONDe party-DAT come-(y)AcAG-DIr 
‘If Ahmet is preparing, he is going to come to the party.’ 
(8.242) Can akşam  yol-a   çık-acak-sa   şimdi alışveriş yap-ıyor-dur. 
Can evening road-DAT  leave-FUT-CONDe now shop-Iyor-DIr 
‘If Can is to leave in the evening, he will be shopping now.’ 
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(8.243) Saat beş-te  yol-a   çık-mış-sa    şimdi Bolu’-da-Ø-dır. 
hour five-LOC road-DAT  leave-EPAST-CONDe now Bolu-LOC-Ø-DIr 
‘If (s)he left at five, she will be in Bolu now.’ 
Like the predictive use of -Xr, the use of -DIr for PROBABLE almost exclusively appears in 
informal communication. It hence renders personal assertions (which signal ASSERTED) rather than 
general statements with official-authoritative force (which signal GENERAL STATEMENT). Hence, the 
semantic values associated with the abovementioned uses of mIş-DIr, -Iyor-DIr/-Ø-DIr, and 
-(y)AcAG-DIr can be generalized as follows: 
(8.244) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(ANTERIOR(SoA))) (mIş-DIr) 
(8.245) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(PERFECT(SoA))) (mIş-DIr) 
(8.246) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(SIMULTANEOUS(SoA))) (-Iyor-DIr/-Ø-DIr) 
(8.247) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(RECURRENT(SoA))) (-Iyor-DIr) 
(8.248) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(ATEMPORAL(SoA))) (-Iyor-DIr/-Ø-DIr) 
(8.249) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(POSTERIOR(SoA))) (-(y)AcAG-DIr) 
(8.250) ASSERTED(PROBABLE(PROSPECTIVE(SoA))) (-(y)AcAG-DIr) 
8.2.5 Stative dimensions expressed by -Xr 
-Xr can contribute to the expressions of state of possibility and state of willingness (see section 2.7) 
As stated in section 2.7, these semantic dimensions do not qualify as anchoring relations, because 
they make part of the inherent semantic structures of designated SoAs. Therefore, such uses of -Xr 
have not been included in the main analysis above.  
Expressions of state of possibility by -Xr are illustrated below. (8.251) and (8.252) convey 
'ability' (or, capacity'). In (8.253) and (8.254), -Xr expresses a potentiality which is not exclusively 
tied to the SoA participants, but also linked to circumstantial conditions:  
(8.251) Hatice gitar  çal-ar. 
Hatice guitar  play-Xr 
‘Hatice plays/can play guitar.’ 
(8.252) Bu  cihaz  üç  saat ses  kayd-ı  yap-ar.  
This device three hour voice record-POSS do-Xr 
‘This device records/can record voice for three hours.’ 
(8.253) Bu  ofis-te   zevk-le   çalış-ıl-ır. 
this office-LOC pleasure-COM work-PASS-Xr 
‘It can be fun to work in this office.‘ 
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(8.254) Bura-da sigara  iç-il-ir. 
here-LOC smoke-PASS-Xr 
‘One is allowed to smoke here.’ 
A state of possibility is also (and more typically) expressed by the Abilitative marker -Abil, as 
illustrated below. Compared to -Xr alone, -Abil-Xr puts a stronger emphasis on the potential 
inherent in the designated situation (ability, capacity, disposition, or permission): 
(8.255) Hatice gitar  çal-abil-ir. 
Hatice guitar  play-Abil-Xr 
‘Hatice can play guitar.’ 
(8.256) Bu  cihaz üç  saat ses  kayd-ı   yap-abil-ir.  
This device three hour voice record-POSS make-Abil-Xr 
‘This device can record voice for three hours.’ 
(8.257) Bura-da sigara iç-il-ebil-ir. 
here-LOC smoke-PASS-Abil-Xr 
‘One is allowed to smoke here. 
-Xr can also express a state of willingness associated with an intentional agent, as illustrated in 
(8.258) and (8.259) below. Unlike the deictic volitional components which can be conveyed by -Xr 
(see section 8.2.1.4 above), these volitional dimensions are part of the designated SoAs (i.e., they are 
‘participant-oriented’ rather than ‘speaker-oriented’):  
(8.258) Ahmet bu  konu-da  siz-e  yardım ed-er. 
Ahmet this issue-LOC you-DAT help-Xr 
‘Ahmet will help you on that issue.’ 
(8.259) Bu  adam çocuk-lar-ı  için can-ı-nı   ver-ir.  
this man child-PLU-ACC for  life-POSS-ACC give-Xr 
‘This man will die for his children.’ 
In addition to state of possibility or state of willingness, such utterances can be further 
analyzed for the anchoring relations they signal. For instance, (8.258) expresses a prediction, hence 
signals a combination of POSTERIOR and PROBABLE (see section 8.2.1.3). (8.259) is a characterizing 
utterance which expresses a combination of ATEMPORAL and GENERAL FACT (see section 8.2.1.1). 
8.3 Anchoring categories characteristically associated with -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø 
Tables 6 and 7 below summarize the generalized semantic values for the main uses of -Xr, -DIr, 
-Iyor and -Ø identified in the analysis above: 
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Marker(s) Volitional category Epistemic category Temporal category  Ref 
-Xr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (ATEMPORAL )) 8.46 
 ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.51 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (POSTERIOR )) 8.59 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (PROSPECTIVE/imminent/ )) 8.60 
 WANTED (HYPOTHETICAL (POSTERIOR )) 8.69 
 WANTED (HYPOTHETICAL (PROSPECTIVE )) 8.70 
 
-Xr-(y)DI ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(ATEMPORAL ))) 8.139 
 ASSERTED (¬CERTAINANA(PROBABLE (POSTERIOR ))) 8.142 
 ASSERTED (¬CERTAINANA(PROBABLE (ANTERIORANA(POSTERIOR )))) 8.144 
 
-Xr-(y)mIş  hearsayANA(ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (ATEMPORAL ))) 8.150 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (PROBABLE (POSTERIOR ))) 8.151 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(ATEMPORAL )))) 8.154 
 
-DIr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (ATEMPORAL )) 8.46 
 ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.51 
 
-mIş-DIr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (ANTERIOR )) 8.206 
 ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (PERFECT )) 8.207 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (ANTERIOR )) 8.222 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (PERFECT )) 8.223 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (ANTERIOR )) 8.244 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (PERFECT )) 8.245 
 
-mAktA-DIr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.208 
 ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (RECURRENT )) 8.209 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.224 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (RECURRENT )) 8.225 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.226 
 
-Iyor-DIr ASSERTED (PROBABLE (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.246 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (RECURRENT )) 8.247 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (ATEMPORAL )) 8.248 
 
-(y)AcAG-DIr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (POSTERIOR )) 8.210 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (POSTERIOR )) 8.227 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (PROSPECTIVE )) 8.228 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (POSTERIOR )) 8.249 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (PROSPECTIVE )) 8.250 
 
-Ø-DIr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.208 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.224 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.226 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.246 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (ATEMPORAL )) 8.248 
Table 6. Semantic values associated with -Xr and -DIr. 
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Marker(s) Volitional category Epistemic category Temporal category  Ref 
-Iyor ASSERTED (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.83 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.88 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (RECURRENT )) 8.92 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (RECURRENT )) 8.94 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.102 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.105 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ATEMPORAL )) 8.112 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (ATEMPORAL )) 8.117 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (POSTERIOR )) 8.125 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (PROSPECTIVE/imminent/ )) 8.126 
 IMMEDIATE CONTR. (NEW INFORMATION (SIMULTANEOUS  )) 8.135 
 
-Iyor-(y)DI ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.161 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(RECURRENT ))) 8.164 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(PERFECT/persisting/ ))) 8.162 
 
-Iyor-(y)mIş ASSERTED (INFERRED (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.172 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (RECURRENT )) 8.173 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (ATEMPORAL )) 8.174 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.178 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (ANTERIORANA(RECURRENT ))) 8.179 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.187 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (RECURRENT ))) 8.188 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ ))) 8.189 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (POSTERIOR ))) 8.190 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS )))) 8.196 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(RECURRENT )))) 8.197 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(PERFECT/persisting/ )))) 8.198  
 
-Iyor-DIr ASSERTED (PROBABLE (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.246 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (RECURRENT )) 8.247 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (ATEMPORAL )) 8.248 
 
-Ø ASSERTED (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.83 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.88 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.102 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.105 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ATEMPORAL )) 8.112 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (ATEMPORAL )) 8.117 
 ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (POSTERIOR )) 8.125 
 
 (continued on the next page) 
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 (continued from the previous page) 
-Ø-(y)DI ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(ATEMPORAL ))) 8.139 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.161 
 ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(PERFECT/persisting/ ))) 8.162 
 
-Ø-(y)mIş hearsayANA(ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (ATEMPORAL ))) 8.150 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(ATEMPORAL )))) 8.154 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.172 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (ATEMPORAL )) 8.174 
 ASSERTED (INFERRED (ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.178 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.187 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ ))) 8.189 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (NEW INFORMATION (POSTERIOR ))) 8.190 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(SIMULTANEOUS ))) 8.196 
 hearsayANA(ASSERTED (CERTAIN (ANTERIORANA(PERFECT/persisting/ )))) 8.198  
 
-Ø-DIr ASSERTED (GENERAL FACT (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.208 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.224 
 GENERAL STATEMENT (CERTAIN (PERFECT/persisting/ )) 8.226 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (SIMULTANEOUS )) 8.246 
 ASSERTED (PROBABLE (ATEMPORAL )) 8.248 
Table 7. Semantic values associated with -Iyor and -Ø. 
On the basis of the summaries given in the tables above and by taking into account the 
semantic associations of the other TAM markers listed in section 8.1.5 (-(y)DI, -mIş, -(y)mIş, -mAktA 
and -(y)AcAG), the semantic behavior of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø in the three domains of anchoring 
can be outlined as follows: 
• In the temporal domain, -Xr and -DIr typically express temporal unrestrictedness 
(ATEMPORAL). -Iyor and -Ø are typically used for for continuing events or states 
(SIMULTANEOUS) and for contingently repeated occurrences (RECURRENT). They can express 
ATEMPORAL only when the scope-taking epistemic category is CERTAIN or NEW 
INFORMATION (or when -Xr and -DIr are blocked due to formal combinatory constraints; 
see section 8.4.1 below). Both -Iyor/-Ø and -Xr can convey POSTERIOR, with different 
epistemic values. But none of them is characteristically associated with POSTERIOR, since 
-(y)AcAG is the most typical marker of future time reference. PERFECT/persisting/ is 
neutralized between -Iyor/-Ø and -Xr/-DIr, hence it is characteristic of neither pair.  
• The speaker’s choice between -Xr/-DIr and -Iyor/-Ø has significant epistemic consequences. 
-Xr and -DIr express either general validity (GENERAL FACT) or epistemic modality 
(PROBABLE), but they can neither signal personal certainty (CERTAIN) nor index pieces of 
immediate evidence (NEW INFORMATION). In contrast, -Iyor and -Ø express either CERTAIN 
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or NEW INFORMATION, but they can be used neither for PROBABLE nor GENERAL FACT. -Iyor 
and -Ø also appear in utterances which express CERTAIN. But this association is not 
characteristic of them, since CERTAIN can also be signaled by -DI, -(y)DI, -mIş, -(y)AcAG, 
and -mAktA. Therefore, CERTAIN is best taken as formally unmarked. 
• In the volitional domain, -Xr and -DIr are associated with GENERAL STATEMENT, while -Iyor 
can mark IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (-Xr expresses IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION only in a 
closed set of formulaic explicit performatives). -Xr also appears in expressions which 
signal WANTED (in requests, offers, and promises), although WANTED is more typically 
expressed by an Imperative or Optative marker (see section 7.2). Both -Xr/-DIr and 
-Iyor/-Ø appear in assertions. But since ASSERTED can also be there with -DI/-(y)DI, 
-mIş/-(y)mIş, -(y)AcAG, and -mAktA, it is best taken as formally unmarked. 
In summary, -Xr and -DIr are most characteristically associated with ATEMPORAL, GENERAL 
FACT, PROBABLE and GENERAL STATEMENT and -Iyor and -Ø, with SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT, NEW 
INFORMATION and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION. These associations suggest the following cross-
domain generalization: -Xr and -DIr express categories of generality (in addition to PROBABLE), while 
-Iyor and -Ø express categories of immediacy (in addition to RECURRENT). This is depicted in Figure 4 
below with two semantic maps drawn on the semantic space of anchoring categories:113 
PERFECT   INFERRED  ASSERTED 
ANTERIOR  CERTAIN  ACCEPTED 
SIMULTANEOUS  NEW INFORMATION IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION 
RECURRENT  PROBABLE  ACCEPTABLE 
ATEMPORAL  GENERAL FACT  GENERAL STATEMENT 
POSTERIOR  HYPOTHETICAL  ENVISIONED 
PROSPECTIVE  CONJECTURED  WANTED 
Figure 4. Semantic maps for -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø. 
                                                           
113 The semantic maps shown here are somewhat different from the conventional ones used in linguistic 
typology. In conventional semantic maps, the contents and the structure of the semantic space are inductively 
discovered using data from more than one language: Two uses are placed on the semantic space if they are 
expressed by different markers in at least two languages. Uses are then arranged on the space such that each 
marker is mapped onto a connected (contiguous) area. Since the analyses here involve only one language, this 
inductive method is not applicable. Instead, the content and the structure of the semantic space are motivated 
in a language-independent way, in terms of universally applicable cognitive and communicative notions (Part 
I). One consequence of this difference is the requirement of ‘contiguity’ (which says that a marker should map 
onto a connected area on the semantic space) is not directly applicable here, because the labels on the semantic 
space do not correspond to ‘uses’ defined at the level of communication but to semantic components (building 




8.4 Further analyses and comparisons with previous treatments 
8.4.1 Notes on semantic restrictions and formal exceptions 
Certain combinations of anchoring categories are more felicitous than others. For instance, hearsay 
can more freely combine with other anchoring categories compared to inference (INFERRED), 
because the contextual requirements of the former are less strict. INFERRED requires immediate 
evidence to be manifest at the time of utterance, and this poses restrictions on the temporal and 
epistemic categories it can combine with. But hearsayANA can take scope over any temporal, 
epistemic and volitional category, becuase it only transmits what the speaker has heard (or read) 
from a third party. For example, hearsayANA can combine with PROBABLE (semantic value (8.151)) or 
NEW INFORMATION (semantic value (8.190)), but INFERRED cannot because it is semantically 
paradigmatic (hence mutually exclusive) with these epistemic categories. 
-Xr and -DIr have been shown to express similar semantic ranges, with verbal and non-verbal 
predicates respectively. The same also holds with -Iyor and -Ø. But these correspondences have 
exceptions. For instance, -Xr can, but -DIr cannot signal POSTERIOR + PROBABLE (predictions) or 
WANTED (e.g., requests, offers, and promises). Similarly, -Iyor can, but -Ø cannot, express 
RECURRENT (contingently repeated occurrences) or IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (e.g., explicit 
performatives). These restrictions are presumably due to the fact that non-verbal (nominal, 
adjectival, or existential) predicates generally denote stative SoAs, while predictions, requests, 
promises and offers normally involve a change-of-state (inchoativity) in the future, and repeated 
occurrences normally involve telic or punctual SoAs.114 
Certain semantic values which can obtain with -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø (or a combination of 
them) require very specific contexts. For instance, -Iyor-DIr can express a guess about how long a 
certain event or state has been obtaining (a combination of PERFECT/persisting/ and PROBABLE), as 
in (8.260) below. Or, -(y)mIş can be used in reporting a permission granted by a third party, as in 
                                                           
114 It is possible to express a request concerning a non-verbal state if one is to prescribe an entry into a 
state. In this case ol-ur is used instead of -DIr (i). Similarly, if the speaker is to express repeated occurrences of 
a non-verbal state, she will use ol-uyor rather than -Ø (i-ii). The auxiliary ol can also serve as an 
inchoativization device in a prediction (iii):  
(i) Sessiz ol-ur  mu-sunuz  lütfen? 
quite AUX-Xr QP-A2PL  please 
‘Would you be quite please?’ 
(ii) Ali  şu  sıralar  çok sık   hasta ol-uyor. 
Ali  this range-PLU very frequent sick AUX-Iyor 
‘Ali gets sick very often nowadays.’ 
(iii) Saat beş-te  ev-de    ol-ur-sun. 
hour  five-LOC house-LOC  AUX-Xr-A2SG 
‘You will (probably) be at home at five.’ 
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(8.261). Such uses were not included in the main analysis above, because they appear very 
infrequently: 
(8.260) Ali bir  hafta-dır  san-a  ulaş-ma-ya  çalış-ıyor-dur. 
Ali one week-SINCE you-DAT reach-AN-DAT try-Iyor-DIr 
‘Probably, Ali has been trying to reach you for one week.’ 
(8.261) Gir-ebilir-miş-sin. 
enter-POS-mIş-A2SG 
‘Reportedly, you can come in/you are allowed to come in.’ 
As also mentioned in Chapter 7, a formal restriction in the TAM system of modern standard 
Turkish is that -DIr does not combine with -Xr, although these markers belong to 
morphosyntactically compatible formal paradigms (the former is an enclitic and the latter, a bound 
marker). This restriction is apparently motivated by formal economy gained by cumulative 
expression (see section 4.4.3): -Xr with verbal and -DIr with non-verbal predicates are associated 
with similar combinations of anchoring categories (e.g., ATEMPORAL along with GENERAL FACT 
and/or GENERAL STATEMENT). Another formal exception is found in the expression of ATEMPORAL 
in certain morphosyntactic contexts: Although ATEMPORAL is normally expressed by -DIr in non-
verbal predication (semantic value (8.46)), it is exceptionally marked by -Ø when either -(y)DI or 
-(y)mIş is there (semantic values (8.139), (8.150) and (8.174)), as shown in the examples (8.262) and 
(8.263) below. This exception is apparently motivated by a combinatory restriction in the general 
structuring of the Turkish TAM system: Both *-DIr-(y)DI and *-DIr-(y)mIş are morphosyntactically 
ill-formed, since they attempt to combine two enclitics (see the allowed patterns of combination in 
section 7.2). Similarly, ATEMPORAL is exceptionally marked by -Iyor or -Ø when it combines with 
epistemic modality (PROBABLE) (semantic value (8.248)), as seen in the examples (8.264) and (8.265) 
below. This exception is also formally motivated; -Iyor and -Ø appear simply because *-Xr-DIr and 
*-DIr-DIr are both ill-formed: 
(8.262) Mustafa çok *zeki-dir-di  / zeki-Ø-(y)di.  
Mustafa very clever-DIr-(y)DI clever-Ø-(y)DI 
‘Mustafa was very clever.’ 
(8.263) Bir mayıssineği-nin ömr-ü   birkaç  *saat-tir-miş  / saat-Ø-miş. 
a mayfly-GEN   lifetime-POSS a.few  hour-DIr-(y)mIş hour-Ø-(y)mIş 
‘Reportedly, the lifetime of a mayfly is only a few hours.’  
(8.264) Kertenkele-ler belki de karanlık-ta  *gör-ür-dür / gör-üyor-dur. 
lizard-PLU  maybe darkness-LOC see-Xr-DIr  see-Iyor-DIr 
‘Maybe lizards see in the dark.’ 
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(8.265) Armadillo herhalde soğukkanlı  bir  *hayvan-dır-dır / hayvan-Ø-dır.  
Armadillo probably cold-blooded a  animal-DIr-DIr  animal-Ø-DIr 
‘Armadillo is probably a cold-blooded animal.’ 
8.4.2 Previous semantic labels of -Iyor, -Xr and -DIr in terms of anchoring categories 
Most of the previous studies in the semantics of -Iyor, -Xr and -DIr have attempted to describe the 
semantic functioning of these makers in terms of the traditional categories aspect, tense, mood or 
modality. The following paragraphs summarize how these aspectual, temporal, and modal 
characterizations of -Iyor, -Xr, and -DIr are covered within the current semantic framework. 
-Iyor has variously been labeled as ‘progressive aspect’ (Underhill 1976/1987: 111-114; Yavaş 
1980: 125-133), ‘continuous aspect’ (Kornfilt 1997: 357-358), ‘present tense’ and ‘imperfective aspect’ 
(Aksu-Koç 1988: 18, 1994: 332, 1998: 268), or ‘focal intraterminal view’ (Johanson 1994: 254-255; 
Csató & Johanson 1998: 214). Such aspectotemporal values were analyzed in the present 
framework as expressing the temporal anchoring category SIMULTANEOUS. Uses of -Iyor which 
involve repeated occurrences have previously been associated with the ‘habitual aspect’ (Underhill 
1976/1987: 149; Aksu-Koç 1998: 260-261; Haspelmath 1998: 39; Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 
141). Such uses were taken here as signaling either RECURRENT or a combination of ATEMPORAL 
with epistemic contingency (CERTAIN or NEW INFORMATION). Yavaş (1980: 83-92, 1982a, and 
particularly 1982b) and Johanson (1994: 254-255) identify the use of -Iyor for future time reference 
in contexts where a present plan or schedule exists for the future event. Such uses of -Iyor were 
analyzed here as cumulatively expressing POSTERIOR and NEW INFORMATION. -Iyor has also been 
associated with the ‘perfect of persisting situation’ (Arslan 2001), which was rendered in the 
metalanguage of anchoring categories here as PERFECT/persisting/. 
-Xr, which has traditionally been labeled as the ‘aorist’ (or muzari in some Turkish sources), 
has most commonly been seen as a tense or aspect marker. In Turkish grammar books, it appears 
as the marker of geniş zaman ‘broad tense’. It has been also identified as ‘extended tense’ 
(Reichenbach 1947: 290-291), ‘timeless tense’ (Menges 1968: 128), ‘indefinite present’ (Aksu-Koç 
1988: 18), ‘present tense’ and ‘habitual aspect’ (Underhill 1976/1987: 147-149, Kornfilt 1997: 336, 
356), ‘generic-habitual aspect’ (Aksu-Koç 1995: 276, 1998: 272-273, Yavaş 1980: 96-100, 1982a: 41-44), 
the marker of ‘object-level predication’ (Yavaş 1980: 101-104, 1982a: 45-49), ‘non-focal intraterminal 
viewpoint operator’ (Johanson 1994: 254-255 ), and a marker which instantiates the cross-linguistic 
category type HABG (Dahl 1985: 157). Such uses of -Xr were analyzed here as signaling the 
temporal anchoring category ATEMPORAL (along with the epistemic category GENERAL FACT when 
the marker is used on its own). Some scholars have described -Xr as being more ‘modal’ than 
‘temporal’. Modal identifications of -Xr include ‘ability’ in (Lewis 1967/1978: 117; Savaşır 1986) 
‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ (Underhill 1976/1987: 148; Yavaş 1980: 105-109), and ‘dispositional 
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statements’ (Aksu-Koç 1995: 276). Such uses of -Xr were analyzed here as expressing a state of 
possibility or a state of willingness. The use of -Xr for future has often been taken as ‘modal’ and 
analyzed as involving ‘uncertainty’ (Yavaş 1980: 104-105, 110; 1982a: 49-51, 1982b; Johanson 1994: 
254-255), ‘possibility or necessity’ (Aksu-Koç 1995: 276-277) or as instantiating the cross-linguistic 
category type PRED (Dahl 1985: 157). Such future-oriented uses of -Xr were labeled here as 
‘predictive’, and analyzed as cumulatively signaling the temporal category POSTERIOR and the 
epistemic category PROBABLE. -Xr has also been identified in ‘requests’ (Lewis 1967/1978: 117), in 
‘polite imperatives’, ‘offers’ and ‘invitations’ (Underhill 1976/1987: 148, Yavaş 1980: 107-109), and 
in ‘promises’ (Lewis 1967/1978: 117, Kornfilt 1997: 340-341). All of these uses were schematically 
analyzed here as signaling the volitional category WANTED in the volitional domain (along with 
POSTERIOR and HYPOTHETICAL in the temporal and epistemic domains). 
-DIr has mostly been discussed in terms of ‘modal’ or ‘pragmatic’ values. These include 
‘supposition’ (Lewis 1967/1978: 140), ‘presumptive’ (‘Präsumtiv’) (Johanson 1994: 253), 
‘nonfactivity’ (Sansa 1986), ‘uncertainty’ (Kerslake 1988: 155-156), ‘possibility’, ‘nonfactivity’ and 
‘supposition’ (Aksu-Koç 1995), ‘inferred probability’ and ‘degree of certainty‘ (Kornfilt 1997: 81, 
376), ‘judgment’ (Ruhi, Zeyrek & Osam 1995; Aksu-Koç 1995). Such uses of -DIr were descriptively 
labeled here as involving ‘epistemic modality’ and analyzed as signaling the anchoring category 
PROBABLE. -DIr has also been described as conveying ‘definiteness’ and ‘general validity’ (Underhill 
1976/1987: 33), ‘factivity’ and ‘certainty’ (Sansa 1986), ‘general truth’ (Tosun 1988: 509), ‘permanent 
or long-term validity’ (Kerlake 1988: 155), ‘factuality’ (Aksu-Koç 1995), and ‘definitional truths’ 
(Kornfilt 1997: 376-377). Such uses of -DIr were linked here to the signaling of the anchoring 
category GENERAL FACT. Uses of -DIr which have been variously identified as ‘emphatic certainty’ 
or ‘definiteness and authority’ in formal and official style (Kornfilt 1997: 81, 376-377), and 
‘emphasis’, ‘definiteness’ or ‘strengthened assertions’ in formal or written language (Lewis 
1967/1978: 122, 139-140) were identified here as involving an impersonal illocutionary force and 
analyzed into the semantic category GENERAL STATEMENT. -DIr has also been associated with the 
‘generic aspect’ (with non-verbal predicates) in Sansa (1986) and Aksu-Koç (1995: 277). This 
aspectotemporal value was identified here with the signaling of ATEMPORAL. 
The analysis of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø presented in this chapter has shown that the traditional 
categories of tense, aspect, and mood cannot adequately characterize the overall semantic ranges of 
these markers, since each of them characteristically expresses semantic categories from three 
different (temporal, epistemic, and volitional) domains. For instance, -Iyor was always identified in 
temporal terms (mostly as a ‘progressive/continuous aspect’ marker and sometimes as a ‘present 
tense’). But the analysis here has shown that it is also strongly associated with the epistemic 
category NEW INFORMATION as well as the volitional category IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION (in addition 
to the temporal categories SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT and PERFECT/persisting/). Similarly, while 
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-DIr has mostly been characterized as a mood marker, it has been shown that it characteristically 
expresses the temporal category ATEMPORAL in addition to the epistemic categories PROBABLE and 
GENERAL FACT and the volitional category GENERAL FACT. 
The following sections voice some generalizations and observations on the basis of the 
decompositional analysis accomplished so far and compare the results with some previous 
treatments in the literature on Turkish TAM categories. A general comparison of the semantic 
framework of anchoring categories with frameworks which depend on the traditional categories of 
tense, aspect, mood (and their subcategories) will be mentioned in the Conclusions. 
8.4.3 The correspondence between -Xr and -DIr and that between -Iyor and -Ø 
-DIr and -Ø in non-verbal predication have been shown to express semantic ranges similar to those 
expressed by -Xr and -Iyor in verbal predication. This result endorses Sansa’s (1986) original 
observation as to the correspondence between -Xr and -DIr on the one hand, and that between -Iyor 
and -Ø on the other. But here, this observation was qualified and restricted in a number of ways. 
First, it was shown that some uses associated with -Xr and -Iyor in verbal predication have no 
counterpart with -DIr or -Ø in non-verbal predication (see section 8.4.1 above). Second, it was 
shown that -Ø can exceptionally appear instead of -DIr due to restrictions in morphosyntactic 
combinability (section 8.4.1). Third, -Ø was shown to function as the non-verbal counterpart of 
-mAktA when the enclitic -DIr is there (e.g., semantic values (8.208), (8.224), (8.226)). Fourth, while 
Sansa (1986: 145) tends to assume zero-marking in every occurrence of -DIr with non-verbal 
predicates, it is only posited here when it can be attributed semantic content due to a paradigmatic 
contrast.115 
8.4.4 -Xr and -DIr as epistemic modals 
Sections 8.2.1.3 and 8.2.4.3 have shown that the semantic ranges of -Xr and -DIr include epistemic 
modality (PROBABLE). Indeed, -Xr and -DIr can be replaced with -(y)Abilir and ol-abilir, respectively, 
                                                           
115 In the present analysis, -Ø is only posited when an anchoring category which would be expressed by 
-Iyor in a verbal sentence (e.g., SIMULTANEOUS or RECURRENT) is signaled in a non-verbal sentence, as in (i). In 
sentences like (ii), -Ø is assumed because it replaces -DIr due to morphosyntactic restrictions. However, in 
sentences like (iii), where ATEMPORAL can be attributed to -DIr alone, there will be no paradigmatic motivation 
for positing zero-marking: 
(i) Ahmet şimdi çok yorgun-Ø-dur. 
Ahmet now  very tired-Ø-JDGe 
‘Ahmet must be very tired now.’ 
(ii) Mustafa çok zeki bir insan-Ø-dı. 
Mustafa very clever a person-Ø-PASTe 
‘Mustafa was a very clever person.’  
(iii) Tavşan-lar otçul-dur. 
rabbit-PLU  herbivore-JDGe 
‘Rabbits are herbivores.’ 
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which are the most typical markers of epistemic possibility in Turkish. Examples are given in 
(8.266-8.268) below. -Xr is like -(y)Abilir in that it additionally expresses future (POSTERIOR), and 
-DIr is like ol-abilir in that it can also combine with bound markers with different temporal values. 
The pairs only differ in the degree of likelihood they express. As shown in sections 8.2.1.3 and 
8.2.4.3, -Xr and -DIr convey a relatively high degrees of likelihood (i.e., ‘epistemic necessity’, or 
PROBABLE/high/) when used without epistemic adverbs. But -(y)Abilir and ol--abilir always express 
relatively low degrees of likelihood, (i.e., ‘epistemic possibility’, or, PROBABLE/low/ or 
PROBABLE/medium/): 
(8.266) Ahmet bu  gece gel-ir / gel-ebilir. 
Ahmet this night come-Xr come-(y)Abilir 
‘Ahmet will probably / may (might) come tonight.’ 
(8.267) Neşe şimdi ev-de-Ø-dir  /  ev-de-Ø   ol-abilir. 
Neşe now house-LOC-Ø -DIR  house-LOC-Ø AUX-(y)Abilir 
‘Neşe should / may (might) be at home now.’  
(8.268) Konuk-lar gel-miş-tir /  gel-miş  ol-abilir. 
visitor-PLU come-EPAST-DIr come-EPAST AUX-(y)Abilir  
‘The visitors will probably / may (might) have arrived.’  
The markers ol-malı or ol-acak, which typically mark epistemic necessity in Turkish, can also be 
used in place of -DIr, to convey very similar (high) degrees of likelihood: 
(8.269) Konuklar gel-miş-tir  / ol-malı / ol-acak. 
vistor-PLU come-EPAST-DIr AUX-mAlI AUX-(y)AcAG 
‘The visitors should/must/will have arrived.’  
(8.270) Neşe şimdi çalış-ıyor-dur / ol-malı / ol-acak.  
Neşe now work-CONT-DIr  AUX-mAlI AUX-(y)AcAG 
‘Neşe should/must/will be working now.’ 
Ruhi, Zeyrek & Osam (1995: 108) and Aksu-Koç (1995: 282-285) identify -Xr and -DIr as 
‘judgment markers’, on the basis of the distinction proposed in Palmer (1986: 57-76) between 
‘judgments’ and ‘evidentials’. The present analysis supports this identification by making it clear 
that -Xr and -DIr are used in non-evidential contexts to express less-than-certain judgments of the 
speaker116 (see also the discussion in 8.4.6). 
                                                           
116 To say that -Xr and -DIr are ‘non-evidential’ is not to say that utterances in which they appear are not 
based on any kind of evidence. For instance, the prediction in (i) can be based on the speaker’s observations 
on prevailing weather conditions. Similarly, the judgment in (ii) can be arrived at using various pieces of 
information such as knowledge about Ahmet’s time of departure, the distance he was supposed to make, 
traffic conditions, etc. Such utterances with -Xr and -DIr are analyzed as ‘non-evidential’ because they do not 
specifically index pieces of immediate evidence: 
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The component of epistemic modality associated with -Xr and -DIr has sometimes been 
coupled with the idea of an ‘epistemic scale’. For instance, Sansa (1986: 145) states that -DIr 
“behaves like an ‘everywhere’ or ‘anywhere’ operator on the modality scale, shifting between 
CERTAIN and NONCERTAIN, where CERTAIN marks factive and NONCERTAIN nonfactive 
components of modality”. Similarly, Aksu-Koç (1995) associates -Xr and -DIr with a ‘scale of 
certainty’, locating their ‘factive’ uses at the top edge of the scale. One apparent shortage of these 
characterizations is that they fail to distinguish the sense of general validity or strong factuality 
(GENERAL FACT) (which is characteristically expressed by -Xr and -DIr) from that of contingent 
certainty based on personal knowledge (CERTAIN) (which obtains with markers other than -Xr or 
-DIr, e.g., with -Iyor, -DI and-(y)AcAG). 
8.4.5 Epistemic generality by -Xr/-DIr vs. epistemic contingency by -Iyor/-Ø 
One generalization which comes out of the analysis in this chapter is that while -Xr and -DIr are 
associated with epistemic generality (GENERAL FACT), -Iyor and -Ø are associated with epistemic 
contingency (CERTAIN and NEW INFORMATION). This contrast, which has already been illustrated 
with utterance pairs in which both -Xr and -Iyor convey PERFECT/persisting/ or ATEMPORAL 
(sections 8.2.2.3 and 8.2.2.4), is emphasized in the examples below. In (8.271), the speaker expresses 
her love for cats as a general, stable fact, hence it uses -Xr. But in (8.272), the expression duyduğuma 
göre ‘as I’ve heard’ signals weaker factuality and the sentence accordingly uses -Iyor. Similarly, in 
(8.273), bilmeyen yoktur ‘everyone knows’ indicates established, general validity, hence the situation 
is expressed by -Xr rather than -Iyor. But in (8.274), çok garip ‘very strange’ indicates a non-
established, contingent piece of information; hence -Iyor is better suited than -Xr:  
(8.271) Ben kedi-ler-i  çok sev-er-im. 
I  cat-PLU-ACC much like-Xr-A1SG. 
‘I like cats very much.’ 
(8.272) Duy-duğ-um-a     göre   Mustafa kedi-ler-i  çok sev-iyor. 
hear-FN-POSS.A1SG-DAT according Mustafa cat-PLU-ACC much like-Iyor 
‘As I’ve heard, Mustafa likes cats very much.’ 
(8.273) Bil-me-yen   yok-tur,   yıl-lar-dır  rakı iç-er-im /  ?iç-iyor-um. 
know-NEG-SREL  NEG.EXCP-JDGe year-PLU-SINCE raki dirnk-Xr-A1SG drink-Iyor-A1SG 
‘Everyone knows; I have been drinking raki for years.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(i) Bu  yıl  mahsül bol   ol-ur. 
this year crop  abundant be-Xr 
‘The crop will (probably) be abundant this year.’ 
(ii) Ahmet  gel-miş-tir. 
Ahmet  come-EPAST-DIr 
‘Ahmet must/should have come.’ 
 186
(8.274) Çok garip,  yıl-lar-dır  kar yağ-m-ıyor / ?kar yağ-ma-z. 
very strange year-PLU-SINCE snow-NEG-Iyor  snow-NEG.Xr 
‘It’s very strange; it has not snowed for years.’ 
A conditional protasis typically indicates a contingent relation to the immediate knowledge 
state, rather than a fact with general validity. Therefore, in (8.275) and (8.276) below, -Iyor and -Ø 
appear instead of -Xr or -DIr in the protases, even though the conditions concern temporally 
unrestricted (ATEMPORAL) SoAs. Similarly, although normally -Xr and -DIr appear in proverbs (see 
section 8.2.1.1), a speaker can emphasize the immediate epistemic relevance of her message by 
using -Iyor or -Ø (8.277 and 8.278): 
(8.275) Yüz-me-yi  bil-m-iyor-sa-nız  /   #bil-mez-se-niz     bura-da 
 kal-ın. 
swim-INF-ACC know-NEG-Iyor-CONDe-A2PL  know-NEG.Xr-CONDe-A2PL here-LOC 
 stay-IMP.A2PL 
‘If you can’t swim, stay here.’ 
(8.276) Ahmet ciddi  bir  insan-Ø-sa /  *insan-dır-sa  gel-ir. 
Ahmet serious a  person-Ø-CONDe person-DIr-CONDe come-HABG 
‘If Ahmet is a serious person, he will come.’ 
(8.277) Her koyun kendi  bacağ-ı-ndan as-ıl-ır  / as-ıl-ıyor. 
each sheep  self  leg-POSS-ABL  hang-PASS-Xr hang-PASS-Iyor 
‘Every man for himself.’ (Lit: ‘Each sheep is hung on its own leg.’) 
(8.278) Aşk-ın göz-ü  kör-dür / kör-Ø. 
love-GEN eye-POSS blind-DIr blind-Ø  
‘Love is blind.’ 
The ‘epistemic generality vs. epistemic contingency’ contrast between -Xr/-DIr vs. -Iyor/-Ø was 
pointed out only on a few occasions in the previous literature, and it has never been identified as 
explicitly as here. The following comment Lewis (1967/1978: 117) draws attention to the sense of 
‘immediacy’ associated with -Iyor: “For ‘I love you’, the Turk says seni seviyorum; if he said seni 
severim that would sound far too vague and without immediacy, corresponding rather to ‘I like 
you’ “. Kerslake (1988) points to a similar contrast in her example replicated in (8.279) below. -DIr 
“implies that the speaker knows about the scent of this species of flower from previous experience, 
or as an item of common knowledge, and that he is making a generic statement on that basis”, and 
zero-marking will be chosen “for conveying that the speaker is receiving the scent of the flower in 
front of him as he speaks” (Kerslake 1988: 156-157): 
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(8.279) Bu  çiçeğ-in  koku-su  güzel-dir / güzel-Ø. 
this flower-GEN scent-POSS nice-DIr  nice-Ø 
‘This flower has a lovely scent.’ 
 (Kerslake 1988: 156) 
8.4.6 -Iyor and -Ø as evidentials 
In the previous literature, evidentiality has only been associated with -mIş/-(y)mIş in Turkish (e.g., 
Lewis 1967: 101, 122; Yavaş 1980: 41-50, 55-65; Slobin & Aksu 1982; Aksu-Koç 1986, 1988, 1995, 
1998; Meydan 1996, Taylan 2000; Johanson 2000b, 2003). The analysis presented here has shown 
that -Iyor and -Ø also have evidential uses, in utterances which signal a newly emerged piece of 
evidence which is not (yet) well-integrated to the current knowledge state (i.e., NEW INFORMATION). 
While the inferential uses of -mIş and -(y)mIş (those which express INFERRED) indicate a process of 
reasoning which leads to a conclusion, the evidential uses of -Iyor and -Ø index the immediate 
piece of evidence itself, with or without a component of surprise or ‘mirativity’. 
The examples below show that while -Iyor and -Ø can indicate surprise, -Xr and -DIr cannot, 
due to the non-evidential nature of the latter pair: 
(8.280) Aa! / vay be! / yaşasın! 
oh   wow   yipee 
 (a) … Ahmet gel-iyor!  / #gel-iyor-dur! / #gel-ir! 
  Ahmet come-Iyor come-Iyor-DIr  come-Xr 
  ‘Ahmet is coming!’ / ‘Ahmet must be coming!’ / ‘Ahmet will come!’ 
 (b) … Ahmet bura-da-Ø!  / #bura-da-Ø-dır!  
  Ahmet here-LOC-Ø  here-LOC-Ø-DIr 
  ‘Ahmet is here!’ / ‘Ahmet must be here!’ 
 (c) … Akşam-a   Murat-lar gel-iyor! / # gel-ir!  
  evening-DAT Murat-PLU come-Iyor come-Xr 
  ‘Murat and his family are coming / will come this evening!’ 
Similarly, while -Iyor and -Ø (as well as -(y)AcAG, -DI, and -mIş) are possible in the existence 
of adverbs which indicate an evidential dependence, -Xr and -DIr are incongruous, even when 
surprise is not involved: 
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(8.281) Demek ki / Anlaşılan / Galiba 
thus    evidently  apparently 
 (a) … Ahmet gel-iyor / #gel-iyor-dur. 
  Ahmet come-Iyor come-CONT-DIr 
  ‘Ahmet is coming.’ / ‘Ahmet must be coming.’ 
 (b) … ekolojik  denge  hızla  bozul-uyor /  # bozul-makta-dır. 
  ecological balance rapidly deteriorate-Iyor deteriorate-PROG-DIr 
  ‘The ecological balance is being destroyed rapidly.’ 
 (c) … Ahmet bura-da-Ø / #bura-da-Ø-dır. 
  Ahmet here-LOC-Ø  here-LOC-Ø-DIr 
  ‘Ahmet is here.’ / ‘Ahmet must be here.’  
 (d) … bu  yıl  mahsül bol   ol-acak /  #ol-ur. 
  this year crop  abundant be-(y)AcAG  be-Xr 
  ‘The crop will (certainly) be /  will probably be abundant this year.’  
 (e) … Ahmet gel-di  / gel-miş / #gel-miş-tir. 
  Ahmet come-DI  come-mIş come-EPAST-DIr 
  ‘Ahmet has come.’ / ‘It turns out that Ahmet has come.’ / ‘Ahmet must have come.’ 
When such an evidential connection is indicated, -Iyor and -Ø will replace -Xr and -DIr even 
when the expressed SoA is temporally unrestricted (ATEMPORAL):  
(8.282) Demek ki / Anlaşılan / Galiba 
thus    evidently  apparently 
 (a) … Ahmet dondurma-ya #bayıl-ır / bayıl-ıyor. 
  Ahmet ice.cream-DAT adore-Xr  adore-Iyor 
  ‘Ahmet adores ice cream.’ 
 (b) … Neşe alıngan bir  #insan-dır / insan-Ø. 
  Neşe touchy a  person-DIr  person-Ø 
  ‘Neşe is a touchy person.’ 
8.4.7 Yavaş’s distinction between ‘stage-level’ vs. ‘object-level’ predication 
Yavaş (1980, 1982a,b) maintains that -Xr and -Iyor express, respectively, what Carlson (1977) 
identifies as ‘stage-level’ and ‘object-level’ (or ‘individual-level’) predication: While -Iyor expresses 
temporal stages of objects, -Xr says something about objects themselves by expressing what is 
“typical, normal, or even inherent to an entity or to a situation” (Yavaş 1982a: 45). For instance, the 
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utterance with -Xr in (8.283) praises the butcher for his characteristic or typical behavior, but its 
counterpart with -Iyor in (8.284) simply reports occurrences of selling good meat:  
(8.283) Ben-im  kasab-ım    iyi  et  sat-ar. 
P1SG-GEN  butcher-POSS-A1SG good meat sell-Xr 
‘My butcher sells good meat.’ 
 (Yavaş 1980: 101, 1982a: 47) 
(8.284) Ben-im  kasab-ım    iyi  et  sat-ıyor. 
P1SG-GEN  butcher-POSS-A1SG good meat sell-Iyor 
‘My butcher is selling good meat.’ 
 (Yavaş 1980: 101, 1982a: 47) 
The analysis presented here subsumed the uses of -Xr which denote an inherent, 
characteristic, or typical property or behavior under the more general case of ‘temporal 
unrestrictedness’ (expressed by ATEMPORAL; see section 8.2.1.1). Although temporal 
unrestrictedness often implies a typical property or behavior, this is not always true. For instance, 
Yavaş’s (1982a: 41) own example replicated in (8.285) below cannot sensibly be elucidated by 
saying that ‘four’ is a characteristic or typical property or behavior of ‘two times two’. Similarly, in 
(8.286), it is difficult to conceive ‘being rarely seen in the locality’ as an inherent, typical, or 
characteristic property or behavior of turtles. For both sentences, it makes perfect sense to say that 
the predications are not associated with any specific temporal location or temporal range: 
(8.285) Đki  kere iki  dört ed-er. 
two times two four make-Xr 
‘Two times two makes four.’ 
 (Yavaş1982a: 41) 
(8.286) Kaplumbağa bu  yöre-de  ender  gör-ül-ür. 
turtle    this locality-LOC  rarely  see-PASS-Xr 
‘Turtles are rarely seen in this locality.’ 
Yavaş’s characterization also falls short in accounting for why both -Xr and -Iyor can be used 
to denote a characteristic property or behavior of a kind or entity. Some such pairs already 
appeared in sections 8.2.3 and 8.2.4. Two of them are replicated in (8.287) and (8.288) below. The 
difference between -Xr and -Iyor in such examples cannot be understood well unless epistemic 
categories are distinguished in addition to temporal ones. To repeat, -Xr signals here general 
validity (GENERAL FACT), while -Iyor signals either well-assimilated personal certainty (CERTAIN) or 
newly apprehended information (NEW INFORMATION): 
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(8.287) Ay  döngü-sü-nü 28 gün-de tamaml-ar. / tamaml-ıyor. 
moon cycle-POSS-ACC 28 day-LOC complete-Xr  complete-Iyor 
‘The moon completes its cycle in 28 days.’ 
(8.288) Kertenkele-ler karanlık-ta  gör-ür. / gör-üyor! 
lizard-PLU  darkness-LOC see-Xr see-Iyor 
‘Lizards see in the dark(./!)’ 
Another shortage of Yavaş’s characterization of -Iyor as a marker of stage-level predication is 
that it does not distinguish an occurrence at the reference time (SIMULTANEOUS) (8.289) from 
repeated occurrences around the reference time (RECURRENT) (8.290): 
(8.289) Hatice (şimdi / şu  an-da)   uyu-yor. (Replicated from section 8.2.2.1) 
Hatice now  this moment-LOC sleep-Iyor 
‘Hatice is sleeping (now / at the moment).’ 
(8.290) Şimdi-ler-de  (sık sık) balığa çık-ıyor-um. (Replicated from section 8.2.2.2) 
now-PLU-LOC often  fish-Iyor-A1SG 
‘I am going fishing quite often these days.’ 
8.4.8 Accounting for the differences between futures with -(y)AcAG, -Xr, and -Iyor 
Yavaş (1980, 1982a, and particularly 1982b) discusses the differences between futures made with 
-(y)AcAG, -Xr and -Iyor. According to her, -Xr expresses a lower degree of certainty compared to 
both -Iyor and -(y)AcAG. She also maintains that -Iyor denotes a higher degree of certainty 
compared to -(y)AcAG. The analysis presented here supports Yavaş’s observation that -Xr conveys 
the least degree of certainty among the three options: Futures with -Xr were shown to be associated 
with epistemic modality (see section 8.2.1.3). But Yavaş’s contention that futures with -Iyor express 
the highest degree of certainty is suspicious. For instance, in the following pair, -Iyor and -(y)AcAG 
do not exhibit any difference as to the speaker’s confidence as to the truth of Ahmet’s departure to 
Istanbul: 
(8.291) Ahmet yarın   Đstanbul-’a  gid-iyor / gid-ecek. 
Ahmet tomorrow Istanbul-DAT  go-Iyor  go-(y)AcAG 
‘Ahmet is going to Istanbul tomorrow / will go to Istanbul tomorrow.’ 
Yavaş also maintains that futures with -Iyor are only used in the existence of a present 
decision, plan, arrangement or schedule for the carrying out a future event.117 Although this 
condition seems to hold in most instances of -Iyor futures, it appears to be too specific for a general 
                                                           
117 Johanson (1994: 255) proposes a similar account when he states that futures with -Iyor involve 
‘Planmässigkeit’. 
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characterization. As illustrated in the examples below, -Iyor can also be found in future utterances 
when such a prearrangement is absent: 
(8.292) Pazar  gün-ü  hava  aç-ıyor / güneş-li-Ø. (e.g., on the basis of weather reports) 
Sunday day-POSS weather open-Iyor sun-ASC-Ø 
‘On Sunday clouds will dissipate/it will be sunny.’ 
(8.293) (Anket-ler-e  göre)   seçim-i   biz kazan-ıyor-uz. 
poll-PLU-DAT according election-ACC  we  win-Iyor-A1PL 
‘(According to the polls) we are going to win the election.’ 
(8.294) Acele-ye  gerek yok.  Nasıl ol-sa  geç kal-ıyor-uz. 
hurry-DAT need NEG.EXCP how be-COND late stay-Iyor-A1PL 
‘There’s no point in hurrying up. We will be late anyhow.’ 
The epistemic distinctions in the semantic space of anchoring categories enable a neat account 
of the differences among futures rendered by -(y)AcAG, -Xr and -Iyor. ‘Definite futures’ with 
-(y)AcAG (8.295) associate a future occurrence with well-assimilated, personal certainty (CERTAIN). 
‘Indefinite futures’ with -Xr (8.296) express a less-than-certain estimation of the speaker 
(PROBABLE). And futures with -Iyor (8.297) emphasize the ‘news’ value or the immediate 
significance of the conveyed piece of information (NEW INFORMATION). This immediate epistemic 
significance typically obtains when a present schedule, plan, or program exists for a future event, 
but such premeditation is not strictly necessary. 
(8.295) Toplantı saat sekiz-de  başla-yacak. 
Meeting hour eight-LOC start-(y)AcAG 
‘The meeting will (certainly) start at eight.’ 
(8.296) Toplantı saat sekiz-de  başl-ar. 
Meeting hour eight-LOC start-Xr 
‘The meeting will (probably) start at eight.’ 
(8.297) Toplantı saat sekiz-de  başl-ıyor. 
Meeting hour eight-LOC start-Iyor 
‘The meeting starts at eight.’ 
8.4.9 The partitioning of imperfectivity by -Xr, -Iyor, and -mAktA 
The aspectotemporal framework developed by Johanson (1971, 1994, 1996, 2000a, 2001) introduces 
three main categories of ‘aspectual terminality’, which stand for different ways of conceiving an 
event in relation to an ‘orientation point’ (reference time): ‘Intraterminality’ (‘Intraterminalität’) 
envisages an event within its temporal boundaries, ‘postterminality’ (‘Postterminalität’), after its 
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end boundary, and ‘adterminality’ (‘Adterminalität’), in the attainment of its relevant boundary.118 
Each of these terminality values are further subcategorized as to their ‘focality’ (‘Prägnanz’), which 
stands for the degree of actional concentration around the orientation point. Johanson (2000a) 
distinguishes three focality values: non-focality (NF), relatively low focality (LF), and relatively 
high focality (HF). Johanson identifies -Xr is a non-focal intraterminal (+INTRANF), and -Iyor and 
-mAktA as focal intraterminal operators, -mAktA being more focal (+INTRAHF) than -Iyor (+INTRALF). 
Johanson’s designation of -Xr as a non-focal and of -Iyor as a focal intraterminal viewpoint 
operator captures the fact that -Iyor, but not -Xr, can express events for which the actional 
concentration is around the reference time. However, it falls short in explaining how -Iyor can 
replace -Xr in conveying the same temporal value, as illustrated in the pairs below (the first one 
replicated from section 8.2.2.4). In these examples, both -Xr and -Iyor convey temporal 
unrestrictedness (which amounts to ATEMPORAL in the present framework and non-focal 
intraterminality in Johanson’s system). Here, their difference was shown to be epistemic in nature: 
-Iyor presents a proposition as a matter of personal certainty (CERTAIN) or new discovery (NEW 
INFORMATION), while -Xr presents it as a strongly factual piece of information (GENERAL FACT): 
(8.298) Ay  döngü-sü-nü 28 gün-de tamaml-ar / tamaml-ıyor. 
moon cycle-POSS-ACC 28 day-LOC complete-Xr  complete-Iyor 
‘The moon completes its cycle 28 days.’ 
(8.299) Ahmet kahve-den nefret ed-er / nefret ed-iyor. 
Ahmet coffee-ABL hate-Xr   hate-Iyor 
‘Ahmet hates coffee.’ 
Johanson’s identification of -mAktA as more focal than -Iyor can be challenged by examples 
where -mAktA (with or without -DIr) expresses relatively extended SoAs, as in (8.300) below 
(replicated from sections 8.1.4 and 8.301). -mAktA can even express repeated occurrences around 
the orientation point (RECURRENT) (8.302; replicated from section 8.2.4.1), or convey that a SoA has 
been obtaining for a long time (PERFECT/persisting/) (8.303; replicated from section 8.2.4.2). As 
these examples make it clear, -mAktA does not consistently denote a narrower actional 
concentration around the reference time compared to -Iyor: 
(8.300) Orman Bakanlığ-ı-nda  müsteşarlık  görevi-m-i    sürdür-mekte-yim. 
forest  ministry-POSS-LOC undersecretary duty-POSS.A1SG-ACC continue-mAktA-A1SG 
‘I am continuing to work as an undersecretary in the Ministry of Forestry.’ 
                                                           
118 Compared to Comrie’s (1976) terminology, the intraterminal view is similar to the imperfective aspect, 
the postterminal view to the perfect aspect, and the adterminal view to the perfective aspect, although these 
correspondences are not exact (see Johanson 2000a: 177-178). 
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(8.301) Mogan gölü Ankara sınır-lar-ı    iç-i-nde    yer al-makta-dır. 
Mogan lake Ankara border-PLU-ACC  inside-POSS-LOC  place take-mAktA-DIr 
‘The lake Mogan is located within the borders of Ankara.’ 
(8.302) Bölge-de  çok sık   deprem  etkinliğ-i   kayded-il-mekte-dir. 
region-LOC very frequent earthquake activity-POSS record-PASS-mAktA-DIr 
‘Very frequent earthquake activities are being recorded in the region.’ 
(8.303) Şirket  15 yıl-dır  bilişim  sektör-ü-nde  faaliyet göster-mekte-dir 
company 15 year-SINCE informatics sector-POSS-LOC  function-mAktA-DIr 
‘The company has been active in the informatics sector for 15 years.’ 
Unlike Johanson’s framework, which mainly draws on aspectotemporal features alone, the 
framework of anchoring categories developed here recruits epistemic and volitional dimensions in 
addition to temporal ones. As such, it allows a more accurate characterization of the semantic 
functioning of -mAktA and of its contrast with -Iyor: The only condition which allows -Iyor but 
disallows -mAktA is epistemic immediacy (NEW INFORMATION). -mAktA can express SIMULTANEOUS 
and RECURRENT when the speaker signals GENERAL FACT by using -DIr (section 8.2.4.1). -mAktA is 
also acceptable on its own when well-assimilated personal certainty (CERTAIN) is at stake, as in 
(8.304 and 8.305) below. But unlike -Iyor, it cannot index newly emerged evidence, for instance, in 
expressing the speaker’s surprise (8.306 and 8.307). These observations suggest that -mAktA is best 
characterized as a ‘non-evidential imperfective marker’. Its incompatibility with scheduled futures 
(8.308) and with explicit performatives (8.309) (both of which have been analyzed as conveying 
NEW INFORMATION) confirms this characterization: 
(8.304) ? Ahmet şu  an-da    çalış-makta. 
 Ahmet this moment-LOC work-mAktA 
 ‘Ahmet is working at the moment.’ 
(8.305) ? Ahmet sık sık  uğra-makta. 
 Ahmet often  drop.by-mAktA 
 ‘Ahmet occasionally drops by.’ 
(8.306) # Aa! Ahmet uyu-makta! 
 oh  Ahmet sleep-mAktA 
 ‘Oh! Ahmet is sleeping!’ 
(8.307) # Kaç-ın!     Aslan gel-mekte! 
 run.away .IMP.A2SG  lion come-mAktA 
 ‘Run away! A lion is coming!’ 
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(8.308) # Tren saat üç-te   kalk-makta. 
 train hour three-LOC leave-mAktA 
 ‘The train leaves at three o’clock.’ 
(8.309) # Siz-i  karı koca  ilan et-mekte-yim. 
 P2SG-ACC wife husband declare-mAktA-A1SG 
 ‘I declare you husband and wife.’ 
8.4.10 Assigning semantic content to what has been taken as pragmatic extensions 
Some of the uses of -Xr, -Iyor and -DIr identified in the present treatment have previously been 
taken as ‘pragmatic extensions’ to some prototypical or general meaning or use. For instance, 
Yavaş (1980: 105-110) takes the element of ‘volition’, which is present in the uses of -Xr in promises, 
requests, and polite imperatives, as a conversational implicature (8.310). Similarly, Johanson (1994: 
255) takes the use of -Xr for future reference as in (8.311) as an implication of the non-focal 
aspectotemporal value of the marker. As another example, Aksu-Koç (1995: 279-280) links the 
sense of factuality conveyed by -DIr in utterances like (8.312) to a pragmatic inference licensed by 
the assumption of the ‘authority’, ‘reliability’, or ‘credibility’ of the illocutionary source: 
(8.310) San-a  borç para  ver-ir-im. 
2SG-DAT loan money give-Xr-A1SG  
‘I’ll give you money.’ 
 (Yavaş 1980: 105)  
(8.311) Ali  saat iki-de  gel-ir. 
Ali hour two-LOC come-Xr 
‘Ali will come at two o’clock.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Johanson 1994: 255)  
(8.312) Emlak Banka-sı  ev-ler-i   satış-a çık-mış-tır. 
Emlak Bank-POSS house-PLU-ACC go on sale-EPAST-DIr 
‘Emlak Bank apartments have been put up for sale.’(Translation mine) 
 (Aksu-Koç 1995: 279) 
Here, the above illustrated uses were descriptively identified as involving ‘deictic willingness’ 
(8.310), ‘predictive future’ (8.311), and ‘strong illocutionary force’ (8.312). These were all taken as 
conventional uses of -Xr and -DIr (rather than ultimately context-dependent implications) and 
matched with distinctive semantic categories (WANTED, POSTERIOR + PROBABLE, and GENERAL 
STATEMENT, respectively). 
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-Iyor, -Xr and -DIr have also been noted to have distinctive functions in narratives in the 
previous literature. For instance, Taylan (1987) detects -Iyor as the predominant tense in her 
subjects’ narrations of a short film they have just been shown. Zeyrek (1994) shows that a switch 
from -mIş to -Iyor is observed in segments of folk tales where “actions/events crucial to the 
development of the plot-line are recounted”. Johanson (1994: 254) identifies the use of -Iyor for 
‘historical present’ (‘historisches Präsens’). -Xr and -DIr have also been identified in narrative-
related uses, e.g., in ‘stage directions’ (Lewis 1967/1978, Johanson 1971: 81) and in ‘adult fictions 
and plays’ (Aksu-Koç-1995: 280). Such uses of these markers have mostly been taken as pragmatic 
extensions to their ‘basic’ aspectual values. For instance, Johanson (1994: 254) accounts for the 
‘historical present’ use of -Iyor by the possibility of using the marker relative to a past reference 
time. Similarly, Aksu-Koç (1995: 280) explains the use of -Xr and -DIr in ‘adult fictions and plays’ 
with reference to ‘non-factivity’, which she eventually links to the ‘habitual/generic’ aspectual 
value of these markers. Although the uses of -Iyor, -Ø, -Xr and -DIr in narratives were not included 
in the main analysis above, the proposed semantic framework paves the way for treating them as 
conventional semantic functions which involve different types of volitional displacements.119  
8.4.11 Is -DIr a third person copular marker? 
-DIr has sometimes been identified as a third person copular marker in formal registers and 
written language (Lewis 1967/1978: 97, 139-140, Johanson 1994: 253, Csató & Johanson 1998: 212; 
Kornfilt 1997: 81-82). But the analysis presented here supports Sansa’s (1986) observation that -DIr 
is “not an innocent third person marker”. It is true that -DIr is more frequently found formal-
official registers and with 3rd persons than with 1st or 2nd persons. But this must be because (i) -DIr 
is favored in the official language due to the strong illocutionary force it generates (by signaling 
GENERAL STATEMENT), and (ii) the official language almost exclusively uses 3rd persons rather than 
the deictically immediate 1st and the 2nd persons. But strongly factual expressions with -DIr (those 
which signal GENERAL FACT) are not too infrequent the 1st and the 2nd persons, as illustrated below 
(the first two examples are from Sansa 1986): 
(8.313) Genel  olarak dikkatli bir  şoför-sün-dür  de. 
general as   careful a  driver-A2SG-DIr CONJ 
‘And in general you are a careful driver.’ 
 (Sansa 1986: 145)  
                                                           
119 The use of -Iyor and -Ø in narratives can be linked to the element of deictic immediacy associated with 
these markers. Similarly, the use of -Xr and -DIr in stage directions may be related to the fact that these 
markers express generality in all the three domains of anchoring, since stage directions are not restricted to 
any specific instance of a play. 
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(8.314) Ev-i-ne    bağlı koca-lar-ın   tipik  bir  örneğ-i-yim-dir    ben. 
house-POSS-DAT  loyal husband-PLU-GEN typical a  example-POSS-A1SG-DIr P1SG 
‘I am a typical example of husbands devoted to their home.’ 
 (Sansa 1986: 145) 
(8.315) (Herkes  bil-ir   ki)  bu  iş-te  usta-yım-dır  / usta-yız-dır. 
everyone  know-HABG that this job-LOC master-A1SG-DIr master-A1PL-DIr 
‘(Everyone knows that) I am / we are skilled in this job.’ 
(8.316) Zaten  sen ilginç   bir  adam-sın-dır. 
anyhow P2SG interesting a  man-A2SG-DIr 
‘You are an interesting person anyhow (this is an established fact).’ 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter identified the conventional uses of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø, either as they appear as the 
sole TAM marker on a predicate or in combination with other TAM markers. Each of the identified 
uses was matched with one semantic category in each domain of anchoring. The analysis revealed 
that -Xr and -DIr typically express categories of generality (ATEMPORAL, GENERAL FACT and 
GENERAL STATEMENT) and epistemic modality (PROBABLE), while -Iyor and -Ø express categories of 
immediacy (SIMULTANEOUS, NEW INFORMATION and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION) as well as repeated 
occurences (RECURRENT). These associations were depicted in the form of semantic maps. The 
results were then expanded on with comparisons to previous semantic analyses of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor 
and -Ø. 
Whatever synchronic relatedness may exist among the conventional uses -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and 
-Ø, their present day semantic ranges can only be explained with reference to the successive 
changes in the form-meaning mappings in their history. The next chapter provides hypotheses 
about such diachronic phases of change and attempts to identify the factors that may have 
motivated each individual change. 
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Chapter 9  
Explaining the ranges of polysemy 
Chapter 8 has identified the semantic ranges conventionally associated with each of the Turkish 
TAM markers -Xr, -Iyor, -DIr and -Ø, and analyzed each identified use into its semantic building 
blocks (anchoring categories). This chapter investigates how the current ranges of polysemy of -Xr, 
-Iyor, -DIr and -Ø may have been formed. It proposes tentative explanations for successive stages of 
semantic change in their history, on the basis of diachronic data which primarily come from Erdal 
(2004), from the contributions in Johanson & Csató (1998), and from Adamović (1985).  
The transcriptions of Old Turkic and Ottoman Turkish examples given in this chapter use the 
same notations as in the original sources, without providing interlineal glosses. Abbreviations for 
original text references are also given the way they appear in the source documents. Grammatical 
markers, in both their present day and earlier forms, are referred to using abstract phonemic 
representations, in conformity with the conventions given in the Abbreviations. 
9.1 The Turkic family and the history of Turkish 
Turkish makes part of the Western group of the Oghuz branch in the Turkic family, of which other 
members include Gagauz and Azerbaijani. In Johanson’s (1998b) panchronic classification, Oghuz 
Turkic (the southwestern), Kipchak Turkic (the northwestern), Uyghur Turkic (the southeastern) 
and Siberian Turkic (the northeastern) are taken as constituting ‘Common Turkic’. Oghur (Bulghar) 
Turkic (represented by Chuvash) and Arghu Turkic (represented by Khalaj) are early deviations 
from Common Turkic.  
The diachronic account given in this chapter roughly distinguishes three phases in the history 
of Turkish: (1) Old Turkic, (2) Ottoman Turkish, and (3) Modern Standard Turkish. The term Old 
Turkic is commonly applied to the language which underlies three groups of corpora dating from 
the 7th or 8th century to the beginning of Mongol rule in 13th century (von Gabain 1941, Johanson 
1998b, Erdal 1998, 2004). These corpora include (i) runiform scripts discovered in the Orkhon 
valley in present day Mongolia, in the upper Yenisey basin and in central South Siberia (this 
collection of texts is taken by Johanson (1998b) as representing ‘East Old Turkic proper’) (ii) Old 
Uyghur runiform scripts and manuscripts, dating from the 9th to the 13th centuries, which mostly 
include religious (predominantly Buddhist) and administrative texts. (iii) two books written in 
Arabic script in the 11th century in the Karakhanid state: Qutadgu Bilig ‘Wisdom that brings good 
fortune’, which is a 6500-couplet poem by Yūsuf Khāss Hājib of Balasagun, and Dīvānu luāāti ‘t-
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Turk ‘Compendium of the Turkic Dialects’, which is Mahmūd of Kāšāar’s didactic description of 
Turkic dialects.120 
Around the end of 13th century, the Seldjuk dominance in Anatolia was replaced by a number 
of small principalities, which began to use varieties of West Oghuz Turkish as their administrative 
language. One of them, Ottoman Turkish, dates back to the foundation of the Ottoman principality 
in about 1300 (Kerslake 1998: 179). The early stage of Ottoman Turkish (between early 14th to the 
late 15th century), together with concomitant varieties of Oghuz Turkic in Anatolia, is often 
designated as ‘Old Anatolian Turkish’. After the late 15th century, Ottoman Turkish was heavily 
influenced by Persian and Arabic in its various registers, borrowing from these languages several 
lexical elements as well as certain grammatical constructions.  
“Modern Standard Turkish” denotes the official language of the Republic of Turkey from its 
foundation in 1928 to the present day. Based on the Istanbul dialect of Ottoman Turkish, it has 
evinced a gradual diminution of Arabic and Persian influence, some neologisms from Turkish 
proper, and new loanwords (mostly form the technological sphere) from French and more recently, 
from English.  
9.2 A brief history of -Xr, -Iyor, and -DIr 
-Xr is the oldest TAM marker of Turkish. Erdal (2004: 240-241) identifies its alternate forms in Old 
Turkic as -r, -Ar, -Xr, -Ur, and -yUr. Johanson (1998b: 116) represents the form as -(y)Vr in Old 
Turkic and conjectures that it descends from the combination of the old converbial suffix -(y)V and 
the old copular verb är ‘be’. 
-Iyor is a relatively late introduction to the Turkish TAM system. It descends from the 
combination of the converb -(y)X with yür-Xr, which is the inflection of the Ottoman Turkish 
auxiliary verb yüri ‘walk’ in (yürü in Modern Standard Turkish) with -Xr (Lewis 1967/1978: 108, 
Kerslake 1998: 193). This auxiliary existed in Old Turkic in the form of yorı and emphasized the 
temporal type ‘durativity’ with dynamic events, as illustrated by Erdal’s (2004) example in (9.1). In 
the late 14th and 15th century Old Anatolian Turkish, especially in the spoken language, it is found 
                                                           
120 Johanson (1998b: 85) states that the Old Uyghur texts “reflect a language that is basically similar to East 
Old Turkic”, and that the Karakhanid language is “close to Old Uyghur, though its vocabulary is influenced 
by Arabic and Persian”. Similarly, Erdal (2004: 10) reports that the grammar of the three corpora are close 
enough to justify a single grammatical description, and further takes Old Turkic as “a specific language once 
spoken in central regions of Asia […] rather than an abstract stage in the history of Turkic”. It has been 
pointed out that Old Turkic is particularly similar to the Oghuz branch of the Turkic family (e.g., Doerfer 
1976: 83), of which Ottoman Turkish and Modern Standard Turkish are members. While Johanson (1998b: 85) 
suggests that Orkhon scripts “may be taken to represent a Common Turkic that has not yet split into Oghuz, 
Kipchak and Uyghur”, Erdal (2004: 10-11) abstains from taking Old Turkic as the direct ancestor of Common 
Turkic, since it manifests certain phonological and morphological changes which are not observed in some 
languages within Common Turkic. Still, he acknowledges that “the ancestor of Common Turkic (as a 
theoretical construction) was, in any case, probably quite similar to Old Turkic in many respects”. 
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in the form of -(y)X-yUrUr, as illustrated in Adamovič’s (1985) example in (9.2). The further 
shortened form -IyUr is attested in the late 15th century (Kerslake 1998: 193, Adamovič 1985: 118), 
as illustrated in (9.3). Both -(y)X-yUrUr and -IyUr expressed ongoingness with both dynamic and 
static predicates (i.e., they expressed the anchoring category SIMULTANEOUS). -IyUr eventually 
evolved into its present shape -Iyor, and recently extended its semantic range to the expression of 
contingently repeated events (RECURRENT) in addition to SIMULTANEOUS (see section 8.2.2.2). 
(9.1) Kamag on bölök šastr yaratdï; amtï barča kenürü yorïyur. 
‘He composed a sastra of all in all ten chapters; at present he is busy elaborating on it all’.  
 (Erdal 2004: 252; Ht V I b 5) 
(9.2) geliyürür / yatayurur / bašlayïyurur. 
 ‘He is coming / is lying down / is beginning.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Adamovič 1985: 117)  
(9.3) Kāfir čerisi geliyür. 
‘Es kommt das Heer fer Ungläubigen.’ 
‘The army of the infidels is coming.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Adamovič 1985: 118; DANÏŠMEND 203) 
-DIr descends from -(y)X tur-ur, which incorporates the old converbial suffix -(y)X and the 
inflection of the old auxiliary tur ‘stay, stand’ (present day dur) with -Xr (Lewis 1967/1978: 96, 
Kerslake 1998: 191-192). Erdal’s (2004) examples in (9.4) and (9.5) illustrate the use of this 
combination for the temporal type persistent durativity (with or without iteration) in Old Turkic. 
The combination -(y)Ip tur-ur (along with -mIş tur-ur) expressed present results of completed 
events (i.e., a ‘state of result’) (Erdal 2004: 250-251, 255), as in (9.6). In the 14th century Ottoman 
Turkic, -(y)X tur-ur appears as -DUrUr or -DUr, and -(y)Ip tur-ur as -(y)UB-DUrUr or -(y)UBDUr 
(Kerslake 1998: 192-193). In the 14th century example given in (9.7) (replicated from Kerslake 1998), 
-(y)UBDUr expresses PERFECT/result/, while -DUr (attached to the non-verbal predicate ne ‘what’) 
expresses a state obtaining at the temporal center (SIMULTANEOUS): 
(9.4) Azkya öŋrä yorïyu turzunlar; män una basa yetdim. 
‘Please walk on a bit; I will have reached you in a moment!’  
 (Erdal 2004: 251; Suv 615, 14) 
(9.5) Kut kolu alkïš pašik ayu turur sizlär. 
‘You keep praying for grace and intoning blessing and hymns.’ 
 (Erdal 2004: 250; ManBeicht 6) 
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(9.6) Täŋri kïrkïnlarïn täŋri ogulanlarïn alkamïš törütmiš ol, kim ol örginniŋ özin täg  
 ortosïn täg … bolup tururlar. 
‘He has created the divine maidens and divine youths, who have become as the hearth and center …  
 of that throne’.  
 (Erdal 2004: 255; BT V 175) 
(9.7) Šikāyeti nedür? Ničün gelübdür? 
‘What is his complaint? Why has he come?’  
 (Kerslake 1998: 193) 
Before -IyUr/-Iyor was established into the TAM system of Turkish, -Xr functioned as a general 
‘imperfective’ marker (i.e., covered all three of SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT and ATEMPORAL), either 
used on its own or in combination with the past copulars är-ti and är-miş (present day idi/-(y)DI 
and imiş/-(y)mIş). Erdal’s (2004) examples below illustrate the use of -Xr for expressing an ongoing 
event (SIMULTANEOUS) (9.8), a repeated occurrence (RECURRENT) (9.9) and a temporally unrestricted 
statement (ATEMPORAL) (9.10) in Old Turkic. Adamovič’s (1985) example in (9.11) illustrates -Xr in 
expressing SIMULTANEOUS in the 14th century Ottoman Turkish:121 
(9.8) Ymä bir kün bo tagda [öt]mäk aš ašayur ärdim…  
‘Well, one day I was eating bread and food on this mountain…’  
 (Erdal 2004: 264-265; DreiPrinz 42)  
(9.9) Atïg ïka bayur ärtïmïz. 
‘We used to tie the horses to trees.’  
 (Erdal 2004: 265; Tuñ) 
(9.10) Yerimin suvumun konar köčär bän. 
‘I alternately settle and nomadize on my land.’ 
 (Erdal 2004: 263; Runic inscriptions) 
                                                           
121 Johanson (1971: 132-133, 1998b: 116) identifies the old semantic range of -Xr as ‘intraterminality’ that 
covers both low and high degrees of ‘focality’ (see also Kerslake 1998: 193). In the present semantic 
framework, a high degree of focality basically corresponds to SIMULTANEOUS, a medium degree to RECURRENT, 
and a low degree to ATEMPORAL. 
Although the use of -Xr for high focality (SIMULTANEOUS) was largely replaced by -Iyor after the late 15th 
century, it survived in later Ottoman Turkish, as illustrated by Johanson’s (1971) 18th century example 
replicated in (i) below. It can still be found colloquially today, more often in some dialects than in others (ii): 
(i) Đštä gälür, baqïnïz. 
‘Look, there is he coming!’ 
 (Akyüz 1959/1988: 291, cited in Johanson 1971: 133) 
(ii) Ne  yap-ar-sın?  
what do-Xr-A2SG 
‘What are you doing?’ 
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(9.11) De rem t oγrusïn saŋa. 
‘Ich sage dir die Wahrheit.’ 
‘I’m telling you the truth.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Adamovič 1985: 49; FERHENG 226) 
Further evidence reveals that -Xr was actually more than a general imperfective marker before 
-Iyor came on the stage. It could convey a perfect of persisting situation (PERFECT/persisting/), as 
seen in Erdal’s (2004) Old Turkic example in (9.12) and Kerslake’s (1998) 14th century Ottoman 
Turkish example in (9.13). It was also used for predictive futures (POSTERIOR + PROBABLE), as 
illustrated by Erdal’s (2004: 264) Old Turkic example in (9.14) and Adamovič’s (1985) example from 
the late 14th century Ottoman Turkish (9.15).122 Adamovič’s (1985) example in (9.16) shows that -Xr 
was also used in explicit performatives (i.e., signaled IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION) in Old Anatolian 
Turkish:123 
(9.12) …ïnčïp amtïkatägi mäniŋ köŋülüm naŋ ornanmaz. 
‘…Till now, however, my hart has not been calming down.’ 
 (Erdal 2004: 263-264; TT II,1 40) 
(9.13) Nie gündür otlardum ot. 
‘For many days I had been eating grass’. 
 (Kerslake 1998: 193) 
(9.14) Ken kältäci burxanlar burxan kutïn kanta bulïrlar? 
‘Where will the future Buddhas attain Buddhadom?’ 
 (Erdal 2004: 264; Maitr)  
(9.15) Ol öldi ben daxï ölürem. 
‘Er ist gestorben, und ich werde auch sterben.’ 
‘He died, and I will die too.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Adamovič 1985: 50; AHMEDI 131) 
                                                           
122 Throughout the history of Turkish, ‘prospective’ and ‘unmodalized’ futures have been expressed by 
markers other than -Xr: -dAcI in Orkhon Turkic and -GAy in the rest of Old Turkic (Erdal 1998: 146, 2004: 242-
243, 263), -(y)IsAr and -(y)AsI (the former only until the 16th century) in Old Ottoman (Johanson 1998b: 116, 
Kerslake 1998: 193-194), and -(y)AcAG from the 14th century until the present day (Kerslake 1998: 194). This 
suggests that -Xr has always been restricted to ‘uncertain’ or ‘predictive’ futures (POSTERIOR + PROBABLE), as it 
still is in Modern Standard Turkish. 
123 Although explicit performatives are typically marked by -Iyor in Modern Standard Turkish (as shown 
in section 8.2.2.6), -Xr retained this use in the formal and official registers. Such expressions may have proven 
resistant to change because of their formulaic nature.  
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(9.16) And ičerem kim išböyle eyleyem. 
‘Ich schwöre,das ich so tun werde.’ 
‘I swear that I will do so.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Adamovič 1985: 49; XÏLAF 44r) 
9.3 Accounting for the semantic changes in the history of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø 
The diachronic data presented above suggest that the history of -Iyor and -DIr is characterized by 
semantic advancement (gradual acquisition of new uses) and that of -Xr by semantic recession 
(gradual loss of existing uses due to the advancement of the competing marker -Iyor). The 
following sections hypothesize successive phases of semantic change in the diachronic 
development of -Iyor, -DIr, -Xr and -Ø and propose possible motivations for each hypothesized 
phase. 
9.3.1 Hypothesized phases in the diachronic development of -Iyor 
In Phase I, the lexical verb yorı ‘walk’ came to be used as an auxiliary, in the form of -(y)X yor-Xr, to 
express the temporal type (Aktionsart category) ‘dynamic durativity’. One possible motivation for 
this change is a metaphorical mapping from the spatial domain to the temporal domain, i.e., the 
extrapolation of the progress in space to the progress in time. A second, complementary motivation 
can also be hypothesized: the verb yorı, as an inherently dynamic verb, already entailed ‘dynamic 
durativity’ in its lexical sense, and this temporal type was generalized in the use of the verb as an 
auxiliary. 
In Phase II, -(y)X yor-Xr (which appears as -(y)X yür-Xr in early Ottoman Turkish) evolved 
into the bound form -Iyor through the intermediate stages -(y)X-yUrUr and -IyUr. This formal 
reduction was accompanied by a semantic shift from the temporal type ‘dynamic duration’ to 
‘continuous aspect’ (subsumed here under the anchoring category SIMULTANEOUS). Since yüri 
‘walk’ was a dynamic verb, one can conjecture that -(y)X yür-Xr first expressed SIMULTANEOUS with 
dynamic SoAs (e.g., expressed the ‘progressive aspect’) and later extended to states. The semantic 
change from ‘dynamic durativity’ to the progressive aspect presumably represents the 
conventionalization of a frequently occurring pragmatic contiguity: A ‘progress’ is at stake only for 
dynamic durative SoAs and not with punctual nor stative ones. The subsequent semantic 
generalization from progressive aspect (SIMULTANEOUS with dynamic SoAs) to continuous aspect 
(SIMULTANEOUS with stative SoAs) may have been motivated by what can be called ‘referential 
similarity’: Both of these uses express SoAs that obtain at the temporal center.  
A parallel development can be hypothesized for this phase: -(y)X-yUrUr/-IyUr/-Iyor must 
have been associated with epistemic and volitional immediacy (NEW INFORMATION and IMMEDIATE 
CONTRIBUTION) as soon as they came to convey SIMULTANEOUS. This is because these three 
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categories of immediacy typically go hand in hand in actual communication: Information about a 
SoA which happens at the time of utterance is often not well-assimilated to the speaker’s current 
knowledge state (see, e.g., Nichols’ (1986: 254-256) generalization as to covariance between 
‘imperfectivity’ and ‘immediate’ meaning). Similarly, an utterance which directly signals the 
speaker’s immediate intention (e.g., a declaratory utterance) always creates a de-facto situation 
which is both temporally immediate and epistemically new. 
In Phase III, -Iyor was further extended to the expression of contingently repeated SoAs 
(RECURRENT) in addition to SIMULTANEOUS. This development, which allowed -Iyor to be used with 
punctual SoAs in addition to durative ones, must have been motivated by referential similarity, 
since both of these anchoring categories include the temporal center in the temporal range they 
refer to.124 This extension may have been facilitated by the fact that -Iyor could already convey 
SIMULTANEOUS with states. This combination often implies an extension in time (see section 5.1.1), 
which is also involved in the expression of RECURRENT. 
In Phase V, as the association of -Iyor with epistemic contingency (CERTAIN and NEW 
INFORMATION) became stronger, it came to be used for PERFECT/persisting/ and ATEMPORAL when 
these epistemic categories were at stake. The association of -Iyor with NEW INFORMATION enabled it 
to be used for scheduled futures too. This process can be seen as a semantic generalization 
accompanied by partial bleaching: The loosening of the temporal and the reinforcement of the 
epistemic associations of -Iyor granted the marker a wider semantic applicability. One can also 
assume that referential similarity was a facilitating factor in the extension of -Iyor to 
PERFECT/persisting/and ATEMPORAL from RECURRENT, since all of these three categories include the 
temporal center in the temporal period they allude to. 
The temporal territory of -Iyor has recently been threatened by -mAktA. As shown in sections 
8.1.4, 8.2.4.1, 8.2.4.2 and 8.4.9, -mAktA competes with -Iyor in the expression of the temporal 
categories SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT and PERFECT/persisting/, and primarily differs from -Iyor in 
its epistemic associations.  
9.3.2 The gradual reduction of the semantic range of -Xr 
As mentioned above, -Xr expressed the full spectrum of imperfectivity until the 14th century: It 
could be used for SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT, as well as ATEMPORAL. It also expressed 
PERFECT/persisting/, predictive future (POSTERIOR + PROBABLE), and explicit performatives 
(IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION). Since every utterance signals one anchoring category from each of the 
                                                           
124 Cross-linguistically, markers of ‘continuous aspect’ seem to have a tendency to extend to ‘habitual 
aspect’. Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 127) report that “[…] historical and comparative evidence exists in 
Turkic, Dravidian, and Celtic languages, as well as in dialects of Yoruba, which shows constructions with 
progressive meaning developing into presents or imperfectives”. 
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three domains of anchoring, we can assume that before -Iyor came into stage, -Xr (when used as the 
only TAM marker) also expressed the epistemic and volitional categories strongly associated with 
the above listed temporal categories (i.e., not only with GENERAL FACT, PROBABLE and GENERAL 
STATEMENT as it is the case in Modern Standard Turkish, but also with CERTAIN, NEW INFORMATION, 
ASSERTION and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION, which are all covered today by -Iyor rather than -Xr). 
As -(y)X-yUrUr/-IyUr/-Iyor was established as a full-fledged TAM marker, it took over 
SIMULTANEOUS (and later, RECURRENT) from -Xr, reducing the latter’s semantic range to ATEMPORAL 
in the spectrum of imperfectivity.125 -Xr retained its previous uses for prediction (POSTERIOR + 
PROBABLE) and for PERFECT/persisting/. This specialization in the temporal domain had 
consequences in the epistemic and volitional domains too: As -Iyor became more strongly 
associated with epistemic and volitional contingency (CERTAIN and NEW INFORMATION in the 
epistemic, ASSERTION and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION in the volitional domains), -Xr was restricted to 
GENERAL FACT and PROBABLE in the epistemic, and to GENERAL STATEMENT in the volitional 
domains. 
Although -Xr ended up with its current day semantic range through a process of semantic 
recession (specialization) rather than semantic advancement (extension), one can still identify 
factors which have played a role in the stabilization of its current semantic range. For instance, the 
stabilization of -Xr in expressing categories of generality may be partly due to the communicative 
consonance among these categories: Strong factuality (GENERAL FACT) typically accompanies 
temporal unrestrictedness (ATEMPORAL) (e.g., gnomic sentences). Similarly, statements issued by 
social, political or institutional authorities (GENERAL STATEMENT) generally sound like established 
truths (GENERAL FACT). The contextual correlates of gnomic or characterizing (ATEMPORAL) 
utterances are similar to those of predictions (POSTERIOR + PROBABLE), since a prediction is normally 
based on observations about temporally unrestricted, typical and characteristic behavior of people 
or things.126 The use of -Xr in offers, requests, and promises (WANTED) is apparently linked to its 
stative volitional uses (see section 8.2.5), since a speaker’s expression of willingness often implies a 
directive illocutionary force.127 
                                                           
125 Dahl (1985: 93) points to this process when he describes what has been happening in Turkish and 
Azerbaijani: “[w]hen PROG is opposed to a ‘Simple Present’ there is also the possibility of a shift to a situation 
where PROG takes on the role of an IPFV and the earlier ‘Simple Present’ develops into a category with 
primarily habitual use. This is apparently taking place in Turkish and Azerbaijani”.  
126 Cross-linguistically, markers of generic-habitual aspect are often attested to express ‘indefinite futures’ 
(e.g., Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 156-157, 275-278; Haspelmath 1998). 
127 It is possible that stative uses of -Xr precede all of its other uses. -Xr was reported to have been used as 
a participle since the Old Turkish period (Von Gabain 1941/1988: 80, Üstüner 2000: 160, Erdal 2004: 284-285).  
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9.3.3 Hypothesized phases in the diachronic development of -DIr 
In Phase I, the lexical verb tur ‘stand, stay’ evolved into the periphrastic form -(y)X tur-ur, which 
expressed the temporal type (Aktionsart category) ‘persistent durativity’. Like the rise of -(y)X 
yor-Xr out of yorı ‘walk’, this development seems to involve a metaphorical mapping from the 
spatial domain (duration in space) to the temporal domain (duration in time). But a 
complementary mechanism must have been at work here too: Just as ‘dynamic durativity’ was 
inherent in the conceptual structure of yorı as a lexical verb, ‘persistent durativity’ was inherent 
(conceptually entailed) in the lexical meaning of tur. In other words, tur as a verbal predicate had 
already been expressing durativity, and this was conventionalized in -(y)X tur-ur as a distinctive 
semantic category. At this stage, tur-ur was also used with -(y)Ip or -mIş to express a ‘state of 
result’, which can be explained by the fact that this semantic dimension entails a state which 
endures at the reference time. 
In Phase II, as -(y)X tur-ur evolved into -DUrUr and -DUr, it came to express the continuous 
aspect (SIMULTANEOUS). Here too, the motivation can be identified as contiguity in the semantic 
structure: durative SoAs often combine with the temporal category SIMULTANEOUS. In this phase, -
DUrUr and -DUr, when used with -(y)Ip and -mIş, contributed to the expression of PERFECT. This 
can be explained by the referential similarity between a ‘state of result’ (Phase I) and PERFECT, since 
both of them refer to the present results of a past event.  
In Phase III, -(y)XyUrUr/-IyUr replaced the uses of -DUr for continuous aspect 
(SIMULTANEOUS) (see Phase II in -Iyor).128 This gave rise to a reanalysis of -DUr as the counterpart of 
-Xr in non-verbal predication: -DUr came to express ATEMPORAL with nominal, adjectival, and 
locative predicates. Just like -Xr with verbal predicates, it was also associated with the epistemic 
and volitional categories of generality (GENERAL FACT or GENERAL STATEMENT). This reanalysis is 
presumably channeled by the general distinction between verbal and non-verbal predication in the 
Turkish TAM system and facilitated by the structural origin of -DUr (the auxiliary tur-ur, which 
includes -Xr in its finite inflection). In this phase, -DUr also ceased to attach to -(y)Ip (which 
gradually lost its converbial use in the finite inflectional paradigm of Turkish).129 
                                                           
128 Johanson (1998b: 114-115) reports that such ‘high focal intraterminal’ uses of turur (or its formally 
reduced successors) is found today in North West and South East Turkic as well as in Chuvash. 
129 -(y)IpDIr disappeared in Modern Standard Turkish, and -(y)Ip exists only as a conjunctive converb (i). 
-(y)Adur is still used to emphasize duration, as seen in Tosun’s (1988) example in (ii): 
(i) Yemeğ-i-ni   yi-yip  çık-tı. 
meal-POSS-ACC eat-(y)Ip leave-PAST 
‘He had his meal and left.’ 
(ii) Sen gid-edur. 
P2SG go-(y)Adur 
‘Get (2sg) going.’ (Translation mine) 
 (Tosun 1988: 507-508) 
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In Phase IV, as -DUr became -DIr (in conformity with vowel harmony). It extended its 
morphosyntactic territory by attaching not only to non-verbal predicates and to -mIş, but also to 
-(y)AcAG, -Iyor, and -mAktA, taking advantage of the ‘morphosyntactic nominalization’ 
accomplished by these bound markers (see section 7.2). By relegating temporal categories to the 
bound markers which precede it, it gained the ability to convey only epistemic or volitional 
categories (i.e., GENERAL FACT or GENERAL STATEMENT). -DIr must have become a judgmental 
marker (one which expresses PROBABLE) in a similar way, i.e., by copying the component of 
PROBABLE in the predictive use of -Xr. 
9.3.4 The rise of -Ø as a semantically distinctive option 
As soon as -DIr was reanalyzed as the non-verbal counterpart of -Xr, -Ø was assigned semantic 
content due to its paradigmatic contrast with -DIr. Then -DIr and -Ø in non-verbal predication 
displayed a semantic opposition which is parallel to that between -Xr and -Iyor in verbal 
predication. Just like -Iyor, -Ø came to be associated with SIMULTANEOUS, RECURRENT, 
PERFECT/persisting/, CERTAIN and NEW INFORMATION. This process illustrates the mechanism 
identified in Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 294-295) as ‘the development of zero grams’, 
whereby the absence of an overt marker is ascribed a certain meaning due its paradigmatic value.  
9.4 Relevance to previous literature on semantic change 
The lexical origins of -Iyor and -DIr (yürü ‘walk for -Iyor and dur ‘stay, stand’ for -DIr) show that 
these markers have undergone a process of grammaticalization.130 Grammaticalization has often 
been identified with ‘semantic generalization’, i.e., the widening of the semantic applicability of a 
marker. Semantic generalization, in turn, is generally coupled with ‘semantic bleaching’, i.e. the 
loss of certain components of meaning (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 291-292). Some phases of 
grammaticalization hypothesized above clearly involve semantic generalization due to bleaching. 
For instance, -DIr in Phase IV assumes a wider semantic applicability by releasing its temporal 
connotations to the bound markers which precede it. But in the generalization of -Iyor from 
progressive aspect (SIMULTANEOUS with dynamic SoAs) to continuous aspect (SIMULTANEOUS with 
stative SoAs) in Phase III, no semantic bleaching is involved. Similarly, -Iyor in Phase IV extends to 
RECURRENT without losing any semantic component. These observations support Fischer & 
Rosenbach’s (2000: 18) claim that semantic generalization should not be strictly coupled with 
semantic bleaching.  
The overall lines of development of -Iyor and -DIr can be seen to be directed towards 
increasingly subjective categories: They start as lexical items which express non-relative temporal 
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types (Aktionsart dimensions), then assume relative temporal categories, and finally extend into 
epistemic and volitional domains. Their semantic evolution hence confirms the hypothesis of 
‘subjectivitization’ in grammaticalization, of which different versions are proposed by Traugott 
(1989, 1995, 2003) and by Langacker (1990, 1998, 2003).131 Tabor & Traugott (1998) claim that 
unidirectionality in grammaticalization is best understood in terms of an increase in structural 
scope. The semantic evolutions of both -Iyor and -DIr land support to this hypothesis too, since 
newly acquired semantic components have always been hierarchically higher than (or at the same 
level with) the old ones.132  
Most of the processes proposed above in the grammaticalization of -Iyor and -DIr involve uses 
in which both the old and the new semantic components coexist within the same semantic value. 
These processes can hence be understood in terms of metonymy, which refers to the naming of one 
entity or relation in terms of another one which is contiguous to it in the same semantic or 
pragmatic context. For instance, in the Phase I of both -Iyor and -DIr, the temporal type ‘durativity’ 
was maintained to have been conceptually contiguous to the lexical meanings of yorı ‘walk’ and tur 
‘stay. Similarly, in accounting for the Phase II of both markers, it was suggested that ‘durativity’ 
and ‘continuous aspect’ coexist in a single semantic value in most communicative contexts. The 
extension of -Iyor from SIMULTANEOUS to NEW INFORMATION and IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION was also 
accounted for in terms of semantic contiguity; these categories often come together in a single 
sentence due to their communicative consonance. Similar metonymic relations were proposed to 
have been at work in the stabilization of the current semantic range of -Xr. In addition to 
metonymic realtions, referential similarity was suggested to be effective in certain semantic changes, 
e.g., in those involved in the Phases II, III and IV of -Iyor. 
In each hypothesized semantic change in the stories of -Xr, -DIr -Iyor and -Ø, explanations 
were grounded at the level of communication (rather than being based on conceptual relatedness 
                                                                                                                                                                                
130 Grammaticalization (or, ‘grammaticization’) refers to the diachronic process whereby a marker 
gradually becomes more general and abstract in meaning, while its form undergoes phonetic erosion and 
becomes more dependent on its morphosyntactic and phonological environment. 
131 Traugott (1995: 31) describes ‘subjectification’ as “a pragmatic-semantic process whereby meanings 
become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition”. Langacker 
(1990: 17, 1998: 73) conceives subjectification as a certain kind of semantic change which involves “the 
realignment of some relationship from the objective axis to the subjective axis”. Langacker’s account of 
subjectivization, which involves the reinforcement of subjective (offstage) meanings and the erosion of less 
subjective (onstage) meanings, is particularly similar to Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca’s (1994: 289-293) account of 
semantic generalization due to bleaching. For instance, for the development of the prospective meaning of is 
going to, both Langacker (1998: 78-82) and Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994: 292) maintain that the temporal 
meaning (futurity) had been there from the beginning, i.e., constantly entailed in the original spatial use of the 
construction. 
132 One reservation is that ‘scope’ is conceived here in the semantic structure, while Tabor & Traugott 
(1998) associate it with the formal-syntactic structure. 
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alone).133 Even when a metaphorical mapping or a uniform conceptual structuring across domains 
(e.g., the extrapolation from space to time in the Phases I of both -Iyor and -DIr, the extension of 
-Iyor in Phase II to epistemic and volitional immediacy, the stabilization of -Xr in expressing 
categories of generality) was acknowledged, a complementary, usage-based motivation was also 
proposed.134 
The diachronic treatment presented above shows how language-internal structural factors can 
be effective in semantic change. For instance, the reanalysis of -DIr as the counterpart of -Xr (Phase 
IV) was shown to be guided by the formal distinction between verbal and non-verbal predication 
in the general TAM system. Similarly, the assignment of a semantic value to -Ø was suggested to 
be due to its formal-paradigmatic contrast with -DIr.  
Lastly, the account of -Xr also showed that semantic recession, which is underestimated in the 
literature, can be as important as semantic advancement in the evolution of a TAM marker. 
9.5 Summary 
This chapter outlined the historical developments of -Xr, -DIr -Iyor and -Ø, illustrated their 
semantic ranges at different stages in their histories and singled out certain phases of semantic 
change. It proposed hypotheses regarding motivatations for each semantic change and identified 
‘metonymic relations’ and ‘referential similarity’ as two main motivations. On the whole, this 
chapter showed that the semantic framework of anchoring developed in Part II, which is primarily 
designed for dealing with synchronic phenomena in the semantics of TAM, can be effectively used 
in diachronic analyses too. 
                                                           
133 The necessity of identifying a connection in actual use in semantic change is pointed to in Givón (1995) 
and in Dahl (1997), in their arguments against the ‘distance metaphor’ as a motivation in the development of 
irrealis uses of past. Givón (1995: 163) describes this connection as a ‘diachronic beach-head’ in the actual 
communicative context. 
134 Metaphorical transfer, which involves the mapping of an entity or relation from a (source) semantic 
domain to a similarly structured (target) one (e.g., Lakoff & Johanson 1980, Lakoff 1987), has been taken by 
some scholars as a chief driving force in grammaticalization (e.g., Sweetser 1988, 1990, Lichtenberk 1991). 
According to a more widely adopted view, metaphor cannot be the only relevant factor in grammaticalization, 
because it represents an abrupt leap across semantic domains, while diachronic evidence points to mid-stages 
in the process of conventionalization of new uses (e.g., Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991: 151-152, Bybee, 




This dissertation undertook two complementary tasks: The theoretical task of developing a purely 
semantic framework of TAM, and the empirical task of analyzing the ranges of polysemy of the 
Turkish TAM markers -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø. 
The semantic framework of anchoring developed in Part I presented a comprehensive yet neat 
account of how the semantic building blocks of TAM reference can be identified in terms of a 
perspective-based delimitation of the domains of time, knowledge and volition. It brought together 
ideas from the account of grounding in Cognitive Grammar, Sweetser’s three conceptual domains, 
the layered structures of the Functional Grammar and the mechanism of space building in the 
Mental Space theory.  It blended them into a single, coherent semantic-pragmatic account of TAM 
reference by incorporating insights from linguistic typology, speech act theory, intensional 
semantics and inferential theories of meaning. It formulated a language-independent semantic 
metalanguage which is capable of expressing the TAM-related part of the overall conventional 
meaning (semantic value) of any natural language utterance.  
The semantic framework developed here is expected to enhance our understanding of the 
cognitive and communicative underpinnings of TAM reference. It is also expected to contribute to 
our knowledge on various pragmatic phenomena, including deixis, indexation, anaphoric 
reference, conventional implicatures (explicatures), discourse organization and the communication 
of illocutionary intentions. Some merits of the semantic framework of anchoring categories 
proposed here can be summarized as follows: 
• It is cross-linguistically applicable, because it is based on universally significant cognitive 
and communicative factors. Since it uses purely semantic categories, it can handle any type 
of formal strategy in any language, which may include grammatical elements, lexical 
items, distinctive sentence types, intonational contours, or a combination of these.  
• It is flexible, because it incorporates a semantic space that consists of gradual semantic 
dimensions rather than a finite number of semantic primes, parameters, or features. 
Semantic categories can be delimited on this semantic space at the desired level of 
specificity. 
• It covers both situated/intentional aspects of semantics (signaling of anchoring relations) 
and generalized/objective reference (designation of SoAs).  
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• It provides insights into the cognitive infrastructure of language by revealing how the 
human cognitive system generates uniform structuring across semantic domains. 
• Unlike some previous frameworks which merely posit hierarchical structures for sentence 
organization, it motivates the scope relations between different layers of sentence meaning 
with reference to the containment properties of higher-order entities. 
• It yields holistic analyses. It investigates the meaning of a TAM marker in the context of 
the ecology of the sentence meaning as a whole. It also shows that sentence meaning is 
closely knit to higher levels of meaning organization, which includes mental space 
building and manipulation, discourse modes and speech acts. 
• It firmly integrates semantics and pragmatics. It takes TAM reference as context-sensitive 
by its very nature, serving to ‘anchor’ an abstract predicational content into the current 
discourse and eventually in the immediate communicative context. It gives a principled 
account of how sentence meaning relates to the illocutionary act performed by the speaker 
and of how the speaker’s intentions fit into the picture. It incorporates contextual 
phenomena which have traditionally been relegated to pragmatics, such as relativity, 
deixis, indexation, conventional implication and anaphoric reference, into the definitions of 
anchoring categories. 
The semantic analysis of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø in Part II demonstrates how the proposed 
framework can be effectively used in analyzing the ranges of polysemy of TAM markers. The 
analysis shows that the traditional grammatical categories of ‘tense’, ‘aspect’, ‘mood’ and 
‘modality’ are not indispensable, without denying their usefulness in either language-specific 
descriptions or cross-linguistic generalizations.  
Although the polysemies of Turkish TAM markers have been addressed before in a number of 
studies, the analysis presented here is unprecedented in the level of detail and in the degree of 
explicitness. The analysis of -Xr, -DIr, -Iyor and -Ø presented here also differs from previous 
treatments in the following ways: 
• Its results are cross-linguistically comparable, because it employs purely semantic 
categories defined using universally-applicable cognitive and communicative factors. 
• It makes the semantic-structural relatedness between different uses of each TAM marker 
maximally explicit by decomposing each use into its semantic components (anchoring 
categories).  
• It shows that none of these TAM markers can be exhaustively characterized as an ‘aspect’, 
‘tense’ or ‘mood’ marker, since each of them is characteristically associated with semantic 
categories from all three of the temporal, epistemic and volitional domains.  
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• It identifies the main conventional uses of these TAM markers without any prejudgment as 
to whether they represent ‘primary/core’ or ‘secondary/extended’ meanings. It seeks the 
motivations for their current ranges of polysemy in the semantic changes which took place 
in their histories. 
10.1 Avenues for further research 
The semantic framework of anchoring categories can be further developed by: 
• incorporating linguistic phenomena not addressed here, such as information-structural 
distinctions and semantic specifications in nominal reference (anchoring of entities).  
• developing the proposed metalanguage of anchoring categories into a sound formal 
language.  
The functionality of the proposed framework and the results of the semantic analysis of -Xr, 
-DIr, -Iyor and -Ø can be tested by further empirical studies, which may include: 
• the extension of the analysis to corpus data. 
• detailed semantic analyses of other TAM markers in Turkish (-DI/-(y)DI, -mIş/-(y)mIş, 
-mAktA, -(y)AcAG and various inflections of the auxiliary verb ol) in order to yield a more 
complete picture of the partitioning of the semantic space of TAM in Turkish. 
• research with a more extensive set of diachronic data for testing the diachronic hypotheses 
voiced here. 
• comparative and typological investigations on specific semantic fields (e.g., aspecto-
temporality, evidentiality, various subfields of modality, volitional moods, etc.). 
The work accomplished raises a number of interesting research topics, which include: 
• the investigation of the cross-linguistic tendencies concerning the mapping of the 
anchoring categories onto formal categories (e.g., the extent to which the scope relations 
between anchoring relations determine the linearization of TAM morphemes or their 
modes of combination).  
• the investigation of the cognitive and social factors which impose universal constraints on 
the structuring of the semantic space of anchoring (e.g., the role of perspectivity in 
constructing the social reality, restrictions of the human cognitive cognitive system, etc.). 
• the study of possible psycholinguistic effects of different partitionings of the semantic 
space of anchoring in different grammatical systems (e.g., whether or not the grammatical 
distinctions in a language affect the psychological processes involved in language 
acquision, production or comprehension). 
 212
• the exploration of the possible uses of the metalanguage of anchoring categories in the 
fields of knowledge representation, automatic translation and second language learning.  
• the elaboration of the implications of the proposed semantic framework for systems of 
logic (particularly, modal logic), epistemology and the philosophy of mind. 
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